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Foreword

i

he International Studies "Blue Book"

War College in

series

1901 to publish essays,

was

initiated

treatises,

and

by the Naval

articles that

con-

tribute to the broader understanding of international law. This, the sev-

enty-eighth volume of the historic

series,

contains the proceedings from a

scholarly colloquium entitled Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO's Kosovo

Cam-

Naval War College on 8-10 August 2001.
The colloquium's mission was to examine the international legal and ethical lessons to be learned from NATO's Kosovo conflict from the standpoint of
the jus in bello, that is, issues relating to the conduct of hostilities, rather than

paign,

which was hosted here

at the

the jus ad bellum questions regarding the legal justification for
tion of the air operation in Kosovo.

Renowned

NATO's initia-

international scholars and

government and academic institutions, participated. The colloquium and this Blue Book were
co-sponsored by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs; the
Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, Duke University School of Law;
the Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia School of Law;
and the International Law Department (then the Oceans Law and Policy
Department) of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, United States Naval
practitioners,

War

both military and

civilian, representing

College.

On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and
the

Commandant

of the Marine Corps,

I

thank the co-sponsors and

partici-

pants for their invaluable contributions to this project and to the future un-

derstanding of the laws of war.

RODNEY P. REMPT
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President,

Naval

War College

Introduction

A

fter

every clash of arms,

it is

important to review the actual application

of the laws of armed conflict, especially the jus in

campaign in Kosovo

is

no exception and,

as allied forces

hello.

The

NATO

were accused of hav-

ing committed various violations of the law of armed conflict, examining what

happened

in

Kosovo

is

particularly valuable.

While the Prosecutor

for the

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia conducted a preliminary inquiry into

NATO's

actions and concluded that there was insufficient

evidence to conduct a formal investigation, there remained significant con-

community over the lawfulness of NATO's actions.
Moreover, even if NATO did comply with the laws of armed conflict, are
those laws properly suited for today's high-technology battlefield and do they
encourage the maintenance of international peace and security? These issues
warranted examination by scholars in the fields of both ethics and internacerns in the international

tional law.

For over one hundred years, the United States Naval

War College has com-

combining a scholarly understanding of the laws of war with an
appreciation for and insight into the perspective of the warfighter
the one

mitted

itself to

—

who must

apply those laws to the battlefield.

As

such, the Naval

War College

was uniquely suited to convene an array of scholars and practitioners to examine the legal and ethical lessons of NATO's Kosovo campaign. We are indebted to Lieutenant Andru Wall of the International

Law Department

and enthusiasm he displayed in organizing our conferediting this volume of the International Law Studies (Blue Book)

faculty for the energy

ence and in
series.

Well done!

Special thanks also are due to

Yoram Dinstein and

the Israel Yearbook

on

Human Rights, Joel Rosenthal and the Carnegie Council on Ethics & InternaJohn Norton Moore and Bob Turner and the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia, and Scott Silliman and the
Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security at the Duke University School
tional Affairs,

Introduction

of Law. Without their co-sponsorship and invaluable assistance the collo-

quium and

this

Blue Book would not have been possible.

book and the colloquium was also provided by Dean
Alberto R. Coll, Center for Naval Warfare Studies of the Naval War College.
His leadership and support are key to the Blue Book series. Invaluable contributions were also made by Captain Ralph Thomas, JAGC, USN (Ret.), who
volunteered many hours of his personal time in reviewing manuscripts and offering advice. Further assistance was provided by the rest of the faculty and
staff of the International Law Department and our associated reserve unit.
Volume 78 will serve as a standard reference work of case studies in this
Funding

for this

area, continuing the solid, scholarly tradition of the "Blue Books."
is

to

published by the Naval

academic

War

institutions,

The

series

College and distributed throughout the world

libraries,

and both U.S. and foreign military

commands.

DENNIS MANDSAGER
Law & Chairman
International Law Department
Professor of

xn

Preface

Andru

E.

Wall

W:

hen an international group of military officers, judges, political scientists, philosophers, historians and lawyers gathered at the United
States Naval War College in early August 2001 to discuss the legal and ethical
lessons to be learned from NATO's Kosovo campaign, no one could have
imagined the horrific attacks that would take place in the United States just
one month later. Much of the discussion centered on whether Operation
what many term humanitarian
Allied Force represented a new kind of war
intervention
or simply an aberration with limited lessons for the future. Some
suggested that Kosovo was nothing like the battlefields of the future would be,
and so the lessons to be gleaned would be of limited use.

—

—

There is no question that the global war on terrorism that the United States
and its allies throughout the world are actively engaged in at the time of this
writing is dramatically different from Operation Allied Force. Most significantly, the war on terrorism is a conflict fought primarily against non-State
actors and the States that aid, harbor, or support them, while the war over
Kosovo was more traditionally fought against a sovereign State. Some scholars
mused over whether humanitarian intervention wasn't really war at all, yet it
was, classically stated, a matter of politics by another means.

eign States

(NATO)

A group of sover-

used military force in order to impose their political

(the cessation of the oppression of

will

Kosovar Albanians) on another sovereign

State (Serbia).

The

goal of the colloquium was to examine

should be applied in modern warfare

how

the law of

—focusing not

the crucial operational perspective of the warfighter.

just

armed

on the

conflict

law, but also

As Judge James

E.

Baker

pointed out during his keynote luncheon address, the law of armed conflict

is

Preface

not for the

specialist,

it is

not for the lawyer;

it

must be capable of application

at the tactical level by the most junior of military personnel.

Dolzer's wisely cautions:

"We

changes in the laws of armed

1

As

Professor

are living through a period of fundamental

and it is important that the implication
of all these changes are thought through in a broad debate where the requirements of criminal law are discussed, where the realities of military conduct are
taken into account and where not only the noble humanitarian aspirations in
conflict,

an isolated sense are highlighted." 2
The theme of the colloquium and, thus, this volume, is simply that while
the politics and the modalities of force employed in Kosovo may have been
unique, the legal and ethical lessons to be learned are applicable to any international armed conflict. So what are the jus in hello lessons to be learned from
Operation Allied Force? First, the law of armed conflict applies to any clash of
arms between two or more States. Secondly, only military objectives may be
lawfully targeted and they are defined within the temporal context of the
given conflict. Thirdly, the principle of proportionality prohibits excessive collateral

damage, yet the law does not impose absolute rules regarding imple-

mentation of weapons and
treaties

on the law of armed

Fourthly, despite the proliferation of

tactics.

customary international law

conflict,

tinue to define major elements and interpretations of the law of
flict.

Thus,

it

is

essential

that

will

armed con-

the development and determination of

customary international law be properly understood and the continuing

vance of state practice be

The
1.

The

con-

rele-

fully appreciated.

Applicability of the

existence of an international

Law

of

armed

Armed

Conflict

conflict

While there was some debate contemporaneous with the Kosovo campaign
over whether "humanitarian intervention" triggered the applicability of the
law of armed conflict, Professor Christopher Greenwood abruptly answers the
question without qualification: while there is no definition of international
armed conflict in any law of armed conflict treaty, it is agreed to be a factual
determination based on the existence of actual hostilities between two or
more States. 3 This is irrespective of a declaration of war and of the justification for the hostilities. An international armed conflict "exists from the first

1.

Baker,

2.

Dolzer, infra, at 358.

3.

Greenwood,

infra, at 9.

infra, at 39.

xiv

Andru

moment
this, as

after

an exchange of fire" between two

States. 4 Opinio juris supports

NATO certainly believed the law of armed conflict was fully applica-

ble

and defined and incorporated the

the

NATO rules of engagement.

2.

E. Wall

legal limits

on the use of

force within

5

The internationalization of an internal armed conflict
The more challenging question is whether intervention

by outside States

NATO)

on behalf of an organized armed group within a State (e.g., the
Kosovo Liberation Army) "internationalizes" the conflict between that group
and the State it is in conflict with (e.g., Serbia). Professor Greenwood argues
that it does "only if there is a clear relationship between the non-governmental
party to the conflict and one of the States party to the international conflict." 6
In the present case, there was not a sufficient link between the KLA and
NATO to internationalize the conflict between the KLA and Serbia. 7 As
such, the members of the KLA were not entitled to combatant immunity nor
were they entitled to prisoner of war status if captured.
(e.g.,

3.

The
The

interdiction of maritime shipping
issue of

whether

vessels carrying strategic
gal one.

NATO

could lawfully intercept and divert neutral

commodities was a

The "customary law

political question

of armed conflict

still

more than

a le-

permits a State engaged in

an international armed conflict to prevent strategic commodities such as oil
from reaching its opponent by sea, even if carried by neutral flagged vessels." 8

The law
rights

UN

Charter, but belligerent

permit warring States to interdict shipping

that from neutral

of neutrality was not abolished by the

still

—even

9

While not disputing the continuing viability of customary belligerent
rights, Professors Greenwood and Bring urge caution in applying them in the
post-UN Charter era. 10 NATO chose not to interdict shipping bound for Serbia, not because doing so would have been illegal, but because certain political
States.

4.

Shearer,

5.

Miller, infra, at 109.

infra, at 76.

Greenwood, infra, at 45.
7. Greenwood, infra, at 44-6; Ronzitti, infra, at 1 14.
8. Greenwood, infra, at 56. See also Walker, infra, at 92 and discussion comments by Professor
Wolff H. Von Heinegg at 127-8.
6.

9.

10.

Ronzitti, infra, at 117-8.

See Discussion, infra, at 127-30.

XV

Preface

leaders within the alliance were "trying to
level of violence" that

4. Is

it

would be

applied.

damp down

expectations of the

11

the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law?

Professor Stein acknowledges the confusion created by "re-naming the
'laws of war' or 'law of armed conflict' as 'international

humanitarian law' thus

between 'humanitarian' and 'human rights' law." 12 For
Colonel Graham this "renaming" indicates that some people think that elements of human rights law are included in the law of armed conflict a troubling proposition for those who have to advise military commanders on their
blurring the distinction

—

legal obligations

given that

the law of armed conflict.
conflict" as
policy, the

its

US

13

human rights law is much less well-defined than
The US military prefers the term "law of armed

obligations are better understood
military applies the law of

armed

and because,

conflict to

all

as a

matter of

military opera-

tions regardless of their characterization.

Bothe and Green, among others, engaged in
whether humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict, is
Professors

human rights

law.

14

a lively debate over
lex specialis vis-a-vis

A lex specialis implies the existence of a lex generalis. How-

many human rights treaties do not apply during armed conflicts,
it is incorrect to label human rights law a lex generalis and the law of armed
conflict a lex specialis. They are two separate bodies of international law with,
ever, because

at times

and depending on the

treaties a State

is

party

to,

overlapping

jurisdiction.

The drafters of Protocol I and other more

recent law of armed conflict treaties

did draw from the realm of human rights law and incorporated certain
rights

concepts into the law of armed conflict.

human

What must remain clear is

that

these concepts are then implemented from the standpoint of the law of armed

Where there is overlapping jurisdiction and the actions of a military
commander are subject to review under both human rights law and the law of
conflict.

armed conflict, then the greater specificity of the
5. Is there
It is

to

a link between the

a well-established

both sides of a

tionship

conflict,

jits

maxim

latter

ad bellum and the

that the law of

must be determinative.
jits

armed

in bellol

conflict applies equally

although some have argued that there

may be

a rela-

between the degree of force that may be used and the "purpose

1 1.

See the comments by Professor Greenwood,

12.

Stein, infra, at 319.

13.

Graham,

14.

See Discussion, infra, at 392-6.

infra, at

infra, at 127.

381.

xvi

for

Andru
which force

is

E. Wall

permitted under the jus ad bellum." 15 Professor Bothe agrees that

the "jus ad bellum and jus in hello have to be kept separate" because the equality

an essential precondition to the objective application of the law
of armed conflict, however, he proffers the caveat that "[m]ilitary advantage ... is a contextual notion." 16 This, to Professor Von Heinegg, amounts to
of the parties

is

simply paying "lip service" to the principle that the two bodies of law are separate. 17

He counters that "the overall aim that led one of the parties to an armed

conflict to resort to the use of

armed

force

is

irrelevant

when

it

comes

to the

question whether certain objects effectively contribute to military action of the
adversary or whether their neutralization offers a definite military advantage." 18
Professor

Greenwood emphatically

manitarian motives entitled
"rival heresy" that

it

rejects the "heresy" that

NATO's

hu-

and the
a humanitarian ob-

to greater latitude in choosing targets

"because the campaign was fought for

humanitarian law has to be interpreted as imposing

jective, international

upon NATO more extensive restrictions than would otherwise have been the
case." 19 Both these "heretical" views "involve an unjustified muddling of jus ad
bellum and jus in bello issues in a way which is contrary to principle and unsupported by authority." 20

"The law of armed

conflict does not ask for motives, political aims, or the

Von Heinegg states: "[i]t takes as a
to function properly." 21 Any time consid-

legality of the first use of force," Professor

fact that the jus

ad bellum has failed

eration of the jus ad bellum plays a role in the jus in

ened. 22 Even

bello,

the latter

is

weak-

violations of the jus in bello can justify intervention as

if

have argued, that remains a matter of the jus ad bellum and the jus
mains equally binding on both parties in any resulting hostilities. 23

some

in bello re-

Nevertheless, Professor Bothe identifies this as the "fundamental issue:

how

far

does the context of the military operation have an impact on the no-

tion of military advantage?" 24 In this regard, Professor Miillerson points out

15.

Greenwood,

16.

Bothe,

17.

Von

infra, at 52.

infra, at 186.

Heinegg,

infra, at

205.

18.

Id.

19.

20

Greenwood,
Greenwood,

21.

Von

22.

See comments by Professor

infra, at

48-9.

infra, at 53.

Heinegg,

infra, at

206.

Von

Heinegg,

infra, at

221.

23. See Robertson, infra, at 457; see also, Roberts, infra, at

"Quite simply, massive violations of jus
threats
24.

in bello

and uses of force by outside powers intervening

See Discussion,

infra, at

409-13. Professor Roberts

states:

by a belligerent can help to legitimize certain

216.

xvn

to stop the violations." Id. at 410.

Preface

that the International Court of Justice in

its

advisory opinion

on Nuclear

Weapons "created a novelty distinguishing between 'an extreme circumstance
of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake' and

other circumstances." 25 This implies that "a wrong done in light of jus ad

on the jus in bello" applicable in the resulting conflict, because an aggressor would not be entitled to argue that it was acting under such
bellum has an impact

"extreme circumstance of self-defense." 26

Notwithstanding the ICJ's advisory opinion,

remains certain that

"it

have to equally abide by the requirements of jus

ties

these branches of the law are separate."

branches of international law"

it "is

27

If

there

is

in bello"

political or

between the two

the requirement of adequacy" because "an

that necessity and kept clearly within

between

par-

and in "that sense

a "bridge

act justified by the necessity of humanitarian intervention

to distinguish

all

it."

28

must be limited by

In the final analysis,

moral reasons

it is

for applying a

important

"maximum

standard" of compliance with the law of armed conflict, and a legal obligation
to

do

so.

29

Targeting Military Objectives

1.

Defining military objectives
Perhaps the most fundamental principle of the law of armed conflict

is

that

of distinction. Professor Michael Bothe traces the development of the principle of distinction

war.

War

is

from Jean Jacques Rousseau's conception of the sovereign's

between States and

their rulers, not their peoples, thus conflict

should be limited to combatants and military objectives. 30 Article 52(2) of
Protocol

I

contains the "binding definition of military objective:" 31

In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects

which by
to

their nature, location, purpose or use

military

action

and whose

total

or

make an

partial

effective contribution

destruction,

capture

or

neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military

advantage.
25.

Miillerson, infra, at 443.

26.

Miillerson, infra, at 444.

27.

Miillerson, infra, at 445.

28.

Miillerson, infra, at 452-3.

29.

Stein, infra, at 326-7.

30. Bothe, infra, at 173-4.
31. Dinstein, infra, at 140.

xvin

Andru

E. Wall

While there should "be no doubt" that

this definition "corresponds to exist-

ing principles as reflected in customary law and simply clarifies them,"

some of

the clarifications could be "open to different interpretations of the scope of

the obligations imposed

on the attacker" and,

thus, "incompatible with a con-

sideration of the provision as fully reflecting customary international law." 32

Judge Pocar

offers as

examples of imprecise

fective contribution to military action"

and

clarifications the expressions "ef-

"definite military advantage." 33

"The difficulty of the Article 52(2) definition" of military objective, Professor Bothe writes, "is its general character" particularly with respect to
"dual-use objects." 34 Professor Dinstein is "not enamored" by the phrase "dual
use" and argues that legally the fact that an object may have both a military
use and a civilian use does "not alter its singular and unequivocal status as a
military objective." 35

Professor Bothe asks

how

"the general principle of distinction" can be ren-

dered "more concrete in order to have secure standards for targeting" and
then agrees that an
tion.

36

illustrative list

of military objectives could be a possible solu-

Professor Dinstein proffers that "only a composite definition

—combining
—can

an abstract statement with a non-exhaustive catalogue of illustrations
effectively avoid vagueness, on the one hand, and inability to anticipate future

on the other." 37 The likelihood of States ever reaching agreement
on such a list, however useful, is doubtful. Given what Professor Dinstein himself identifies as the "temporal framework" within which military objectives
are defined
what may be legitimately attacked at one time may not be at another time
a list could include objects which by their "nature" are military
objectives, but would not likely include the myriad of objects that become milscenarios,

—
—

itary objectives

2.

by their location, purpose or use. 38

Presuming civilian purpose
While the general definition of

52(2) of Protocol
ful that

32.

I

military objective contained in Article

can be considered customary international law,

it is

doubt-

the same can be said about the requirement to assume civilian purpose

Pocar, infra, at 348.

33. Id.
34.

Bothe,

35.

See comments by Professor Dinstein in the Discussion,

36.

Bothe,

37.

Dinstein, infra, at 142 (footnote omitted).

38.

Dinstein, infra, at 144; see also

infra, at 177.

infra, at

infra, at 177.

Von

Heinegg,

XIX

infra, at

204.

218-9.
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contained in Article 52 (3). 39 This was an issue that was

much debated

during

some argue that it "may reflect a '[r]efusal to recogof combat' in some situations." 40 Professor Dinstein points

the drafting process and
nize the realities

out, however, that the

presumption only

arises in cases of doubt regarding the

"The degree of doubt that has to exist prior to the emergence
of the (rebuttable) presumption is by no means clear. But surely that doubt
has to exist in the mind of the attacker, based upon 'the circumstances ruling
civilian purpose.

at the time."' 41

3. Effects-based targeting

The

and review process in Operational Allied Force was
based targeting," which articulates a desired objective,

target selection

premised on "effects

then seeks to identify "specific
achieve the objective.

among

42

nodes, or objects" that,

links,

if

attacked, will

Judge Baker warned of "the impending collision

the law of armed conflict, the doctrine of effects-based targeting, and a

shared desire to limit collateral casualties and consequences to the
extent possible."

43

The

focus of the collaborative targeting sessions seems to

validate Judge Bakers fears, as they "revolved

age to military effects

damage

estimate,

fullest

—

around three

issues: 1) the link-

the key to obtaining legal approval, 2) the collateral

and

3)

"[E]ffects-based targeting

the

unintended civilian casualty estimate." 44

and the law of armed

conflict

may be on

a collision

course" with respect to critical infrastructure, particularly factories

owned

by supporters of regimes that could be quickly converted to military use. 45

A focus on desired effects could lead

military

commanders

to target certain

objects for effect, rather than because of their "effective contribution to military action."

4. Presidential

review of targets
belief,

the president of the United States did not re-

all targets,

but rather a "smaller subset" of the 200-300

Contrary to popular
view and approve

39. Bring, infra, at 261; Pocar, infra, at 348.

40. Dinsetin, infra, at 149 quoting

LAW REVIEW

1,

W. Hays

Parks, Air

137 (1990).

41. Dinsetin, infra, at 150.
42.

Montgomery,

infra, at 190.

43. Baker, infra, at 8.
44.

Montgomery,

infra, at 193.

45. Baker, infra, at 16.
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were reviewed by the National Security Council. 46 Traditional

military objectives

were approved in theater, while military

industrial, electric

power grid, critical infrastructure, and targets with a high likelihood of collateral damage were reviewed by the Pentagon. Of these, maybe ten targets were
submitted for presidential review every four to

five days. 47

Nevertheless, General Short believes there was too
civilians in the targeting process.

He

by civilians rather than by military

much involvement by

argues that because targets were chosen

officers,

NATO "bombed targets that were

frankly inappropriate for bringing Milosevic to the table." 48 General Short asks

"whose responsibility should targeting be?" Answering
asserts that the president

leave

it

should

restrict

own

question, he

himself to selecting target sets and

to "professional military officers" to select individual targets in accor-

dance with the strategic guidance and the law of armed
5.

his

conflict. 49

Targeting the will of the people

The morale

of the population and of the political decision-makers

contribution

to

'military

action.'

is

not a

Thus, the advantage of softening the

one and, thus, cannot be used as a
legitimation for any targeting decision. If it were otherwise, it would be too easy
to legitimize military action which uses bombing just as a psychological
weapon and there are other words for this. 50
adversary's will to resist

is

not a

'military'

—

NATO did not target the will of the civilian population, but neither was
so naive as to

fail

geted, a peripheral result of which will be to

happy with

it

to see that there are valid military objectives that can be tar-

make

the civilian population un-

their leadership for choosing a course of action that allowed this to

NATO did seek to impose "discomfort" on the civilian population,

happen. 51

but this was secondary to targeting lawful military objectives. 52

46. Baker, infra, at 13.

47. Dalton, infra, at 201.
48.

Short, infra, at 20.

more on

theory of civil-military relations" and the
between military leaders and political leaders during times of war, see ELIOT A.
Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (Free
49. Short, infra, at 20. For

this "'normal'

relationship

Press 2002).
50.

Bothe,

51.

See Short, infra, at 29-30.

52.

Miller, infra, at

infra, at 180.
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Damage and

Collateral

the Principle of Proportionality

The principle of proportionality
The principle of proportionality, while

1.

codified for the

first

time in Article

one of the core principles of the customary law of
armed conflict. While the Protocol I formulation of proportionality may have
included specifications that cannot be found in prior declarations of the principle, these "specifications are aimed at clarifying the scope
rather than at
adding new elements that would lead to the modification of their contents or
51(5) (b) of Protocol

I,

is

.

effects."

53

lation to the concrete

is

.

Simply put, the principle of proportionality prohibits attacks that

cause injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects "which

The

.

and

is

excessive in re-

direct military advantage anticipated." 54

on the presumption

principle of proportionality rests

that the attacker

complying with the principle of distinction, thus implicitly acknowledging

that

some

collateral

acknowledge

damage

is

unavoidable. 55 Yet

many

fail

to recognize or

Dinstein agues that they

this simple fact. Professor

make

the

mistake of confusing extensive with excessive: "injury/damage to noncomba-

can be exceedingly extensive without being excessive, simply because
the military advantage anticipated is of paramount important." 56
tants

"[S]ome have used Kosovo to advance a

legal

view that the law of armed

conflict virtually prohibits collateral casualties. This

aspiration, but not the law.

world

will

Nor should

operate with impunity."

57

human

be the law, or the tyrants of the

suffering."

58

is

war; not a chess game. There

Rather than focusing

tic goal of eliminating civilian casualties,

mitigation

— understanding

their inevitability

cidents and just sheer bad luck."

The

an honorable and worthy

Professor Dinstein reminds us that "[o]ne

has to constantly bear in mind that war

ways a price- tag in

it

is

on the

the goal should be

and the

is al-

unrealis-

on

their

reality of mistakes, "ac-

59

was "the guiding principle of paramount
importance" for US forces during Operation Allied Force. 60 "Concern for collateral damage drove us to an extraordinary degree," General Short states,
principle of proportionality

53. Pocar, infra, at 346.
54. Protocol

I,

Article 5 1 (5) (b).

55. Bring, infra, at 262-3.
56. See Discussion, infra, at 215.

57. Baker, infra, at 17.
58. See Discussion, infra, at 219.
59. Id.

60.

Miller, infra, at 308-9.
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next generation of warriors even more

because

so,

see this as an extraordinary failure, the leadership within the

senior administrations

would say

General Short emphasizes that

this

NATO

was indeed an extraordinary success." 61

NATO did

its

"very, very best to limit collat-

damage" but "[e]very time we failed in that effort, the reaction by political
leaders was hysterical." 62 The political leadership of NATO could not stand
collateral damage and "they did not understand war. They thought it was a
Did you ever see anyone die in the
video game, and that no one ever dies.
films from the Gulf War? I never did. I just saw crosshairs on a target in downtown Baghdad, and then it blew up." 63
eral

.

.

.

2. Responsibility for civilian casualties

There
ties. It is

a very real danger in misplacing responsibility for civilian casual-

is

wrong

to place "the entire responsibility for civilian casualties

party to the conflict that has the least control over them."

Mr

64

on the

As an example,

Parks argues that civilians "killed within an obvious military objective"

should not be counted as "collateral civilian casualties." 65

To count them

as

such "would only encourage increased civilian presence in a military objective

make

in order to
ties."

66

its

attack prohibitive in terms of collateral civilian casual-

In the same sense, placing too

human shields would
of human shields.

presence of
use

3.

The use

many

targets off-limits because of the

create the perverse effect of rewarding the

of precision^guided munitions

Contrary to the arguments made by some, there

is

no obligation,

in

custom-

ary international law or treaty law, to use precision-guided munitions in at-

on urban areas. 67 Such a rule would be "dysfunctional" and a far better
standard would be "to rely on the judgment of the commander." 68 Nowhere in
the law of armed conflict is there a requirement to use specific weapons, rather
tacks

there

is

a legal standard of reasonableness that remains constant.

A doctor in a

developing country has the same legal standard of care as a doctor in a

61. Short, infra, at 24.
62. Short, infra, at 23.
63. Id.
64.

Parks, infra, at 288.

65. Parks, infra, at 291.
66. Id.
67.
68.

Murphy,
Murphy,

infra,

231-43.

infra,

241.
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developed country, but the doctor in the developed country may be expected

expend more resources in order to properly treat his
patient. Mr Sandoz argues that this is an apt analogy to apply in analyzing the
reasonableness of a military commander's choice of weapons. 69 Yet one wonto perform

more

tests or

The doctor has no choice in whether to
treat his patient, yet the military commander always has a choice in whether
to target a particular military objective. If the commander does not have the

ders whether this isn't a false analogy.

technological capability to attack the target without causing disproportionate

damage, then the law of armed conflict prohibits him from attacking it. Thus
the law simultaneously protects civilians and provides an incentive for the acquisition of technology that increases the

above 15,000

4. Flying

Collateral

commanders freedom

feet

damage concerns must be balanced

to engage

bombing did not by

in high-altitude

Professor

the law of armed conflict." 71 Colonel Sorenson

and interviews, but the

against "the risk that you are

Murphy noted

asking your pilots to take."

70

pers, airtime

ing in basically carpet bombing."

that

NATO's

"decision

itself constitute a violation
is

more

blunt:

it

"sells

of

newspa-

facts just simply aren't there to suggest

that by keeping our pilots at 15,000 feet to protect

5.

of action.

them

that

we were engag-

72

The environment
For those States that are party to Protocol

I

35 and 56, causing damage to the environment

without reservation to Articles
is

a

war crime only

if it

reaches

"the triple cumulative threshold" of being "widespread, long-term and severe." 73 Professor

Bothe suggests that a lower threshold could be reached if the
"collateral environmental damage was excessive in relation to a military advantage anticipated." 74 However, Professor Von Heinegg counters that customary international law would still not consider wanton destruction of the
environment a prosecutable war crime. 75 Judge Pocar agrees noting that the
provisions have "no clear precedent in customary law." 76

69. Sandoz, infra, at 278.
70.

Short, infra, at 22.

71.

Murphy,

72.

See Discussion,

infra, at

73.

Bothe,

181-3.

74.

Id.

75.

Von

76.

Pocar,

infra, at

infra, at

Heinegg,
infra, at

249.

infra, at

310.

204-

348-9.
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Professor Bring asserts that

the lives of your
ians

E.

Wall

conflicts

NATO's

"no-body bags policy

own pilots are worth more than the

lives

.

.

of the innocent

on the ground." 77 Yet Professor Adam Roberts cautions that

protect one's

the speeches

implies that

.

own servicemen was "entirely understandable"
made by NATO leaders prior to the start of the

civil-

this desire to

and, looking at
air

campaign,

it

who argue that
military service mem-

was not presumed going in to be a "no body bags war." 78 Those

NATO should

have accepted an increase

bers lose sight of the goals of

democracy

risk to their

to stop

democide, genocide, and ag-

John Norton Moore points out, is that
we want to achieve those goals "as rapidly as we possibly can at the lowest cost
to all involved." 79 By arguing that democracies must be willing to accept
gressive war.

"The

reality," Professor

greater risks to their personnel, proponents of humanitarian goals

may

manner that would lead to increased suffering.
Murphy closes his paper on collateral damage with the

in fact

raise barriers in a

Professor

prescient

observation that future wars will increasingly see a "'happy congruence' be-

and the avoidance of unnecessary injury
to civilian persons or property"; however, "the protections the law of armed
conflict affords to civilian persons and property are likely to be less and less effective in practice. This is because the technologically weaker States, as well
as terrorists or other non-governmental actors, may increasingly conclude
that they must attack the civilian population of the enemy State to offset the
tween the needs of military

latter's great

efficiency

advantage in firepower." 80

Customary International
1

.

Law and

The Martens Clause
The Martens Clause, which was

the

Law of Armed

codified in the 1899

ventions as well as the 1977 Additional Protocol
of customary international law to the law of
Until a

armed

more complete code of the laws of war

parties think

it

I,

is

Conflict

and 1907 Hague con-

recognizes the importance
conflict. It reads:

issued, the high contracting

right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations

adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages

77.

Bring, infra, at 266.

78. Discussion, infra, at 304-5.
79.

Discussion, infra, at 303.

80.

Murphy,

infra, at

254-5.
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established

between

from the laws of humanity and the

civilized nations,

requirements of the public conscience.

81

"The Martens Clause," Professor Shearer writes, "is a powerful reminder
that in situations of armed conflict, of whatever kind, there is never a total gap
in the law, never a situation in which there cannot be an appeal to law in order
82
to mitigate the horror and the suffering." The powerful rhetoric invoking the
dictates of the public conscience should not be misunderstood as creating a

new

source of customary international law, but rather as a safeguard thereof.

Anytime one

discusses the application of the laws of armed conflict to new, or

perceived new, types of conflicts,

it

must never be forgotten that there

is

at the

very least customary law that regulates the application of military force.
Professor Dolzer notes that

much

of the "humanitarian law community"

emphasizes the "principles of humanity and

.

.

.

dictates of public conscience"

aspect of the Martens Clause, while the military tends to be primarily con-

cerned with the customary practice provision. 83 This

tomary practice tends to be more
importance

when

easily

potential criminal liability

is

understandable as cus-

defined,
is

which

at stake.

is

of primary

The two approaches

should converge, however, upon the realization that the Martens Clause
encourages the view that customary international law
tlefield practice,

but rather on opinio juris

a concurrent belief that

it is

lawful.

It is

—

is

based not just on bat'

battlefield practice

upon the

combined with

State's subjective belief in

the legality of its actions that "the principles of humanity and dictates of pub-

conscience" weigh most heavily. In any event, no tribunal has ever

lie

trumped customary law by resting an opinion on the "dictates of the public
conscience."

2.

The formulation

of customary international law

Following the North Sea Continental Shelf case and the Nicaragua case,
"there

is

no doubt that

for a rule to exist as a

norm

recognition as a legal obligation by States and the latter's conduct

law both

its

which

consistent with the rule are required." 84

laid

is

down in Article 38 of the

as applicable to the
81. Preamble,

of customary international

of principles

Statute of the International Court of Justice" are

law of armed conflict as they are to other areas of public

Convention

(II)

with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,

1899, U.S.T.S. 403, 32 Stat. 1803,

1

Bevans 247.

82. Shearer, infra, at 72.
83. Dolzer, infra, at 356.
84- Pocar, infra, at

The "cannon

340 (footnote omitted).
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international law. 85 Thus, "[widespread practice and corresponding opinio
juris will

be required for the formulation of customary law, with or without par-

allel treaty

law." 86

The importance

of State practice cannot be overstated as this

is

the

the three components of customary law listed in the Martens Clause.
ever, equally important

be noted that

many

is

the corresponding opinio juris.

87

first

of

How-

On this point it must

of the steps taken by the United States during Operation

damage were taken because they could be
taken, not because there was any sense of a legal obligation to do so. Thus,
these actions provide little in the way of clarifying customary international
law. 88 The "positivist approach" taken by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case, which argues that "restrictions on the practice

Allied Force to limit collateral

of States cannot be presumed,"

may be

"particularly well-suited to issues of the

law of armed conflict, which, by their very nature, implicate the
of States."

vital interests

89

and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have looked
beyond traditional sources for "evidence" of customary international law,
which the ICTY said could include "the number of ratifications to international treaties and the dictates of military manuals." 90 However, a "long list of
signatories" has very little to do with determining State practice in the area of
the law of armed conflict because the "vast majority of signatories of Protocol
I are at best interested observers
bystanders if you will when it comes to
the actual application of the law of armed conflict in combat situations." 91
Professor Stein observes that the International Court of Justice

—

—

On

the issue of the precedential value of international case law, Judge

Pocar writes:
[I]t

has to be stressed that previous decisions of international courts cannot be

relied

law.

on as having the authority of precedents

in order to establish a principle of

The current structure of the international community, which clearly lacks a

hierarchical judicial system, does not allow consideration of judicial precedent
as a distinct

source of law. Therefore, prior case law

evidence of a customary rule in that
85.

it

may

Dolzer, infra, at 353.

86. Dolzer, infra, at 354.
87.

Graham,

infra, at

384.

88. See Parks, infra, at 281-2.
89.

Murphy,

90.

Stein, infra, at 318-9.

91.

Graham,

infra, at

infra, at

235.

383.
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and international practice, but cannot be regarded per se

as

having precedential

92
authority in international criminal jurisdiction.

Finally, the traditional rules protecting the persistent objector

norm

State to protect itself from a developing

The customary nature

3.

it

still

finds objectionable.

of provisions of Protocol

allow a

93

I

I
and clarifies customary
94
part
develops
that
law.
"For
the first part [its] rules
and
in
international law
bind all States, for the second only the State parties to the Protocols are
bound." 95 The "fundamental principles" of "distinction between civilians and
combatants, the prohibition against directly attacking civilians, and the rule
of proportionality, are customary international law," Professor Stein writes,
but "it is very doubtful whether the same can be said about other provisions of
in particular those dealing with collateral damage." 96
Protocol I

It is

"undisputed" that Protocol

in part reaffirms

—

Three points are important to
vision in Protocol

I

(whether

it is

this debate: 1) the status of a particular pro-

new law or customary international law) may

change with time, 2) if the provision is customary international law, it is customary international law that is binding "not the treaty provision as such" and
3) the codification process necessarily involves new or more precise elements

which must themselves be distinguished from the customary principle. 97 In the
final analysis, "there is a trend in the increasing number of ratifications and
some case law in some international tribunals" towards recognition of Protocol

I

as

customary law; however, there

is

also significant State practice involv-

ing the "major actors" that prevents consideration of many provisions of

Protocol

I

as

customary international law. 98

Reasonableness and Implementation of the
It

Law

of Armed Conflict

has become a popular .mantra for commentators to decry the perceived

increasing influence of lawyers over the planning and execution of military operations. Yet, "[w]hether actors like

92.

Pocar,

infra, at

it

or not,

Kosovo may serve

342.

93. Dolzer, infra, at 354.
94.

Pocar,

infra, at

338-9.

95. Sandoz, infra, at 273.
96.

Stein, infra, at 321-2.

97.

Pocar, infra, at 338-9.

98.

See comments by Judge Pocar, Discussion,

infra, at

xxviii

389-90.
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military actions

—down

to the tactical

from non-governmental organizations, ad

will receive legal scrutiny,

and the International Criminal Court." 99 The concern, how-

tribunals,

ever,

which

in

E.

not so

much

that military operations are subject to legal review, but

what standard will be applied in evaluating the wartime actions of military
commanders? Is it that of the reasonable man or the reasonable military commander? As Professor Green wryly observes, a "reasonable man is the man on
a

downtown

bus; that

is

not the reasonable soldier." 100 Reasonableness during

times of armed conflict must be judged through the eyes of the

armed

in that

man

involved

conflict.

A particular challenge arises in the context of proportionality, the determination of which often gives

Value genres'."

tarian

military necessity

and

101

rise to a

Can

"clash

between the

and humani-

a "reasonable civilian" ever properly determine

proportionality? Professor

proper training, but Professor

military

Green

is

less

Bothe thinks they could with

confident that civilian judges could

ever appreciate "the circumstances that were prevailing at the time that led to
the soldier's actions." 102 This, of course, raises the issue of whether civilian

judges should try military cases. Professor Ronzitti offers a solution by distin-

guishing between wartime crimes that are battlefield crimes (war crimes) and
those that are not (crimes against humanity and genocide)

chambers be established

special

to hear the former.

.

He

suggests that

103

Conclusion
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PARTI
KEYNOTE ADDRESSES

Opening Remarks

Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski

he Naval

J-L

War

College

thrilled to

is

have such a distinguished and

verse group of participants in this colloquium.

You

di-

represent the pre-

eminent international law and ethics scholars and the top military lawyers and
warfighters from the United States and at least ten of our friends and allies—including Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany,
Italy,

Israel,

Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

This colloquium, Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO's Kosovo Campaign,
is

unique in that

it is

the

first

time that warfighters and international law

scholars alike have gathered to specifically address the jus in hello issues that
arose during Operation Allied Force.

The opportunity to study,

reflect, discuss

one that must be seized with zeal and
determination. The mission for this colloquium is simple: to examine the legal
and ethical lessons of NATO's Kosovo Campaign focusing exclusively on
the jus in hello aspect of the campaign. Notice that we have not said lessons
learned, for only the future will reveal if they have in fact been learned. Your
work will lay the foundation that is necessary for policy makers and
warfighters to comply with international law today, tomorrow and for years
and debate the

issues involved

is

a rare

—

into the future.

The Information Age and Modern Warfare

How
fare?
tles

does law and ethics impact where

We

or

here at the

US

Naval

and

its

are

headed with modern war-

War College, whether

modern technology, always ask the

for the military

we

looking at ancient bat-

question: what are the implications

activities in the future?

Opening Remarks

Admiral Jay Johnson, the former Chief of Naval Operations for the United
States Navy, has described the future as being shaped by three increasing and
irreversible trends: networking, greater globalization and economic interdependence, and technology assimilation. Each has enormous implications for
militaries

and

societies

throughout the world.

Obviously, these trends have enormous implications for the armed forces.

We

are

now

in the midst of a revolution in military affairs unlike any seen

since the Napoleonic Age. In that period, the practice of maintaining small

was replaced by the mobilization of citizen

professional armies to fight wars

mies composed of
as a

much

ar-

of a nation's adult population. Henceforth, societies

whole would, perhaps

tragically,

become

intricately vested in warfare.

The

character of armed conflict had changed fundamentally.

Today we

are witnessing an analogous change in the character of

—an information revolution

war and

what we call
platform-centric warfare to network-centric warfare. Understanding of these
new operations remains nascent. No great body of collated wisdom has
emerged to explain how this revolution will alter national and international
warfare

that enables a shift from

security dynamics.

Allow me to briefly explain what network-centric warfare is, then raise
some concerns with how it intersects with law and ethics. Perhaps most notably, network-centric warfare enables a shift from attrition-based warfare to a

much

one characterized not only by operating inside an opponent's decision loop by speed of command, but by an
ability to change the warfare context or ecosystem. At least in theory, the result

faster effects-based warfighting style,

may well be

decisional paralysis.

How might this be

achieved?

The approach

premised on achieving three

is

objectives:
•

First,

the force achieves information superiority, having a dramatically

better awareness or understanding of the battlespace.
•

Second, forces acting with speed, precision, and the

ability to

reach out

long distances with their weapons achieve the massing of effects versus
the massing of the forces themselves.
•

Finally, the results that follow are the rapid

reduction of the enemy's

options and the shock of rapid and closely coupled effects in his forces.

This disrupts the enemy's strategy and,

it is

hoped, forecloses the options

available to him.

Underlying
control.

this ability

The key

is

an alteration

to this possibility

to those force levels that need

it

is

in the

dynamics of

command and

the ability to provide information access

most. In a sense, the middle-man

is

cut out.

Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski

commanders engaged in top-down direction to achieve
of forces and weapons at the point of contact with the en-

Traditionally, military

the required level

emy. However, top-down coordination inevitably results in delays and errors

an unwieldy process that denies flexibility to subordinate commands. Combat power is needlessly reduced and opportunities present themselves to one's enemy. In contrast, bottom-up execution permits
combat to move to a high-speed continuum in which the enemy is denied opin force disposition. It

is

erational pause to regroup

and redeploy.
Challenges

There are several challenges that arise from the information age and the resulting bottom-up organizational structure. The ones you will address during
this colloquium concern the law of armed conflict as it relates to the conduct
of hostilities, rather than the jus ad bellum or legality of the conflict.
cerns related to targeting

come immediately

to mind. First

you are delegating decision-making down to the lowest

is

levels,

Two con-

consistency: as

how do you

sure that

commanders

necessity

and proportionality? The second concern related to targeting

are uniformly applying the

countability: the information age ensures that

more and

better information, but

it

—our

Thus, our decision making

also

means

same standards of

we

en-

military
is

ac-

have

as warfighters will

that everyone else will as well.

targeting decisions

—

will

continue to be

scrutinized in ever-increasing detail.

me

remind you of an incident that occurred during Operation
Allied Force. On April 12, 1999 a NATO fighter was given the mission to destroy the Leskovac railway bridge over the Grdelica Gorge and Juzna Morava

Allow

to

bombs

—

The

was to drop two electro-optically guided
one on each end of the bridge. The first bomb was launched and as it

River in eastern Serbia.

fighter

was being remotely guided in to the aimpoint, at the last instant before impact,
a train came into view. It was too late to divert the bomb and the train and
bridge were struck. The fighter then circled around to complete his mission by
dropping the second

bomb on

bomb was dropped and
last instant

as

before impact,

it
it

the opposite end of the bridge as planned.

broke through the clouds and smoke, again

became apparent

The

at the

that the train was covering the

expanse of the bridge. The train was struck a second time. All told 15 civilians
lost their lives.

The

laws of armed conflict judge military

commanders on the

basis of the

information they have available to them at the time decisions are made.

Now

the decision to target and destroy this particular railway bridge was reviewed

Opening Remarks
and approved by the US National Command Authorities and, in general, by
the North Atlantic Council. The bridge was a valid military objective because
it was an integrated part of the communications and logistics networks in Serbia. It was determined that the military necessity of destroying the bridge was
not outweighed by the potential incidental injury or collateral damage that
would occur should civilians be on or near the bridge at the time of the attack.
That was a reasonable determination consistent with the laws of armed
conflict.

The challenge

arose during the execution of the mission

acquired information that the planners did not have

lot

sibly a civilian

passenger

train,

was on or near the

—

bridge.

i.e.

when the pi-

that a train, pos-

The

pilot

then made

a split-second decision under the pressures of combat, while flying in

would execute

airspace that he

his mission as planned.

He was

enemy

properly as-

suming that the possibility of incidental injury or collateral damage had been
accounted for during the target approval process. But while the pilot made
that decision as he flew above the clouds, at an altitude above 15,000 feet, in
enemy airspace, and while guiding the bomb on a five-inch screen in his cockpit,

the public

—including eventually the

Prosecutor's Office for the Interna-

tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

—had

hindsight and of viewing the cockpit video in slow-motion
televisions in the comfort of their

the luxury of

on

large -screen

own homes or offices. Many critics were

ap-

palled by the sight of crosshairs seemingly locked-on to a civilian passenger

The

train.

pilot

was accused by many of having committed a war crime

—

of

having intentionally targeted civilians or recklessly disregarded the fact that
they would be struck.

So

as

detail,

our actions as warfighters

it is

important that

we

will

reflect

be increasingly analyzed in ever greater

back on Operation Allied Force and

and ethical lessons to be learned. There is no better venue
for this colloquium than here at the Naval War College. Here we have a proud
tradition of bringing the preeminent legal minds together with the leading
warfighters and policy makers. Together we can ensure that the law of armed
identify the legal

conflict

is

not only expertly articulated, but also applied to real world scenar-

manner that incorporates the crucial operational perspective and realities. You will go even further by not just asking "what is lawful?" but also
"what is ethical?" Not just what can we do, but what should we do.

ios in a
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M;

y objective

to give

is

E.

you some personal

Baker

insights into the application

of the law of armed conflict to the Kosovo air campaign from the per-

spective of a lawyer serving the United States'

commander

in chief.

I

am

not

my story. Almost all of my instincts as a lawyer, former national security official, and judge run against my participation in this forum. However, I have overcome my reticence because I am committed to
here out of any desire to

tell

constitutional government,
ical, to

and I believe that national

military operations, not just in determining

level legal review

is crit-

whether the commander in

chief has domestic and international legal authority to resort to force, but also
in shaping the

manner

in

which the United States employs

force,

which

is

the

focus of this colloquium.

In short, Kosovo was a campaign during which the law of armed conflict

was assiduously followed. The campaign was conducted with uncommon,
not unprecedented, discrimination.
within the

US

I

government worked

if

believe the process for reviewing targets
well.

Where

there were mistakes, they

were not mistakes of analytic framework or law. Where the process did not

work smoothly or
likely

came

effectively, the idiosyncratic

into play.

tion of diplomacy

And,

and

successful in achieving

let

nature of a

NATO campaign

us not lose sight of the fact that the combina-

military operations that comprised the

NATO's

objectives.

campaign was

Judging Kosovo

I

would

like to focus

on a

particular aspect of

viewing targets going to the president.

At

—

Kosovo the process of reI would like to correct a

the outset

misperception. In preparing for the opportunity to

comment

asked military friends what they would be interested in hearing
the audience.

I

was struck by the number of times thoughtful

here today,
if

I

they were in

officers

asked

me

upon approving all air targets; invoking images of
President Johnson crouched over maps of Vietnam. As a matter of fact, the
commander in chief did not approve all targets during Kosovo, but rather a
smaller subset, which I will describe later. Carrying the analysis to the next
step, in my opinion presidential review did not impede effective military oper-

why

the president insisted

was efficient, contributed to the rule of
law, and allowed the president to engage more effectively with NATO allies.
During my preparation for this speech, I was also (perhaps as a courtesy)
asked about the role of lawyers, and particularly the role of a civilian lawyer at
ations in Kosovo. Rather, such review

the National Security Council. Therefore,

my

sessing

role in applying the law of

I

armed

will

conflict.

among

concerns about the impending collision

begin by describing and
I

will close

as-

with a few

the law of armed conflict, the

doctrine of effects-based targeting, and a shared desire to limit collateral casu-

and consequences

alties

to the fullest extent possible.

The Targeting Process
Before, during
roles

1.

and

after the air

campaign,

I

performed three integrated

with respect to the law of armed conflict.

Preparation
First,

I

educated and advised the president, the national security advisor,

and the attorney general on the law
of armed conflict before (as well as during and after) the air campaign. As with
any client, the time you spend educating them up front pays huge dividends
when it comes time to apply the law in a live situation. (0400 on a secure
the principals and deputies committees,

1.

The

Affairs,

Principals

1

Committee, chaired by the Assistant to the President

for National Security

included the following core members during the Kosovo conflict: the Secretary of State,

Secretary of Defense, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs,

Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Representative to the United Nations, and the Director of

Central Intelligence.
for

The Deputies Committee, chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President

National Security Affairs, included the Deputy Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State

for Political Affairs, the

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Assistant to the Vice President for

National Security Affairs, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff,

United States

Representative to the United Nations, and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

8

The Honorable James E. Baker

conference

call is

not the time to introduce any client, especially the na-

tional decision-maker,

to the concepts of proportionality, necessity

and

discrimination.)

At

the most practical level,

I

provided background and advice in the form

of memoranda, e-mail, and oral input.

My

sources were customary interna-

tional law (including those portions of Protocol

States as customary international law), the

mentaries on the Geneva conventions,

and

treatises,

all

who

taught

me

US

I

recognized by the United

Geneva conventions, the commilitary

manuals and academic

along the way, including a

number of the

par-

ticipants in this colloquium.
I

have often thought that questions about the president's domestic author-

to resort to force are driven by one's constitutional perspective

ity

trinal convictions. In contrast,

experts

armed
ally

who have done

so

and

much

I

know

this

is

risky to say in a

and doc-

room

full

of

to shape our understanding of the law of

conflict, the principles underlying the

law of armed conflict are gener-

agreed upon: necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and military ob-

jective. It

to force

is

the different application of these principles to decisions to resort

and

to decisions regarding

how

force

is

used that generates most

debate.

The law

of armed conflict

is

not law exclusively for

We expect

specialists.

same principles on a tactical level. These are
principles that policymakers must understand and apply to their most solemn
responsibility: the exercise of force and the taking of human life. I would add,
particularly to this audience, that in this respect government lawyers share a
common duty with law professors and other experts to educate the
policymaker of today and tomorrow in advance of the crisis and not just to
junior personnel to apply these

—

comment after the fact.
Advance guidance on

the law of armed conflict also helps establish lines of

communication and a common vocabulary of nuance between lawyer and client. In a larger, more layered bureaucracy than the president's national security staff, I imagine that the teaching process is even more important where
the lawyer may be less proximate to the decision-maker. Not only does a good
advance law of armed conflict brief educate the policymaker, any policymaker

who hears such a brief will be sure

his or her lawyer fully participates in the tar-

geting process. In addition, the policymaker will understand in a live situation
that the lawyer
I

law,

is

applying hard law, and not kibitzing

say that in part because

some policymakers

and domestic, particularly criminal law,

conflict

is,

as

on operational

treat international

hard law.

law as

The law

of course, both. Indeed, reading some of the literature

matters.
soft

of armed

on Kosovo,

Judging Kosovo

and consequences seem always to be referred to as a political constraint and rarely as the legal constraint that it also
is. Whether this reflects lack of knowledge about the law, or merely recognition that the policy hurdle was often the first encountered, is hard to say. But
as you well know, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2441, war crimes committed by or

on

limitations

against

2.

collateral casualties

US persons violate US

criminal law.

Target Categories

My second law of armed conflict related role was the
gories,

such as

cific targets

air

review of target cate-

defense or lines of communication, under which rubric spe-

were almost always approved in theater.

Among

other things,

I

would ensure that such categories were consistent with the president's constitutional authority and with his prior direction.

How did I play this role in practice? To the extent specific targets or categories

of targets were briefed, suggested or debated at deputies or principals com-

was immediately available in the room to
around legal rocks and shoals.

mittee meetings,

guide

officials

You may

ask

I

why

principals

identify issues

were discussing military targets

at

and

all. First,

General Wesley Clark makes clear in his book Waging Modem War,

as

NATO al-

liance operations involved the careful orchestration of nineteen national policies and,

I

will add,

nineteen legal perspectives,

many

of which hinged

nature of targets selected and the risk of collateral casualties.

If

on the

the secretary

of state was to address an appeal from one foreign minister or another to

change the course of the campaign, she needed to understand the campaign.
Second, policymakers brought to bear extraordinary regional knowledge,
including insight into Serbian pressure points.

knowledge into the

The

principals

had

effects of targeting that a military staff officer

special

might not

have.

outcome of a policy carried out through Operation Allied Force. I believe it was their duty to test the
scope of operations to ensure we were doing all that we should do to achieve
NATO's objectives, but in a way that would hold the alliance together. This
Principals also bore a

was a duty
3.

heavy responsibility

for the

fulfilled.

Targets

My third law of armed conflict related role was

to review specific targets. If

the president was going to approve or concur in a target,

is

the military

was

my duty to en-

Time and again I returned to the same checklist:
objective? Are there collateral consequences? Have we

sure the target was lawful.

What

it
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taken

all

appropriate measures to minimize those consequences and to dis-

criminate between military objectives and civilian objects? Does the target

and

brief quickly

You might

ask

clearly identify the issues for the president

why

the

and

NSC legal adviser and not military lawyers was do-

ing this. There are at least three reasons. First, the European

judge advocate

principals?

(EUCOM SJA)

and

legal counsel to the

Command

Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (Chairman's legal counsel) were performing these reviews.

system of legal review, however, was sufficiently streamlined that
fail-safe to

I

is

served as a

also the authority to modify or to

was essential that any such changes receive
approval and execution.

change, and

it

As you know,

there

is

a propensity in

government

legal

review prior to

to adopt smaller

smaller decision- making circles in the interest of operational security.

can become too

cle

may

cipals

The

ensure legal review had occurred on targets going to the president.

Moreover, the authority to approve
final

staff

ask too

small.

much

and

The cir-

A decision-making process limited to cabinet prin-

of too few

those principals are to address issues of

if

and law on operational timelines. In my view, there should be a lawyer
at the senior most policy level who is directly responsible at that level (in addition to the indispensable legal reviews conducted at other levels) for applying
the law of armed conflict to each decision involving the use of force.

policy

Second,

it

was in Washington

at the Pentagon, the State

Department and

and operations came together. A
NATO alliance objection to a particular target, at the "political" level, might
be couched in both policy and legal terms. Having a lawyer involved helped to
avoid a "default judgment" when legal issues were raised.
at the

White House

that issues of law, policy,

and importantly, I implicitly assumed an additional role as a trustee
to the process. I was not self-appointed; rather, this is what the national security advisor expected from his lawyer. In short, it was my job to make sure that
in doing the right thing the US government was doing it the right way.
Finally,

had a standard mental checklist: Are all the relevant facts on the table
do the president and his principal officials know what they are reviewing? Are the longer-term repercussions of striking a target identified? Have
the right process steps been taken? These are, of course, not inherently legal
I

—

questions, but the lawyer in the

room may be

the staff person best positioned

to test the process with policy detachment.
It is

also important to think broadly about

ticular process.

For example,

general should review?

If

I

would

ask,

whom may be missing from a par-

is

this a

matter that the attorney

not, will the attorney general nonetheless be asked

by the press or the congress for her legal view on whether an action
11
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consistent with the president's constitutional authority. Did this lead to the

attorney general substituting her military judgment for those of the
ers?

command-

Of course not. Understanding the military objective for an action is not to

question the military recommendation.
constitutional authority
that

is

At

It is,

however, central to evaluating

and the application of US law

to particular facts,

and

a lawyer's task.

the level of practice points and lessons learned, the critical process link

was with the Chairman's legal counsel working closely with the Department of
Defense (DoD) general counsel. As the national level lawyer closest to the operational line, Admiral Mike Lohr served as the primary communications
channel with whom I could track and review briefs as they came to the White

was ahead of, or at least even with, the operational
timeline and that the president and not just the Pentagon had the benefit of
military and DoD general counsel legal expertise. It also provided for one
chain of legal communication, avoiding confusion. Because I had the familiarity of working with one person on hundreds of targets, we understood each
House. This ensured that

other's vocabulary, tone

I

and expression.

my input and advice in writing. First, felt I
should be no less accountable for my legal concurrence than the president for
his decision. Second, I wanted to make sure my advice was received. Relying
Where

only

on

I

oral

could,

I

provided

communication

I

is

to

run the

risk that the process will

move

for-

ward without your input, given the competing pressures for principals' time.
Finally, I found that my advice was cumulative and that policymakers were
ready to apply the law of armed conflict principles in other contexts, including
during conversations and meetings that I might not attend.
Assessment

Having given you a sense of the legal process in the White House involving
target review, let me now give you my assessment as to how that process
worked, focusing first on the role of the commander in chief and then on the
role of lawyers.

1.

Role of the

As

Commander in Chief

part of the president's brief on military operations, he was briefed

categories of targets (that

is,

he concurred in the framework

certain classes of target such as air defense or

and he reviewed a sub-category of

ground force

specific targets.

all

for addressing

targets in Kosovo),

These were

part targets raising heightened policy concerns, because

12
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factors, potential allied reactions,

and

especially because of potential risk to

US personnel and collateral casualties. Not surprisingly, these were the targets
that also raised

more

difficult

law of armed conflict questions.

Of the

approxi-

mately 10,000 strike sorties involving some 2,000 targets, review of targets by
the national security advisor and his legal adviser reached into the hundreds

of targets (200-300), with the president reviewing a smaller subset of this

number.

From my vantage-point,

the president's review of targets was crisp; he

would hear the description, review the briefing materials and at times raise a
question he wanted answered. He expected issues to be addressed before they
reached him, or alternatively, that the issue perhaps with an ally be
quickly and clearly presented. This was not a ponderous process, but rather a
decision-making process that one would expect of a commander in chief.

—

—

would have preferred that the commander
in chief not review as many targets or the particular ones that he did, because
such review amounts to micromanagement of the armed forces. Under this
school, which has its genesis in the Vietnam era, the president should issue
strategic guidance, a presidential mission statement of commander's intent,
and give the authorization to pursue necessary targets.
There

is

a school of thought that

While I think it is prudent to test whether the right balance was struck between military efficacy and civilian control, I disagree with the "minimal review" school as applied to Kosovo. In my view, the right balance was struck
between national level and theater approved targets. I believe the success of
the campaign is highly relevant in this debate
the alliance was sustained and
NATO's objectives were achieved.

—

Why

was presidential review important? As General Jumper, and others,
have pointed out, this was a highly idiosyncratic campaign involving coalition
warfare by nineteen democracies
fourteen with deployed forces. In this con-

—

some individual target decisions assumed strategic policy implications. A
government might fall. A runway might close. Or, NATO consensus might
text,

my

collapse. In
surprisingly,

would get

when

Not

there were allied concerns about targets, the president

called.

Further,

At

view, those are implications of presidential dimension.

some of the

targets the president reviewed required his approval.

removed any possible question of legal authority
reaching beyond the scope of what he had already

the very least, his review

with respect to targets
reviewed.
Finally,

the

whether

was accountable to
Whether a target was

legally required or not, the president

American people

for

US

operations and casualties.
13
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approved

at the tactical, operational or national level, its

consequences would

and usually immediately, rest with NATO's political leaderand no leader more than the US president. This last argument is not
ship
particular to Kosovo. Perhaps it is a truism, but it applies to an analysis of
ultimately,

—

Kosovo

just the

same.

would make doubly sure that national
level target suggestions, or nominations, were processed in the same manner
as targets originating in the military chain of command; no shortcuts and no
deference to grade or policy position. This would ensure that all targets receive the same measure of staff review and analytic scrutiny. Frankly, I am not
in a position to state whether this was a novel or recurring problem during
If

I

were to strengthen the process,

I

Kosovo. But there were times during the campaign

and so was pushing

for a certain

when I would hear

that so

proposed target to be included in the next

was aware of such "advice" I would channel it into the
normal process of selection and review. In any event, the potential for error
will diminish if target nominations all receive the same stepped process of represidential brief. If

view.

Where

process

2.

work

I

operational necessity dictates speed,
faster,

my

answer

is

to

make

the

but do not adopt shortcuts.

Lawyers* Role

Although I think legal review at the NSC worked well with respect to
Kosovo targets, there is no one answer to good process. Indeed, the policy and
military context of one scenario is likely to be so different from the next that it
would be dangerous to generalize or to insist on one shoe size for all conflicts. Kosovo was not Desert Storm. And Desert Storm was not Desert Fox.
One has to maintain situational awareness. If there is no one right way to lawyer, however, there is a wrong way and that is to absent yourself from the deci-

—

sion-making process or be prone simply to defer to others' conclusions.

Lawyers are not always readily accepted into the military targeting team.
This reluctance has to do with concerns about secrecy, delay, lawyer creep
(the legal version of mission creep,

whereby one

legal question

becomes

17,

which requires not one lawyer but 43 to answer). And, of course, fear that the
lawyer may "just say no" to something the policymaker wants to do. I was fortunate that the national security advisor, secretary of defense and chairman
and vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff needed no persuading on the
need for close-up lawyering. During the Kosovo campaign, legal advice may
not have always received
hid from

it

warm and

or sought to shut

it

generous thanks, but policymakers never

out.
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In return,
tract.

I

think the lawyers

fulfilled their responsibilities

under the con-

We kept the number of participants to the absolute minimum; for exam-

ple, if a

matter of domestic legal authority needed to be limited within the

Department to the attorney general alone, then the attorney general
alone it was. And, within the US government, NSC legal review met all but
one operational deadline. One target was put on the president's brief before
legal review was complete. Therefore, when the president reached the target
during an Oval Office briefing, I asked that it be set aside until that review

Justice

could be completed.

While

I

always

such pressure

I

pressure,

felt

I

never

let

pressure dictate

my

analysis.

did not fully anticipate was the extent to which

US

One

actions

would receive international legal scrutiny. In any event, we applied the law,
because it was the law, not because there was an audience.

Whether

actors like

ner in which specific

it

US

or not,

Kosovo may serve

military actions

receive legal scrutiny, from

NGOs,

actors.

As

man-

—

to the tactical sortie

will

ad hoc tribunals, and the International

Criminal Court, the latter two of which

US

—down

as a harbinger of the

may attempt to assert jurisdiction over

a result, policymakers should anticipate that the

same public

statement intended to influence an adversary might also influence the legal

and not lawyers, should surely decide what points to
emphasize in public statements, but they should do so conscious of the legal
implications of what is being said. As the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) review of NATO action illustrates, although
that review concluded our actions were indeed lawful, merely doing the right
thing and doing it well and carefully will not necessarily immunize actors from
law of armed conflict scrutiny.
observer. Policymakers,

Areas of Future Tension
I

forecast

with a few words of caution involving three areas where

would
tension in the future between doctrine, policy and the law of armed

will close

I

conflict.

1.

Proportionality, Necessity,
First,

there

is

and "Going Downtown"

a potential tension

the one hand, and

between proportionality and necessity on

on the other hand, the

military importance of striking hard

at the outset of a conflict to surprise, to shock,

and thus

to effect a rapid

end

to

There has been commentary about the incremental nature of the air
campaign, and the merits of "going downtown" earlier. On one level this
conflict.
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aspect of the campaign was dictated by

NATO's

phased

what NATO approved and therefore that was the
and consensus.

air

campaign; that

is

limit of alliance authority

Legal considerations did not drive this result. Indeed, the political constraint agreed to

by the alliance was reached well before any legal constraint

based on necessity or proportionality, particularly so given NATO's objectives
of preventing ethnic cleansing and avoiding a larger regional war. But looking
forward,

we should not

lose sight that there

is

a legal facet to any decision to

"go downtown." Legal judgments depend on factual predicate.
believe a symbolic

lawyer would find

show of force alone
it

difficult to

will

If

policymakers

accomplish the permitted goal, a

concur in the bombing of national

level mili-

tary targets in a nation's capital.

2.

Dual-Use Targets
any number of inherent ten-

Similarly, so called "dual-use targets" present
sions.

The law

between

of armed conflict attempts to posit a clarity in the distinction

military objective

and

civilian object that

may not

exist

on the

found that dual-use targets largely appeared on a continuum. This
seemed particularly true because we were dealing with a dictatorship with
broad, but not always total, control over potential dual-use targets, like media
ground.

I

relay towers or factories. In

such an environment,

facilities

can be rapidly con-

verted from civilian to military to civilian use at the direction of a government

not bound by Youngstown Sheet and Tube.
In such a context, effects-based targeting and the law of armed conflict

be on a collision course. The tension

is

particularly apparent

may

where a facility fi-

nancially sustains an adversary's regime, and therefore the regime's military
operations, but does not

make

a product that directly and effectively contrib-

utes to an adversary's military operations.
dictatorial context, these

may be

The

policy frustration

is

that in a

exactly the targets that not only might per-

suade an adversary of one's determination, but more importantly striking such
targets

may

shorten the conflict and therefore limit the number of collateral

casualties that will otherwise occur.
I

am not

arguing here for a change in the law;

I

am very conscious

malleable a doctrine of military objective will send the law hurdling
slippery slope toward collateral calamity.

Nor,

I

should be

clear,

that too

down

the

am I suggesting

that the United States applied anything other than a strict test of military objective as recognized in

customary international law and by those states that

have adopted Protocol

My purpose is to identify to you a very real area of ten-

I.

sion that warrants further review and that will confront lawyers in the future.
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3.

Protection of Noncombatants and Traditional Understanding of Military

Objective

The law of armed

conflict generates a

number of ironic

est of a higher principle or in the interest

results in the inter-

of clarity. For example, "treacher-

ous" killing of military leaders (as that term

is

understood under the law of

armed conflict) is prohibited, but the law of armed conflict permits the use of
more dramatic force, even with significant collateral consequences, to attack
a military headquarters with essentially the same objective of disrupting command and control. During the Kosovo campaign, lawyers were never squarely
confronted with the target that would have the effect of ending the conflict
with minimal collateral consequences, but which nonetheless failed a traditional test of military objective. But I sensed that such an issue could have
arisen.

Without diminishing the paramount principle of protection for noncombatants, I wonder whether the definition of military objective deserves another
look, in the interest of limiting collateral casualties. Are traditional definitions
adequate, or do they drive military operations toward prolonged conflict and
ground combat? Do they provide enough guidance to shield the commander
from prosecution where the commander has made legal judgments in good
faith?

These are more than academic questions of passing interest. The potentially poor fit between traditional categories of military objective and the reality of a conflict where targets fall on a continuum of judgment between
military and civilian, becomes more perilous in an age of international scrutiny
where good faith differences of view can take on criminal implications. Those
who do evaluate such actions should do so aware of the factual and temporal
context in which decisions are made. National security decision-making is not
judicial decision-making. Time is more of the essence, and information is not
necessarily of evidentiary quality.

Further, as

armed

much

conflict in

would hope that the United States is not engaged in
the future, there are no doubt national interests that will reas

I

quire the exercise of force.

As Air Vice-Marshal Mason

has said,

it is

honor-

able for democracies to strive to the fullest extent possible to eliminate
collateral casualties

from armed

conflict. Just as

low and no casualty conflicts

have resulted in a public expectation, and some suggest a de facto policy constraint,

gal

regarding

US

military action,

some have used Kosovo

to

advance a

view that the law of armed conflict virtually prohibits collateral

This

is

an honorable and worthy

aspiration, but not law.

or the tyrants of the world will operate with impunity.
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casualties.

Nor should

it

be law,

Judging Kosovo

The law

of armed conflict does not prohibit collateral casualties any more

than international law prohibits armed
limits.

conflict. It constrains, regulates,

and

War is almost never casualty free and we will be extraordinarily lucky if

the next conflict incurs as few collateral casualties as Kosovo.

Conclusion

In closing,

view

at the

hope
with

I

I

hope

I

have given you some insight into the process of legal

commander

in chief level during the

have given you a sense of the

my duty

Kosovo

issues, at least in a

air

campaign.

manner

I

re-

also

consistent

to safeguard deliberations.

My message is clear. First, lawyers are integral to the conduct of military opcommand

They must be in the physical and
metaphorical decision-making room. And, they can perform their duties to
the law in a timely and secure way that meets operational deadlines and needs.
Those who uphold the law of armed conflict bring honor to the profession and
to the armed forces.
Second, the law of armed conflict is hard law. It is US criminal law. Increaserations at the national

level.

an international measure by which the United States
is judged. The law of armed conflict addresses the noblest objective of
law the protection of innocent life. And the United States should be second
ingly,

it

will also serve as

—

none

was the case with Kosovo.
Finally, application of the law of armed conflict is a moral imperative. If
international law regulates, but does not prohibit war, the law of armed conflict helps to ensure that force is used in the most economical manner possito

in compliance, as

Whether we agree on the precise definition of military objective, or on
each and every Kosovo target, I am confident that we all agree on the moral

ble.

imperative of minimizing civilian casualties and suffering to the fullest extent
possible.
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loss

he forces that

I

USAF

(Ret)

was privileged to command bombed Milosevic

for sev-

enty-eight days flying over thirty-eight thousand sorties without the

of a single pilot, after which Milosevic accepted

Those terms were: number one, the

killing

would stop

the professional military forces of the Serb

all

in

Army and

of

NATO's

terms.

Kosovo; number two,

the paramilitary police

NATO commander would come in on
the ground with a predominantly NATO force to occupy the province (this
was General Mike Jackson and the NATO forces that came in shortly after
would leave Kosovo; number

the

number four, the Kosovar Albanians would
homes; and, number five, we would facilitate the ICTY (Inter-

bombing campaign was

return to their

three, a

over);

national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) process.
despite

We did all that

some extraordinary restraints that were placed upon the warfighters

in

this effort.

would like to talk quite frankly tonight about three of the issues coming
out of Kosovo that are of most concern to me personally and for the future of
the US armed forces. I am not a lawyer. I will hopefully share with you some
things that will be of value to you who are military lawyers, or civilian lawyers
who impact the Department of Defense, about how the next generation of my
profession does its business. But I am not a lawyer. I am a professional soldier. I
I

did that for thirty-five years.

me

are targeting, collateral

The

three things that are of particular interest to

damage and

coalition warfare.

Perspective of the

NATO Air Commander

Targeting

Let's talk first

A lot has been said in a lot of different publi-

about targeting.

and by a lot of different people about how we did our targeting. Let me
first assure you that the professionals in the American and NATO militaries
understand the concept of effects-based targeting. We know what we were trying to do. We were trying to compel Milosevic to accept NATO's terms as rapcations

idly as possible

with as

with as

little loss

little

destruction of Serbian property as possible and

of life on both sides as was humanly possible. That

were trying to do. Unfortunately, because
nations,

you get the lowest

what we

NATO was an alliance of nineteen

common denominator. All those folks have to agree

on something.
Targeting became something that was not

my

is

when

in

my control.

I

spent thirty-four

was in charge of an air effort, I
would indeed be in charge of targeting. I thought that the president of the
United States and the leaders of whatever alliance we were associated with
would give me broad guidance political objectives that they wanted to
achieve. I thought that my boss, the combatant commander, would translate
years in

profession thinking that

I

—

those into military objectives for me.

I

thought

I

would perhaps

dent of the United States on target categories that
that individual targets

would be mine

to decide

I

brief the presi-

intended to

and mine

strike,

to destroy.

but

And,

would achieve the effect of bringing Milosevic to the table as rapidly
as possible. As all of you understand, that was not the case.
Targeting was not mine to decide. Targeting decisions were made in the
White House, at Number Ten Downing Street, and in Paris, Rome and
thereby,

Berlin.

targets

I

The

—

senior political leaders of the alliance approved individual fixed

a fixed target being something that doesn't

were mine to decide upon.

I

move. Mobile

targets

could decide to attack tanks and armored person-

was appropriate. Quite frankly I never
thought it to be appropriate, because the center of gravity was not the third
army in Kosovo. The center of gravity was Milosevic, the circle of leadership
around him, and the ruling elite. But that was not the way NATO wanted to
wage war.
We did our level best to target those things that we thought would have the
effect of bringing Milosevic to the table. Instead, because those targets were
not picked by professional soldiers and professional sailors and professional
nel carriers any time

airmen,

we bombed

I

thought

targets that

it

were quite frankly inappropriate

for bringing

would say to you that in terms of targeting,
victory by happenstance more than victory by design.
Milosevic to the table.

I
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had a video teleconference (VTC) every day for seventy-eight
between myself and my staff and the
clearly the highlight of my day
days
combatant commander, General Wesley Clark, and his staff. One of my favorite video teleconferences occurred when General Clark was haranguing Admiral Jim Ellis, a great American. (No one in this audience, no one in this country
will ever understand the extraordinary difficulties that Jim Ellis put up with
and the incredible difficult position he was placed in.) General Clark was telling Jim and I what we needed to do that day and at the end of his guidance he
said to us: "Mike, Jim, I hope this will work." Jim Ellis looked at the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) on the VTC and said: "SACEUR,
hope is not a course of action." Course of action is kind of a military
term maybe some of you are unfamiliar with it but it is what we are going to
do today. Hope is not something we would like to be doing today. We like to
know what we are doing.

—

—

—

—

We

were accused by a

standing what

we were

lot

of folks of inaccurate targeting and not under-

The fact of the matter is

targeting.

that every target

we

intended to strike had passed an extraordinary series of tests, perhaps the most

important one being whether

it fit

with our definition of military objective un-

We

had some targeting failures. We acknowledge that. The Chinese embassy was a failure of intelligence, not a targeting
failure. The young men who worked for me hit exactly what I told them to hit.
It wasn't until two or three or four in the morning that I found out we had hit
the Chinese embassy as opposed to the Serbian logistics headquarters that we
thought we had struck.
der the law of armed conflict.

As

convoy that we struck early in the operations against the third
army in Kosovo, I reviewed that tape five times before it became clear to me
that those were indeed tractors hauling wagons as opposed to eighteen-wheel
military vehicles. The young man that dropped those bombs was flying at 450
miles an hour in bad weather and he was being shot at. He had one chance to
make identification and he made a mistake. That was not a war crime. He had
no intent to kill people he was not supposed to kill. He made a mistake.
for the

The

issue

I

would

lay in front of you

—

be the next generation in the civilian

—

tary

is

whose

responsibility should targeting be.

sponsibility of the president of the

profession,

and

Mr

United States

Should targeting be the

—someone not

trained in

re-

my

who does not fully understanding what I am trying to do in terms of

military objectives
target sets?

you youngsters who will
hierarchy or in the uniformed miliparticularly

I

Blair

and the

targets that

he has given me? Should he approve

we should have gone to Mr Clinton
and Mr Chirac and Mr Schroeder and Mr D'Alema and said:

believe he should.

I

believe
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"Gentlemen, we intend to target these

sets.

We

will target the military pro-

We will target command and control nodes. We will target
power grids. We will target lines of communication. We will target field forces.
duction capability.

And we

will target the integrated air

defense capability of the nation.

Now if

want me to strike, tell me,
and I will place those individual targets on a no-strike list. But once you have
done that, then give me that totality of target set, and let me achieve the effect
you want achieved as rapidly and with as little loss of life and as little destructhere are targets within those sets that you don't

tion of property as possible."

Collateral

Damage

Now let me move to the issue of collateral damage. It is inconceivable to me
anyone who understands anything about modern warfare would think
that as a responsible commander that I would not take every step within my
command to limit collateral damage; that I would not provide to my air crews
that

from

all

the participating nations and

guidance

I

all

the

American

forces the

most precise

could provide to them on limiting collateral damage; that

not package the forces
foremost in

we send

into battle every day with collateral

would
damage
I

my mind. But it becomes my job, your job as the next generation of

commanders and the commanders' advisers, to balance concern for collateral
damage and concern for loss of life on the one hand with the risk that you are
asking your pilots to take.

On about the fiftieth day of the war, we bombed
of Nis in broad daylight
nication.

ment
left

a Saturday afternoon.

It

was a valid

line of commu-

We had seen Serbian troops moving across that bridge in reinforce-

efforts to

bridge.

on

the bridge outside the city

The

Kosovo.

Two

first aircraft hit

F-16's dropped laser guided

bombs on

that

the right stanchion and the second aircraft hit the

stanchion. Predictably, the bridge dropped in the river. That

is

what

I

had

on or near the bridge were about twenty
was market day. It was Saturday. The young pilots could do
nothing about that. The next day Milosevic stretched the bodies out on the
street, called the press down from Belgrade, and announced that the NATO
war criminals had done their thing once again. As a result of that incident,
told the pilots to do. Unfortunately,

Serb

this

civilians. It

was the guidance

I

got from the very highest levels of the

NATO military

you will no longer bomb bridges in daylight, you will no
longer bomb bridges on market days, on holidays or on weekends. In fact, you

political leadership:

will

only

bomb

between ten o'clock at night and three o'clock in the
ensure that we do not kill civilians crossing those bridges.

bridges

morning in order to
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you that that may indeed lessen the possibility of killing civilians
crossing the bridges, but what does it do to your aircrews? Number one, it creates sanctuary for the enemy. It will take Milosevic about forty-eight hours to
figure out that no bridges are being bombed except between ten o'clock at
I

will grant

night and three o'clock in the morning; that they are not being

bombed on

weekends or on market days. So he does not need to protect those bridges except for between ten o'clock at night and three o'clock in the morning. At ten

NATO aircrews become totally predictable because that

o'clock at night the
is

the five hour limit that the air

men

way

commander

is

allowed to send those young

So the risk
for NATO aircrews is raised by a magnitude of three or four or five times what
it would have been if I were allowed to conduct the conflict the way I wish to.
No responsible commander wishes to kill civilians. Let me say that to you
into harm's

to attack those bridges that

must be

struck.

commander wearing the NATO uniform wishes to kill
civilians. Never in seventy-eight days did we target Serb civilians, but unfortunately in war civilians are sometimes where you would like them not to be.

No

again.

responsible

Unfortunately sometimes in a war civilians are a very key part of the establish-

ment

that you're targeting.

There are

workers on every one of our

civilian

air fields in this

country and

every shipyard and every aircraft factory. There are civilian workers

would die
ica.

if

who

they were attacked by an adversary of the United States of Amer-

Every day we did our very, very best to limit collateral damage and limit

the loss of

life

on the

adversary's side. Every time

reaction by political leaders was hysterical

The

you.

restrictions that

we

failed in that effort, the

—along the

were placed on the young

lines

effect

we were

trying to achieve. In fact,

the last ten days of the war

we

just outlined for

men and women who

—

were going in harm's way every day were extraordinary

what

I

losing

all

sight of

got to the point that during

was instructed to attack only those targets that
had a potential for low collateral damage. I was given no instruction with regard to the impact this might have on Milosevic, whether this would injure
I

the war machine, whether this would bring the conflict to a close.

Our young

people were to only to strike those targets that had the potential for a low collateral

damage, because the leaders of the nineteen nation alliance could no

damage incidents and because they did not understand
was a video game, and that no one ever dies.

longer stand collateral
war.

They thought

it

Did you ever see anybody die in the films from the Gulf War? I never did.
just saw crosshairs on the target in downtown Baghdad, and then it blew up.
never saw a body in the

street.

But Milosevic was extraordinarily good

ing bodies in the street of people that

we had
23
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I

I

at putt-

That

is,
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maybe a hundred Serbs, not in all cases did we kill who he said we killed. We
were on the defensive and our political leaders could not stand the heat. They
could not grit their teeth and say simply "get this done do it as well as you

—

you don't haye to kill, and don't blow up things you don't
have to blow up, but go ahead and get it done you know how to do this, we
do not, but we have given you the basic guidance." That is not what hapcan, don't

kill

folks

—

pened. Concern for collateral damage drove us to extraordinary degree, and
will drive the

next generation of warriors even more

so,

because whereas

I

it

see

an extraordinary failure, the leadership within the NATO senior administrations would say this was indeed an extraordinary success. We bombed
for seventy-eight days; nobody died on our side; and Milosevic accepted all
this as

our terms.

What in the world is that burned-out old

This was an extraordinary success, they would

three star whining about?

say, yet

indeed

it

was not.

Coalition Warfare

Finally, let

by ourselves.

me turn to the issue of coalition warfare. We do not want to fight

My country wants to fight as part of the coalition. We want to be

We want to share the risk. We do not want just young Americans to die on the first night and the second night and the third night. We want
our friends to be there with us. We do not want to be the lone wolf going out
striking wherever we think we need to strike. We need to represent the considwith our

allies.

ered opinion of the

whoever

it

NATO alliance, or the Western community of nations, or

happens to be,

if

we choose

to

employ

be part of a coalition. However, as a professional

military action.

We want to

would tell you I prefer to be a member of a coalition of the willing as we had in the Gulf War.
In 1991 if you chose to throw in your forces with us and the Saudis and the
Kuwaitis and the Brits, you were welcome, but you came under our terms. We
explained to you how we were going to make war and if you did not like that
explanation, or if you could not sign up for those terms, then you did not need
to be part of our coalition. However, in 1999 it was NATO, not a coalition of
the willing. All nineteen nations had to agree, and so we ended up with the
lowest common denominator. That is how it was that a nation that was providing less than 10% of the total effort could say to the most powerful nation

on the

face of the earth "you cannot

bomb

soldier,

I

that target."

America lost its leverage on the first night. On the
first night of the war we lost any leverage we had, and we ended up being
leveraged. What was the US interest in Operation Allied Force? Was there a
US national interest? I make the case that our only national interest was the

The United

States of
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some successful form. If NATO had
been defeated by a third-rate war criminal and murderer, then I think NATO
would cease to exist. Before the war started, the United States of America enjoyed ultimate leverage over its NATO allies. NATO wanted to go to war.
The Europeans were saying, "we need to do something about this tragedy that
is occurring in Europe's backyard." NATO wanted to go to war. There was no
maritime option and NATO did not want to commit ground troops, so the
only option was the air option. I do not wish to offend any of my NATO
friends in the audience, but NATO cannot make war without the United
States of America. It is just that simple. You do not have the technology. You
do not have the numbers. You do not have the precision. You do not have the
forces that allow you to do it. So if the United States of America was not going
to participate in that air war in Kosovo, it was not going to be a successful air
war in Kosovo. So we had the ultimate leverage. We were in the same position
we were in 1991 to dictate how this should be done. We did not do that becontinuance of the

NATO

alliance in

was going to be a three night war. We were going to demonstrate resolve. Who cared what we bombed, because it was going to be over in three
nights. So we threw that leverage away and we ended up being leveraged.
cause

it

Now

what do the lawyers have to do with all of this? I expected that I
would be the targeteer, and so the advice of my lawyer would be extraordinarily important to me because everything I struck had to be a valid military
target for all the coalition members. Concern for the law of armed conflict was
absolutely paramount in my mind. However, as I said to you earlier, those target decisions were taken out of our hands. Target decisions were

made by

the

president of the United States, the prime minister of Great Britain, the presi-

dent of France, and the president of Germany, and targets were

me. So

I

really did

passes the test?
military target
yers

may

not need to go to

Is this

my

lawyer and say "do you think this

a valid military target?"

What my lawyers say is

and consistent with the law of armed

disagree with.

So every day

I

just issued to

conflict,

a valid

nation X's law-

put together what was called the

air

more NATO airplanes what
targets they were going to strike that next day. I had to wait for the individual
nations to answer back, having gone to their capitals and asked whether they
should accept that target. And, indeed, in many capitals the answer was
no we do not define that as a valid military target. Now if I could get that
answer back in a timely fashion, I could assign that target to a nation that
had a less restrictive view of the law of armed conflict, but if I got that information late, and the aircraft were already airborne, then I ended up canceltasking order

which sent out

to the thousand or

—

ing the strike.
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Great Britain exercised control over

AH

B-52's and

they could be struck.

their targets

and

approved by the British parliament before

we were based on

As many

British soil.

of you know, the French

They would take the

position that not only

their aircraft not strike the "Rock-and-roll Bridge,"

the "Rock-and-roll Bridge." That makes
coalition. It

makes

it

UK soil.

on

F-15E's stationed at

all

US aircraft had to have their targets approved by other na-

exercised total veto over targets.

would

airplanes stationed

B-l's stationed at Fairford

all

Lakenheath had to have
tions because

US

all

no one could

very, very difficult to fight within a

it

your lawyer to do

very, very difficult for

strike

his business.

Concluding Thoughts For Lawyers

A young

man

me

asked

evening what advice

earlier this

would give an

I

up-and-coming young operational lawyer wearing the uniform in defense of
this country. Understand what your commander is up against. Understand and

development of

participate in the

special instructions

he

is

hear

air.

—

Then, do not be

men and women

afraid to tell

Every target that

him what he

may

really

men and women
does not want to

we bombed

in fact violate the law of armed conflict.

for seventy-eight days

by professional military lawyers and that

the targets.

hand

at sea, or his

that he has put together this exquisite plan, but his targets indeed are

not valid ones or his targets

level

engagement. Understand what

providing as supplemental to his rules of engagement,

to his troops in the field, or his

in the

his rules of

I

telling

want

to get this thing done, but

is
I

the

had been reviewed

way it has

must have

to be.

I

want

advisers sitting at

at

some

to

bomb

my right

me whether I am doing this properly or not. Am I breaking laws?

Am

I

doing things that are unacceptable? Will the eyes of a professional soldier believe
that to be a valid target or a valid target set?

It will

take enormous courage to do

that in particular circumstances because you're always going to be junior to your
boss.

to

My lawyer most of the time was a lieutenant colonel. It is very difficult for him

come

in

and say to a three

star

"you are out of bounds,

the law." But you have got to be able to
ness inside

lawyer

make

is

it

things

I

and out and you have got

not to prevent

possible for

me

me

to

do

that.

to think like

from doing

my job,

sir,

You have

killing

got to

know your busi-

an operator. Your job as a military
your job as a military lawyer

do my job without breaking the

should not blow up, without

you are about to break

people

I

is

to

law, without blowing

up

should not

kill

and without

You have got to help me. Do not be
a hindrance. Tell me the truth. Tell me when I have pushed it too far. Tell me when

committing war crimes.

I

I

want

to get this done.

am in the gray area, but help me get this

done

for the alliance. That's

thing done that our country wants to get

it.
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Brian O'Donnell:
General, did you ever feel constrained in the bombing campaign not to

because you did not have a precision-guided munition?

strike a target

Michael Short:

We

started this fight out as a totally precision-munitions fight.

A lot has

been made in the press about the fifteen thousand foot floor that I placed on
my people. You need to understand that when we started this fight, we were

We were not going to attack tanks. We were
not going to attack troops in the field. We were going to attack buildings and
only going to attack fixed targets.

and bridges and those sorts of things, which are
thousand feet. Restrictions were placed on me
that I could not lose any aircraft and any aircrews. So I had enormous concern
for force protection. You cannot fly high enough to avoid the radar of a surface-to-air missile. But you can fly high enough to avoid small arms and light
triple-A (anti-aircraft artillery) and the IR (infra-red) missile. Fifteen thousand feet was that floor, so that's where we started out.
airfields

and

aircraft shelters

easily identifiable

Every

bomb

from

fifteen

that was dropped for the

first

X number of days

in Serbia

and

Kosovo was a guided munition. There were a number of NATO nations that
did not carry precision-guided munitions, and they were not allowed to drop
bombs. Then as we moved into the next phase, which was attacking the Third

Army in Kosovo, we
we found

that

if

we

continued to use nothing but precision munitions. Then
controlled

it

properly and used the correct force that

could drop a certain number of unguided munitions

dumb bombs.

—what you and

I

we
call

We did indeed drop a number of dumb bombs, particularly from

B-ls and B-52s.

I

understand there was a discussion earlier today about

bombing B-52s.

No

bombing occurred. Outside of
Kosovo, again with the exception of the B-52 and the B-l, we dropped nothso-called carpet

carpet

ing that wasn't precision guided. Everything that hit Serbia proper was

Discussion

precision-guided munitions in an attempt to control collateral

attempt to control
Leslie

Do

loss

of civilian

Green:
you not think that

it is

time

we took

the line that

representative with perhaps their legal advisers from the
tion to get together
political

advisers

and

—we

say, putting

are

damage and

in

life.

it

going

brutally, to hell

to

three-and-a-half thousand miles away

who

decide,

we want the military
members of the coali-

with our constitutional

not

somebody

sitting

has not the vaguest idea of what

is

going on anyway?

Michael Short:
No, sir, I can never imagine giving up
Leslie
It is

civilian control of the military.

Green:
the constitutional control that worries me, not the civilian control.

Michael Short:
No, as strongly as I feel about men and women in my profession being allowed to do their jobs, and as strongly as I would advise against
micromanagement by political appointed or elected leaders, if that is the role
they choose to play, then I have to accept that role. I advise against it. I hope
that what my own country and I saw during the last eight years was an aberration driven by a particular administration that I will not see again. But you
need to understand, I hoped the same thing in 1967 when Lyndon Johnson
was on his hands and knees in the Oval Office reviewing targets with Robert
McNamara. Remember that my generation swore that would never happen
again. In the Gulf War, in fact, it did not. George Bush the elder gave us missiontype orders. That was not the case in 1999. But I cannot imagine a military
professional saying to hell with the constitution and to hell with our elected
and appointed leaders, we'll do this as we see fit. That is not how we do
business.

Leslie

Green:

What

if

the constitution of one country interferes with the military opera-

tions of the coalition?
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Discussion

Michael Short:
I

believe,

sir,

you've got to set those rules beforehand with that particular

country. In the case of the Canadians, there were targets

I

knew

F-18s were not allowed to attack. Their pilots were dying to do

was not going to allow them. So

it

tion with less restrictive guidance.

my job to fold all those

my job

was

could

I

the Canadian
it,

but Ottawa

to assign those targets to a na-

use the Canadians in

still

many

and produce a coherent
war-making effort. Now I agree with you that before the fact is when we have
to agree on what the rules are. I would take the position that before the fact we
say "nation X, if you don't wish to attack any of these targets, that's fine, but
you cannot prohibit the rest of us from attacking those targets." But as far as I
can tell, that conversation never took place, and once the fight started, we
roles. It

is

capabilities together

lost that leverage.

Ruth Wedgwood:
You said that the center of gravity to really win the campaign was
elite in

the ruling

Belgrade.

Michael Short:
Milosevic and the

who

he, in turn,

men and women around him who depend upon him and

depends upon.

Ruth Wedgwood:

We had a big debate this afternoon about whether civilian morale as such
ever an allowable target.

you make

From an

operational point of view,

fill

me

in

is

on what

of that.

Michael Short:
Let

me

give

you

my perspective, and

will leap to his feet if

You cannot

I

get out of bounds here

target civilians

will target the

power

grid,

—pure and
which

I

who was my lawyer
even though I am retired now.

Colonel Sorenson

simple.

Now,

as a professional soldier,

believe will significantly impact

and control of all Serb forces throughout the entire country.
their ability to

to

do

move on

trains,

their military business.

to think that

and we

Now when

I

make

sit

it

I

—

of me targeting a valid military target.
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We will prohibit
them

my planners, I am not going
to myself and to my planners

with

ship because they allowed this to happen. But that
result

command

very, very difficult for

do not say
make the Serb population unhappy with

you are so naive that

that this will also

will

I

is

their senior leader-

a spin-off

—a

peripheral

Discussion

If

I

had gone

to

my bosses

something because
spective, that

it

I

want

impact the Serb civilian population, from

will

would be

with Colonel Sorenson and said

to target

my

per-

out of bounds. That would be unacceptable.

totally

But any thinking military professional knows that there are certain target

sets

on the population which in turn will
pressure the senior leadership. There were factories that we were never able to
get to for a number of different reasons that were dual-use factories. They produced Yugos from midnight until noon and tank turrets from noon to midnight. That is a valid military target. Now if I blow that up, two thousand
that if targeted are going to have an

effect

and they

Serbs probably just lost their jobs,
Milosevic's palace because they

why

I

targeted that

that because that

is

facility.

will

I

how we

would be unhappy.

hit

demonstrate outside

will
I

know that, but that is not

stand in any court in the land and swear to

our targets. But certainly we understand the

peripheral in that.

Christopher Greenwood:

My question is this General: Britain would have been in the dock along with
the United States, so can you see any circumstances in which

been responsible
targets?

Can you

for a British

government not

to

have

insisted

would have
on reviewing

it

think of any circumstances in which the United States would

allow British aircraft to

from a

fly

US

air

United States checking to see whether

it

base to attack a target without the

would be attacking a lawful

target?

Michael Short:

No,

I

understand your position. There were strange

Germany every day and

the

prove the targets of those

Germans

aircraft.

stationed at Aviano, Italy and

nary

skills

aircraft taking off

from

did not exercise their prerogative to ap-

The

vast majority of US strike aircraft were

Mr D'Alema, who was struggling with extraordi-

to hold together a coalition government, never approached us

and

asked to review the targets of our aircraft taking off from Aviano. So while
certainly understand the position taken by the British government,
rest of

to

my

allies

when

I

the

did not take that position, then the British position stands out

me as a problem. Okay?

fication time or as long as

I
I

was able to work around

this as

was able to understand the

long as

I

got a noti-

sensitivity of what Brit-

on more than one occasion when
the system wasn't working, I had dozens of strike aircraft on the tanker within
ten minutes of pushing into Serbian airspace when the word came through
from Ten Downing Street that the target was not acceptable to the British.
ain thought was good, bad, or indifferent. But
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PART II
THE APPLICABILITY OF
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Introduction

Scott Silliman

T

his first

panel will address the overall applicability of the law of armed

conflict, also called international

eration in Kosovo.

We

are also going to be focusing

that arose during that campaign,
soldiers

who were

humanitarian law, to the

one being the

on

NATO op-

several specific issues

legal status of the three

captured while on a routine mission near the border.

Army

As you

immediately after they were captured, our State Department an-

recall,

nounced to the press that the three were "illegal detainees" and many of
and several are here at this conference responded vehemently that they
us
were clearly prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention, and that to

—

—

consider

them otherwise was

to

denude them of the protections afforded them

under international law.

Fd

like to lay a

foundation by reading from a portion of the very controver-

sial

Final Report to the Prosecutor by the

the

NATO Bombing Campaign Against

on

Committee Established

to

Review

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

1

between the jus ad bellum, which is a very large debate as all of
you know, and the more particular jus in bello, which is the focus of this collothis linkage

quium.

It

The

reads:

between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is not completely
resolved.
[I]n the 1950's there was a debate concerning whether UN
authorized forces were required to comply with the jus in bello as they
represented the good side in a battle between good and evil. This debate died
out as the participants realized that a certain crude reciprocity was essential if
the law was to have any positive impact. An argument that the 'bad' side had to
32.

precise linkage
.

.

.

Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
1257 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A [hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor].
1

.

Final Report to the Prosecutor by the

Introduction

comply with the law while the 'good'
unlikely to reduce

33.

More recently,

human

side could violate

it

at will

would be most

suffering in conflict.

a refined approach to the linkage issue has been advocated by

certain law of war scholars. Using their approach, assuming that the only lawful

each use of force during a conflict must
in bello and by whether or
not it complies with the necessity and proportionality requirements of self
defence. The difficulty with this approach is that it does not adequately address
what should be done when it is unclear who is acting in self defence and it does
basis for recourse to force

is

self defence,

be measured by whether or not

not

it

complies with the jus

2
clarify the obligations of the 'bad' side.

The Report

to the Prosecutor

went on

to say that the

Committee

deliber-

from assessing jus ad bellum issues and focused exclusively on
whether violations of the law of war occurred within the confines of the jus in
ately refrained

bello. It
sis

concluded that there was no basis

whatsoever

for further investigation

for the referral of war crimes charges against

and no ba-

any of the

NATO

combatants.

With regard

between the jus ad bellum and the jus
in bello, though, there seems to be no ambiguity in the United States position.
If there is an armed conflict, whether deemed just or unjust, right or wrong
under the jus ad bellum, the jus in bello applies equally to both sides. That's the
position

2.

I

to the question of linkage

personally take, but

I

know

that

Id.

34

many

will disagree

with that.

The

Applicability of International

Humanitarian Law and the
Neutrality to the

Law of

Kosovo Campaign

Christopher Greenwood

he purpose of this paper

1

is

to

examine the

applicability of interna-

and the law of neutrality to Operation Allied
Force, the NATO campaign over Kosovo in 1999. The paper is thus chiefly
about jus in hello (which is treated here as synonymous with the law of armed
conflict and international humanitarian law), not about jus ad bellum. It is not
tional humanitarian law

intended, therefore, to enter into the controversy regarding the legality of the
decision to resort to force over

Kosovo or the long-running debate over

whether contemporary international law recognizes a

right of

humanitarian

intervention in the face of large scale violations of human rights.
writer has already

made

(albeit

one of a

strictly limited character) exists in

This paper has been revised since the colloquium in order to take account of points

number

of commentators

in

the

Kosovo

remain mine alone.

I

have

also taken the opportunity

account of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Bankovic

and Others delivered on December

made by a

immensely valuable discussion periods, although the

responsibility for the views here expressed

to take

present

clear in other publications his view that a right of

humanitarian intervention

1.

The

19,

2001 since that decision

conflict. Conflicts occurring since

Kosovo

is

directly

are not discussed here.

v.

Belgium

concerned with the

.

The

Applicability of International

Humanitarian

Law

international law and that the conditions for the exercise of that right were

present in Kosovo in 1999, 2 although that view

That, however,
sufficient

—

is

is

by no means universal. 3

a debate for another occasion. For present purposes,

—

but also necessary

it is

to note three points regarding the legal justifi-

cation advanced by the NATO States for their resort to force, since these
points have a bearing on the application of international humanitarian law

and the law of neutrality during the campaign.
First, the Kosovo campaign was one in which some actions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) were undertaken pursuant to a mandate
from the United Nations Security Council, while others were taken by the

House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee,
HC Paper 28-11, p. 137, reprinted in 49
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 926 (2000), and Humanitarian
Intervention: the Case of Kosovo, 10 FINNISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2.

See Christopher Greenwood, Evidence

to the

Foreign Affairs Committee Fourth Report, 1999-2000,

(forthcoming)
3.

Amongst

the literature on the subject, which reflects the very different positions taken by a

wide range of international lawyers, see the evidence given by Ian Brownlie, Christine Chinkin

and Vaughan Lowe to
Commons, supra note

Kingdom House of
49 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY 876-943 (2000); Louis Henkin, Ruth Wedgwood, Jonathan Charney, Christine
Chinkin, Richard Falk, Thomas Franck and W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comments: NATO's
Kosovo Intervention, 93 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 824-878 (1999); Bruno
Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1999); Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10
European Journal Of International Law 23 (1999) and A Follow-Up: Forcible
Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis, id., at 791; Nico Krisch, Unilateral
Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Council, 3 YEARBOOK OF UNITED
NATIONS LAV/ 59 (1999); Dino Kritsiotis, The Kosovo Crisis and NATO's Application of Armed
Force Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 49 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY 330 (2000) Steven Blockmans, Moving into UNchartered Waters: An Emerging Right
of Unilateral Intervention?, 12 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 759 (1999); and
Francesco Francioni, Of War, Humanity and Justice: International Law After Kosovo, 4 YEARBOOK
OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 107 (2000). The Kosovo crisis has also attracted an unusual number
of studies by official and semi-official bodies. These include the report of the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the United Kingdom House of Commons, HOUSE OF COMMONS PAPER
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United
2,

reprinted

in

;

(1999-2000) NO. 28-1 together with the response by the United Kingdom Government

COMMAND

at

PAPERS 4825 (August 2000) the report of the Advisory Council on International
and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law of the Netherlands
Government, Report No. 13 (April 2000), available at http://www.aiv-advice.nl (reviewed by Ige
Dekker in 6 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 115 (2001)); the report of the Danish
Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects
(1999); and the Kosovo Report published by the Independent International Commission on
Kosovo (2000).
;

Affairs
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NATO States on their own initiative. The Security Council had imposed an
arms embargo on the
before the

NATO

FRY when

it

adopted Resolution 1160 in 1998, a year

military action

commenced. After the cessation of the

bombing campaign on June 10, 1999, the Council adopted Resolution 1244,
which provided the legal basis for ground forces led by NATO and known as
KFOR, to enter Kosovo and assume responsibility for the security situation
there, to the exclusion of the armed forces and paramilitary police of the FRY.
The bombing campaign itself, however, was not authorized by the Council.
Although that campaign was undertaken by NATO in support of goals identified by the Security Council in Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203 (all of which
contained provisions which were legally binding upon all States, including the
FRY), none of those resolutions authorized military action. Unlike the situation in the 1990-91 Gulf conflict, therefore, Operation Allied Force was not a
case of enforcement action taken with the authority of the Security Council.

A

must accordingly be drawn between the bombing campaign
which occurred between March 24, 1999 and June 10, 1999, on the one hand,
and the military presence in Kosovo thereafter. As will be seen, this distinction is of some importance in considering the law applicable to military operadistinction

tions after June 10, 1999.

members of

Secondly, while some

NATO

were more forthright on

this

matter than were others, the only substantial justification advanced for the
decision to resort to military action was that such action was justified as a re-

sponse to the humanitarian situation which had been created in Kosovo in the

immediate run-up to the commencement of Operation Allied Force on March

United Kingdom's Permanent Representative to
the United Nations told the Security Council, on the day that the military op24, 1999. For example, the

eration

The

commenced,

that:

action being taken

is

legal. It

is

justified as

an exceptional measure

to prevent

an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. Under present circumstances in
is convincing evidence that such a catastrophe is imminent.

Kosovo, there

Renewed

acts of repression

would cause further
civilian population

loss

on

by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

of civilian

life

and would lead to displacement of the

a large scale and in hostile conditions.

Every means short of force has been tried to avert

this situation. In these

circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming

humanitarian necessity, military intervention

37

is

legally justifiable.

The

force

The

Applicability of International

Humanitarian

Law

now proposed is directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian
and is the minimum judged necessary for that purpose. 4

The emphasis on

catastrophe,

the limited purpose for which force was being employed

and the reference, inherent

in that statement, to the requirement that the

force used should be proportionate to that goal has led

some commentators

argue that the application of international humanitarian law in the

to

NATO

operation should have been different from that required of States engaged in a
"normal" armed conflict. That argument is considered later in this paper.
Finally,

needs to be remembered that, while the jus ad helium and the jus

it

in hello are

separate bodies of law (a fact which has important legal conse-

must comply with both
bodies of law. The Gulf conflict of 1990-91 may be used as an illustration.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the clearest possible violation of the jus ad
helium. It followed that the subsequent occupation of Kuwait and the Iraqi resistance to the coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait were also a violation of
the jus ad helium, even though some aspects of Iraq's behavior (e.g., some of
the property requisitions which occurred or the missile attacks on the Dahran
quences), for military action by a State to be lawful,

airbase) complied with the jus in hello. 5

Thus,

it

Iraq's liability to

make

repara-

tion in accordance with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 687 for

the consequences of

its

unlawful invasion

by acts unlawful under the jus
In this context,

it

is

not confined to damages caused

in hello.

has to be recognized that there was considerable contro-

versy about the legal justification advanced by the
sort to force against the
jus

FRY. That controversy about the application of the

ad helium may have affected the way in which certain

jus in hello and, in particular, the
it

NATO States for their re-

may have

whether the

law of neutrality were perceived. Specifically,

governments to the question
States would have been entitled to impose an embargo on

affected the approach of various

NATO

U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988, at 12. See also the views expressed
Permanent Representatives of the United States of America

4.

Netherlands
of the

(8)

NATO

.

same debate by the
Canada (6) and the

In the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force brought by the

FRY against ten
same

1999

I.C.J.

CR/99/15, available

at

Oral Pleadings of Belgium (Yugo.

For a discussion of these

this issue

issues, see

The other

during that phase of the case.

Christopher Greenwood,

Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law, 55

note 38,

v. Belg.),

http://www.icj'Cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iybe/iybeframe.htm.

respondent States did not address

articles cited at

in the
(4-5),

States in the International Court of Justice, Belgium advanced the

justification for military action; see

5.

issues regarding the

New

MODERN LAW REVIEW

infra.
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World Order or Old? The
153-178 (1992) and the

Christopher

shipments of

oil

and other supplies to the FRY, even where those supplies

were carried in ships
This paper

Greenwood

flying the flags of States

not involved in the

will first consider the applicability

conflict.

of international humanitarian

law to Operation Allied Force before examining certain general issues regard-

manner

which that law had to be applied in the Kosovo campaign.
The question whether persons captured during the operation were prisoners
of war within the Third Geneva Convention will be addressed next, followed
by discussion of the issue of a naval embargo and the law of neutrality. The legal regime applicable to KFOR operations in Kosovo since June 10, 1999 will
ing the

in

be briefly considered before closing with a discussion of the various judicial
proceedings relating to the conduct of the Kosovo conflict. Questions of

tar-

geting and proportionality are considered only in passing, as these are the subject of other papers in the present

The
1.

volume. 6

Applicability of International

The Existence

of an

Humanitarian

Law

Armed Conflict between the NATO

States

and the

FRY
The

first

question to consider

whether international humanitarian law

is

was applicable to Operation Allied Force. Though much discussed at the
time, there is less to this question than meets the eye. The answer
which can

—

be given without qualification

—

is

that international humanitarian law was

fully applicable

from the moment that Operation Allied Force began on

March

until the cessation of hostilities

24,

1999

on June

10, 1999.

ThroughFRY on

out that period an international armed conflict existed between the

hand and the NATO States on the other.
There is no definition of an international armed conflict in any of the treaties on international humanitarian law. It is agreed, however, that the concept
is a factual one based on the existence of actual hostilities between two or more
States, even if those hostilities are at a low level and of short duration. The Apthe one

peals
via

Chamber

of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-

(ICTY) has stated that an "armed conflict

armed force between

to

States."

case of Operation Allied Force.

7

That

The

test

exists

whenever there

was undoubtedly

fact that

is

a resort

satisfied in the

no declaration of war was made

was, of course, irrelevant to the applicability of international humanitarian law
6.

See the papers by Professors Bothe and Dinstein and Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery on

targeting
7.

and by Professors Bring and Murphy on

Prosecutor

also

v.

Tadic, Jurisdiction, 105

collateral

damage.

INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS

Commentary on Geneva Convention
39

III

23 Oean Pictet

453,

ed., i960).

11

70 (1997). See

The Applicability

to that conflict.

It is

of International

well established that

Humanitarian

it is

Law

the fact of armed conflict be-

tween two or more States, not the formality of a declaration of war (which has
been almost unknown since 1945) which triggers the application of that law. 8

Nor does

it

make any

difference to the applicability of international humani-

tarian law that the decision to resort to force

was taken by the North Atlantic

Council, the governing body of NATO, or that the military conduct of the cam-

paign was in the hands of the Supreme Allied

and the

Commander Europe (SACEUR)

NATO military authorities, who acted in consultation with the NATO
them by the North Atlantic Counan international organization which possesses a legal person-

Secretary-General under the authority given
cil.

While

ality

NATO

is

separate from those of its members, that separate personality does not affect

armed
That fact was

the applicability of international humanitarian law to the

member State which implements

NATO decision.

a

9

forces of any

expressly rec-

NATO and the member States during Operation Allied Force.
North
Atlantic Council's authorization to SACEUR and the military
Thus, the
ognized both by

authorities expressly required that operations

dance with international humanitarian law.

ernment stated that "action by our forces

is

were to be conducted in accor-

United Kingdom Gov-

Similarly, the

in strict conformity with international

humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional

NATO governments adopted a similar position.
The fact that NATO acted for humanitarian reasons, so that the legal justifi-

Protocols." 10

Other

cation offered for the decision to resort to force was different from the reliance
self-defense or Security

most armed
tional

8.

Council authorization which has been characteristic of

conflicts since 1945,

humanitarian law.

See Christopher

on

The

is

also irrelevant to the applicability of interna-

principle that international humanitarian law

Greenwood, The Concept of War

AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 283

in International

Law, 36 INTERNATIONAL

(1987). US forces are specifically required to comply

with international humanitarian law in any armed conflict,

irrespective

of

its

formal

Department of Defense, DoD Law of War Program, DoD Directive
5100.77, Dec. 9, 1998 and ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 290-1 (A.R. Thomas and James Duncan eds., 1999)
(Vol. 73, US Naval War College International Law Studies).

characterization; see

9.

Whether

it

affects the issue of State responsibility for a violation of those rules

is

currently

under consideration in the proceedings in the International Court of Justice and the European
Court of Human Rights discussed later in this paper. No one, however, has suggested that armed
forces operating under NATO command and control are not subject to customary international
humanitarian law and the treaty provisions binding upon the State concerned.
10.

Answer

to a Parliamentary question

Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and

International

Law 605

on May 18, 1999 by Baroness Symons, Parliamentary
Commonwealth Office, 70 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF

(1999).
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applies equally to

force or
It

its

both sides of a conflict irrespective of the reasons

legality

one of the best established

is

follows that the humanitarian law of international

applicable throughout the period
tilities

March

for resort to

principles of the jus in hello} 1

24, 1999 to June

armed

conflicts

was

1999 to the hos-

10,

NATO States and the FRY. Two questions, however, re-

between the

quire further consideration.

2.

The

FRY

Status of the

Geneva Conventions and

as a Party to the

Protocol I

The

Geneva Convenu
tions and Protocol I of 1911. This question arises because of the peculiar status of the FRY at the relevant time. The FRY was one of the States which
first

question concerns the applicability of the 1949

emerged from the former

(SFRY)
when that State collapsed in 1991-92. Of the six republics which had made up
four
Bosnia-Herzegovina,
the
SFRY,
Croatia,
Macedonia
and
Slovenia had declared their independence between June 1991 and May
1992 and had, in due course, been recognized and admitted as members of the
United Nations. The two remaining republics, Serbia and Montenegro,
formed the FRY. The Government of the FRY from its foundation until the
overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000 considered the FRY to be the con-

—

—

tinuation of the old
tion of the

FRY
1 1.

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

SFRY

USSR) and not

(just as

the Russian Federation was the continua-

a successor State.

continued the SFRY's membership in

See,

e.g.,

all

It

therefore maintained that the

international organizations

the decision of the United States Military Tribunal in United States

REPORTS OF TRIALS OF

WAR CRIMINALS

1234, 1247. See also Protocol

to the 1949

I

8

v. List,

and

LAW

Geneva

Conventions, the Preamble to which states that "the provisions of the Geneva Conventions

and of this Protocol must be

fully applied in all

circumstances to

those instruments, without any adverse distinction based
conflict or

Additional

all

persons

.

.

.

who are protected by

on the nature or

origin of the

armed

on the causes espoused by or attributed to the parties to the conflict." Protocol
(I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of

Victims of International Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
OF
Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Protocol I].
422 (Adam Roberts

&

WAR

12.

Geneva Convention

Armed

for the

Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3 1 14, 75

LAWS OF

WAR

Wounded and Sick in
U.N.T.S. 31, DOCUMENTS ON THE

Amelioration of the Condition of the

Geneva

Geneva Convention

for the

Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the

Armed

supra note 11, at 197 [hereinafter

Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85,

Geneva Convention Relative

I];

id.

at

222 [hereinafter Geneva

II];

to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
244 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,

3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,

id.

at

id.

at

301 [hereinafter Geneva IV]. Protocol

I,

supra note 11.
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The

that

all treaties

and Protocol

Applicability of International

Humanitarian

Law

concluded by the SFRY, including the Geneva Conventions

FRY without any need

continued to apply to the

an act of
succession. Accordingly, whereas the other States which emerged from the
SFRY each made a declaration of succession to the Conventions and Protocols,

the

I,

FRY

for

did not.

The FRY's claim

to be the continuation of the

SFRY was not,

however, ac-

cepted by the rest of the international community. Thus, the Arbitration

Commission of the Peace Conference for the Former Yugoslavia (known as
"the Badinter Commission" after the name of its Chairman, Judge Robert
Badinter of the French Constitutional Court) rejected the FRY's claim and
gave the opinion that the States which emerged from the SFRY were all successor States, none of which had any special claim to continue the personality
of the old State. 13 The United Nations Security Council and General Assembly also rejected the FRY's claim and stated that it should apply for membership of the United Nations. 14 The then Government of the FRY, however,
adhered to its position that it continued the personality of the SFRY and thus
continued to be bound by, and to have the benefit of, all of the latter's treaty
obligations. Thus, in the cases brought against

Justice by Bosnia-Herzegovina

NATO States in
The change
State,

did not contest that

it

1

Court of

for alleged violations of the

Geno-

it

999. 16

of government in the

of this position.

new

in the International

was bound by that Convention. 15
took the same position in the cases which it brought against ten

cide Convention,

The FRY

and Croatia

it

The

post-Milosevic

FRY in 2000 brought a complete reversal
government accepted that the FRY was a

one of five successors to the SFRY. In October 2000

13. Opinions 9 and
10, 92 INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1488 (1998).

LAW REPORTS
See Michael

Yugoslav States in the United Nations and in Multilateral Treaties,

Nations Law 231

203,

Wood,
1

it

applied

206

for,

(1998);

Participation of

31

Former

YEARBOOK OF UNITED

(1997).

(May

U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992); S.C. Res. 777 (Sep. 19, 1992),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (1992); S.C. Res. 821 (Apr. 28, 1993), U.N. Doc. S/RES/821 (1993); and
G.A. Res. 47/1 (Sep. 22, 1992), U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (1992).
15. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn.
Herz. v. Yugo.) 1996 I.C.J. 595 (Preliminary Objections) and 1997 I.C.J. 243
(Counter-claims) Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
14.

S.C. Res. 757

30, 1992),

&

;

Crime of Genocide (Croat,

v.

Yugo.), available

on the ICJ website

at http://www.icj-cij.org.

At

the time this was written, the Court had not held hearings on the merits of the Bosnian case or

taken any substantive decision in the Croatian case.
16.

See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
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and was admitted to, membership of the United Nations. 17 On March 8, 2001,
the new government deposited an instrument of accession to the Genocide
Convention, which became effective ninety days later in accordance with Article XIII of the Convention. By the same instrument, the FRY entered a reservation to Article IX (the provision which confers jurisdiction on the
International Court of Justice). The FRY subsequently applied to the International Court under Article 61 of the Court's Statute to re-open the jurisdiction phase of the Bosnia case on the grounds that the FRY had not been bound
by the Genocide Convention at the relevant times and had never been bound
by Article IX. 18 At the time of writing, the Court had not taken any decision
regarding this application.

The FRY

had, however, been treated throughout the Kosovo conflict as a

Geneva Conventions and Protocols both by other States (including the NATO States) and by the ICRC, which sent a formal note to the FRY
and the NATO member States on March 24, 1999 reminding them of their
obligations under the Geneva Conventions. 19
On October 16, 2001, the new government of the FRY deposited with the
Swiss Federal Government a declaration regarding the Geneva Conventions
party to the

and Protocols. In contrast to the position taken by the new government with
regard to the Genocide Convention, however, this declaration was an instru-

ment of succession, not
tive, stating

which

that

it

was expressly made retrospecfrom April 27, 1992. Any element of doubt

accession. Moreover,

took

effect as

it

might therefore have arisen regarding the status of the

FRY as a party to

the Geneva Conventions and Protocols is therefore removed. The new government had earlier deposited instruments of succession to a large number of
multilateral conventions.

Accordingly, the Geneva Conventions were applicable to

volved in the conflict, while Protocol

NATO States which were parties to

17.

I

all

applied as between the

it (all

the States in-

FRY and

those

of them except France, Turkey and

S.C. Res. 1326 (Oct. 31, 2000), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1326 (2000); G.S. Res. 55/12 (Nov.

1,

2000), U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/12 (2000).
18.

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide (Bosn.

& Herz. v. Yugo.), Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 July

1996 (23

April 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
19.

ICRC

Press

Release

99/15,

Mar.

24,

news_by_date.
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1999,

available

at

http://www.icrc.org/eng/

The

Applicability of International

the United States of America). 20

Humanitarian

The customary law of armed

Law
conflict

was

also

applicable.

The Relationship between NATO and the KLA/UCK
The second question concerns the extent to which the hostilities between
the FRY and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UCK) were governed by
3.

international humanitarian law. There
start

doubt

that,

even before the

of Operation Allied Force, an armed conflict existed in Kosovo between

FRY and

the

is little

the

KLA/UCK. The

possibility that

such a conflict might

was impliedly recognized by the Security Council as early

when

as

March

exist

1998,

urged the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the

it

former Yugoslavia (ICTY) "to begin gathering information relating to the violence in

Kosovo that may

jurisdiction

is

might already

an armed

within

its

largely confined to crimes

invitation appears to
flict

fall

jurisdiction." 21 Since the Tribunal's

have proceeded on the

exist.

The

armed

conflict, 22 this

basis that, at least,

an armed con-

committed

in

events of early 1999 also strongly suggested that

conflict existed within Kosovo. 23

At least until March
acter, since

it

24, 1999, that conflict

was of a non-international char-

consisted of "protracted armed violence between governmental

20. France became a party to Protocol I in 2001. Peter Kovacs, Intervention armee des forces
del'OTAN au Kosovo, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 103 (2000), argues that
the United States had agreed to comply with Protocol I and was therefore bound by it. This

argument

is

unconvincing.

It

confuses the willingness (and, indeed, the obligation) of the United

States to apply the rules of customary international law codified in

Protocol

I

with a declaration of readiness to apply the entire Protocol as such.

has never agreed to apply
21.

S.C. Res. 1160

The

some of the provisions of

11

all

of the provisions of Protocol

The United

States

I.

17 (Mar. 31, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998).

existence of an armed conflict

is an inherent feature of grave breaches (Article 2 of the
and war crimes (Article 3); it is also expressly required as a condition for
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity (Article 5). Only genocide (Article 4) can be
prosecuted in the Tribunal without the need to demonstrate the existence of an armed conflict.
The ICTY was created by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 827 (May 25,
1993), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). The ICTY Statute and the Secretary-General's
Commentaries are contained in the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (May 3, 1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32

22.

Tribunal's Statute)

International Legal Materials
23.

1163, 1192 (1993).

See the indictment against Slobodan Milosevic and others issued by the Prosecutor on

May

22, 1999 and confirmed by Judge Hunt on May 24, 1999 (IT-99-37-I). Note also the ICRC
statement of January 18, 1999 regarding the massacre at Racak, which called on "both sides to

comply with international humanitarian law and to spare those not, or no longer, involved
fighting."

ICRC Press Release 99/04, Jan.

18, 1999, available at the

44

in the

ICRC website, supra note

19.

Christopher Greenwood

authorities

and organized armed groups

.

.

.

within a State." 24

As

such,

it

was

governed by the provisions of common Article 3 and the customary law applicable to non-international conflicts. 25 Although the KLA/UCK has at
times claimed to be a national liberation

movement,

self-determination would constitute an international
Article

1

(4)

of Protocol

community.

tional

The

question

armed

its

struggle for

conflict

under

that claim has not been accepted by the interna-

I,

26

is

the law applicable to international

NATO

on March 24, 1999
that all the hostilities became subject to
armed conflicts considered above. The

whether the intervention of

"internationalized" that conflict, so

ICTY

so that

in the Tadic case, 27 that

an international armed conflict can co-exist alongside a non-international one and that
the latter will be internationalized only if there is a clear relationship between
the non-governmental party to that conflict and one of the States party to the
international conflict. While the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber on the
nature of that relationship is open to criticism, the requirement that some
has recognized, in

kind of relationship exist

two decisions

its

is

surely right

comes into being alongside

— the mere

fact that a conflict

between

one of those States cannot,
make the law of international armed conflicts
in and of itself, be
applicable to the latter. At least until the end of May 1999, however, NATO
kept its distance from the KLA/UCK and even after that time it is far from
clear that the relations between them were sufficiently close for the conflict
States

a conflict within

sufficient to

24.

The

definition of a non-international

armed

conflict given

by the Appeals Chamber of the

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Tadic, supra note
25.

It is

more doubtful whether Protocol

unclear whether the

KLA/UCK

II

7,

11

70.

applied. Until the closing stages of the fighting,

it is

exercised sufficient control over a defined area of territory to

meet the requirements of Article

1(1) of Protocol

II.

Protocol Additional to the

Geneva

Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, 1 125 U.N.T.S. 609, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra
note
26.
a

1 1,

It is

at

483 [hereinafter Protocol

II].

none of the

noticeable, for example, that

national

liberation

self-determination, nor

regarding Kosovo.

movement
is

or

that

NATO States argued that the KLA/UCK was

the

population

such a view reflected in the various

of Kosovo

UN

had

a

right

to

Security Council resolutions

The Prosecutor has not charged Slobodan Milosevic with grave breaches
ICTY Statute the only offense within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal

—

under Article 2 of the

which can only be committed

—

an international armed conflict (Tadic, supra note 7) in
some of the incidents in Kosovo in early 1999 (such as the
massacre of forty-five villagers at Racak on January 15, 1999 (U.N. Doc. S/PRST/ 1999/2)) would
appear to have qualified as a grave breach had there been an international conflict.
27. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Jurisdiction) (2 October 1995), 105 INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
419 (1997); Prosecutor v. Tadic (Merits), 38 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1518 (1999).
in

respect of Kosovo, even though
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The
between the
tional armed

Applicability of International

KLA/UCK

and the

conflict, rather

different set of rules.

FRY

tional

Law

to be regarded as part of the interna-

than a separate internal conflict governed by a

28

Application of International Humanitarian

The

Humanitarian

Law

in the

Kosovo Conflict

preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that the law of interna-

armed

conflicts (both the

customary law and that contained in the

vant treaties) was applicable to the Kosovo conflict. Since

it

rele-

a well

is

established principle that international humanitarian law applies equally to

both sides in a

conflict, irrespective of the lawfulness of the resort to force or

the purpose for which force

is

used,

it

should follow that there was nothing

special about the application of international humanitarian law in the

campaign.

Kosovo

29

—

That means, in particular, that the two main principles of targeting
were applicable throughout. While these
tinction and proportionality

—

ciples are discussed in greater detail in other papers in the present

way

dis-

prin-

volume,

it is

which they are formulated in Protocol I, which is
generally regarded as stating the customary law on the subject. The principle
of distinction is evident throughout Articles 48 to 58 of the Protocol but three
useful to recall the

in

provisions are particularly important:

Article

48

In order to ensure respect for

and protection of the

and
between

civilian population

civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish

the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives

and accordingly

shall direct their operations only against military

objectives.

Article 51(2)

The

civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall

object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of

spread terror

28.

among

not be the

which

is

to

the civilian population are prohibited.

On the subject of prisoners captured by the KLA and handed over to NATO forces, see infra

this paper.

29.

The

more

principle of equal application

is

clearly stated in the List case, supra note 11,

recently reaffirmed in the Preamble to Protocol

46

I,

supra note 11.

and was
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Article 52(2)

Attacks shall be

strictly limited to military objectives. In so far as objects are

concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use

whose

or

total

make an

effective contribution to military action

capture

destruction,

partial

or

neutralization,

in

and
the

circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

The

principle of proportionality

is

succinctly stated in Article 51(5)(b),

which prohibits "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."

Two
the

very different schools of thought have suggested that the purpose of

NATO intervention and the unusual character of the conflict meant that

the rules of international humanitarian law
distinction

and proportionality

—were

—and,

in particular, these rules of

to be applied in a

from that in other recent conflicts such as the 1990-91

The purpose

for

which

manner

hostilities in

the Gulf.

NATO employed force — to halt the attacks on the

Kosovars and to reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo
ready been considered.

have manifested

The unusual

itself in

two ways.

Allied Force, the ability of the

character of the conflict

First, for

Kosovo was

may be

al-

said to

most of the period of Operation

With no ground

immediate deployment, they were obliged to
ing in

—has

NATO States directly to influence events on

the ground in Kosovo was very limited.

to strike effectively at the

different

rely

FRY forces engaged

on

air

forces available for

power and

their ability

in the process of ethnic cleans-

limited, at least until the closing stages of the conflict. In-

was to attack targets throughout much of the FRY in
order to bring about a change of policy on the part of the FRY government.
stead, their strategy

Secondly, while the FRY's anti-aircraft defenses continued to attack

NATO aircraft throughout the conflict, the FRY did not attack the territory
of any of the NATO States, nor, apart from the capture of a US patrol on the
border between the
against
flict
flict,

FRY and Macedonia,

did

it

conduct any operations

NATO forces anywhere outside the FRY. The result was that the con-

was exceptionally one-sided

where Iraq launched

—

in contrast, for example, to the

missile attacks against Saudi

Gulf con-

Arabia and other

coalition States, as well as against Israel.

which NATO resorted to force and these unusual characteristics of the conflict have led to two very different theories, each of which
suggests a departure from the normal principles of the law of armed conflict

The purpose

for

47

The Applicability
and each of which, in

of International

this writer's view,

is

Humanitarian

a heresy

Law

which demands emphatic

rejection.

The
which

first

of these heresies

that

is

NATO's

motives and the manner in

was obliged to fight the conflict permitted it a greater latitude in
choosing the targets which it would attack than would otherwise be the case.
In particular, since the purpose of the bombing campaign was not to defeat the
FRY armed forces (in the normal sense of that term, i.e., by successfully engagit

change of policy on the part of the FRY
Government, objects whose destruction was particularly likely to increase the
pressure on the FRY Government were legitimate targets in this conflict irreing

them

in battle) but to produce a

spective of whether they

fell

within the definition of military objectives codi-

fied in Article 52(2) of Protocol

I.

An

important part of

this thesis

is

that

undermine support amongst the enemy civilian
population for the policy of its government would be lawful.
Tempting though such an approach may be, it is difficult to reconcile with
attacks carried out in order to

contemporary international humanitarian law. As demonstrated above, the
principle that the

enemy

civilian population

themselves legitimate targets

is

now

and individual

clearly established in that law.

over, the definition of a military objective requires

make an

question

civilians are

effective contribution to the

30

not

More-

both that the object in

enemy's

military action

and

damage of the object offers a definite military advantage to the State whose forces attack it. 31 Nothing in any of the treaties on the
law of armed conflict or the practice of States suggests that a State's motives
that the destruction or

or the fact that

it

seeks to procure a change in

its

adversary's policy rather

than that adversary's total defeat can expand the range of targets which

is

law-

an object does not become a target simply because of its political significance or the effect which its destruction is likely to
have on civilian morale and support for a hostile government. Only something
fully

open

to

it. It

which meets the

follows that

criteria of a military objective laid

may lawfully be attacked.
That does not mean that the political effect

down by international hu-

manitarian law

(including the effect

on enemy

morale) of attacking a particular target cannot legitimately be taken into consideration. Provided that the target constitutes a military objective

30. See, e.g., the provision to that effect in Protocol

I,

Articles 48, 50

and the

and 51(2), supra note

11,

THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON
in
the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 144M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.1) (1995),
reprinted in the ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 8, at 403.
31. Protocol I, Article 52(2), supra note 1 1, at 450; COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 30,
and the statement

11

8.1.1 (the

11

8. 1.2

of Naval Doctrine Command,

wording of which

is

slightly different).
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principle of proportionality contained in humanitarian law
entirely legitimate to seek to

undermine the

will of

is

respected, 32

and support

it is

for the en-

emy's government. But the desire to achieve that goal cannot convert into a
lawful target something which does not otherwise meet those criteria. It is

noteworthy that none of the

The

rival

heresy

is

that,

NATO governments suggested otherwise.

33

because the campaign was fought for a humanitar-

ian objective, international humanitarian law has to be interpreted as imposing

upon

NATO more extensive restrictions than would otherwise have been

Such an approach is apparent
national Commission on Kosovo (an
the case.

in the report of the

Independent

Inter-

body of non-governmental
commentators established at the initiative of the Prime Minister of Sweden)
As part of what it describes as a "Framework for Principled Humanitarian Inunofficial

tervention," the Report proposes that in cases of humanitarian intervention

"there must be even stricter adherence to the laws of war and international

humanitarian law than in standard military operations." 34
This suggestion (which

cism on at

is

admittedly

made

least three grounds. First, there

minded about the whole

idea.

de lege ferenda)
is

something

The Report does not appear

is

open

to criti-

distinctly woolly-

to suggest that the

rules of international humanitarian law applicable to a force engaging in hu-

manitarian intervention should

differ

from those applicable to forces engaged

in other military operations, but rather that those rules should

be more

strictly

can prescribe the same rules for all types of
military operations but require a higher standard of adherence in some cases
than in others is untenable. International humanitarian law requires that,
whenever it applies, it should be complied with. One violation may, of course,
be less serious than another and, as a matter of fact, one force may have a
better record of compliance than another. It is, however, illogical and contrary
applied. Yet the idea that the law

to principle to say that the law requires

one party to comply with

all

of the

—

which are binding upon it but requires another party albeit bound by
all of the same rules
to comply only with some, or to comply with all but to a
lesser degree. In reality what the Commission is proposing is that different and stricter rules should apply to a State which resorts to force by way
rules

—
—

—

32.

See Protocol

I,

Article 51(5)(b), supra note 11, at 448-9;

COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK,

supra note 30, H 8.1.2.1.
33.

See also the

article

Law and the Kosovo Crisis:
82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 129, 131-2

by James Burger, International Humanitarian

Lessons Learned or to be Learned,
(2000).
34.

Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report 195

(2000); see also page 179.
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of humanitarian intervention than to one which resorts to force for any other
purpose. But the Commission's proposal begs

many

questions about which

and what degree of modification might be involved.
Secondly, whichever way the Commission's suggestion is put, it would have
the effect of driving a coach and horses through the principle that international humanitarian law applies equally to both sides in any conflict, without
regard to the cause which they espouse or the legality of their action under the
jus ad helium. A State whose forces were resisting humanitarian intervention by
rules are involved

another State or group of States would, presumably, be required to comply with
the normal rules of international humanitarian law (or to display the normally
required degree of adherence)
gree of latitude than

its

.

It

would therefore be

opponent.

The

entitled to a greater de-

implications of the Commission's pro-

posal in this respect are concealed by the unusual circumstances of the
conflict.

As has

already been noted, the

FRY

Kosovo

did not respond by force against

NATO States (other than by the use of anti-aircraft fire) and did not atwould be naive, however, to assume that
tack the NATO States themselves.
the

It

the same conditions will necessarily apply in any future humanitarian intervention. Indeed,

had

NATO proceeded to a ground campaign,

it

would not have

been the case in the Kosovo conflict, as the FRY could, and almost certainly
would, have put up a strenuous resistance to NATO ground forces.
Thirdly, the effect of the Commission's suggestion would be that international humanitarian law would impose greater constraints on a State engaging
in

humanitarian intervention than on a State which acted in self-defense or

even one which invaded a neighbor in clear violation of Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter. It is not immediately obvious why an aggressor
should be subject to

less rigorous rules in respect, for

example, of targeting

than a State which intervenes to prevent genocide or other large-scale violations of

human

A more

rights.

sophisticated suggestion

is

tique of the Report to the Prosecutor.

regarding the

Both

canvassed by Professor Bothe in a

35

cri-

After examining the Report's findings

NATO campaign, Professor Bothe states:

in relation to the question of the definition of the military objective

relation to the proportionality principle, the report

fundamental question.

Do

fails

and in

to raise yet another

traditional considerations of military necessity

and

Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 1257 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A [hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor!

35. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the

The Report

is

discussed infra this paper.
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military advantage have a legitimate place in a conflict the declared purpose of
which is a humanitarian one, namely to promote the cause of human rights? The
thought would deserve further consideration that in such a conflict, more
severe restraints would be imposed on the choice of military targets and of the

balancing test applied for the purposes of the proportionality principle than in a
'normal'

The
follows:

conflict. 36

armed

reasoning which seems to underlie this proposal can be summarized as

humanitarian intervention, in so

does so only for

strictly limited

far as

purposes.

It

it

justifies military

action at

all,

follows that only military action

which serves those limited purposes is legitimate and the traditional considerations of military advantage and military necessity must be adapted (and circumscribed) accordingly. In

effect, it requires

reading the definition of a

and the statement of
though they referred to a

military objective codified in Article 52(2) of Protocol

the proportionality principle in Article 5 1 (5) (b) as
legitimate military

advantage.

Professor Bothe's approach 37 avoids the

the Kosovo Commission proposals but
tions

I

and must therefore be

first

it still falls

As soon

rejected.

objection raised in relation to

as

two objecthe concept of

foul of the other

one

qualifies

military advantage (or military necessity) by reference to considerations of le-

gitimacy drawn from the purpose for which a party resorts to force, the jus ad

become

mixed and the principle of
equal application of international humanitarian law is fatally compromised. If
a State, whose resort to force is in jus ad bellum terms lawful only for strictly
limited purposes, violates the jus in hello whenever it attacks a target whose destruction will not contribute to the achievement of those purposes, it follows
that a State whose resort to force is unlawful under the jus ad helium will violate the jus in hello whenever it targets anything. Yet that is precisely the argument which was advanced and comprehensively rejected both in the trials at
the end of World War Two and in the negotiation of Protocol I.
The difficulties, both practical and theoretical, of such an approach are obvious when one asks what standards would have been applicable to attacks by
the FRY on targets in the NATO States had such attacks been carried out
during the Kosovo conflict. The FRY was plainly not acting by way of humanitarian intervention. Would its actions therefore have been judged by
bellum and the jus in hello

36.

Michael Bothe, The Protection of the

Comments on

the

Report

International Law
37.

to

the

inextricably

and NATO Bombing on Yugoslavia:
ICTY, 12 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF

Civilian Population

Prosecutor

of the

531, 535 (2001).

See the papers by Professors Bothe and Bring
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in the present

volume.
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reference to the modified jus in hello considered to apply to a humanitarian in-

tervention or would they have been subject to the jus in hello applicable in a

"normal" armed conflict? Neither answer would be at

FRY

the

all satisfactory, for

engaged in an activity which was entirely alien to it
while the second would mean that the FRY would enjoy greater latitude in
States for no apparent reason. It is only because the
targeting than the
treats the

first

as

NATO

circumstances of the Kosovo conflict were such that the
tice,

able to attack the

FRY was not, in prac-

NATO States that these difficulties were obscured.

That is not to say that the legal basis for resort to force has no bearing on
the manner in which that force may be used. As the statement by the United
Kingdom Representative, quoted in Part I above, makes clear, the force used
in

humanitarian intervention has to be necessary in order to achieve the goal

of ending (or preventing) the humanitarian emergency. In other words, the

purpose for which force

is

permitted under the jus ad helium

Kosovo, a humanitarian purpose

—

—

limits the degree of force

in the case of

which may be

However, this recognition of the relationship between the degree of
force used and the goal to be achieved is different from the suggestion advanced by Professor Bothe in two important respects.
First, considerations of necessity and proportionality here operate as part of the
jus ad helium, not the jus in hello. This is much more than a theoretical distinction
and has important practical consequences. It leaves intact the jus in hello definition of what constitutes a military objective and such concepts as military necessity and proportionality for the purposes of Article 51(5)(b). The proportionality
used.

limitation in the jus ad helium measures the use of force as a whole against the

yardstick of what

is

proportionate to the overall goal to be achieved;

it

does not

quire analysis of each individual attack by reference to that overall goal.
over, the limits of the jus ad helium, unlike those of the jus in hello,

re-

More-

do not carry

with them the possibility of criminal sanctions for individual servicemen. Secondly, a requirement that the force used

achieved
sense

is

is

must be proportionate

to the goal to be

not confined to humanitarian intervention. Proportionality in

also a requirement of the law of self-defense.

this

38

Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary
and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, H 194 (June 27); this principle
was common ground between the United States of America and Nicaragua. For further
discussion of the principle of proportionality in self-defense and its relationship to the jits in bello,
see Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between lus ad Bellum and lus in Bello, 9 REVIEW OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 221-34 (1983) and Self-Defence and the Conduct of International
Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 273-88 (Yoram Dinstein
38. See, e.g., the decision of the International

Activities in

ed., 1989).
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Both of the "heretical" views considered here are the product of understandable (though largely contradictory) concerns but they involve an unjustified muddling of jus ad bellum and jus in hello issues in a way which is contrary
to principle

tion

and unsupported by

authority. In this writer's view, the true posi-

can be stated very simply: the

NATO States and the FRY were bound to

comply with the relevant rules of international humanitarian law in
nothing more or less.
flict, as they would have been in any other

this

con-

—

Prisoners of

Issues

War

concerning prisoners of war arose in two contexts during the Kosovo

conflict. First, three

US

soldiers serving

with the multinational peacekeeping

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) were captured by FRY forces on March 31, 1999. Secondly, two members of the FRY
forces captured by the KLA/UCK were subsequently handed over to United
States forces who held them for a short period. Both cases gave rise to a degree
of confusion about the status of the prisoners, which is surprising in view of
the clarity of the Third Geneva Convention. In both cases the status of those
concerned as prisoners of war entitled to the full protection of the Convention
should never have been in doubt.
force in the

At

US soldiers were serving in a multiFYROM. That force had originally been a

the time of their capture, the three

national peacekeeping force in the

United Nations one
in February

(UN

Preventative Deployment Force

(UNPREDEP))

but

1999 the People's Republic of China had vetoed the Security

Council resolution required to renew the mandate of UNPREDEP, because of
the

FYROM's diplomatic links with Taiwan. The contingents which had com-

posed

UNPREDEP had remained in the FYROM

at the request of its govern-

ment and had reconstituted themselves as a multinational force outside
United Nations control. At the time of their capture, the three US soldiers
were not involved in the military operations against the

FRY and

were con-

ducting a patrol as part of the multinational force's operations. There was

some doubt

as to

strayed into the

whether

FRY

at the time of their capture they

had inadvertently

or whether they were captured in the territory of the

FYROM.
Neither their membership in the multinational force nor the place of their
capture, however, affects their status.

Under Article 4A(1) of the Third Con-

members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict who have
into the power of the enemy" automatically have the status of prisoners
The three US servicemen were undoubtedly members of the US armed

vention,
"fallen

of war.
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Humanitarian

clearly a party to

Moreover,

at the time of their capture.

it is

Law

an armed conflict with the
difficult to

think of words

more apt to describe what happened to the three than that they had "fallen
into the power of the enemy." Nothing in the Convention, or the subsequent
practice in its interpretation leaves any room for excluding them on the
ground that they were not involved in the conflict itself or that they were
members of a non-United Nations peacekeeping force.
Nor would their status be affected by the fact that they were captured in the

FYROM. Whether

the

FYROM

controversial question but even

if it

then the

FRY

is

was, the place of their capture does not

Convention.

fect the applicability of the
as a neutral State,

was, strictly speaking, a neutral State

If

the

a

af-

FYROM was properly regarded

incursion into

its

territory

which resulted

in

the capture of the three would have been unlawful but the status of prisoner of

war

is

made contingent on

legality of the

the fact of being in the hands of an enemy, not the

means by which

that was accomplished.

and disturbing that there was ever
any doubt about the status of the three captured soldiers. James Burger has
commented that "[sjome persons thought initially that it would be better to
assert that the captured soldiers were illegal detainees, allowing the United
In these circumstances,

States to

demand

active hostilities"

men were

their
39

it is

surprising

immediate

release, rather

than waiting until the end of

but that the United States instead took the position that

which he describes as "the right decision." It
was certainly that but the point needs to be emphasized that the status of the
three as prisoners of war was an automatic consequence of the fact that they
met the requirements of the Convention, not the result of a policy choice. The
status of a detainee as a prisoner of war is not something dependent upon the
the

prisoners of war,

tainty

own State or the detaining power. The initial uncermay have contributed to the refusal by the FRY to allow access by the

ICRC

to the three until

choice of either his or her

more than three weeks

breach of the Convention.
In passing,

it

after their capture, a clear

40

should be noted that, had the force in which the three

been serving remained a United Nations peacekeeping

would probably have been

different. In principle,

force,

when

then the answer

a national unit

signed to the United Nations for a mission under United Nations

mand

—

i.e.,

a "blue beret" operation

39.

Burger, supra note 33, at 136.

40.

ICRC

— the members of the

Press Releases 99/21, Apr. 23, 1999 (protesting lack of access)

1999 (recording a

visit

by the

is

as-

com-

unit are, for the

and 99/25, Apr.

ICRC to the three men) available at ICRC website, supra note
54

men

19.

27,
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duration of their assignment and at least as long as they do not act outside the

scope of the United Nations mandate
ties

(e.g.,

by engaging in surveillance

activi-

unauthorized by the United Nations), to be considered as United Nations

members of the armed

personnel, not

forces of their

own

State. In those cir-

cumstances, they would be protected by the provisions of the Convention on
the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel of 1994, assuming that

the States concerned were parties, or the Convention

on

Privileges

and Immu-

nities of 1946.

The

position of the

FRY soldiers captured by the KLA/UCK is also straight-

forward, at least once they

came

into the custody of the United States. As-

suming that, at the time of their capture, the conflict between the KLA/UCK
and the FRY was still an internal conflict (a matter considered above), the
captured soldiers did not become prisoners of war when they fell into the
hands of the

KLA/UCK,

as that status

does not apply to prisoners in internal

once they were transferred to the custody of a State
which was engaged in an international armed conflict against their own State,
they fulfilled the requirements of Article 4A(1) of the Third Convention and
conflicts. Nevertheless,

were thus entitled to treatment

as prisoners of war. It appears that they

were

treated as such throughout the time they were held by the United States

access by the

ICRC was

allowed in accordance with the Convention.

and

41

The Naval Embargo
By

contrast, the naval operations against the

The focus of discussion was

legal questions.

mented

—

FRY gave

the proposal

—

oil

ships flying the flag of States not involved in the conflict.

no obstacle

own

where the

in international law to the

flags

from engaging in

flag State,

warships intercepting

which gave

41. See

more

in fact

never imple-

serious

that the considerable naval forces available in the Adriatic should

prevent shipments of oil to the FRY, even where the

their

rise to

NATO States preventing ships flying

this trade. 42

Nor was

there any such obstacle

though not a member of NATO, consented to
its

vessels, as a

rise to difficulty

ICRC

was being carried by
There was obviously

number of

was whether

Press Releases 99/20, Apr. 18, 1999

States did.

The

NATO

question

NATO could lawfully intercept and

and 99/29,

May

18, 1999; available at

ICRC

website, supra note 19.
42.

Whether the

and one which

national laws of the States concerned permitted such action

falls

outside the scope of this study.
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is

another matter

The

divert ships flying the flag of a neutral State
tion,

such

as

Law

___

which did not consent

to such ac-
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Humanitarian

Russian merchant ships.

The problem

was, in part, of a political, rather than a legal, character.

There was an understandable

desire

on the

part of

NATO not to risk an escaA fur-

lation of the conflict or further to embitter their relations with Russia.

ther political complication was that the

FRY's only port, Bar, was in

Montenegro, not Serbia. Throughout the

Montenegro sought
actions of the

in

political

Government of

Government and the Government
of the FRY, could not be regarded as a

Federal
as part

the legal sense of the term,
status

the

to distance itself to the greatest extent possible from the

FRY

While Montenegro,

conflict,

it

terms.

of Serbia.
neutral in

nevertheless sought something akin to a neutral

NATO,

although

bombed some targets in
the Montenegro Government
it

Montenegro, wished to bolster the position of
and thus to minimize military action against Montenegro.
By contrast, international law appeared to present few problems. Although
the matter is not entirely free of controversy, the general view is that the customary international law of armed conflict

still

permits a State engaged in an

armed conflict to prevent strategic commodities such as oil from
reaching its opponent by sea, even if carried in neutral flagged vessels. The
majority view is that that can be done either by the imposition of a blockade 43
or by less drastic measures of visit, search and capture designed to prevent the
flow of contraband to an enemy. 44 Since the NATO States were engaged in an
armed conflict with the FRY, the imposition of an oil embargo (with or without a general blockade) would, in principle, have been compatible with the jus
international

in hello.
It

would, however, be wrong to dismiss the doubts about the proposed em-

bargo as having no legal

Two

need to be considered. First, in order to be lawful an oil embargo would have had to comply not
only with the jus in hello but also with the jus ad helium. A blockade of Saudi
Arabia by the Iraqi navy (had that been possible) during the 1990-91 Gulf
conflict

basis.

different legal issues

might well have complied with the requirements of the jus

in hello

but

would nevertheless have been unlawful, because the entire Iraqi resort to
force contravened the jus ad helium. The need to comply with the jus ad helium
it

is

particularly important

43. See,

e.g.,

International

1111

the measures in question are taken against

COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK,

Doswald-Beck
44.

when

Law

Applicable

supra note 30,

11

7.7;

SAN REMO MANUAL ON

to armed Conflicts at Sea

1111

93-104 (Louise

ed., 1995).

Commander's Handbook,

supra note 30,

146-152.

56

11

7.4.1;

San Remo Manual,

supra note 43,
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An oil embargo of the FRY would

neutral States.

on the

strictions

Greenwood
have involved enforcing

exercise by the shipping of neutral States of the normal rights

of freedom of navigation under international law. Accordingly, while
essary to

show

that those restrictions were compatible with the jus in

not sufficient to do

The

re-

so;

it is

nec-

hello, it is

they must also be within the limits of the jus ad helium.

embargo was therefore, for many, the reflection of their uncertainty about whether NATO had a
solid legal justification for resorting to force at all. In addition, even if international law does recognize a right to use force by way of humanitarian intervention, it is still necessary to ask whether that extends to the exercise of
belligerent rights over the shipping of neutral States. As was made clear earlier
in this paper, the present writer is firmly of the view that there is a right of humanitarian intervention in an extreme case. Moreover, if international law
uncertainty about the possible imposition of an

oil

permits States to use force in such a case against the State responsible for the

humanitarian
action which

crisis,

then

it is

logical that

it

should also permit the taking of

both necessary and proportionate against neutral shipping to
prevent that State from acquiring supplies needed to continue its human
rights abuses or resist attempts to prevent them. But it is in considerations of
this kind,

is

and not

just in references to the traditional rights of belligerents at

embargo needed to be found.
Secondly, both the jus ad helium and the jus in hello require that action
taken against neutral shipping be necessary and proportionate. In view of the
limited port facilities at Bar, the difficulty of moving oil from the port to the
rest of the FRY and the relative ease with which the NATO States could have
disrupted links between Bar and the rest of the FRY, it is questionable
whether interference with neutral shipping was really necessary on the facts of
sea, that

the justification for an

oil

the case.

The Military Presence

On June

10,

1999 the

in

Kosovo

after

June 10, 1999

NATO airstrikes were suspended and active hostili-

came to an end. The FRY Government accepted the principles on a settlement presented to it by the European Union envoy, Mr Ahtisaari, and the
Russian Federation envoy, Mr Chernomyrdin, on June 2, 1999, themselves
based on an earlier set of principles laid down by the G-8 foreign ministers. 45
ties

On

June

NATO
45.

9,

and

Annexes

1

1999, a military technical agreement was concluded between

FRY commanders.

United Nations Security Council Resolution

and 2 to S.C. Res. 1244 Gune

10, 1999),
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U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
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1244, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter
these steps.

The

resolution

went on,

on June

Law

10,

1999 approved

in paragraph 7, to authorize

"member

and relevant international organizations to establish the international
with all necessary means to fulfill its responsisecurity presence in Kosovo
States

.

bilities."

The

known, were

.

.

responsibilities of
set

KFOR,

as the security presence

became

out in paragraph 9 of the resolution as follows:

hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a
and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into
Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces,
except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;

Deterring renewed

(a)

ceasefire,

Demilitarising the

(b)

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed

Kosovo Albanian groups;
which refugees and displaced persons
can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a
transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be
Establishing a secure environment in

(c)

delivered;

Ensuring public safety and order until the international

(d)

civil

presence can

take responsibility for this task;

Supervising demining until

(e)

the

international

civil

presence can,

as

appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the

(f)

international civil presence;
(g)

Conducting border monitoring duties

(h)

Ensuring

the

as required;

and freedom of movement of itself,
presence, and other international organisations.

protection

international civil

the

Although NATO was not expressly mentioned, the reference in paragraph 7 to
"relevant international organizations" was clearly intended to mean NATO
and KFOR was, from the start, largely NATO-led. While KFOR derived its legal authority from the Security Council, it was not a United Nations force and
was not subject to United Nations command and control.

By

contrast, the international civil presence,

tions body, created

noting

UNMIK's

rized the

UNMIK, was

and controlled by the United Nations.

It is

Na-

worthwhile

terms of reference. Paragraph 10 of Resolution 1244 autho-

United Nations Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant

international organizations (a reference not confined to
civil

a United

presence:
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to establish a
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[I]n order to provide

an interim administration

for

Kosovo under which the

people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic

and which will provide transitional administration while
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic
self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for
of Yugoslavia,

all

inhabitants of Kosovo.

Under paragraph

11, the responsibilities

given to the international

civil

presence were:
(a)

Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2
and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(b)

Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as
required;

(c)

Organising and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for

democratic

autonomous

and

self-government

pending

a

political

settlement, including the holding of elections;
(d)

Transferring,

as

these institutions

are

established,

its

administrative

while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of

responsibilities

Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building
(e)

Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future
status, taking into

(0

account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional
institutions to institutions established

(g)

activities;

under a

political settlement;

Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic
reconstruction;

(h)

Supporting,

coordination

in

organisations, humanitarian
(i)

Maintaining

civil

and

with

international

humanitarian

disaster relief aid;

law and order, including establishing local police forces

and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel
to serve in

Kosovo;

human rights;

(j)

Protecting and promoting

(k)

Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of
persons to their

homes

Resolution 1244 (1999)

in

is

all

refugees

and displaced

Kosovo.

of the utmost importance. By using

under Chapter VII of the Charter to create a
59

its

powers

civilian administration for
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an international military presence there, the Security
Council ensured that Kosovo did not fall under a regime which was subject to

Kosovo and

to authorize

the law of belligerent occupation.
bility

Whatever the doubts regarding the

applica-

of international humanitarian law to United Nations military operations

generally, 46 the

United Nations

law of belligerent occupation

is

not bound by the basic framework of the

(in particular, the

the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare

duty codified in Article 43 of

to respect "unless absolutely pre-

where

vented" the law in force in the occupied territory)
administration for a territory after a conflict.

it

establishes a

new

To hold otherwise would place

a

wholly unreasonable fetter on the power of the Council to provide for political

change in

territories

such as Kosovo and East Timor. Resolution

be seen as an exercise of that power and the legal
security

and

civil

presences

is

244 has to
regime governing both the
1

derived primarily from that Resolution, not from

the law of belligerent occupation. 47 That said, individual principles of the law
of belligerent occupation, such as those requiring
tainees,

would be

of the unusual features of the

the military operations

and

tribunals.

of de-

applicable.

International Proceedings Relating to the

One

humane treatment

Three

became the

Kosovo

Kosovo Conflict

conflict

was the extent to which

subject of scrutiny by international courts

different tribunals

have considered different aspects of

the Kosovo conflict (and, at the time of writing, proceedings were continuing
in

two of them). While space does not permit a detailed

ceedings,

1.

The

it is

analysis of these pro-

nonetheless important briefly to consider each of them.

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

International humanitarian law has long expressly provided for

ment through criminal proceedings

On

enforce-

against individuals. Nevertheless, while

the grave breaches machinery established by the

46.

its

Geneva Conventions and

which, see the Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law,
Bulletin, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), reprinted in 2

Secretary -GeneraVs

Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 563 (1999); Christopher Greenwood,
International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations, 1 YEARBOOK OF
International Humanitarian Law 3-34 (1998).
47. For a contrary view, see
Post-Conflict Kosovo, 12

John Cerone, Minding

the

Gap: Outlining

KFOR

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 469
60

Accountability in

(2001).

Greenwood

Christopher

Protocol

I

48

requires States to take action in cases of grave breaches

and

to

bring offenders to justice irrespective of nationality, proceedings of this kind

been almost unknown. In the case of Kosovo, however, there was
already in existence an international tribunal able to exercise criminal jurisdiction. The ICTY, which was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), had "the power to prosecute persons responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991." 49 Although drawn up with the
conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in the early 1990's in mind, the
Statute was not limited to those conflicts and was clearly applicable to
events in Kosovo (as the Security Council recognized in Resolutions 1160
and 1199 (1998)).
The attacks by the FRY armed forces and police on the majority community in Kosovo led to the indictment, on May 22, 1999, by the ICTY Prosecutor of the then FRY President, Slobodan Milosevic, and a number of other
prominent political and military figures on charges of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. 50 While this indictment was dismissed as a political gesture
by Milosevic at the time, the new government of the FRY surrendered him to
the custody of the Tribunal in 2001. At the time of writing, Milosevic was
standing trial on these and other charges.
The Prosecutor also considered that the ICTY had jurisdiction over any serious violations of humanitarian law which might have occurred in the
NATO air campaign. Although her stance in this regard attracted some criticism in political circles, it was plainly correct. The ICTY's jurisdiction under
have in

Article
it is

fact

1

of its Statute

is

confined to the territory of the former Yugoslavia but

not limited to offenses committed there by Yugoslavs and clearly extends

to offenses

by

NATO personnel. The

Prosecutor established a committee to

NATO

had violated international humanitarian law and to advise whether there was "a sufficient basis
to proceed with an investigation into some or all of the allegations or into
other incidents related to the NATO bombing." 51 The committee concluded
inquire into various allegations that

48. See

Geneva

I

(Article 49),

Geneva

II

(Article 50),

(Article 146), supra note 12. See also Protocol
49.

Statute of the Tribunal, Article

50.

The indictment

is

available

english/mil-ii990524e.htm.

1,

ICTY

24, 1999,

III

(Article 129),

and Geneva IV

1 1.

Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A,

11

website at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/

Judge Hunt confirmed the indictment, Case No.

IT-99-37-I.
51.

Geneva

(Article 85), supra note

supra note 22.

on the

On May

I

forces

3.
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no investigation should be commenced. 52 The Prosecutor accepted
recommendation and told the Security Council that:
that

[T]here

is

no

basis for

opening an investigation into any of those allegations or
bombing. Although some mistakes

NATO

into other incidents related to the

were made by

that

NATO, am very satisfied that there was no deliberate
I

NATO

of civilians or of unlawful military targets by

targeting

during the bombing

campaign. 53

The committee's
attracted

much

report and the conclusions

criticism.

Most of

drawn by the Prosecutor have

that criticism has

come from

those

who

wanted to see charges brought against members of the NATO armed forces
and who accused the committee of adopting too lenient a stance in its appraisal of the NATO actions. 54 More surprisingly, however, others have criticized the committee for subjecting decisions taken in the heat of the moment
and sometimes in conditions of considerable danger to too close and detached
a scrutiny. 55 In the opinion of this writer, both criticisms are misconceived.
The report suggests neither undue leniency nor an excessive dose of hindsight. While scrutiny of military decisions with a view to prosecution is never a
comfortable experience for those who might be the subject of charges, it is
what the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I envisage and what has been applied to

non-NATO

port shows

is

that

defendants by the

armed

forces today

—seeking

ICTY

for several years.

What

the re-

cannot expect to be immune from the

which have long been binding
on all States which has become commonplace in other walks of life. It also
shows that a body like the committee established by the Prosecutor of the
ICTY is capable of applying those rules in a fair and sensible manner.
kind of legal scrutiny

—

2.

The

to apply rules

International Court of Justice

NATO air campaign was also the subject of proceedings instituted by
FRY before the International Court of Justice against ten of the NATO

The
the

52.

Id.,

11

91.

United Nations Security Council 4150 th Meeting; S/PV.4150, at 3, col. 1.
54. See, e.g., Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO Bombing
Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1 2 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
53.

LAW 503

(2001) and, for

more moderate

criticism, see the article

36.
55. See the

Commentary by Judith

Miller in the present volume.

62

by Professor Bothe, supra note
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campaign was in progress. 56 The FRY maintained both that
the NATO resort to force was a violation of the principles oijus ad helium enshrined in the United Nations Charter and that the conduct of the campaign
violated obligations contained in a wide variety of treaties ranging from the
Geneva Conventions to the Convention on Navigation on the River Danube.
In each case the FRY sought provisional measures in the form of an order that
States while the

the respondent State should immediately cease military action against the

FRY pending
sures,

the hearing of the merits. In order to obtain provisional mea-

however, an applicant must demonstrate the existence of a prima facie

on the

basis for jurisdiction

FRY

the

The

merits.

The Court

held, by large majorities, that

had failed to satisfy this threshold requirement.

result

is

scarcely surprising.

None

of the treaties which were the basis

FRY's substantive claim contain provisions conferring jurisdiction on
the International Court and the two bases for jurisdiction advanced by the

for the

FRY 57

—

Genocide Convention of 1948 (which was invoked
against all the respondents) and Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court, the
so-called "Optional Clause" (which was invoked against six out of the
ten)

Article IX of the

—were

rightly rejected

by the Court.

Even assuming that the FRY was a party to the Genocide Convention, a position which it has subsequently repudiated, Article IX manifestly offered no
basis for jurisdiction against Spain and the United States of America, both of
which had entered reservations rejecting the application of that provision
when they became party to the Convention. Moreover, Article IX confers jurisdiction only with regard

56.

to a dispute

Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,

Kingdom and the United
for provisional

Italy,

States of America.

"relating to the interpretation,

the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United

The Orders of the Court

refusing the FRY's request

measures of protection and ordering the removal of the cases against Spain and

the United States of America from the Court's

list

are

each reported under the

title

Case

concerning Legality of Use of Force, 1999 I.C.J. 124 (Belgium), 259 (Canada), 363 (France), 422

(Germany), 481 (Italy), 542 (the Netherlands), 656 (Portugal), 761 (Spain), 826 (United
Kingdom) and 916 (United States of America). At the time of writing, the cases against the
respondents, other than Spain and the United States of America, were still before the Court. The
eight remaining respondents have all objected to the jurisdiction of the Court and the
admissibility of the applications.

The

writer acted as counsel for the United

Kingdom

in these

proceedings; the present paper represents his personal views.

and the Netherlands, the FRY also attempted at a late stage to
treaty. The Court held that this treaty had been invoked too late in the
Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (FRY v. Belgium), 1999 I.C.J. 124

57.

In the cases against Belgium

rely

upon

a bilateral

proceedings; see, e.g.

Gun.

2)

y

— Request

(Order

for the Indication of Provisional Measures),

63

11

44.

The

Humanitarian

Applicability of International

application or fulfillment" of the Genocide Convention.

Court held

Not

Law
surprisingly, the

that:

[T]he essential characteristic [of genocide]

is

the intended destruction of a

'national, ethnical, racial or religious group' (Application of the Convention

Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,

September 1993, ICJ Reports 1993,

II

the

Order of 13
the threat or use of force

Provisional Measures

p. 345, para. 42);

.

.

.

against a State cannot in itself constitute an act of genocide within the

of Article

on

meaning

of the Genocide Convention; and ... in the opinion of the Court,

it

does not appear at the present stage of the proceedings that the bombings which

form the subject of the Yugoslav Application 'indeed entail the element of
intent, towards a group as such, required by [Article II]' (Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1996
26)

(I), p.

240, para.

58
.

In effect, the

FRY was seeking to use Article IX of the Genocide Convention as

a device to establish jurisdiction over complaints relating to quite different

The FRY's interpretation of the Genocide Convention would
have entailed watering down the crime of genocide to the point that it was deagreements.

prived of its separate identity as the most serious of international crimes.

The

other provision relied on by the

the Court

—could

FRY

—

Article 36(2) of the Statute of

afford jurisdiction only in the event that

the respondent State in question had each

made

both the

a valid declaration accepting

the Court's jurisdiction under that provision and the dispute

scope of both declarations.
der Article 36(2) on April

FRY and

fell

within the

The FRY had purported to make a declaration un25, 1999 (a month after the commencement of the

NATO campaign and three days before the FRY filed its applications against
the respondent States).
for jurisdiction in the

It

then sought to

rely

upon

that declaration as a basis

proceedings against those respondent States which had

extant declarations under Article 36(2) (Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain

and the United Kingdom).

immethe Security Coun-

In view of the dispute regarding the status of the FRY, the question

whether the FRY declaration was valid. If, as
59
cil and the General Assembly had decided,
the respondent States claimed
and the FRY has now accepted, the FRY was not at the relevant time a member of the United Nations, then it was not a party to the Statute of the Court
and could not have made a valid declaration under Article 36(2) of that
diately arose

58.

Id.,U40.

59. See supra note 14.
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Statute.

The

Court, however, understandably chose not to decide that ques-

tion in provisional measures proceedings

when

there were other,

more obvi-

was no basis for jurisdiction. In the cases
against Spain and the United Kingdom, Article 36(2) of the Statute could not
have provided a basis for jurisdiction, because those two States had accepted
the jurisdiction of the Court only as between themselves and another State
which had made a similar declaration not less than one year earlier. The FRY's
declaration, even if valid, plainly did not fulfill that requirement.
ous, reasons for holding that there

The

Court's reason for holding that Article 36(2) did not afford a basis for

jurisdiction in the cases against Belgium,

Canada, the Netherlands and Portu-

The FRY

declaration accepted the jurisdiction

gal

is

of more general interest.

of the Court as between the
tions "in

all

disputes arising or

ent declaration
facts

FRY and

[i.e.,

subsequent to

other States with Article 36(2) declara-

which may

arise after the signature of the pres-

after April 25, 1999],

this signature."

60

with regard to the situations or

The Court

held that the dispute which

FRY

wished to bring before the Court had arisen before April 25, 1999.
That was clear from the terms of the FRY applications, which referred primarthe

and from the debates in the Security Council on
March 24 and 26, 1999 in which the legality of the NATO action was the subject of extensive discussion. The Court rejected the suggestion that the air
campaign could be sliced up like salami, so that each air raid gave rise to a
ily

to events before that date,

fresh dispute.

The decision is not a technical one. The temporal reservation in

no proceedings
could be brought against the FRY in respect of the abuses in Kosovo which
had led to the NATO campaign. It was entirely in accordance with precedent
the FRY's declaration was carefully drafted to ensure that

and principle that the FRY was not allowed, in the words of the old saying, "to
have its cake and eat it too."
The International Court proceedings are, nevertheless, an important reminder that military action can be the subject of scrutiny by the International
Court not merely after the action has ended but while it is in progress. Provisional measures proceedings
tively

can be brought before the Court in a comparashort time and the Court has now held that an order for provisional

measures

is

legally binding. 61 Since

be a jurisdictional ground for

60.

The

full

text of the

FRY

cannot be assumed that there will always
dismissing a request for provisional measures in

declaration

it

is

quoted in Order

in the case against Belgium, supra

note 57, H 23.
61.

LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), 40 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
(2001) Oudgment of June 27, 2001).
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such a case, the
tary operations

ceedings.

The

of International

Humanitarian

possibility clearly exists that States

Law

involved in ongoing mili-

might be forced to defend them before the Court in such pro-

stakes, in

such an event, could be very high indeed. Moreover,

the Court's findings were, for the most part, provisional and, at the time of

respondent States except

writing, the proceedings against all of the

and the United States of America remained on the Court's

3.

The European Court of Human Rights
The third proceedings were in the European Court

for

Spain

list.

of Human Rights.

The

on the building in Belgrade
housing the studios of Radio Televizije Srbije (RTS) 62 That building was hit in
an air raid on April 23, 1999. Sixteen people were killed and sixteen injured.
The application was brought by one of those injured and relatives of some of
those killed against the seventeen NATO States which were also parties to
the European Convention on Human Rights (i.e., all of the NATO States except Canada and the United States). The applicants alleged that the attack
had violated the right to life, under Article 2 of the Convention, and the right
case of Bankovic v. Belgium concerned the attack

.

to

freedom of expression, under Article

10, of those killed or injured.

They

maintained that the respondent States were responsible for those violations

even though they had occurred outside the

territory of

any of them (and,

in-

deed, in the territory of a State not party to the European Convention). In ar-

guing that the Convention was not confined to events occurring on the
territory of the States parties, the applicants relied
v.

on the

decisions in Loizidou

Turkey, in which the European Court had held Turkey responsible for viola-

Convention occurring in the north of Cyprus where

tions of the

large

numbers

of Turkish forces have been stationed since 1974 and in which the Court

found that Turkey exercised effective control. 63 In addition they argued that
the respondents were responsible for the alleged violations irrespective of

which

State's forces

tended that
62.

The

al.)

11

Grand Chamber of the Court on December

BUTTERWORTHS HUMAN RIGHTS CASES 435

website of the Court, http://www.echr.coe.int.

Kingdom

attack, because they con-

NATO operated on the basis that any NATO State could have

decision of the

Belgium et

had actually carried out the

The

12,

2001 (Bankovic

(2002)

is

et al. v.

also available at the

present writer was counsel for the United

in those proceedings; this paper represents his personal views.

Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 103 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 622
(1995); Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), 108 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 443 (1996). These
decisions were confirmed by the Court's decision in Cyprus v. Turkey (10 May 2001), available on
63.

Loizidou

v.

the Court's website, supra note 62.
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vetoed the decision to attack the

RTS

building. 64

In doing so, they high-

European Convention and Its applicability to operations involving the armed forces of States
party to the Convention which occur outside the territory of those States.
lighted the

The

whole

issue of the geographical extent of the

case also raised important questions about the relationship between

human

the principles of international humanitarian law and international
rights law.

The

applicants contended that

human rights

law and international

humanitarian law were not mutually exclusive and denied that military opera-

an international armed conflict were governed solely by humanitarian
The first argument of the applicants was that the legality of the attack

tions in

law.

65

on the RTS building had to be assessed by reference to provisions of the European Convention, quite independently of whether that attack complied with
international humanitarian law, although they also contended, in the alternative, that

the Convention in effect incorporated the principles of humanitar-

ian law, so that the Convention would have been violated

RTS

if

the attack

on the

building had been in breach of international humanitarian law.

These are arguments of very considerable breadth which, had they been accepted, would radically have altered the legal framework within which military operations have to be conducted. A Grand Chamber of the Court, 66
however, rejected the applicants' arguments and unanimously declared the
application inadmissible.

The Grand Chamber accepted

gument that the case
Convention defines

outside the scope of the Convention. Article

fell

that scope by providing that "the

Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction

doms defined

the respondents' ar-

in Section

I

of this Convention."

vision reflected a largely

of the

High Contracting
the rights and free-

The Court held

(though not exclusively)

1

that this pro-

territorial

concept of

and that it was only in exceptional cases that persons outside the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties would be considered as falling
within the jurisdiction of that Party. The Court contrasted Article 1 of the European Convention with common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions,

jurisdiction

64.

Benvenuti, supra note 54, at 526-9, broadly supports these propositions.

65.

They

Coard

et

HUMAN

on the

relied in part
al.

v.

report of the Inter- American

United States of America, Case

RIGHTS CASES 150

Human

Rights.

951 (Sept. 29, 1999) 9

Human Rights in
BUTTERWORTHS

(2001), which considered that the detention by United States

forces of persons captured in the

on

10,

Commission of

Grenada operation was subject

Available

at

to the

American Convention

http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/merits/

unitedstatesl0.95.htm.
66.

While most cases

in the

Court are heard by

a

Chamber

of seven judges, the

originally constituted to hear Bankovic relinquished jurisdiction to the

seventeen judges because of the importance of the issues raised by the case.
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under which "the High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and ensure
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances." The parties to the

Geneva Conventions were

expressly required to respect the Conventions in

and could be held responsible for any failure on
the part of their forces anywhere in the world to observe those Conventions.
By contrast, Article 1 of the European Convention was clearly narrower and
imposed responsibility only in respect of treatment of a person who was within
the jurisdiction of the State concerned at the relevant time. The Court held
that a person was not to be treated as falling within the jurisdiction of a State
merely because he or she was affected by the military operations of that State's
all

their military operations

forces.

The Bankovic judgment removed the possibility that military operations by
the European members of NATO would henceforth be measured not only
against the yardstick of international humanitarian law but also by reference

European Convention on Human
Rights. Indeed, had the applicants' arguments been accepted it would not only
have been NATO that would have been affected. Coalition military operations in the Gulf and United Nations operations in, for example, East Timor
would also presumably have come within the purview of the European Court
and the provisions of a regional human rights treaty would have been superimposed on the requirements of international humanitarian law. The Court did
not reverse its earlier decisions in the Cyprus cases, but it noted that the circumstances in Cyprus were unusual in that both Cyprus and Turkey were parties to the European Convention so that the inhabitants of northern Cyprus
should not be deprived of the benefits of the Convention by reason of the
changes brought about by the Turkish intervention of 1974. It remains to be
seen what attitude the Court would take in a case where armed forces of a
party to the European Convention occupied territory of a non-Convention
to the very different standards of the

country.

Conclusions

The Kosovo

conflict raised important questions about the jus in hello in ad-

which have already attracted so
much attention. Indeed, in one sense the former group of questions are more
important, because they may have a wider impact. Although, for the reasons
given above, the Kosovo conflict was unusual in certain respects (notably its
dition to the difficult issues of the jus ad bellum

asymmetric character),

many

of the lessons learned should be relevant to fu-

ture conflicts.

68
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The
1

following conclusions

seem warranted:

International humanitarian law applies to a conflict between two or

more States irrespective of what that conflict is called or the cause for
which force is used; the use of force by way of humanitarian
intervention is no different in this respect from the use of force for
other purposes.

2.

While the jus ad bellum requires that the use of force be proportionate
to the goals which the State or States using force are permitted to
pursue, that does not mean that the jus in hello principles on such
issues as targeting are to be interpreted or applied differently and it
should never be used as an excuse to undermine the principle of the
equal application of the jus

3.

Members of

who

in hello.

the armed forces of a party to an international conflict

power of the enemy are prisoners of war,
irrespective of the purpose for which the conflict is waged, whether
prisoner of war status is claimed on their behalf or how or where they
find themselves in the

were captured.
4.

It

might have been lawful

oil

for the

embargo on the FRY but the

NATO States to have imposed an

legal issues involved

went beyond

a

simple application of the law of neutrality.

5.

The

KFOR

and

UNMIK

presence in Kosovo pursuant to Security

Council Resolution 1244 (1999) was not governed by the law of
belligerent occupation.

6.

Scrutiny by international courts and tribunals of military operations

even before the establishment of the International
Criminal Court. The approach of the three tribunals which
considered the conduct of the Kosovo conflict suggests that much of
the concern which has been expressed on this subject is misplaced.

was

a fact of

life

69

Rules of Conduct During

Humanitarian Intervention

Ivan Shearer

I

he Russian Orthodox Church recently canonized the
sia,

Nicholas

II.

A fantasy of mine

is

that the

also consider for sainthood (assuming his private

last

Czar of Rus-

Church will at some point
life met appropriate stan-

Baron Feodor de Martens, who was responsible
for the wording of what has come down to us as the "Martens Clause."
As it first appeared in the Preamble to the Second Hague Convention of
dards) the czar's legal adviser,

1899, the Martens Clause reads:
Until a

more complete code of the laws of war

parties think

it

is

issued, the high contracting

right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations

adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established

between

civilized nations,

requirements of the public conscience.

In

common

Clause

1.

is

articles

of the

from the laws of humanity and the

1

1949 Geneva Conventions, the Martens

substantially repeated, with the substitution of the

Preamble, Convention

(II)

word

"dictates"

with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,

1899, U.S.T.S. 403, 32 Stat. 1803,

1

Bevans 247.
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for "requirements" in relation to the public conscience. 2

The Clause

Geneva Conventions.
powerful reminder that in situations of armed con-

pears in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the

The Martens Clause is
flict,

a

also ap-

3

of whatever kind, there

is

never a total gap in the law, never a situation in

which there cannot be an appeal to law in order to mitigate the horror and the
suffering. Baron de Martens correctly foresaw in 1899, and again in 1907, that
unscrupulous commanders and their cunning legal advisers might seek to exploit loopholes or ambiguities in the written law.

"general participation clause" of the
to

An egregious example is

Hague Conventions

of 1907, according

which the provisions of the Conventions did not apply

belligerents unless
tailed

Hague

all

the

to any of the

of them were parties to the Conventions. Thus, the de-

Regulations might not apply but, according to the Martens

Clause, standards of civilized behavior deriving from custom, humanity and
the public conscience do.

2.

Geneva Convention

Armed

for the

Amelioration of the Condition of the

Wounded and

Sick in

Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, Article 63, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31,

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
Geneva

197

(Adam

Roberts

& Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed., 2000)

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, Article
142, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, id. at 222 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Article 142, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, id. at 244 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Article 158, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, id. at 301 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
[hereinafter

I];

Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, Jun.
at

422 [hereinafter Protocol

I].

8,

1977, Article 1(2),

1

125 U.N.T.S.

3, id.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August

1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- International

1977, Preamble,

1

125 U.N.T.S. 609,

id.

at

483 [hereinafter Protocol

72

Armed Conflicts, Dec.
II].

12,

Ivan Shearer

I

take this as

my starting point in the discussion of the jus in hello in relation

to humanitarian intervention operations. 4

Whatever may be the

uncertainties

and application of this law to a relatively new form of
armed conflict, at least we can be confident that we start from a firm, albeit
general, basis in humanitarian law. That basis is indeed becoming more detailed in content as consensus emerges that certain principles and rules of the
jus in hello have achieved recognized status in customary law. Note should be
taken in this regard of ongoing discussions in Geneva to identify those parts of
in the identification

Protocol

I

that

may be

regarded as customary, notwithstanding the inability of

certain States to ratify the Protocol by reason of particular objections. 5

The

other firm foundation for

in hello is

to

armed

my approach is that the application of the jus

not dependent upon the demonstration of a legal basis for the resort
force in the jus ad helium.

The law of armed conflict (which term I re-

gard as including international humanitarian law) applies
equally to the just and the unjust sides to a conflict. This

is

its

protection

an established and

undoubted proposition.

What

We

may

consider

first

a

is

"Intervention"?

number of

actions that constitute (for the most

and thus uncontroversial forms of intervention. These are
under the heading "Military Operations Other than War"

part) non-forcible

sometimes

listed

(MOOTW)

and include

disaster

relief,

humanitarian assistance, peace

McCoubrey and Nigel White, THE BLUE
HELMETS: LEGAL REGULATION OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS (1996);
Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, The applicability of international humanitarian law to UN
peacekeeping operations: conceptual, legal and practical issues, in SYMPOSIUM ON HUMANITARIAN
ACTION AND PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS (Umesh Palwankar, ed., 1994); Willy Lubin,
Towards the international responsibility of the UN in human rights violations during peace-keeping
operations: the case of Somalia, 52 BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS
47 (1994); Julianne Peck, Note: The UN and the Laws of War: How Can the World's Peacekeepers
Be Held Accountable?, 21 SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
4.

Some

recent literature

on the

283 (1995); Brian Tittemore,

law to

topic includes: Hilaire

Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International

Humanitarian

UN Peace Operations, 33 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1997); Garth

THE
Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy of International Humanitarian
LAW (Helen Durham and Timothy L.H. McCormack eds., 1999).
Cartledge, Legal constraints on military personnel deployed on peace-keeping operations, in

5.

Yoram

Dinstein, The Thirteenth

Law Review 93

Waldemar A.

Solf Lecture in International

(2000).
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operations, arms control, military support to the civil authorities, enforcement

of sanctions, foreign internal defense, counter-drug operations, evacuation of

noncombatants, hostage rescue, and others. 6 The law applicable to such oper-

norms of human

ations consists principally of the

rights, as

recognized in the

major international covenants and conventions, and established

as general in-

The domestic law of the country where the intervention takes
place will also call for respect, except in so far as it may conflict with established international human rights law or the provisions of a higher law, such as
ternational law.

a resolution of the United Nations Security Council.

Some

of these examples may, of course, in the circumstances, involve the

use of armed force or grow through "mission creep" to require the use of armed
force.

A hostage rescue

almost certainly requires the use of armed force, but

the swiftness of the insertion and withdrawal of force hardly allows for the application of the law of

armed

conflict as such: only the general principles of

proportionality and humanity guide us here. Lengthier presences, such as the

operation in Somalia,
laws of

armed

may come

to pose questions of the applicability of the

from a peaceable and unoppeacekeeping operation authorized by

conflict as the situation escalates

posed intervention to armed

conflict.

A

the United Nations

may

envisage the necessity of the use of force beyond the

elementary right of

UN

forces to defend themselves against

These are sometimes referred to

as "robust"

armed

attack. 7

peacekeeping operations. This

type of operation also raises the question of application of the laws of

armed

conflict.

Finally, intervention

ment action

usually authorized by the

Iraq's invasion

case of the
in

a forcible action

—

UN Security Council

a peace enforce-

(as in

of Kuwait), but in certain cases not authorized by

bombing by

Kosovo). This

bility

may be avowedly

is

the case of

it

(as in

the

NATO forces of Yugoslavia by reason of the situation

the type of intervention most clearly requiring the applica-

of the laws of armed conflict. But what laws?

6. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07,
Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (1995).
7. In September
1992 the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced that
peacekeeping troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina "would follow normal peace-keeping rules of
engagement [and] would thus be authorized to use force in self-defense
It is to be noted that
in this context self-defense is deemed to include situations in which armed persons attempt by
force to prevent UN troops from carrying out their mandate." Cited by LESLIE GREEN, THE

CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 344
74

(2d ed. 2000).
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The Applicability

of the Conventional

Laws

of Armed Conflict

to Forcible Intervention

We

(LOAC)

"Hague
the now rather dated Hague

speak more narrowly of the law of armed conflict

Law," since

it

finds

principal elaboration in

its

Conventions of 1907.

We

as

speak of international humanitarian law (IHL) as

"Geneva Law", since it derives principally from the Geneva (Red Cross) Conventions of 1949. These two sets of laws, of separate origin in the nineteenth
century and flowing in separate if parallel streams through most of the twentieth century, were brought together in one stream and updated in Additional
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1977. 8 Those Protocols have since been widely (although not universally) ratified. It is now usual
to speak of "the law of armed conflict" and "international humanitarian law"
interchangeably. Either expression generally includes the other.

What is the threshold of application of these laws? The Hague Conventions
are silent

on the

point, assuming that their application to "war"

ascertainable by reason of a declaration to that effect by

was objectively

one or more

parties.

The Charter of the United Nations no longer envisages declarations of war as
right of States

and

restricts the use

of force by States against other States to

a

sit-

uations of self-defense and actions authorized by the Security Council under

Chapter VII of the Charter. (Some also believe that there
uses of

armed force which

a limited range of

are not prohibited by Article 2 (4) of the Charter,

such as "humanitarian intervention.") Hence, the
lish a definition

is

of a state of war or armed conflict.

UN Charter does not estab-

The Geneva Conventions of

1949, however, adopted soon after the creation of the United Nations, do establish a threshold in general terms, a threshold that

col

I.

Common Article

2 of the

In addition to the provisions

Geneva Conventions

which

present Convention [s] shall apply to

shall

is

also

adopted in Proto-

provides:

be implemented in peacetime, the

war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.

The Convention[s]
the territory of a

no armed

all

cases of declared

shall also apply to all cases of partial or total

High Contracting Party, even if the

said occupation

resistance. 9

and Protocol

8.

Protocol

9.

See Article 2 in each of the four Geneva Conventions, supra note

I

II,

supra note

3.
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meets with
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The

threshold of application of the

thus not set high:

it

I is

merely requires the objective existence of an "armed con-

which presumably

flict,"

Geneva Conventions and of Protocol

exists

from the

first

moment

after

an exchange of

fire.

The Conventions and Protocol I apply between "the Contracting Parties."
Can the United Nations, as such, be a Contracting Party? Following the Advisory

Opinion of the International Court of Justice

juries Suffered in the Service of the

could,

if it

chose,

become

United Nations case, 10 the United Nations

a party to such conventions. But

for reasons to be discussed further below.

forces participating in

in the Reparations for In-

an armed

The

it

has not done so

national contingents of

conflict would, however, be

conventions to which their States are

UN

bound by the

parties.

under the Geneva Conventions and Protobetween
col I they may apply
Contracting Parties and other parties to the conflict which are not represented by a government or an authority recognized by
the adverse party. These latter forces must, however, "be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict." 11 Essentially this
means voluntary de facto compliance by a entity not competent to become a
Contracting Party to the Conventions, which if offered must be reciproIt is

also necessary to note that

—

—

cated.

More formal status, however,

is

accorded by Protocol

I,

Article 96(3) to

the particular case of an "authority representing a people engaged against a

High Contracting Party
cle 1,
ist

in

an armed

conflict of the type referred to in Arti-

paragraph 4 [self-determination struggles against colonial, alien, or rac-

regimes]" provided that the authority undertakes to apply the Conventions

and the Protocol by means of a declaration addressed

to the depositary (the

Swiss Federal Council).

So

far as

non-international armed conflicts

Common Article
objective

(civil

wars) are concerned,

Geneva Conventions similarly refers merely to the
existence of an armed conflict, and applies as between "the parties
3 of the

an expression distinct from, and wider than, "Contracting
Parties." Protocol II supplements this by defining such a conflict in terms of
the parties being the armed forces of the Contracting Party in whose territo the conflict,"

tory the conflict takes place

and "dissident armed

armed groups which, under responsible command,

10.

1949 I.CJ. 174 (Apr.

11.

Protocol

I,

11).

supra note 3,

art.

43.
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forces or other organized

exercise such control over
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a part of

its

territory as to enable

and

them

to carry out sustained

and concerted

implement this Protocol." Thus, police-type actions
against armed individuals or bands that do not fulfill these conditions do not
engage the application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions or
military operation

Protocol

to

II.

As can be

seen, there are a

number of issues

of interpretation and applica-

tion of the above instruments to particular situations. Notwithstanding these,

one must always remember the Martens Clause and the growing body of customary law of armed conflict and human rights law as relevant sources of law
to apply to any situation.

The United Nations and International Conventions Relating

Armed

to

Conflict

an international personality in its own right,
a party to any of the conventions relating to armed conflict. It is sometimes
suggested that it should become a party. This, however, could impede its
peacekeeping missions. The problem is the threshold of application of the
conventions. There are situations in peacekeeping, especially those that re-

The United Nations

quire

but

—

it

or

come

may be

is

not, as

to require

—

"robust" measures, that

cross the threshold,

undesirable for the operation to "change gears" notionally from a

peacekeeping mission into an armed
effect.

may

conflict.

This could well be escalatory in

Moreover, there would be something odd about a situation in which

the United Nations, in the

name

of the international community,

is

conduct-

ing an essentially peaceful operation in accordance with the United Nations

Charter, which could be characterized nonetheless as an "armed conflict" in

which United Nations forces and opposed forces are equally "combatants." It
has rightly been suggested that the threshold of armed conflict must be set
higher than that set by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols where United
Nations peacekeeping operations are concerned. 12

Notwithstanding that understandable view, the United Nations has consistently taken the

view that "the principles and

spirit

of general international

12. Joseph Bialke, United Nations Peace Operations: The Applicable Norms and
THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, LL.M thesis, University of Iowa College

of Law, published by Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Technical Information

Center, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia,
Operations: Applicable

Review

1

AD No. ADA380930

Norms and

(2000) Joseph Bialke, United Nations Peace

the Application of the

(2001).
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conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel" shall be observed

by forces participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations. 13 This, of
course, is to underline the fundamental consideration that the absence of for-

mal

applicability of the laws of

does not open up a

might

It

vacuum

in

armed conflict/international humanitarian law
which no laws apply.

stick in the throats of right-thinking people that there should

be an

equality of arms (and the equal moral stature that might be implied by the for-

mal

applicability of international

conventions relevant to armed conflict) in

the case of enforcement actions carried out under the authority of the United

Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. After
in such a case there

is

all,

a party clearly identified by the Security Council as be-

ing in the wrong, and United Nations forces are being deployed to right that

wrong. That, however, would be a wrong approach,

if it

led to the proposition

Both the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law have throughout their development been conthat the conventions could not apply.

sistently agnostic so far as the Tightness or

position

concerned.

is

The jus

in hello applies equally

ever strong or weak their claims
der the jus ad bellum.

And

wrongness of a belligerent

may be

to

have the

among

party's

the parties how-

right to resort to force un-

of course that must be so, otherwise the conflict

could be fought without restraint.

Peace enforcement personnel acting on behalf of the United Nations are
essentially

same way

engaged in

armed forces of a state."
Professor Greenwood has remarked,
14

as the

of view, as

13. In

and "are treated in exactly the
Looked at from the practical point

hostilities as belligerents

if

those laws did not apply

1991 the United Nations formulated a Model Participation Agreement, to be concluded

between

itself

and Member States contributing

forces, to

be used in peacekeeping operations.

Paragraph 28 of the Model Agreement provides:

[The United Nations peacekeeping
the

spirit

forces] shall observe

and respect the principles and

of the general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military

The

Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the
UNESCO Convention of 14 May 1954 on the Protection of Cultural Property in the
personnel.

international conventions referred to above include the four

Event of Armed Conflict. [The participating State] shall therefore ensure that the
serving with [the UN peacekeeping force] be fully

members of its national contingent
acquainted with the principles and

U.N. DOC. A/46/185 (1991).
14. Christopher Greenwood,

spirit

of the Conventions.

Protection of peacekeepers: the legal regime, 7

Comparative and International Law

185, 189 (1996).
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then a

commander

of the force opposed to the

that he "might as well be

The Convention on

The

hanged

for a

UN force could well conclude

sheep as for a lamb." 15

the Safety of United Nations

and Associated Personnel

between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations is
clearly marked by the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, adopted by the General Assembly and opened for signature
difference

on December
civilian

made

1994. 16

9,

The convention

applies to protect military, police or

personnel engaged or deployed in a "United Nations operation."

It is

any person to murder, kidnap, or otherwise attack personnel
so engaged or deployed. The convention provides for quasi-universal jurisdiction over offenders. 17 The term "United Nations operation" is defined to
a crime for

mean:
[A]n operation established by the competent organ of the United Nations in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and conducted under
United Nations authority and control:

where the operation is
peace and security; or

purpose of maintaining or restoring international

for the

where the Security Council or the General Assembly has declared, for the
purposes of this Convention, that there exists an exceptional risk to the safety of
the personnel participating in the operation.

between UN personnel and others in peacekeeping operations authorized under what Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, referring to the situation in the Congo, once dubbed "Chapter VI and a
half even "robust" ones under what some others have dubbed "Chapter VI
and three quarters." However, as mentioned above, the policy of the United

Thus there

is

no

"equality of arms"

—

15.

Id.

16.

34 International Legal Materials 482

peacekeepers contained in Protocol
17.

By "quasi-universal

I

jurisdiction"

(1977),
is

meant

conventions creating international crimes

any State

may

art.

37(1)

Note

is

in the territory of

the protection of

also

supra note 3.

jurisdiction of a pattern

common

(aircraft hijacking, torture, etc.)

in

modern

which provide that

its

national law.

If a

any contracting State, that State must either prosecute

the offender itself or extradite to a State competent
is

(d),

exercise jurisdiction over offenders in accordance with

suspected offender

judicare. It

(1995).

and

willing to prosecute: aut dedere aut

not truly universal jurisdiction as in the case of piracy.
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Nations

is

that "the principles

and the

spirit

of the general conventions appli-

cable to the conduct of military personnel" apply to those operations.

In relation to peace enforcement operations the situation
cle 2(2) of the

is

different. Arti-

Convention provides:

This Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by
the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the

Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are engaged as
combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of
international

armed

conflict applies.

This provision thus indirectly recognizes that while the principles and
of

LOAC/IHL

spirit

apply to peacekeeping, the letter of that law applies to peace

enforcement.

The

On

August

UN Secretary -General's Bulletin of 1999

1999 the Secretary-General of the United Nations issued a
Bulletin entitled "Observance by United Nations forces of international
6,

humanitarian law." 18 In
parlance has

this

document one can discern

come out of the shadows of

that United Nations

"the principles and spirit" formula

and has embraced "international humanitarian law" as such, which the docu-,
ment then proceeds to summarize in substance (sections 5 to 9). These sections are "promulgated" by the Secretary-General "for the purpose of setting

out fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to

UN

forces conducting operations

under United Nations

command

and control."
It will

UN

forces

control."

While

be noted that these principles and rules apply only to

"conducting operations under United Nations

UN peace operations,

command and

would not have applied in the case of
Iraq, where the Security Council approved the operations of a "coalition of
the able and willing," led by the United States, acting in support of the right to
this covers

most

self-defense of Kuwait.

Nor does

it

it

apply to current operations in the Balkans,

which have been approved by the UN Security Council but the command of
which has been entrusted to NATO.

18.

Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law, Secretary 'General's
U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), reprinted in 2 YEARBOOK OF

Bulletin,

International Humanitarian

Law

563 (1999).
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The statement
importance.

1.1

It

in Section

1

—

of the Bulletin

"Field of application"

The fundamental
armed

and

principles

rules of international

humanitarian law set

1.2

when

in

conflict they are actively

applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations
is

of

engaged as combatants, to the
the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly

extent and for
of force

is

provides:

out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces
situations of

—

when

the use

permitted in self-defence.

The promulgation

of this bulletin does not affect the protected status of

members of peacekeeping operations under the 1994 Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel or their status as non-combatants,

long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians under the law of

as

armed

conflict.

There are some

possible problems of interpretation of the

this provision. In the first place,

operation,

UN

forces

and "engagement"
so neatly

ond

marked

first

paragraph of

one wonders whether, in the course of a

single

can move in and out of "situations of armed conflict"

as the

paragraph implies. Thresholds of application are not

in situations of the kind likely to be encountered. In the sec-

than to search

place, rather

for

some more

polite

and more exact

defini-

tion of "robust peacekeeping," such situations are described as "peacekeeping

operations
fense

is

States,

when

the use of force

described in the

it is

also in

all

UN

is

permitted in self-defence." Just as self-de-

Charter, Article 51, as an "inherent" right of

major legal systems of the world an inherent right of indi-

viduals to use necessary, proportionate
self-defense.

The

right of members of

sonal and unit self-defense in

and reasonable force

UN forces to use force in immediate per-

operations should be assumed;

all

in personal

it

should not

be used in order to characterize a particular type of operation.

Conclusions

While the difference between interventions authorized by the United Nations

and those not so authorized may have everything

regarding the jus ad bellum

—the

right to use force

given above, not relevant to the jus
flict.

Whether an

intervention

is

in hello

—

—the law

to

do with the debate

it is,

for all the reasons

applicable in

armed con-

carried out under the authority of the United

Nations, or by a single State, or by a coalition of States
81

(e.g.,

NATO)

without
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the authority of the United Nations, the participants are equally

bound by the

law of armed conflict.

The

and documents discussed above regarding the applicability of the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law to forces acting under the authority of the United Nations is to

make

effect of the various statements

the entire corpus of that law, as presently understood to represent cus-

tomary international law, applicable. National contingents may, in addition,
apply various rules and interpretations of that law contained in conventions
binding on them (notably Protocol

that

I)

may not have reached customary

law status. In the interests of consistency in adopting combined rules of en-

gagement among the participating forces and
ment,

US forces acting against Iraq in

Protocol

for the

avoidance of disagree-

1991 applied certain of the provisions of

de facto, even though that instrument has not been

I

ratified

by the

United States.

The application of the law relating to armed conflict is not a difficult matter,
at least for

most of the armed forces of the world

likely to contribute forces to

UN operations. They are trained constantly in their use, secured through rules
of engagement.

It

would be

difficult

indeed for them to act in any other way.

Michael Ignatieff has recently observed that
sary

if

wars are to preserve public support.

lawyers into the prosecution of warfare

war

is

clean

rules, the

if

the lawyers say so.

enemy

will too."

Then,

is

"legal constraints are neces-

The

real

that

it

problem with the entry of

encourages the illusion that

A further illusion

is

after describing the

that

if

way

in

we

play by the

which Serbian
clear: it is a form of

"The lesson is
hubris to suppose that the way we choose to wage a war will determine how
the other side fights. Our choice to wage 'clean' war may result in wars of exceptional dirtiness." 19 That may be so, but neither public opinion nor the
training and instincts of modern armed forces in civilized countries would
forces

have

behaved

it

in Kosovo, he concludes:

any other way.

The real problem may lie

elsewhere.

the laws of armed conflict as in the

It lies

much in the observance of
conducting operations. The

not so

manner of

problems of discrimination in targeting, illustrated by certain tragic errors in
the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, do not result in any sense from a
desire to ignore or avoid the law, but

of forces, especially

Western

may have more

forces, to

to

do with the tendency

be averse to taking casualties. As an-

other writer has observed: "In recent years the key results of these concerns

19.

Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond 200
82

(2000).
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for the military

have been

tives

largely to

—designed

engagement and force-protection direcprotect political and military leaders from recrimirules of

nations that often follow casualties." 20

But

human

life is

sentiment, and public opinion,

lost in the

injury, for the

20.

"Duke

et

decorum

may be

less

est

pro patria mori."

understanding

course of nasty wars between other peoples.

To

when

die, or suffer

human rights of other people is indeed a noble, even heroic,

John Gentry, Complex

Civil-Military Operations:

Naval War College Review

57, 61 (2000).
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U.S. Military -centric Perspective, 53

Application of the

Law of Armed Conflict

During Operation Allied Force:
Maritime Interdiction and
Prisoner of War Issues

George Walker
Introduction

N;

ATO's 1999 Operation Allied Force,
and others (e.g., Roma) indigenous

to succor

Albanian Kosovars

to the former Yugoslavia's

1

Kosovo province subjected to brutal actions, including murder, rape and displacement from their homes by Serbian forces under SFRY President Slobodan
Milosevic's direction, was a legitimate collective action for humanitarian intervention pursuant to principles of state of necessity under circumstances
at the time.

2

NATO's Kosovo

known

intervention was but one of those crises where

States, individually or collectively, succored indigenous nationals, as part of a

rescue operation for their
1.

own

or other non-State nationals, or with the sole

Hereinafter referred to as SFRY. There

may be no

"Yugoslavia" in the future.

A March

14,

2002 agreement, which must be approved by Serbia and Montenegro, declares the area of the
former Yugoslavia will be known as Serbia and Montenegro. See Ian Fisher, Serbia and
Montenegro Sign a Plan for Yugoslavia's Demise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at A3.
2.

For analysis of principles of the state of necessity doctrine for collective humanitarian

intervention and

its

application to Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, see

Principles for Collective

Humanitarian Intervention

to

George Walker,

Succor Other Countries' Imperiled Indigenous

American University International Law Review (2002). Milosevic
the issue of the NATO campaign's lawfulness in his opening statement in his genocide and

Nationals, published in the
raised

war crimes

trial in

Defense by Assailing

The Hague.

NATO,

See Ian Fisher &. Marlise Simons, Defiant, Milosevic Begins His

N.Y. TIMES, Feb.

15, 2002, at

Al.

Maritime Interdiction and Prisoner of

goal of protecting indigenous nationals.

Some

War Issues

occurred during the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries before the United Nations Charter era, in some cases
pursuant to the Concert of Europe, which lasted in one form or another from
1815 through most of the nineteenth century. Scholars have traced these principles to ancient times. 3 Others have arisen since 1945, i.e., after the Charter
became effective for interState relations. 4 Among the more important of the
latter was NATO's bombing and sea interdiction campaigns, conducted pursuant to

UN

Security Council decisions authorizing them, that led to the 1995

Dayton Accords
enous peoples.
latest of this

the

first

for

Bosnia-Herzegovina, which included protection for indig-

NATO's

1999 Operation Allied Force action was among the

kind of campaign.

What made Allied Force unique was that it was

time a collective self-defense organization constituted under Article

5 1 of the Charter intervened while the Security Council was seized of a crisis

the Council had said threatened international peace and security.

A. Relevance of

the General

Law

of

Armed

Conflict

and Neutrality

Law

Other papers in this volume discuss the lawfulness of particular NATO attacks. A more fundamental question is whether the law of armed conflict and
the law of neutrality, which apply during war in the traditional sense, govern
during operations like Operation Allied Force.

There

is

a developing

view that military operations operating under

curity Council decisions pursuant to Articles 25

necessarily follow the law of
trary to law of

cision

armed

armed

conflict.

UN Se-

and 48 of the Charter do not

When a Council decision is con-

conflict principles, particularly those in a treaty, the de-

must be followed. This

rule,

rooted in Article 103 of the Charter and

the obligatory nature of Council decisions, does not account for contrary

3.

See Walker, supra note

4.

See

2.

id.
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George Walker

customary or general principles norms, nor does it consider the possibility of a
5
jus cogens norm in the law of armed conflict. If a Council decision does not
specify rules of

conduct

for

conducting military operations that would appear

armed

and this is the usual case, the law of
armed conflict should be followed. If non-mandatory UN resolutions 6 are contrary to law of armed conflict rules, the only established body of law for standards is the law of armed conflict, and it should be followed. The same is true
to contradict the law of

for

conflict,

Council decisions authorizing force with unspecified standards; the law of

armed

conflict should be followed.

speaking,

strictly

5.

103. Jus cogens,

customary and general principles

certain;

it is

UN

does not govern because a

UN CHARTER arts. 25, 48,

treaty,

Thus although the law

rules,

i.e.,
is

a

a peremptory

of

armed

conflict,

resolution-authorized

norm

that trumps inconsistent

vague doctrine whose contours are

not cited in traditional international law sources,

e.g.,

less

than

Statute of the International

Court of Justice, Articles 38, 59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 102-03 (1987). See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, arts. 53, 64, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 33 1, 345, 347; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL
Treaties 177-87
Jennings
cmt.

b,

1994);

LAW

514-17 (5th ed. 1998); T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF
Oppenheim's International Law §§ 2, 642, 653 (Robert

19,

4,

(1974);

1

& Arthur Watts eds., 8th ed.

331(2), 338(2);

Ian Sinclair,

1992); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, §§ 102 r.n.6, 323
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1 1 18-19 (Bruno Simma ed.,
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 17-18, 85-87,

94-95, 160, 184-85, 218-26, 246 (2d ed. 1984) (Vienna Convention, supra

development); GRIGORII

I.

TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 98

is

progressive

(William E. Butler

Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law, 172
RECUEIL DES COURS 219, 262-63 (198 1) John Hazard, Soviet Tactics in International Lawmaking,
7 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 9, 25-29 (1977); Eduardo Jimenez
de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 64-69
(1978); George Walker, Integration and Disintegration in Europe: Reordering the Treaty Map of the
Continent, 6 THE TRANSNATIONAL LAWYER 1, 60, 63 (1993); Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of
the Concept ofJus Cogens, As Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICHIGAN JOURNAL
trans., 1974);

;

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1

(1995). For

UN Charter Article 103 analysis, see generally LELAND

Goodrich et al, Charter of the United Nations 614-17 (3d ed. 1969); The Charter
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra at 1 1 16-25; W. Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United
Nations, 87 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1993).
Non-mandatory UN
recommending

include General Assembly resolutions and Council
Assembly or Council recommendations passed pursuant to
UN Charter Articles 10-1 1, 13-14 and Chapters VI-VII are non-mandatory, although they may
strengthen preexisting customary and treaty norms recited in them. SYDNEY BAILEY
SAM
6.

resolutions

resolutions
action.

&

Daws, The Procedure of the

UN

Security Council

Brownlie,
supra note 5, at 14-15, 694; JORGE CASTENEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS ch. 3 (Alba Amoia trans., 1969); GOODRICH ET AL, supra note 5, at 126, 144,
290-314; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 16, at 47-49; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, §
103(2) (d), cmt. c, r.n.2; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 5, at 284, 407-18,
605-36, 652.
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ch. 1.5 (3d ed. 1998);
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operation
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not a conflict between States in the traditional sense of war, the

law of armed conflict should govern in these situations.

If

UN resolution-gov-

erned operations grow in number and complexity and intensity of conflict, an

may be

body of law that should be, and hopefully will
be, the same as the law of armed conflict for war.
Humanitarian intervention under Operation Allied Force stood on footing
similar to the latter situations. The campaign was not war in the classical
sense, although there are reports the United Kingdom's Prime Minister and
maybe others characterized later phases of the NATO campaign as war. Participants, whether the collectively intervening States or the affected State,
should have applied the law of armed conflict as in the case of UN resolutionauthorized actions. No Council decision governed the Allied Force situation
with respect to humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian law issues covered
by, e.g., the 1949 Geneva Conventions, stand in a special place. 7 The same
principles of applying the law of armed conflict and neutrality law should govern during collective humanitarian interventions operating under state of neultimate result

a parallel

cessity principles.

Standards of necessity and proportionality in self-defense situations
different

may be

from law of armed conflict standards of necessity and proportionality

for attacks

during traditional armed conflict.

tional for a self-defense response

The

may not be

armed

conflict situation.

tional

under the law of armed conflict

reverse

is

What

what

is

necessary or propor-

may not be necessary or pro-

The same

intervention pursuant to state of necessity.

necessary or propor-

necessary or proportional in an

also true;

for attacks

portional in a self-defense context.

is

What

is
is

true for humanitarian

necessary or proportional

humanitarian intervention may not be necessary or proportional in a

for

self-defense or law of

armed

conflict situation,

and what

portional in a self-defense or law of armed conflict situation
sary

or

proportional

intervention.

in

attacks

incident

to

a

necessary or pro-

is

may not be

particular

neces-

humanitarian

Depending on the scope of the intervention and the timing of

attacks (immediately after a decision to intervene

is

made

as distinguished

from attacks made well into a campaign) the law of self-defense or the law of
,

armed

7.

conflict

may be examined

as guides.

See infra this paper.
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There are some per

se forbidden targets, e.g., cultural property unless used

8

Under the law of armed conflict, there are some methods of warfare, e.g., no first use of poison gas, 9 that are per se indiscriminate
under the law of armed conflict. These targets or methods and means of warfor military purposes.

forbidden under the law of armed conflict, should also be followed in hu-

fare,

manitarian intervention operations under state pf necessity.
Decision makers should only be held accountable for what

is

known, or rea-

sonably should have been known, at the time a decision to attack

Hindsight can be 20/20; decisions at the time
war.

10

may be clouded with

Declarations of understanding by countries party to Protocol

is

made.

the fog of
I

11

to the

Convention for Protection of Cultural Property in Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereunafter Cultural Property Convention];
Protocol for Protection of Cultural Property in Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249
U.N.T.S. 358; Second Protocol to Hague Convention of 1954 for Protection of Cultural Property
in Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, art. 1(f), 38 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
769 (1999) [hereinafter Second Protocol]; Treaty on Protection of Artistic &. Scientific
8.

See generally,

Institutions

&

e.g.,

Historic

Monuments, Apr.

15,

1935, 49 Stat. 3267, 167 L.N.T.S. 290; JlRI

Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
(1996); George Walker, The Tanker War, 1980-88: Law and Policy 507-11
(2000) (Vol. 74, US Naval War College International Law Studies).
9.
Protocol for Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, &. of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1965, & US Reservation, 26 U.ST. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65. See also ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS HH 10.3-10.4.2 (A. Thomas & J. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73.,
US Naval War College International Law Studies).
10. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 117-21 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret ed. & trans.,
1976).
1 1.

Protocol Additional

(I)

to the

Geneva Conventions of

Protection of Victims of International
[hereinafter Protocol

Armed

I].
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Conflicts,

12 August 1949,

June

8,

1977,

& Relating to the
1125 U.N.T.S. 3
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1949 Geneva Conventions state that

War Issues

for civilians' protection in Article 51, 12

protection of civilian objects in Article 52, 13 and precautions to be taken in attacks, stated in Article 57, 14 a

commander should be

mander's assessment of information available

12.

Protocol

I,

id., art.

5

1, 1

liable

based on that com-

at the relevant time,

i.e.,

when a

125 U.N.T.S. 26. Articles 5 1 (2) and 5 1 (5) prohibitions on attacks on

absent other considerations, e.g., civilians who take up arms, restate customary law.
Michael Bothe et al, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict 299 & n.3 (1982);
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea
civilians,

11

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, 6.2.3.2; 1 JEAN
PlCTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 224-29 (1952); CLAUDE
PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 618, 623-26 (1987); Julius Stone, Legal
39 (Louise Doswald-Becked., 1995);

11

Controls of International Conflict 684-732

(1959); Michael Matheson, Remarks, in

Law to the 1977
Geneva Conventions, in Symposium, The Sixth Annual American Red
Cross - Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on
Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2
American University Journal of International Law and Policy 423, 426 (1987);
William Schmidt, The Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts: Protocol I Additional to
the Geneva Conventions, 24 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 225-32 (1984); Waldemar Solf, Protection
of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary International Law and Under Protocol
1, 1 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 130-31 (1986).
13. Article 52 states a general customary norm, except its Article 52(1) prohibition on reprisals
against civilians, upon which commentators divide. See generally BOTHE ET AL., supra note 12, at
320-27; C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA §§ 510-11, 524-25, 528-29
(6th rev. ed. 1967); ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, UH 6.2.3 &n.36, 6.2.3.2, 8.1.1
Session

One: The United

States' Position

on

the Relation of Customary International

Protocols Additional to the

&

n.9, 8.1.2

& n.12

(noting U.S. position that Protocol

I

Article 52(1) "creates

new

law"); 2 D.

O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea 1 105-06 (I. Shearer ed., 1984) 4 Pictet,
PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 12, at 630-38; Matheson, supra note
12, at 426; Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law of Armed
Conflict, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS: LlBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR JACK
;

supra note 12, at 131 (1958);

GRUNAWALT
Law

197 (Michael Schmitt

ed.,

Studies); Solf, supra note 12, at 131.

Warfare, 30

NAVAL LAW REVIEW

1,

1998) (Vol. 72,

Frank Russo,

US Naval War College

Jr.,

Targeting Theory in the

17 n.36 (1992) rejects applying Protocol

I

International

Law

of Naval

Article 52(2) to

naval warfare.
14.

See also

12, at

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9,

359-69; PILLOUD ET AL., supra note

12, at

1IH

8.1-8.1.2.1;

proportionality, with the concomitant risk of collateral

damage inherent

Article 57, generally restate customary norms. See supra note 12.
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BOTHE ET AL., supra note

678-89. Rules of distinction, necessity and
in

any attack, recited in

,
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decision

is

made. 15

Two

commander is only bound by information available
attack is made. 17 The Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague

have similar terms,

when

1980 Conventional Weapons Convention 16 protocols

i.e.,

a decision to

a

Cultural Property Convention also recites this principle. 18

Protocol

with

I,

understandings, and the Conventional

its

Weapons Con-

vention protocols are on their way to acceptance, among States. 19 These treaties'

common

statement, in text or declarations, that

commanders

are held

15. Declaration of Belgium, May 20, 1986, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A
Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents 706, 707 (Dietrich

Schindler &Jiri

Toman

eds.,

3d ed. 1988); Declaration of Italy, Feb.

7 12; Declaration of the Netherlands,

United Kingdom, Dec.

27, 1986, reprinted in id at

June 26, 1977, reprinted in id. at 713, 714; Declaration of the

12, 1977, reprinted in

id.

at 717.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No.
1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Conventional Weapons Convention!.
17. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Mines, Booby Traps &. Other Devices,
Oct. 10, 1980, art. 2(4), 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 (Protocol II (Mines)); as amended, May 3, 1996, art.
2(6), 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1206, 1209 (1996) (Amended Protocol II);
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), Oct. 10,
1980, art. 1(3), 1342 U.N.T.S. 171, 172. The United States has ratified the Convention and
Protocols I and II (Mines) supra; Protocol III is not in force for the United States. United States
Department of State, Treaties in Force 478-79 (2000) [hereinafter TIF]. Amended Protocol II,
Protocol III and Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons, May 3, 1995, 35 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1218 (1996) are now before the US Senate. Marian Leich, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 91 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 325 (1997). Protocol IV and Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments
(Protocol I), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, do not have these provisions. Protocol II (Mines)
and III commentators say little about these provisions; they state the obvious. See Burrus
Carnahan, The Law of Land Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention on Certain
16.

,

Conventional Weapons, 105

Developments

in the

Law

MILITARY

LAW REVIEW

73 (1984);

W.

Canadian Year Book of International Law 229

Comment, New
Armed Conflict, 19

Fenrick,

Concerning the Use of Conventional Weapons

in

Howard Levie, Prohibitions and
Use of Conventional Weapons, 68 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW 643 (1994); J.
Roach, Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian Law?, 105
MILITARY LAW REVIEW 1 (1984); William Schmidt, The Conventional Weapons Convention:
Implications for the American Soldier, 24 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 279 (1984).

Restrictions

on

(1981);

the

Second Protocol, supra note 8, art. 1 (f). Second Protocol is not in force; 10 States are party,
and 101 have ratified the Hague Cultural Property Convention, supra note 8. International
Committee of the Red Cross website as of March 24, 2002, available at
18.

http://www.icrc.org/eng/party_gc.
19.

the

159 States are party to Protocol

Red Cross

listed

II

but not the United States. See International Committee of

website, supra note 18. International

88 States

Protocol

I,

as parties to the

(Mines), 63 for

Committee of the Red Cross

website,

Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note

Amended

Protocol

II,

24, 2002.

91

81 for Protocol

III,

16;

79

id.,

for

supra note 17, as of March

,
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accountable based on information they have at the time for determining

whether attacks are necessary and proportional has become a nearly universal
norm. The San
It

Remo Manual

can be said with

dard.

fair

recognizes

it

confidence that this

as the naval warfare standard. 20
is

the jus in hello customary stan-

also the standard for self-defense situations.

It is

It

was the standard

for

Allied Force.

Collective action after a decision to intervene raises problems of consensus

on action within a campaign. Even as collective self-defense situations may
raise scope and definitional problems (i.e., whether anticipatory self-defense is
admissible in the Charter era, what are proportional and necessary responses)
and the same kinds of issues can surface in the law of armed conflict under collective action situations, analogous

problems

will arise

during collective

What

are proper targets?

humanitarian intervention under state of necessity.
Is

the proposed attack necessary and proportional? These issues arose with re-

spect to targeting during Allied Force and were resolved, like the decision to

mount

the campaign, by consensus

among

the 19

NATO member States.

One issue, perhaps for Operation Allied Force and certainly for the future,
is how far consensus decision making should penetrate into operational matters. To take an extreme example from a hypothetical ground campaign, must
a

NATO squad leader seek a necessity and proportionality determination all

way up the chain of command to take a particular building, with almost assured damage to it? US commentators and military commanders have decried
the

the "rudder orders" approach to military
lective

command and control;

consensus decision version of it? Should there be one?

der orders policy, or the opposite of letting field and at sea

is

there a col-

How does a rud-

commanders and

perhaps lower echelon commanders decide, affect accountability under international law

B.

NATO's

if

things go wrong?

Right to Conduct Maritime Interdiction as Part of Allied Force

NATO considered but did not implement visit and search of ships that may
have carried goods to the

SFRY through

Adriatic Sea ports. Nothing in the

law of state of necessity or the law of armed conflict forbade these kinds of operations

if

they had been ordered.

20. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, H 46(b) & Commentary 46.3. See also BEN CHENG,
General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 90
(1983) Myres McDougal & Florentino Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public
;

Order 220

(1961).
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1.

NATO Naval Assets Available; Naval Operations during Allied Force

There were no naval engagements at or under the sea connected with
Allied Force; some apparently had been projected. 21 But, as the following indicates, naval forces had a role:

NATO

and

forces provided defense

sealift after

logistics

support [undoubtedly including

the campaign,] for the alliance forces deployed in

Italy,

Albania,

and carried out naval operations in the Adriatic Sea. The
latter included, at one time, aircraft carriers, submarines, and surface ships from
four nations, all operating within the same confined space. 22
and

.

.

Yugoslavia;

.

.

.

.

US

USS Kitty Hawk and USS Theodore
Roosevelt battle groups and UK Royal Navy units, including a missile-launching
submarine. 23 When Allied Force began the USS Enterprise battle group was in
These

vessels included the

the Persian Gulf; there was
bia.

24

March

In late

Navy's

no other battle group within bombing range of Ser-

1999, incident to sponsoring a Security Council resolution

condemning Operation Allied Force and conversations with Yugoslavia, Russia sent several naval vessels to the Mediterranean where they could enter the
Adriatic. This caused tension between NATO and Russia, leading to worries
that the SFRY might get information on NATO flight operations from these
ships. 25

The

mid-March.

There

21.

is

Roosevelt battle group arrived April 5, the
26

also

in the area since

first

There is no record of NATO-Russian maritime confrontations.
no report of blue-water NATO-SFRY naval confrontations. 27

General Wesley Clark, while Supreme Allied

Commander Europe (SACEUR),

spoke to the

Yugoslav Chief of Staff [by telephone] at least once during the campaign, warning him that
sent any of his navy out into the Adriatic

it

would be sunk. WESLEY CLARK,

if

he

WAGING MODERN

War
22.

184 (2001); Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond 137 (2000).
United States Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force

After- Action Report xiv (Jan. 3
reliance

on

1,

2000) [hereinafter After- Action Report] but see
;

id.

at

41

(little

sealift)

North Atlantic Council, Statement on Kosovo, Apr. 23, 1999, reprinted in IVO
Daalder Michael O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo 104
(2000). The Roosevelt battlegroup had been in the Adriatic; it had been sent to the Persian Gulf
in March 1999 as the Kosovo crisis deepened. Clark, supra note 21, at 240, 421.
23.

Id.

at 92;

&

26.

& O'Hanlon, supra note 23, at 103.
CLARK, supra note 21, at 212; DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 23, at
Daalder & O'Hanlon, supra note 23, at 23

27.

The SFRY had been warned

24.
25.

Daalder

1.

of the

risks.

See supra note 21.
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Although NATO land-based aircraft (for the United States, US Air Force
and US Marine shore-based aircraft) predominantly conducted strike operasea-based strike aircraft and
tions, "Navy carrier-based aircraft, Marine
cruise-missile equipped ships and submarines played a significant role." 28 Navy
.

.

.

electronic warfare aircraft, operating off the carriers, protected
craft

from attack by Yugoslav

air defenses.

jamming

platforms able to use electronic

These

aircraft

air-

US

were the only

enemy

to suppress

NATO

air defenses.

Na-

val aircraft also launched air defense suppression support for strike aircraft. 29

The Navy

flew

unmanned

vessels, survey potential

(UAVs)

aerial vehicles

landing areas for Marines

ordered, and to target coastal defense radar

Tactical Air Reconnaissance
patrol aircraft

made

Pod System

sites.

to identify Yugoslav naval

if

amphibious landings were

Navy F-14

Although never used

with the

Navy maritime

identified targets;

significant intelligence, surveillance

(ISR) collection contributions. 30

aircraft

and reconnaissance

for at-sea interdiction,

these assets were available to contribute to that effort, besides warships in the
Adriatic.

There were differences of opinion at NATO headquarters after the 1999
NATO summit on the possibility of boarding ships in the Adriatic "to enforce
the maritime blockade of Yugoslavia.

." 31
.

.

Oil reached Serbia through

Montenegro's port of Bar; the "stop and search" regime would have aimed to

However, there was concern over provoking Russia, Serbia's
supplier. 32 This was reflected at national levels. In the Danish

halt this.

princi;

pal oil

parlia-

ment,

e.g.,

minor controversy arose over the possible contribution to a naval blockade
and the modes of its implementation. Not only was this blockade probably a
[a]

violation of international law;

it

also [was seen to entail] risks of a direct

confrontation with the Russian Navy.

NATO)

to enforce the

sanctions regime,

As

blockade only with

on which

basis

.

a
.

.

compromise
countries

Denmark decided

28.

After-Action Report, supra note 22, at 55, 79, 92-3.

29.

Id.

.

.

.

it

was decided (by

parties to the [prior]

... to participate.

at 66-7.

30. Id. at 57-8.
31. Nicola Butler,

NATO: From Collective Defence

to

Peace Enforcement, in

KOSOVO AND THE

& Ramesh Thakur

Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention 279 (Albrecht Schnabel
eds., 2000) [hereinafter KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE]. See also Continued

NATO Air-Strikes

on Yugoslavia, 45 Keesing's Record of World Events 42901 (1999) [hereinafter 45 Keesing].
32. Continued
Air-Strikes on Yugoslavia, supra note 31, at 42901.
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Denmark promised
ended

first.

to clear

navy contributed a mine -clearing vessel and a minelayer
munitions dumped in the Adriatic. 33 Poland was not "asked to

Later

NATO

a corvette from July 1999 onwards, but the conflict

its

participate in the maritime blockade against Yugoslavia." 34

After the Alliance pledged to impose a binding naval embargo in

its

April

met April 26 and proposed
an embargo, to begin April 30, to cut off oil shipments to the SFRY, coming
primarily from Italy and Greece. The EU ministers also approved economic
measures targeting Milosevic and his family and closing loopholes halting export credits and investment flows to the SFRY previously agreed in 1998. A
statement offered support to Montenegro and pledged EU upgrade of EU relations with Albania and Macedonia through association agreements. 35 The
naval embargo

Union (EU)

statement, European

became

foreign ministers

somewhat hollow promise

a

physically enforce

and Kotor Bay. But

.

.

.

NATO

when

decided

it

would not

through a blockade at Montenegro's two main ports, Bar

[it]

all

was not

did go into effect and was joined by a

lost. It

number of non-EU and non-NATO

countries.

.

.

.

[T]he voluntary

"visit

and

search" scheme at least had the benefit of preventing profiteers using ships
flagged in cooperating countries from shipping oil into Montenegro.

NATO

also

used

its

Herzegovina to cut off oil

Proposed
Option
2.

NATO

There were two

and NATO SFOR troops in Bosniacoming from there to the SFRY. 36

influence

Naval Interdiction during Allied Force:

principles concerning

A

Lawful

any projected naval interdiction dur-

ing Allied Force. First, would vessel interdiction, considered with other aspects of Operation Allied Force,

i.e.,

the aerial bombing campaign, have been

and proportional part of the campaign when the overall goal of
humanitarian intervention under state of necessity was taken into

a necessary
collective

33.

Bjorn Moller, The Nordic Countries: Whither the West's Conscience?,

CHALLENGE,
34.

in

KOSOVO AND THE

supra note 31, at 156.

Peter Talas

& Laszlo Valki, The New Entrants: Hungary,

Poland, and the Czech Republic, in

KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 31, at 207.
They encouraged EU members not to organize sports events with SFRY
DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 23, at 146; Continued NATO Air-Strikes
35.

supra note 31, at 42901.
36.

DAALDER

& O'HANLON, supra note 23, at
95

146.

participation.

on Yugoslavia,

Maritime Interdiction and Prisoner of

account?
ciple

is

If the

response

is

War Issues

Yes (and the record suggests

this),

the second prin-

that under the view that parties to a humanitarian intervention should

follow the law of armed conflict for these operations, 37

NATO could have im-

and search, and capture or diversion, subject to
the usual law of armed conflict rules and limitations. 38
Blockade was an option discussed outside NATO circles, probably reflecting media and others' confusion between blockade and interdiction. If NATO
wanted to establish a blockade, traditional rules notice of start and end,
posed vessel interdiction,

visit

—
—would have been required

grace period, area, impartiality, effectiveness, limitation to belligerents' coasts

and ports and other requirements or limitations 39
under law of armed conflict standards after an affirmative answer to the first
question on blockade's place in necessity and proportionality, etc., for Allied

37.

See supra Part A.

&

Convention for Amelioration of Wounded, Sick
Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 31,6 U.S.T. 3217, 3226, 3230, 3234, 75 U.N.T.S. at 85,
92-96 [hereinafter Second Convention] Convention Concerning Rights
Duties of Neutral
Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415; Convention Relative to
Certain Restrictions with Regard to Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War (Hague XI),
Oct. 18, 1907, id. 2396; Convention for Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of Principles of the
Geneva Convention (Hague X), Oct. 18, 1907, art. 4, id. 2371, 2384; Hague Cultural Property,
Convention, supra note 8, art. 14(2), 249 U.N.T.S. at 252; Convention on Maritime Neutrality,
Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1989, 135 L.N.T.S. 187; Commission of Jurists, Hague Rules of Air
Warfare, Dec. 1922 - Feb. 1923, arts. 49-50, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,
38. See generally

&

;

supra note 15, at 207, 215 [hereinafter

Hague Air

Rules]; International

Law

Association

Committee on Maritime

Neutrality, Final Report: Helsinki Principles on Maritime Neutrality,

reprinted in International

Law

Association, Report of the Sixty-Eighth Conference Held at

Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China 497, Principles 1.4, 2.1-2.4, 5.2.1-5.2.9 (1998) [hereinafter

Helsinki Principles]; Institute of International Law,
Relations Between Belligerents, Aug.

Oxford Naval Manual];
PlCTET, supra note

WALKER,

War

8, at

Hague Air

in

16, 1856, U

4,

1,

115 Consol. T.S.

36

Rules, supra note 38,

1,

9, 1JH

7.7-7.7.5;

supra note

Concerning

3; Declaration Concerning Laws of Naval

art. 53(i), id. at

BOTHE ET AL,

SUPPLEMENT, supra note

7.6-7.6.2, 7.10-7.10.2; 2

supra note 12, HU 112-34;

Stat, at 2408; Declaration

1-21, 208 Consol. T.S. 338, 341,

arts.

THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note

Principles 5.2.10, 5.3;
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857, 864 [hereinafter

357-64.

XI, supra note 38, art.

(Declaration of London), Feb. 26, 1909, Annex,

343-44, reprinted
force;

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9,
181-84 (1960); SAN REMO MANUAL,

Hague

Maritime Law, Apr.

The Laws of Naval Warfare Concerning the

art. 41, reprinted in id. at

12, at

supra note

39. See generally

9,

1913,

15, at 843,

846-47, never in

215; Helsinki Principles, supra note 38,
12,

at

432-39, 694-97;

ANNOTATED

Oxford Naval Manual, supra note 38, arts. 30, 53, 92,
at 309-12, 3 18-24; PlLLOUD ET AL, supra note 12, at

at 862, 866, 872; 4 PlCTET, supra note 13,
812-36, 1476-81; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note

389-94.

96

12,

1111

93-104;

WALKER,

supra note 8, at
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which laid primary stress on humanitarAny blockade imposed during Operation Allied Force
ian intervention.
would not have been a "pacific blockade," i.e., a blockade imposed on an adversary's coasts during time of peace, generally thought to be unlawful under
Force's overall goals for intervention
40

the Charter. 41

C. Captured

Armed

SFRY forces

Forces Members' Entitlement to Prisoner of

took three

War Status

NATO ground service personnel into custody dur-

ing Allied Force, perhaps kidnapping

them

across the

three suffered beatings at the hands of their captors.

Macedonia border. The
42

Two downed NATO

NATO rescued them. NATO forces later took
43

pilots risked

capture before

SFRY army

personnel into custody after moving into Kosovo.

1999 President Clinton authorized releasing two

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) captured

SFRY

force

On May

16,

members the

44

Although the record is
not clear, it is likely that the SFRY captured members of the KLA and that the
KLA captured other SFRY armed forces members.

40. See generally

North Atlantic Council, Statement on Kosovo, Apr.

DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 23, at 262
Statement by

in April.

NATO

(2000)

;

Secretary General, Mar. 23, 1999,

After- Action Report, supra note 22, at 10; supra notes
41.

2

O'CONNELL,

23,

1999, reprinted in

NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana,
45 Keesing, supra note 31,

31-36 and accompanying

supra note 13, at 1157-58, citing

UN

at

42847;

text.

Charter Article 2(4);

ANTHONY

D'Amato, International Law: Process and Prospect 43-46 (1987) (same, listing rules
for permissible blockades); WALKER, supra note 8, at 389; but see COLOMBOS, supra note 13, §§
484-88B; 2 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law §§ 44-49, 52b-52e, 521 (Hersch
Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952); U.S. Department of the Navy, Law of Naval Warfare: NWIP
10-2, 1

632a n.26 (1955 through Change

6,

Security Council to impose a blockade. See also

Charter of the United Nations,

supra

1974).

UN

Charter Article 42 authorizes the

GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 14-17; THE
note 5, at 629-36. Annotated Supplement,

It 7.7.2. 1 n. 13 1 correctly says, "It is not possible to say whether, or to what extent, a
U.N. blockade would be governed by the traditional rules." See also The Charter of the United

supra note 9,

an example of how a Council decision can trump LOAC treaty
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
42. Reverend Jesse Jackson, US President Bill Clinton's friend, was involved in negotiating their
release; there had been fears the detainees would be held hostage. CLARK, supra note 21, at 229,
Nations, supra at 632. This
rules.

UN

286-87;

Charter

is

arts. 25, 48, 103.

DAALDER

&

O'HANLON,

supra note 23, at 119, 146; Continued

Against Yugoslavia, supra note 31, at 42957; Continued

NATO Air-Strikes

note 31, at 42900.
43.

CLARK, supra note

44.

Id. at

286;

21, at

DAALDER

214-18, 274-

& O'HANLON, supra note 23, at
97

146, 233.

NATO

Air-Strikes

on Yugoslavia, supra
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These personnel were entitled to those parts of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, other applicable humanitarian law treaties, and customary law or general principles of law governing them, absent a Security Council decision to
the contrary. 45 (There was none.)
1.

NATOSFRY Aspects of Allied Force
First, as between NATO and the SFRY, the 1949 Geneva Conventions apAlthough Operation Allied Force was not a war in the

plied.

Common

traditional sense,

Article 2 declares their provisions apply to "other" international

armed conflicts. For example, the Third Convention, establishing prisoner of
war treatment standards, provides in part in Article 2:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the

present Convention shall apply to
conflict

even

.

Party,

.

.

even

Although one
the

arise

cases of declared

between two or more of the High Contracting
not recognized by one of them.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Power

.

.

.in the

no armed

conflict

mutual

relations.

They

in relation to the said Power,

shall
if

resistance.

may not be

Convention, the Powers that are parties thereto

in their

Parties,

occupation of the territory of

the said occupation meets with

if

war or of any other

is

shall also apply to all cases of partial or total

lit]

a

which may

the state of war

if

all

shall

a Party to

remain bound by it

furthermore be bound by the Convention

the latter accepts and applies the provisions

thereof. 46

The SFRY and

all

NATO States were parties to the

1949 Conventions be-

47

SFRY's dissolution. Although there was no official record of the
SFRY's having accepted and applied the Conventions in accordance with

fore the

45.

UN CHARTER arts.

46.

Convention Relative

3318,

75 U.N.T.S.

and accompanying text.
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.

25, 48, 103. See supra note 5
to

135,

(hereinafter Third

136

Amelioration of Condition of Wounded
2,

Convention). See

also

2,

6 U.S.T.3316,

Convention

for

& Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art.

6 U.S.T. 31 14, 31 16, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32 (hereinafter First Convention); Second Convention,
art. 2, id. at 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86; Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian

supra note 38,

Persons in

Time of War, Aug.

12, 1949, art. 2,

(hereinafter Fourth Convention)
47. TIF, supra note 17, at 330, 450-52.

98

6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288
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Article 2 before or during the

accepted them retroactive to 1992 on October 16, 200 1. 48 Neverthe-

SFRY
less,

NATO campaign, after Allied Force ended, the

treaty succession principles, 49

even

if

SFRY and

the

other States had for-

mal acceptance of the former country's treaties under review at the time of
Allied Force, 50 may have bound the SFRY during the NATO campaign. The

SFRY was

also

bound

eral principles of law.

to the extent the
51

The

Conventions restated custom or gen-

general view

that

is

much, but maybe not

all,

of

the Third Convention restates customary rules or general principles of law. 52

bound the SFRY and NATO to that extent as custom or general
principles. The Third Convention also has a Martens clause; even denunciation of the Convention "shall in no way impair the obligations which the
Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles of
Therefore,

it

the law of nations, as they result from the usages established
peoples, from the laws of
science."

the

53

The

clause

SFRY was bound

even

if

Not

humanity and the

may reflect

among

civilized

dictates of the public con-

a general principle of law or custom. 54 If so,

to apply principles of humanity for detainees' treatment,

not bound by the Conventions as treaty law.
all

States party to

NATO-SFRY

aspects of Allied Force,

United States, were parties to 1977 Protocol

I

to the

e.g.,

the

1949 Conventions. The

International Committee of the Red Cross website, supra note 18. See also Christopher
Greenwood, The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Neutrality to the
Kosovo Campaign in the present volume. When this paper was researched and delivered in June
2001, the SFRY's acceptance had not been deposited. The ensuing and sometimes convoluted
discussion based on treaty succession principles and the Conventions and Protocols as restating
custom or general principles of law demonstrates the importance of the Conventions and
48.

Protocols as treaty law.
See generally Symposium, State Succession in the Former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, 33
Virginia Journal of International Law 253 (1993); Walker, supra note 5.
49.

50. TIF, supra note 17, at 330,

450-52.

Today 189 States are party to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. International Committee
of the Red Cross website, supra note 18. This suggests that many if not all of their provisions
represent customary norms. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 5; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
51.

5, §

102 cmts.

Collective

f,

i;

1

OPPENHEIM

Self-Defense

International

Law

5, § 10, at 28, 31; George Walker, Anticipatory
Era.What the Treaties Have Said, 31 CORNELL
Journal 321, 367-68 (1998); The Law of Military Operations,

in

the

supra note

Charter

supra note 13, at 391-92. See also

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,

supra note 9,

11H

8.5.1.1,

8.5.1.4-8.5.1.5,11.2-11.3.
52.

See

Annotated Supplement,

supra note 9,

1111

1

1.4, 1

1.7-1 1.7.4; supra note 51.

Third Convention, supra note 46, art. 142, 6 U.S.T. at 3424, 75 U.N.T.S. at 242. See also 1
PlCTET, supra note 12, at 41 1-13; 2 id., supra note 38, at 281-83; 3 id., supra note 12, at 647-48

53.

(1960); 4
54.

id.,

supra note 13, at 624-26.

BOTHE ET AL,

(THIRD), supra note

supra note 12, at 44. See also
5,

§§ 102-03.

99

I.C.J. Statute, art.

38(1);

RESTATEMENT

Maritime Interdiction and Prisoner of
former Yugoslavia was, 55 but this

is

War Issues

subject to treaty succession principles

other considerations as to whether the

SFRY was bound in

tent the Protocol's terms relating to prisoners of war

57

1999.

reflected

56

To the

and
ex-

custom or gen-

eral principles, they bound States involved in Allied Force, including NATO
countries and the SFRY. Protocol I also has a Martens clause: "In cases not
covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of in58

ternational law derived from established custom, from the principles of hu-

manity and from the dictates of public conscience." 59 The clause may
general principle of law or custom;

60

if so, like

the analysis applied to

reflect a
its

Third

Convention counterpart, the SFRY was required to treat its prisoners of war
with humanity even if Protocol I did not apply as treaty law.
The same principles apply to the 1907 Hague IV Regulations relating to
prisoners of war, insofar as they reflected custom. 62 Yugoslavia was not a formal party to them, but, e.g., the Regulations' provision forbidding killing or
wounding those who have laid down arms, or who no longer have means of
61

55. Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions Concerning the Protocols

Geneva Conventions, 1977,

SFRY accepted

in

THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT,

I

and

11

Additional to the

supra note 15, at 703.

The

on October 16, 2001, retroactive to 1992, but was also
bound by customary and general principles norms stated in Protocol I. As in the case of the 1949
Conventions, the ensuing and sometimes convoluted discussion based on treaty succession
principles and the Protocol as restating custom or general principles of law demonstrates the
importance of Protocol I as treaty law. See supra note 48 and accompanying text
56. TIF, supra note 17, at 330; Symposium, State Succession, supra note 48; Walker, supra note 5.
57.

Protocol

Protocol

I,

supra note

I,

supra note

1 1, arts.

SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9,
PILLOUD ET AL, supra note

1 1,

8-1 1,

125 U.N.T.S. at 10-12, 22-24. See also

1

1JU 11.4, 11.7;

12, at

BOTHE ET AL,

107-63, 473-559.

58.

See supra notes 5, 11-15, 19, 53 and accompanying text.

59.

Protocol

I,

accompanying

supra note 11,

ANNOTATED

supra note 12, at 82-116, 216-62;

art.

1(2),

1125 U.N.T.S. at

7.

See also supra note 53 and

text.

60. See supra note 54

and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.

61. See supra notes 53-54

BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 5; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 102 cmts. f, i; 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 10, at 28, 31; Walker, supra note 51, 31, supra note 13, CORNELL
International Law Journal at 367-68; The Law of Military Operations at 391-92.
62.
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bound the SFRY and

defense, 63

NATO

Third 1949 Convention and Protocol

States as a customary norm. 64

The

complementary to the extent that
they do not supersede the 1907 Hague IV Regulations. 65 Moreover, Hague
66
IV's preamble, and its 1899 predecessor's preamble include Martens clauses.
I

are

To the extent these clauses reflect custom or a general principle of law, 67 the
SFRY was bound to apply principles of humanity in its custody of prisoners of
war whether the Hague
2.

treaties

The SFRY-KLA Aspects

Common Article

were binding

as treaty

law or not.

of Allied Force

3 to the 1949

Geneva Conventions

establishes

minimum

armed conflicts that are not of an international nature;
Second Convention relating to prisoners of war says:
criteria for

63.

Hague Convention

Regulations,
64.

art.

(IV) Respecting

Laws

& Customs

of

War on

Land, Oct.

e.g.,

the

18,

1907,

23(c).

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,

supra note

9,

H 11.4. See also Protocol

I,

supra note 11,

arts.

BOTHE ET AL, supra note 12, at 216-24; PlLLOUD ET AL, supra
note 12, at 473-91; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, H 47(i), cmt. 47.56; Horace B.
Robertson, Jr., The Obligation to Accept Surrender, in READINGS FROM THE NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE REVIEW ch. 40 (John Moore & Robert Turner eds., 1994) (Vol. 68, US Naval War
College International Law Studies); supra note 62 and accompanying text. Serbia was a party,
40-41, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 22;

modern Turkey, a NATO member, and some
areas today within the SFRY, only signed 1899 Hague Convention II with Respect to Laws &
Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (hereinafter 1899 Hague II), Regulations,
art. 23(c), 32 Stat, at 181 1, 1817, identical with Hague IV, supra note 62, Regulations, art. 23(c),
36 id. at 2301-02, which Montenegro, Serbia and the Ottoman Empire signed but did not ratify.
but the

Ottoman Empire,

predecessor State to

SFRY and its successor States and Hungary,
1899 and 1907 Conventions. See Convention of 1899,
Ratifications and Accessions, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,

Austria-Hungary, a predecessor State to parts of the
a

NATO

member, was party

Convention of 1 907: Signatures,

to the

is a circuitous argument that the SFRY, constituted as it was in
was
treaty
bound
by
succession
principles as well as custom. See generally Symposium, State
1999,
Succession, supra note 49; Walker, supra note 5. The same kind of issues might plague analysis
within NATO because of, e.g., Canada's status as a NATO member; Canada had a different
status a century ago within the British Empire. TIF, supra note 17, at 455 does not list Canada,
Montenegro, Serbia or Yugoslavia but does list Turkey as Hague IV parties; 1899 Hague II is not

supra note 15, at 94-98. There

listed.

65.

Third Convention, supra note 46, art. 135, 6 U.S.T. at 3422, 75 U.N.T.S. at 240; Protocol I,
1 1, art. 96, 1 125 U.N.T.S. at 46. See also BOTHE ET AL, supra note 12, at 554-57; 3

supra note

PlCTET, supra note 53, at 636-40; PlLLOUD ET AL., supra note 12, at 1084-92
66.

Hague

IV, supra note 63, preamble,

preamble, 32

id.

at

36

Stat, at

2277-80; 1899 Hague

1803-05. See also supra notes 53, 59 and accompanying

67. See supra notes 54,

60 and accompanying

text.
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text.

supra note 64,
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In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the

High Contracting

Parties,

each Party to the

conflict shall

be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1)

Persons taking no active part in the

who have

down

hostilities,

including

members of armed

arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color,
forces

laid

their

religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or

any other similar

criteria.

To

this

end

the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place

.

.

.

with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

violence to

(a)

life

cruel treatment

and

and person,

in particular

murder of

all

kinds, mutilation,

torture;

(b)

taking of hostages;

(c)

outrages

upon personal

dignity; in particular, humiliating

and degrading

treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial

guarantees

(2)

.

.

.

recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

The wounded and

sick shall be collected

Parties to the conflict should further

and cared

for.

endeavor to bring into

special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of [this]

The

force, by
.

.

.

means of

Convention.

application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of

the Parties to the conflict. 68

If

Allied Force was not an international

KLA-SFRY

68.

Third Convention, supra note 46,

id.

at 3220, 75

U.N.T.S. at 288;
53, at 28-44; 4

conflict with respect to

confrontations but would be within the

Convention, supra note 46,
38, art. 3,

armed

1

id.,

art. 3,

art. 3, id. at

U.N.T.S.

6 U.S.T.

Article 3

33 19, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136. See also

First

31 16, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32; Second Convention, supra note

Fourth Convention, supra note 46, art. 3, id. at 3518, 75
12, at 38-61; 2 id., supra note 38, at 33-38; 3 id., supra note

at 86;

PlCTET, supra note

at

Common

supra note 13, at 26-44-
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KLA members the SFRY captured, or SFRY armed forces members the KLA captured.
It is doubtful whether the SFRY and the KLA negotiated Article 3 special
definition,

its

standards applied to those taken into custody,

minimum

arrangements. Article 3 recites

e.g.,

standards; other provisions of the

Third Convention reciting customary law may also have applied to these persons. Protocol II, applying to non-international conflicts as a supplement to
the Third Convention, 69

was a Protocol

lists

additional protections. 70

party subject to a declaration,

II

treaty succession principles

71

The former Yugoslavia

but this

and other considerations

as to

is

also subject to

whether the

SFRY

was bound in 1999. To the extent Protocol II standards recited custom, 73 the
SFRY and the KLA were bound. The SFRY and the KLA were also bound by
the Martens clause principle ("in cases not covered by the law in force, the hu72

man

person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and

the dictates of the public conscience") stated in Protocol

not bound under Protocol

II

II,

74

even

if

they were

or other formal treaty rules.

Conclusions

Operation Allied Force's legitimacy under international law

commentators would

69.

Protocol Additional

say, a close call.

to

(II)

Because of its

Geneva Conventions of

is,

as

US sports

history, intervention, like

12 August

1949,

&

Relating to

Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 1, 1125U.N.T.S.
also BOTHE ET AL, supra note 12, at 604-0.8, 623-29;

Protection of Victims of Non-International
609, 611 [hereinafter Protocol

PlLLOUD ET
70.

II].

See

AL., supra note 12, at 1319-36, 1343-46.

Protocol

II,

supra note 69,

arts.

4-1

1, 1

125 U.N.T.S. at 612-15. See also

BOTHE ET AL., supra

note 12, at 640-64; PlLLOUD ET AL., supra note 12, at 1368-1436.
71.

Signatures, supra

note 55, at 703, 718.

72.

TIF, supra note

7, at

1

330; Symposium, State Succession, supra note 49; Walker, supra note

5.

The SFRY accepted Protocol II, supra note 69, on October 16, 2001, retroactive to 1992, but was
also bound by customary and general principles norms stated in Protocol II. As in the case of the
1949 Conventions, the ensuing and sometimes convoluted discussion based on treaty succession
principles

and the Protocol

importance of Protocol
73.

See supra notes

74.

Protocol

custom" as

II,

II

as restating

as treaty law.

custom or general

62-64 and accompanying

supra note 69, preamble,

in other

Martens

principles of law demonstrates the

See supra note 48 and accompanying text

1

text.

125 U.N.T.S. at 61

1,

which does not add "established
newness of law applying to

clauses, because of the relative

may argue for including that norm
PlLLOUD ET AL., supra note 12, at

non-international armed conflicts, although time since 1977
as well. See also

BOTHE ET

AL., supra note 12, at 44, 620;

134 1 —42; supra notes 53-54, 59-61, 66-67 and accompanying text.
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war,

is

a loaded

Today, in the
than

ful

word

for

many States

War Issues

or commentators and in

UN Charter era, intervention in some contexts

many contexts.
may be less law-

was before 1945, given Charter provisions on sovereignty, territorial
and the political independence of States. On the other hand, the

it

integrity

growing body of the law of human
humanitarian law, recognized by

rights, also

UN

recognized in the Charter, and

organizations' resolutions, within the

world arena must be considered. Under the perhaps (and hopefully) unique
circumstances of Kosovo, the

humanitarian intervention under state of necessity.

ples of collective

With

NATO campaign was legitimate under princi-

regard to the application of the law of armed conflict, as an operation

involving the use of force, Allied Force certainly met the threshold of

mon

Article 2 of the 1949

gated to conduct

its

Geneva Conventions. Therefore

campaign

NATO was obli-

in accordance with the standards of that

of law. Additionally, state of necessity principles mandated that
ations, to

Combody

NATO oper-

be considered legitimate, must have been undertaken only

when

necessary and proportional to Operation Allied Force's overall goal of protecting the Albanian Kosovars from the depredations of Serbian forces.

Under law

armed conflict standards and consistent with that objective, NATO, although choosing to implement only voluntary measures, could have con-

of

and search ship interdiction operations to halt the
shipment of oil to the SFRY. On the issue of the status of captured NATO and
SFRY military personnel, the Third Convention was binding as either treaty
or customary law on both sides; thus captured personnel were entitled to prisoner of war status. The situation with regard to KLA personnel is more complex. If the KLA-SFRY conflict is viewed as an international armed conflict,
then captured KLA personnel would also be prisoners of war and entitled to
the protections of the Third Convention. If, however, that conflict is considered to be non-international in nature, then detained KLA personnel would
be subject to the more general protective standards of Common Article 3.
ducted traditional

visit

Intervention to protect indigenous nationals such as occurred in 1999 in
the

SFRY

First, is

creates

two

distinct legal issues for the international

the intervention itself lawful?

cessity principles

I

believe that long-accepted state of ne-

would apply and that interventions that meet

sity criteria are legitimate.

This

community.

will limit

state of neces-

humanitarian interventions to the

most immediate and egregious situations when no reasonable alternative to
intervention exists. Second, what law applies to the use of military force during humanitarian interventions? Except in the most extraordinary circumstances (none of which I can currently envision) it must be the law of armed
,

conflict applicable to international

armed
104

conflicts. It

is

that

body of law to

George Walker

and it is that body of law that provides the greatest
protections to both combatants and noncombatants. Any lesser standard risks
inflicting greater harm than the good sought to be accomplished.

which military forces

train,

105

Commentary
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In

several instances during this colloquium scholars

have alluded to UN Se-

curity Council Resolutions as having the impact "as law." I'm not sure that

I

would be

willing to accord the Security Council

certainly agree that the

member

such overarching authority.

I

States of the United Nations, in Article 24 of

on the Security Council the primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security, and agreed that the Security Council, in carrying out its responsibility, acts on their behalf. Furthermore, member States agreed, in Article 25, to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter. In Chapter VI of the
Charter the member States conferred on the Security Council the authority
and responsibility to inquire into disputes which may endanger international
peace and security, and to investigate those disputes and recommend measures
with a view towards pacific settlement. Member States also conferred on the
the Charter, conferred

Security Council in Chapter VII the responsibility to determine the existence

of a breach of the peace or act of aggression,

make recommendations, and

de-

what measures shall be taken pursuant to Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, which we all know involve non-forcible and forcible measures to maintain
or restore international peace and security.

cide

The
is

an

my view,
States mem-

international security paradigm established by the Charter, in

international

bers of the

UN

mutual security agreement, in which sovereign

have by mutual agreement conferred on the

UN

Security

Council certain responsibilities for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, and have agreed to abide by the decisions of the
Security Council in this respect.
ring

I

do not read the Charter, however,

law-making authority on the

UN

Security Council. In

my

as confer-

view, neither

Commentary

UN

UN

General Assembly commands the authority or the responsibility to establish rules of law applicable to the international community or to any particular State. The Security Council, of course,
the

Security Council nor the

may by its decisions reinforce
may even advance developing
Each dispute or threat
Security Council

is

applicable principles of international law,

and

principles of international law.

to international peace

unique, having

its

and

security addressed by the

own factual basis.

UN Security Council

decisions in respect to those factual situations must of necessity be tailored to

the factual situation at hand. Because of this, and because decisions of the Se-

members of the international community, the resolutions of the Security Council do not and should
not establish principles of international law applicable to all members of the
curity Council often

do not reach out and touch

international community.
to read into the
lated,

UN

all

and a dangerous one at that,
Charter authority and responsibility which is not articuI

think

it is

and which was never intended

a stretch,

for those institutions established therein.

Even the decisions of the International Court of Justice

are applicable only to

the parties to a case before the Court, although those decisions can be powerfully

persuasive evidence of applicable international legal principles.

And,

al-

though some may disagree, Article 13 of the Charter authorizes the General
Assembly only to initiate studies and make recommendations concerning the
progressive development of international law and its codification
it is not a

—

law-making body.
I

am sure everyone

International

we are now experiencing in the
Criminal Court Preparatory Committee in arriving at a suffiis

aware of the

difficulty

ciently precise definition of the crime of aggression.

One

of the difficulties

is

on adopting the definition of aggression embodGeneral Assembly Resolution 3314 of December 14, 1974, arguing

the insistence of some States
ied in

UN

that the resolution articulates the international legal principle defining ag-

one looks into the preparatory work on the definition, the debate
in the General Assembly, and the interventions by States after its adoption by
consensus, one would clearly discern that the definition does not represent by
any means a definitive statement of aggression, much less the crime of

gression. If

aggression.

posed by

UN General Assembly

declarations purporting to reflect the state of the law.

Such pronouncements

This

is

but one example of the

difficulties

are so often political in nature, not supported by State practice or the realities

of international discourse, and so tainted by underlying political agendas as to

be highly suspect. Yet we are confronted with such pronouncements years
later as definitive

statements of the law.
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true of
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Security Council decisions, and

on

spective

how

just

limited

I

would hope that we would not

lose our per-

UN Security Council resolutions are intended to

be, the fact that they too are political statements,

and that they do not have

the force and effect of law.

Turning now to the
air

operation,

I

applicability of the law of

armed

conflict to the

Kosovo

think that the appropriate point of departure must be the ap-

was a NATO operation, the NATO
rules of engagement were applicable and were employed by all NATO forces.
In this respect, the NATO ROE specify that: "ROE first must be lawful. Interplicable rules of

engagement. Since

this

1

national law defines the lawful limits for the use of force during military operations.

law,

.

.

.

The conduct of military operations is
include

to

the

applicable

provisions

circumscribed by international
of the

law

of

armed con-

NATO ROE,

and the application of them, never permit the use of
force which violates applicable international law." Furthermore, each NATO
member is bound by its own domestic law, which may further constrain the
use of force in certain circumstances and complicate the conduct of combined
operations. For United States armed forces, service regulations specify that
the international law of armed conflict applies to the use of force in hostilities,
and that at all times, commanders shall observe, and require their commands
to observe, the principles of international law, including the observation and
flict.

.

.

.

enforcement of the law of armed

conflict.

So from the outset of hostilities on March

24, 1999, indeed during the plan-

ning process in preparation for Operation Allied Force, there was no question

armed

was fully applicable and that it was incumbent
that there be scrupulous compliance with the principles of the law of armed
conflict at all times. This was particularly important in the selection of targets,
in weaponizing those targets, in choosing aimpoints, and in employing weapons against those targets. US Department of Defense (DoD) attorneys played
a critical role in conducting legal reviews and analyses during the entire targeting process, and applied the traditional principles of the law of armed conflict throughout. Allow me to briefly provide you with a couple of examples of
the target sets which were attacked during Allied Force, and walk you through
the legal issues and concerns posed by those target sets.
that the law of

conflict

In addition to targeting purely military objectives

bunkers, fighter aircraft, etc.)
ture assets such as

(i.e.,

tanks, barracks,

NATO targeted so-called "dual-use" infrastruc-

command,

control and communication (C3), electric

power, industrial plant, leadership lines of communication (LOCs) and petro-

and lubricant (POL) facilities. This immediately raised issues of discrimination and the prohibitions against attacking civilians and civilian
leum,

oil
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objects.
lateral

We were also acutely aware of the rules of proportionality—that col-

damage

to civilians

and

civilian objects

was not to be excessive in

light

of the military advantage anticipated.
It is

no secret that NATO targeted

power facilities. Such facilities
because they do provide energy re-

electrical

are normally targeted during hostilities,

sources to military forces, and their destruction has a direct military advan-

Kosovo, we were careful to avoid undue and
prolonged power outages which would have a disproportionate effect on the
tage. Nevertheless, during

civilian population. In

most

cases, attacks

on

electrical

power

facilities

em-

which could take the system down for a few
hours or a day or two, but would not permanently shut down the power grid.
We also were mindful of the possible cascading effects of the attacks on power
grids, which could spill power outages over into neighboring countries not involved in the hostilities, and we were careful to ensure that these outages did
not occur. There were some "hard kill" power grid attacks, and NATO did
shut down the grid throughout Serbia at one point, but the outage was not
ployed "soft

kill" capabilities,

permanent.
I

will readily

admit

that, aside

from directly damaging the military

electrical

NATO

wanted the civilian population to experience
discomfort, so that the population would pressure Milosevic and the Serbian
power

infrastructure,

leadership to accede to

UN

Security Council Resolution 1244, but the in-

tended effects on the civilian population were secondary to the military advantage gained by attacking the electrical power infrastructure.
Likewise,

NATO mounted attacks on "dual-use" industrial facilities, those

having both military and civilian purposes. But each and every target of

this

nature was carefully scrutinized by our lawyers, both at the Joint Staff level

and

in

my

office

(DoD General

Counsel). In each case a direct military link

was required, or only those portions of the facility having military utility, or
conducting military work, were targeted. An example of this type facility was
the Kragujevac

Arms/Motor Vehicle Plant

—one

tomobiles while the other side produced tanks.
of the plant producing tanks.
fied as a

heavy bomber

might add that

I

target,

side of

which produced au-

NATO targeted only that side
initially this facility

was

identi-

but later disapproved as such because of the

proximity of civilian housing.

You might find

it

interesting to review a recently published

Stephen T. Hosmer, entitled
Did." Hosmer concluded that

"Why
it

"dual-use" infrastructure targets

RAND study by

Milosevic Decided to Settle

When He

was the attacks and the threat of attacks on
that generated the decisive pressure for war

termination. Furthermore, Milosevic and the Serbian leadership capitulated
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because they expected an unconstrained bombing campaign of even greater

magnitude, including carpet bombing of Belgrade,

if

they rejected the

NATO

ultimatum delivered by Chermnomyrdin and Ahtisaari on June 2, 1999. This
study also concluded that the air campaign against military targets did not significantly influence Milosevic's decision to

come

to terms. This in

my

view,

has significant and disturbing implications for the application of the law of

There very well could be serious
consequences for the civilian population should decision makers no longer appreciate the military utility of striking military targets, and applying military

armed

conflict in future conflicts of this type.

pressure solely against military objectives.

These are but two examples of the application of the law of armed conflict
during the targeting process for Operation Allied Force. I wish to assure all of
you that careful and thorough legal reviews of all targets were conducted at
every echelon of command, from the Supreme Allied

Commander up through

my office prior to the target lists being sent over to the
Command Authorities (President and Secretary of Defense) for

the Joint Staff and in

US

National

final approval. In

many

cases sound legal advice led to the deletion of targets,

change of ordnance assigned, adjustment of aimpoints, or disapproval of
gets because of law of

armed

tar-

conflict concerns. Principles of distinction, pro-

and military advantage were applied on a daily basis throughout
the conflict. Although mistakes were made, and weapons did not always perform as accurately as we had hoped, in my view NATO scrupulously complied
portionality

with the law of armed conflict in every instance.
civilian casualties
air

campaign. In

and dedicated

One

We should be gratified

that

were kept remarkably low considering the intensity of the

many ways, we have

targeteers, to

thank

the lawyers, and the incredibly talented

for

such a superb

effort.

comment. You undoubtedly are aware of, and may have read the
Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the FRY. The Report concludes that for
several reasons, not the least because the law of armed conflict in the area of
"dual-use" targets is not clear, no "in-depth" investigation of the NATO air
final

1

campaign

whole was warranted, nor should there be further investigations
incidents. While I found this aspect of the Report to the Prosecu-

as a

into specific

tor gratifying, the

manner

deeply disturbing.

To have

in

which the committee reached

its

conclusions

twenty-twenty hindsight scrutiny, done at

is

leisure,

I. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
1257 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A.
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of decisions and determinations

neous time constraints and

made

in the fog of war, often

life -threatening

under instanta-

conditions by military

command-

and airmen, based on allegations by those who do not hold
Western nations in very high regard, is a chilling and frightening prospect. I
fear that the reservations of the United States with respect to the Internaers, pilots, soldiers

Court are well-founded, based on the aftermath of the Kosovo
conflict. I also fear that a precedent has been established, and we can expect
such allegations in future instances where the use of force is employed, even in
tional Criminal

instances of humanitarian assistance.

The

prospects for Western participa-

tion in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations

good, and one wonders

if

this

bodes well for

tional law for the future.
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in

order to assess the relevance of the

Hague and Geneva Conventions and

Kosovo conflict, one has to ascertain, first of all, the nature of the conflict. Without a doubt, the hostilities between NATO countries
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) should be qualified as an international armed conflict.
J-L Protocol

On

I

to the

the contrary, the qualification of hostilities between the

FRY and

the

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is more controversial. At first glance, it
would seem that it should be regarded as an internal conflict, since the conflict took place between the constituted government and an insurgent community within a State. Can the hostilities between the FRY and the KLA be
qualified as an international armed conflict, since Article 1 (4) of Protocol I
1

applies? Article

refers to peoples

1 (4)

under colonial domination or alien oc-

cupation and racist regime fighting for the implementation of their right to
does not apply to mere secessionist movements.

The

whether the Kosovars are a people entitled to
determination, or whether they are simply a minority.

self-

self-determination.

It

question, therefore,

The

distinction

is

tional law, while conferring different categories
ities,

is

does not define either peoples or minorities.

Council Resolution 1244
1.

moot point and internaof rights on peoples and minor-

between people and minority

Protocol Additional to the

2

a

It is

true that

qualifies the inhabitants of

Kosovo

ON THE LAWS OF WAR 422 (Adam
2.

S.C

Roberts

& Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed.

I].

Res. 1244

Gune

Security

as "people."

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating

Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.

Protocol

UN

10, 1999),

U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).

3,

to the

DOCUMENTS

2000) [hereinafter

Commentary
whether

However,

it

does not

mination.

It

only says that the people of Kosovo should enjoy "substantial au-

tonomy." Autonomy
people.

Be that

as

clarify

fits

it

this

more with the

may, the

KLA,

people enjoys the right of self-deter-

rights of minorities

as a liberation

than with those of

movement

representing

Kosovo's "people," did not address any declaration to the depositary of Protocol

I

in order to bring into effect both the

col, as

Geneva Conventions and the

required by Article 96(3) of Protocol

The

other possibility

is

to consider the

Proto-

I.

KLA

as being so close to

NATO

countries that the Kosovar militias, under the control of NATO, did not represent an

autonomous party

to the conflict.

The Appeals Chamber

of the

ICTY, in the Tadic case relied on the control criterion to qualify the conflict,
which took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Bosnian Serb Army
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as international. 3 Since the Bosnian Serb Army was
under the strict control of the FRY, the conflict was in reality between the
FRY, on one hand, and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other. The FRY did not regard the conflict against the KLA as international. NATO countries, on the
other hand, did not take any stance on that point. Hence, the dual qualification of the Kosovo conflict (NATO countries-FRY; FRY-KLA) still holds
good, unless contradicted by a future judgment of the ICTY.
I

will

now turn my attention to

the applicability of the relevant instruments

of international humanitarian law (IHL). While the

Hague Conventions

mostly regarded as declaratory of customary international law, this

is

are

only true

Geneva Conventions and in particular for Protocol I. All
countries are party to the Geneva Conventions. As for Protocol I, all

in part for the

NATO

were party to

it

at the

time of Operation Allied Force except for France, Tur-

key and the United States. 4 All the
ities

against the

FRY

NATO countries which conducted hostil-

are parties to Protocol

although the United States does consider

its

II

except the United States,

provisions to be reflective of cus-

tomary international law.

The FRY was admitted

to the

ever, during the hostilities the

United Nations in 2000

FRY

considered

itself

as a

new State. How-

the continuation of the

former Yugoslavia, which was party to the Geneva Conventions and to Proto-

and

one disregards the continuity claim, other principles could be
applied to affirm that the FRY was obliged, during hostilities, to abide by the
Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols. Article 34 of the
cols

I

II.

If

3.

See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Jurisdiction, 105

4-

France acceded to Protocol

I

on April

INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 453,

11,

2001.
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70 (1997).
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1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States, 5 imposing the rule of
automatic succession in case of dissolution of States,
of customary international law, or
the

FRY

that

it

would honor the

it

is

regarded as declaratory

could be argued that the declaration by

treaties stipulated

by the former Yugoslavia

should be considered equivalent to a declaration of succession to
eral treaties

As

far as

mostly of

all

multilat-

binding the predecessor State.

conduct of

air warfare,

hostilities

is

concerned, the Kosovo war consisted

with the exception of cruise missiles launched by war-

which fall under the aegis of naval warfare. Hague Convention IX regulates naval bombardment. For air bombardment there are no
conventional rules, although some commentators have argued that the 1923
Hague Rules on Aerial Warfare are declaratory of customary international
ships in the Adriatic,

law. 6 Protocol

and

air) to

tional law?

I,

Article 49(3) subjects

the same rules.

The

point

is

three kinds of attacks (land, naval

that provision declaratory of customary interna-

important, since France and the United States were

However, the very fact that all NATO countries
to the same conventional instruments, did not raise any seri-

not parties to Protocol

were not parties

Is

all

I.

ous problem as far as the legal interoperability of forces
ing)

(for instance, target-

was concerned.

Three

US soldiers were captured on March 31,
They were

goslavia border.

1999

Macedonia-YuThey were wear-

at the

entitled to prisoner of war status.

and could not be considered spies. The pretense by Milosevic,
subsequently abandoned, to subject them to criminal proceedings was without
any legal foundation. Given the nature of the operations, the allies did not
capture any FRY soldier. Personnel captured by the KLA and handed over to
NATO countries were entitled to prisoner of war status. KLA personnel were
covered by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and by Protocol II.
As previously mentioned, the conflict between the FRY and the KLA should
be regarded as an internal one.
ing uniforms

The Kosovo
of neutrality

new problem, that of the interface of the law
and peacekeeping operations. The case in point refers to the staconflict raised a

tus of military personnel, belonging to a party to the conflict, in the territory of

a non-participating State.

NATO
war.

During the Kosovo war, personnel belonging to

countries were stationed in foreign territory, close to the theater of

They were

either part of a peacekeeping operation, such as

SFOR

in

5. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.80/31/Corr2 (1978), 17 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1448 (1978).

6.

See authorities cited

infra

note

14-
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Bosnia-Herzegovina, or dispatched as a measure of preventive deployment,

such

as

UNPREDEP in Macedonia, whose mandate was terminated on Febru-

ary 28, just before the

commencement

of hostilities.

According to the customary law of neutrality and the rules of the Hague

Convention V,
interned.
conflict,

belligerent military units present in neutral territory should be

the same principle applicable to units, belonging to a party to the

Is

but part of a peacekeeping force?

The danger

for the

enemy

is

that

the military unit might be diverted to a combat mission and take part in the
hostilities.

new problem, which should be resolved taking into account the
principles embodied in Article 1 1 of the Hague Convention V of 1907, on the
one hand, and the law of the UN Charter, on the other. The resolution of the
This

is

a

issue could

•

If

be along the following

personnel are under the

lines:

command and

control of

the danger that troops be diverted to take part in

UN

Headquarters,

combat operations

is

remote;
•

•

The same is true, however with difficulty, if the force, even though under
national command and control, is mandated by the United Nations;

A

further line of reasoning could be to invoke Charter Article 103,

overriding the law of neutrality,
•

on

this point;

A policy of non-belligerency might also be invoked by the neutral State,
hosting foreign troops, insofar as they do not

During the

conflict,

NATO

aircraft

commit any warring

act.

dropped weapons, not used during

their mission in Serbia, in the Adriatic, before landing at

Aviano,

Italy.

Land-

weapons represented a hazard to the safety of the aircraft. The
weapons were dropped in jettison areas that had been identified by NATO in
previous years on the high seas.
The use of the high seas for military purposes is without any doubt lawful.
Therefore one may conclude that jettison areas are not contrary to international law. However, the weapons dropped by NATO aircraft lie on the continental shelf of both Italy and Croatia. Italy was a member of the warring
coalition, which took part in the identification of jettison areas, and consented to the weapon dropping. However, the case of Croatia, a State that did
not take part in the armed conflict, is different. Could the continental shelf of
ing with the

a neutral State be used for warring activities?

since the con-

under the sovereignty of the coastal State, which only ensovereign rights on it. The same solution proposed for mines or other

tinental shelf is not
joys

Our answer is yes,
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devices

on the continental

continental shelf of a foreign State are lawful, provided that
tivities

on the
the economic ac-

shelf should be followed. Military activities

of the coastal State are not irremediably impaired.

The

principle of

"due regard" should be taken into account.
Unlike total exclusion zones, jettison areas are a new phenomenon. Should
they be regulated?

may

The

first

problem

is

whether there

is

a duty of notification.

happened with Italian trawlers in the upper Adriatic,
which caught a number of weapons in their nets. A duty of notification of
minefields, as soon as military exigencies permit, is established under Article 3
of the Hague Convention VIII. The same rationale could be invoked as far as
dropping of weapons is concerned, even though the danger is more remote
than with mines. It should also be taken into account that in the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that Albania had the
Incidents

occur, as

duty to notify of the danger to navigation represented by mines floating in
territorial waters.

its

7

The second problem is whether

remove weapons dumped
in the high seas at the end of hostilities. Article 5 of the Hague Convention
VIII establishes a generic duty to remove mines. De-mining is a duty, which
has been rendered more stringent by new conventions on land mines. Environmental considerations play a role, not only during the armed conflict (Articles 35(3) and 55 of Protocol I), but also after its termination. After the
termination of hostilities, Italy and other NATO countries dispatched 13
minesweepers to remove the weapons dropped during the war. However, that
operation was considered a sort of exercise and not regarded by NATO as a
duty imposed by international law.

The law

there

is

a duty to

of neutrality has not been abolished by the entry into force of the

United Nations Charter. The ICJ reaffirmed the permanent validity of this
body of law in 1996 in its advisory opinion on Nuclear Weapons, even though
the Court took into consideration only the rights of neutral States and not

those of belligerents vis-a-vis neutrals. 8

The

right to visit

shipping in order to confiscate contraband of war

is

and search neutral

a well-established right

under the law of neutrality, which has also been exercised during naval conflicts

that have occurred since the entry into force of the

During the Kosovo war,

NATO envisaged exercising belligerent rights against

neutral shipping in order to stop the

Channel (U.K.

UN Charter.

supply to FRY. This position was opposed

oil

7.

See Corfu

8.

Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996

v.

Albania), 1949

I.C.J. 4,

(July 8).
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22 (Dec.

5).

I.C.J.
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__

by the Russian Federation, according to which the control of shipping bound
the port of Bar could be enforced only

if

authorized by a

for

UN Security Council res-

among NATO allies, France and Italy were not enthusiastic. Reso1 160 established an embargo on the sale and supply of war material to FRY,

olution. Also,

lution

but did not authorize any enforcement measures, except those which could be ex-

own shipping. 9
that foreign shipping may not be visited and searched,
on

erted by a country
true

It is

rity

its

unless a Secu-

Council resolution authorizes appropriate measures to enforce an embargo

tablished by the Security Council. This

the Rhodesia case 10 and implemented

is

es-

a well established practice going back to

more

recently against Iraq, 11 the former Yu-

and the FRY. 13 However, this statement holds true in time of peace, i.e.,
a situation in which there is no armed conflict. In such a case, in the absence of

goslavia 12
in

a Security Council resolution, States are authorized to control shipping flying
their flag or belonging to foreign countries,

under

reciprocity,

armed

conflict

is

may be

visited.

which agree that

their ships, usually

A completely different situation arises when an

going on. Warring States, as practice shows, are entitled to exer-

and search. One can only discuss whether
any geographical limitation or whether visiting and searching may be con-

cise belligerent rights, including visit

there

is

ducted anywhere. This depends on the scale of hostilities.
sity

and proportionality might advise that those

The

activities

principle of neces-

be conducted close to

the theater of war.

A blockade of the port of Bar was also envisaged by NATO countries to impede the

oil

supply to the FRY. This idea was immediately qualified by the

Russian Federation as contrary to international law and was also opposed by

France and Denmark within the Alliance. Lacking a Security Council resolution, those countries did

tional law.

A

blockade

not regard a blockade as in keeping with interna-

is

still

considered a lawful measure, at least

when

one of the measures referred to in
Article 42 of the Charter. But a blockade is a far more intrusive measure than
visit and search and might contribute to an escalation of the conflict. Yet
established by the United Nations, as

these are policy considerations.

9.

S.C. Res. 1160 (Mar. 31, 1998),

From

it is

a legal viewpoint, the considerations

U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998)

11

8.

This was restated in

paragraph 7 of S.C. Res. 1199 (Sep. 23, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998) without any

mention of enforcement measures.
10. S.C. Res. 221 (Apr. 9, 1966), U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966).
11. S.C. Res. 665 (Aug. 25, 1990), U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).
12. S.C. Res. 713 (Sep. 25, 1991), U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991); S.C. Res. 757 (May
U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992).
13. S.C. Res. 787 (Nov. 16, 1992), U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (1992).
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30, 1992),

Natalino Ronzitti

made

and search, are

before, in relation to visit

also valid, mutatis mutandis,

with regard to blockade. In time of peace, a blockade to enforce an embargo
requires

an authorization by the Security Council; in time of armed

Security Council authorization

The Kosovo

is

not necessary.

once again brought attention to the question of the

conflict

use of neutral territory as a base for hostile operations or in a
to neutrality rules.

conflict,

The 1923 Hague Rules on Aerial Warfare,

eral writers as declaratory of

manner contrary
regarded by sev-

customary international law, establish two basic

principles, as far as neutrality

is

concerned. 14 Belligerent military aircraft are

forbidden to enter the jurisdiction of a neutral State (Article 40); a neutral
State should prevent the entry into

its

jurisdiction of belligerent military air-

craft (Article 42).

Austria and Switzerland did not permit
ritory.

Hague

This posture
rules.

On

NATO aircraft to over fly their ter-

in keeping with law of neutrality, as

is

the contrary, Bulgaria, Hungary,

might be

justified

only

if

Romania and Slovenia

NATO

agreed that their airspace could be used by

proven by the

aircraft.

This practice

one admits that a policy of non-belligerency

keeping with international law.

If

a deviation

in

is

from the rule of impartiality

is

the consequence of a Security Council resolution, non-belligerency does not
raise

any particular

difficulty.

Security Council Resolution 1160 established

an arms embargo against the FRY. Consequently, States not taking part in the
hostilities

lowed to

were forbidden to supply the

sell

weapons

in practice). It

is

to

more

FRY

NATO countries

difficult to justify

with war material, but were

(something which did not happen

derogation from neutrality

the absence of a Security Council resolution, imposing sanctions

emy and/or

qualifying

it

as

al-

an aggressor. Even

if it is

rules, in

on the en-

argued that non-belliger-

ency does not constitute a violation of international law, one has to admit that
the belligerent, without infringing any neutrality rule, would be allowed to react against non-belligerent States, since their territory

is

being used by the ad-

versary for warlike purposes.

14-

Remigiusz Bierzanek, Commentary

OF NAVAL WARFARE 404-6 (Natalino

to the

1923 Hague Rules for Aerial Warfare,

in

THE LAW

commenting on
the Rules: "While these Rules were never put in treaty form, they nevertheless had a profound
impact on the customary international law governing aerial bombardment." This passage is
quoted by Yoram Dinstein, The Law of Air, Missile and Nuclear Warfare, 27 ISRAEL YEARBOOK
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 n.2 (1977). See also the decision by the Tokyo District Court, December
7, 1963 in the Shimoda Case, in 8 THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 212ff
Ronzitti ed., 1988). R.R. Baxter says in

(1964).
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Commentary
Richard Sorenson

I

am

going to

background

Allied Force,

I

shift

the focus just a

little bit

as a military operational

to

what

is

appropriate for

my

law attorney. During Operation

served at the headquarters of the United States Air Forces in

Europe, at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. Along with Lieutenant Colonel

Tony Montgomery, I worked targeting issues in theater in concert with
NATO. Tony Montgomery from the US European Command and myself down
at the air component level can discuss what we did to comply with the law of
armed conflict as we planned and executed this operation.
By way of background, both

NATO and the United States were doing de-

was simply
untenable to accept another Srebrenica, where five to eight thousand individuals were taken out and slaughtered wholesale. As you know, the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) convicted General Krstic for
his activities at Srebrenica on August 2, 2001. Neither NATO nor the United
States, individually, could allow another Srebrenica. In the event we were unable to get consensus in NATO to go with military action, the United States
was also planning for the possibility of a US-only operation. My principal role
was in planning and executing the US portion of the operation.
tailed

planning in June 1998 to address the situation in Kosovo.

The United
tailed

and

It

States had over forty air campaigns developed as a result of de-

planned during the ten months preceding Operation Allied Force.

US

NATO planning was occurring in parallel. We

gence information

at very

high levels

had very detailed intelliof classification. We also had lawyers

looking at each and every individual target throughout that time period.

There

is

no question

that

we had more

ation Allied Force than has ever been

scrutiny of every single target in Oper-

done

in the history of warfare.

Commentary
Military planners

and lawyers applied the jus

in hello as

we considered

mili-

and proportionality. Every effort was made to eliminate unnecessary suffering whenever possible and to discriminate between military and
non-military objectives. There is no question that Operation Allied Force was
tary necessity

a successful

campaign

aircraft sorties,

—

it

covered seventy-eight days, thirty-eight thousand

over ten thousand strike

tended deaths of only about 500

civilians.

sorties,

and yet resulted

While the

in the unin-

loss of every civilian life

is

regrettable, the proportion of unintended deaths relative to the scale of the

operation

is

unprecedented in warfare.

To plan for those strike
tive

cess

we conducted target analysis using a predicmodel for collateral damage. The United States used this targeting prowith its four-tier collateral damage model to look at each and every
sorties

We used imagery and distance rings around the proposed target to determine whether we had non-military objects within range of the targets. We
target.

then would analyze the type of weapon we were putting against the target and

aim point or the weapon employed as required to minimize collateral damage. The model would, for example, predict the damage likely from
the use of a particular weapon against a particular building whether it would
cause panel collapse, glass breakage, or eardrum rupture.
Regarding the obligation to discriminate between military and non-military
objects, it is difficult to discriminate regardless of what altitude you're flying
when you have a high threat level in a very sophisticated air defense environment. Since emissions are created every time a bomb is dropped or a target is
otherwise taken down, aircrews are exposed to increased risk with every successive mission. Regardless of risk to our own forces, however, we still have to
comply with the law of armed conflict during offensive operations and we did.
Weapons reliability is always an issue during proportionality analysis. You
can talk about the possibility of using missiles that are 100% reliable; however,
even the United States cannot afford to buy 100% reliable weapons because
the costs are about one to three million dollars per weapon. No country in the
world is required by the law of armed conflict to have 100% reliable weapons.
Another problem with weapon accuracy is the delivery system. When you
have pilots in the cockpit dropping ordinance or submarines launching Tomaadjust our

—

hawk land attack missiles, the systems don't always
when you hit the switch to launch the missile or you

function as advertised
"pickle off the

bomb.

weapons and delivery
systems with 100% reliability, rather it requires the acquisition of weapons systems that are lawful under international law and the exercise of due care when
But, again, the law of

utilizing

them.

Once

armed

it

is

conflict does not require

determined that a target

122

is

a legitimate military

Richard Sorenson

objective,

we must then determine

that any unnecessary

tary objects or loss of civilian lives caused
livery

system,

or reliability

advantage anticipated.

is

damage

to non-mili-

by either the choice of weapon, de-

not excessive in relation to the military

Of course we must

avoid civilian casualties whenever

and we did that during Operation Allied Force.
The applicability of Protocol I was not an issue from

possible

1

cause

all

my

perspective, be-

NATO States applied a common understanding based on customary

international law.

It is

well

known

tions with regard to Protocol

I,

that the United States has

but as

far as

some

reserva-

the execution of Allied Force with

NATO allies, we were able to reach common ground on the important
issues. Every nation signed up to the common NATO rules of engagement deour

all

veloped for Operation Allied Force. These rules also allowed for national
ervations

when

appropriate so that

a country's national laws or policies

if

didn't allow for certain activities, then

res-

its

national forces would be exempted

from those functions.
In summary,

I

agree with Professor Greenwood's remarks that the law of

was fully applicable during Operation Allied Force. The targeting analysis was conducted the same as in any other conflict and the captured
military personnel were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war.

armed

1.

conflict

Protocol Additional

(I)

to the

Geneva Conventions of

12 August 1949, and Relating to the

Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.

ON THE LAWS OF WAR 422 (Adam

Roberts

3,

DOCUMENTS

& Richard Guelffeds., 3d ed. 2000).
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The

UN Security Council and the Creation of International Law

John Murphy:
Regarding Judy Miller's comment about the United Nations Security
Council and its powers of law creation, I would suggest with respect that the
Security Council of the United Nations

—has the authority

—

at

least

if

it's

acting

under

and enforce international
law. For more on this issue, I would recommend the two- volume book United
Nations Legal Order edited by Oscar Schachter and Chris Joyner, which goes
into the authority of the UN Security Council and other bodies of the United
Nations to create, to interpret, to apply and enforce international law.
Chapter VII

to debate, decide,

1

George Walker:
I

think

Any

I

agree that Security Council's decisions under Chapter VII are law.

other resolution of the Security Council, any General Assembly resolu-

tion except those governing United Nations governments

and most other

or*

ganizations unless the participants have agreed that they are law, are either

supportive of law or the

like.

General Assembly resolutions

law and they are not law in their
side of things they

own

can contribute to

The

Law

light,

but

I

may never declare

believe that

on the

political

soft law.

of Neutrality

Under

the

UN Charter

Christopher Greenwood:
Regarding the question of the application of the law of neutrality in an en-

vironment where you have Security Council action.

I

think

it is

clear that

if

the Security Council adopts a decision under Chapter VII, that decision or

1.

UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER

eds., 1995).

(2 vols.),

(Oscar Schachter and Christopher C. Joyner

Discussion

rather the obligation to comply with
tional law.

There

is,

therefore,

no

it

prevails over any other rule of interna-

difficulty if you

have a Security Council de-

cision which, for example, prohibits the delivery of particular goods to a

That is why I have some reservation in trying to draw lessons
from what happened in the second Gulf conflict and applying them to the
particular State.

conflict in Kosovo.

In the second Gulf conflict, you had a very clear, unambiguous Security

Council Resolution 66 1, 2 which forbid the delivery of virtually anything to
Iraq or Kuwait, and a second resolution, 665, 3 which authorized navies of gov-

ernments cooperating with the government of Kuwait to enforce 661. Now
neither of those conditions was satisfied in the Kosovo conflict. Resolution
1

160 4 only applied to the delivery of weapons and military equipment to Yugo-

and there was no equivalent of 665. So on the critical point about intercepting deliveries of oil to Yugoslavia, there was no Security Council
authority. For legal basis, you would have had to fall back on the customary international law principles. That's where I would suggest there is a real diffislavia

culty in practice.

Peacekeepers or an Occupying Force?

Christopher Greenwood:

would just like to say something about the situation after Resolution
1244 5 was adopted because we've only briefly touched on that so far. It seems
to me that 1244 moved the goalposts completely with respect to Kosovo because it meant that when ground troops went into Kosovo, they did so under a
Security Council mandate. Had that not happened, then I think the legal position would have been a very murky one indeed. Suppose that the Yugoslav
government had capitulated as it did, but we had not been able to get a resolution through the Security Council because of the Chinese veto. You would
then, I think, be in a position where the troops that now make up KFOR
would have been there in effect as belligerent occupants or at least under a regime of belligerent occupation tempered by whatever Yugoslavia had agreed
to. That would have been an extremely uncomfortable position indeed. However much we might find 1244 limiting, the law of belligerent occupation
would have been a limit a great deal more difficult to live with.
I

2.

S.C. Res. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990), U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).

3.

S.C. Res. 665 (Aug. 25, 1990), U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).

4.

S.C. Res. 1160 (Mar. 31, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998).

5.

S.C. Res. 1244

Qune

10, 1999),

U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
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Discussion

The

=====^======

Legality of Blockade or Visit

& Search

Adam Roberts:
As

I

recall the

way the

and search arose during the Kosovo

issue of visit

events of 1999, there should have been no problem about the application of

most of the law of armed
I

recall

it

conflict because

being said that one oi the

leaders in their

Kingdom we

it

applies

difficulties

wisdom had proclaimed

when

there

is

fighting.

But

was that numerous Western

that this was not a war. In the United

had, for example, a Minister of Defence then,

General of NATO, proclaiming repetitiously that

this

now

Secretary-

was not a war. Then the

made that it was particularly difficult to exercise rights of visit
when Western leaders had been so industriously and, in my opin-

suggestion was

and search

wonder if there was a conad bellum problem and the application of that

ion, so absurdly claiming that this

nection there between this jus
particular

branch of jus

was not a war.

I

in hello.

Christopher Greenwood:

Well

I

don't think

has anything to do with whether there was a state of

it

war in the formal sense.

I

really think that

is

an

issue

which has become almost

museum piece. Having said that, I think that if you repeatedly
say in public we are not fighting a war, you are not simply saying there is no
technical state of war in being. You are trying to damp down expectations of
completely a

the level of violence that

is

going to occur.

variably as a matter of political reality

—

if

do

If you

that,

then you almost

not a matter of law

in-

—constrain your

freedom of action in the future.

Wolff H. von Heinegg:
Let

me

address the subject of visit and search.

debate over the legal issues involved, because

upon the

legal issues

and not on the

part of the law of neutrality
trality. If

you look

at the

would

policies,

strictly

is

no doubt that

search operations

6.

it is

as

really don't

when we
it is

quite clear that at least that

if

you look

at the

San Remo Manual, 6
decides to conduct visit and

as well as the

as a belligerent

perfectly in order

this

are just concentrating

law of maritime neutrality and

soon

understand

be labeled the law of maritime neu-

works of the International Law Association
there

I

and

in conformity with the existing

San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at

SEA HI 93-104

(Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).
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my

law. In

opinion, this

belligerents to

Now when

conduct

is

visit

customary law and there

is

a customary right of

and search operations.

comes to certain legal limitations that have been suggested
this morning, well I warn you against mixing up self limitations with legal obligations. A belligerent would be entitled to conduct visit and search operations
it

with regard to neutral shipping everywhere in the high seas outside neutral
territorial waters.

he

is

else.

probably would not do that in the Atlantic

engaged in the Indian Ocean, but that

So when it comes

neutrality,
visit

Of course, he

I

is

just a self limitation

to this part of the law of neutrality that

if

and nothing

means maritime

think there can be no real doubt about the legality of conducting

and search operations.

Natalino Ronzitti:

We

both agree that

conflict.

About the

visit

and search

is

legal limitation, there

legal as
is

you are entitled to search a ship within the

some

soon

as there

practice

is

an armed

and precedent that

limits of self defense, but

it's

very

exemplify what these limitations are.

difficult to

Christopher Greenwood:
I

take the point that there are any

number of texts from

the Naval

Com-

mander's Handbook in the United States to the International Law Associa7

San Remo Manual

tion to the

that talk about rights of visit

and search.

I

subscribe to the views that the right could have been exercised in these cir-

cumstances
cal

than a

if it

was

legal one.

do so. The problem was more a politido think we have to go into this with our eyes open.

really necessary to

But

I

Our own governments would be

exceptionally reluctant to accept the exercise

of those kind of belligerent rights
conflicts in

which we were

if

neutral.

we were on

It is

the receiving end of

them

in

simply not the case today that one can

give the kind of confident advice that "don't worry this right
lished in

customary international law, nothing

that that

would not today be responsible advice

else to

is

clearly estab-

bother about."

I

think

for a lawyer to give. Also,

I

don't accept that limitations as to area are purely politically self-imposed imitations.
first

7.

I

think that

Gulf war, which

if

Iran had sent frigates to the Mediterranean during the

it

could just about have done, and

made

a few token visit

Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
(A.R. Thomas and James Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, US Naval War College

OPERATIONS
International

Law

Studies).
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and searches there, we would not have accepted the legality of that in
The United States would not have accepted its legality either.

Ove
I

Britain.

Bring:

think

I

rather stand

on the

line

with Chris Greenwood being more cautious

of the applicability of the law of neutrality in warfare than Wolff von Heinegg

who takes a more cock-sure
in place.

I

attitude that the traditional law of neutrality

is still

take this view because the law of 1907 was adopted at a time

when

—

no law of collective security there was no UN Charter. In 1907 the
of force for visit and search purposes was not doubted at all. What has hap-

there was

use

pened since then

is

that

we have

the law of collective security: belligerents

not automatically, or perhaps should not automatically at

least, rely

may

on the op-

tion of the use of force in relationship to States that are not involved in the

armed conflict. There is a tension between the law of 1907 and the law of 1945,
and that is a logical, legal and ideological tension. I'm not sure that this has resulted in state practice confirming one thing or the other, but it is a matter that
should be discussed in legal circles because

I

think that

it is

a problem.

Christopher Greenwood:
First

of

all,

without looking to get into the argument about whether the

NATO operation in Yugoslavia was lawful or not,
a real

problem

if

agree entirely that there

I

you have a State that maintains that there

manitarian intervention at

all,

or that,

if

there

is, it

is

no

is

right of hu-

doesn't apply to Yugosla-

and then takes the position "what right have you to stop us from trading
with an existing trading partner?". But that same problem arises where you
have a State not involved in the conflict that says we don't accept your
self-defense argument. Obviously you can't contend that there is no right of
via,

self-defense in international law.

Exactly the same problem arises
that Iran

is

if

a neutral country says

acting in self-defense against Iraq.

in self-defense against Iran, thus

there

is

It is, I

doesn't accept

don't accept Iraq

what power do you have

trading with an existing trading partner."

hangs over

"We

it

is

acting

to prevent us from

think, the question

mark

this area of the law of neutrality in the twenty-first century.

an answer to

that,

and the answer

is

that

Now

that the customary international

law of neutrality continues to provide certain elements of rights to belligerents
irrespective of the legality of the resort to force. If you didn't
ple of that kind,

together. But

I

have some

princi-

then you would in effect be scrapping the law of neutrality

come back

to a point

you have a combination of

real

I

made

doubt

in

my opening statement. Where

— admittedly doubt

129
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I

don't share, but

Discussion

—

doubt nonetheless about the legal basis for an operation in the first
place, coupled with doubts about how far the law of neutrality has survived
into the modern era in relation to intercepting ships and doubts about the necessity for such action, then you have a real problem about stopping neutral
real

ships irrespective of what your lawyers

Applying the

tell

you.

LOAC: A Question of Intent or Act?

Ruth Wedgwood:
had a question for Judy Miller and for anybody else who wants to comment on it. When I recently spoke to Dejan Sahovic who's the new Yugoslav
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, he concurred essentially
with the conclusion of the Rand Study. His answer to the question "why did
Milosevic ultimately step down from the campaign?" was that he thought that
Milosevic doubted the ultimate loyalty of the Yugoslav Army. The disloyalty
was not ideologically based, but rather that they would fear for the safety and
I

comfort of their

own

families.

My question is the old catholic question of motive versus purpose, or intention versus act. If in fact

we succeeded because

the Serbs believed

we would

Hamburg after the Second World War, was that a licit kind of animation? The threat of force versus
the actual use of force, because we may indeed have chosen our target. I know
we chose our targets with great care, but if the Serbs believed we would not let
up until everything they used in civilian life was destroyed, then we may have
won the war by intimating, or allowing them to conclude, that we would use
force in a much more unrelenting way that would raise far greater questions of
reduce Belgrade to a flattened version of Frankfurt or

proportionality.

Judith Miller:
I

don't think objectively speaking that the people of Yugoslavia should

have had that

fear.

In point of fact

NATO

we were not

razing parts of Belgrade. In

—

and the United States were saying throughout and we were
saying it because it was true
that we were going to follow the law of armed
conflict. So I can't account for the belief, if it occurred, among the army and
the civilian population that we were going to practice total war. That simply
wasn't in the cards from anyone's perspective, or from anyone's formal or infact,

—

formal statements.
I

do think that

if

in fact

somehow

that perception

is

what

really

drove

Milosevic to relent, then that does create some issues for people going forward
130
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because you're presumably going to hear military commanders say that

we

want to do X or Y. We're going to have lawyers even harder pressed to explain
you can't do that because it's not allowed under the law of armed conflict. I
think it does challenge one's ideas about what it is to engage in hostilities in a
world where our every move is covered on CNN and reported instantaneously. It may have reverberations that are somewhat different than we've
been accustomed to previously.
H

Enforcement of the Laws of Armed Conflict and 20/20 Hindsight
Christopher Greenwood:
If

I

ment.

may respond
I

something Judy Miller said on the question of enforcetake the point entirely, and I recognize the difficulty for a civilian in
to

speaking on a subject of this kind to a predominantly military audience.
ognize entirely that

it is

I

rec-

uncomfortable to have the idea of a judge and a court

with twenty-twenty hindsight second guessing the decisions you took in the

we should be

heat of the moment, but

I

we should be worried by

the sight of our

don't think

afraid of this.

I

don't think

own shadow.

example what was happening in Northern Ireland over the
last thirty years; any British soldier firing a weapon at somebody in Northern
Ireland did so knowing that the decision that he took in the heat of the moment was likely to be hauled over afterwards in great detail by people with
If

you take

for

twenty-twenty hindsight.

The

fact of the

matter

is, it

didn't chill

all

military

Northern Ireland. It may have produced some circumstances and
cases where we would question the result, but the fact of the matter is that it
hasn't handicapped the British forces in what they set out to do, And I don't
think the prospect of an International Criminal Court or the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is going to have that effect on
military action in general. Perhaps a more important point is that whether we
like it or not, this is a fact of life. It's not something we're going to be able to escape from and there's no point in our pretending otherwise.
activity in

W. Hays
I

Parks:

agree that

we

often times are judged in law enforcement situations with

twenty-twenty hindsight. Every law enforcement officer in the United States,

any soldier who uses force in the United States,

is

subject to a line of cases that

govern whether that person should have used deadly force in that circumstance.

We

not blessed

have those processes
like

at

both the state and federal

you are with a European Court of Human
131

level.
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are

Rights. That's your
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burden.

You can have

SAS

1988

There was
ful.

8

it;

we

don't

want

killing of the three Irish

it.

The example

Republican

Army

I

can think of is the

terrorists in Gibraltar.

10 to 9 decision that found the use of force unlaw-

a very political

we are concerned about when
commanders make in the fog of war.

That's the kind of chilling decision that

talking about judging decisions that

Christopher Greenwood:
First,

make

I

understand where you're coming from and the answer

sure you get the right judges.

who are

You need

make

to

is

you need to

sure you have people

not there just because they have a political axe to grind, but are genu-

inely seeking to apply the law impartially.
fear provided that

Then

I

you get over the second hurdle.

think you have nothing to
It

has got to be clearly un-

derstood by everybody concerned that you are looking at an event after

pened. Therefore, there

inevitably a degree of

is

hindsight, but you have got to apply a test that
plied by

somebody
is

hap-

a degree of

actually capable of being ap-

moment. There's an English case on self
ago which contains the passage that detached

in the heat of the

defense from about thirty years
reflection

is

detachment and

it

not to be expected in the face of an uplifted knife.

sential to appreciate that that

is

ample, to any investigation of a

I

think

it's

es-

the standard which has to be applied, for ex-

pilot's

decision to

fire

a missile

on the basis of a

couple of seconds in which he had a chance to appreciate the situation in
front of him.

Judith Miller:

The problem I have with
it's

currently constituted

the International Criminal Court (ICC)

is

that as

does not have the sort of ground rules that Christo-

it

pher Greenwood has pointed

body of law that

is

to.

Impartial judges, impartial prosecutors, and a

knowable in advance and

fairly

applied has not been guar-

ICC as currently envisioned and embraced by so many people in
regret personally that we are in this situation. I do not believe the

anteed by the
the world.

I

United States

want

to have

is

entitled to

an institution

world can rely on, to do
8.

See

McCann and Others v.

it

do what it wants to do without scrutiny. I simply
set up that we can rely on, and everyone else in the

in a fair way.

the United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R.

(ser.

A) (1995) holding by

Kingdom had violated the European Convention on Human
Rights. The European Commission on Human Rights had previously voted eleven to six that the
use of lethal force was "no more than 'absolutely necessary.'" McCann and Others v. the United
Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, Eur. Comm'n. H.R. (Mar. 4, 1994), p. 251.

only ten votes to nine that United
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My point

about the Report to the Prosecutor

is

that you must look at that

from the point of view of a lawyer in the Department of Defense trying to give good advice to the secretary and the chairman and everyone else trying to carry out a military mission. If you read that Report and try

and think about

it

what kind of advice you're going to give, then I think it raises a lot
questions. So the point I'm making is that there are issues that it

to figure out

of serious

and approaches that it took that I think are not necessarily the obvious
way to interpret the law of armed conflict and apply it in individual instances.
raises

Are

the

Laws

War a Constraint?

of

Adam Roberts:
There has been an implication that the laws of armed conflict are essentially a constraining factor on the waging of war. Of course they are a constraining factor, but there are two sub-aspects of that that should be brought
out. One is that some of the most important parts of the law of armed conflict
don't deal with combat as such, but with the treatment of victims of war, prisoners of war, inhabitants of occupied territory and so on. Those crucially important bits of the law of armed conflict are not as it were affected by this
critique, but the law of armed conflict is still constraining in a number of
respects.
It's

also true that the

law of armed conflict

is

a very important

means

whereby the conduct of war can be kept within limits which Western publics
will accept. In that sense, it is enabling and not constraining. We've seen
plenty of evidence of that in the at least three major wars in which Western

— the Falklands War,

democracies have been involved in the

last

the 1991 Gulf War and Kosovo. In

three, a sense that the forces involved

all

twenty years

were fighting within certain constraints and were treating prisoners honorably

and everything

else

was an important precondition

port for the operations.
straining,

So while

we should not

it is

think of

for

continued public sup-

war may be conexclusively a constraining and

true that the laws of

them

restraining factor.
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PART III
TARGETING

Introduction

Robert F. Turner

and ethical lessons of NATO's Kosovo
campaign as they concern targeting the jus in hello issues of what obmay lawfully be attacked by weapons that are themselves not prohibited

I
jects

his panel will focus

by the jus
In

on the

legal

—

in hello.

my view, no development in US

national security law in recent decades

has been more important than the development and growth of the

field

of op-

and the cooperative relationship between the finmilitary and the leading scholars on these issues from

erational law in the military

minds in the US
the United States and around the world has been truly remarkable. The Naval
War College anticipated the benefits of such cooperative relationships decades ago with the establishment of the Stockton Chair of International Law
and this remarkable colloquium is but a continuation of that tradition.
est legal

Legitimate Military Objectives

Under The

Current Jus In Bello

Yoram Dinstein
The

Principle of Distinction

and Military Objectives

Threat
Advisory Opinion of 1996 on
Use
Nuclear
InWeapons,
Court of
recognized the
the
of
—between combatants and noncombatants
—
or

Legality of the

its

International

of

"principle

Justice

distinction"

(civilians)

as a fun-

damental and "intransgressible" principle of customary international law. The
1

requirement of distinction between combatants and civilians
the jus in

hello. It is

reflected in Article

1949 Geneva Conventions

lies at

48 of Protocol Additional

for the Protection of

War Victims,

I

the root of

of 1977 to the

entitled "Basic

between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives." 2 There is no doubt that, irrespective of objections to sundry other
rule:" "the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish

1.

Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996

226,257
2.

I.C.J.

Reports

(July 8).

Protocol Additional to the

Geneva Conventions of

Protection of Victims of International

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
2000) [hereinafter Protocol

I].

Armed
(Adam

WAR 447

12 August 1949,

Conflict, June 8,

and Relating

to the

1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.

3,

Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 3d. ed.

Legitimate Military Objectives

stipulations of Protocol

I,

3

"the principle of the military objective has

a part of customary international law for

sea or in the

air.

The coinage

armed

conflict"

become

whether on land,

at

4

"military objectives"

first

came

into use in the non-binding

1923 Rules of Air Warfare, drawn up at The Hague by a Commission of
Jurists

5

up

(set

Armament).
tion of

War

in

It

1922 by the Washington Conference on the Limitation of

also appears in the

Victims

6

(which

fail

1949 Geneva Conventions

to define

7

it ),

for the Protection of Cultural Property in the

Convention,
nal Court.

Hague Convention

Event of Armed Conflict 8 and

1999 Second Protocol appended to the Cultural Property

especially the
9

the 1954

for the Protec-

as well as the

1998

Rome

Statute of the International Crimi-

10

A binding definition of military objectives was crafted in
52(2) of Protocol

1977, in Article

I:

Attacks shall be limited

strictly to military objectives.

In so far as objects are

concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use
3. See,

e.g.,

Guy

Roberts, The

Additional Protocol

I,

New

26 VIRGINIA

make an

effective contribution to military

Rules for Waging War:

The Case

against Ratification of

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

109,

124-170

(1985-1986).

Law of Armed Conflict 197,
207, in The Law of Military Operations, Liber Amicorum Professor Jack
GRUNAWALT (Michael Schmitt ed., 1998) (Vol. 72, US Naval War College International Law
4.

See Horace Robertson, The Principle of the Military Objective in the

Studies).
5.

Hague Rules of Air Warfare,

1923,

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note

2, art.

24(1), at 139, 144.
6.

See

Geneva Convention

(I)

for the

Amelioration of the Condition of the

Wounded and

Sick

Aug. 12,1 949, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2,
art. 19 2d para., at 195, 205; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, id., art. 18 5th para., at 299, 308. Both texts refer to the
in Armed Forces in the Field,

perils to

which medical establishments may be exposed by being situated

close to "military

objectives."
7. See Edward Kwakwa, The International Law of Armed Conflict: Personal
and Material Fields of Application 141 (1992).

8.

Hague Convention

May

14, 1954,

for the Protection of Cultural Property in the

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note

Event of Armed Conflict,

2, art.

8(1)

(a), at

371, 376.

Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2,
9.

art. 6(a), 8,

13(1) (b), at 699, 702, 703-4, 706.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(ii), (v), (ix), at 667, 676-7.
10.
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action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the

circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 11

The term "attacks" is

defined in Article 49(1) of the Protocol as "acts of vi-

olence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence." 12
violence

fits

this matrix:

not only massive

The

must be

act of

air attacks or artillery barrages,

also small-scale attacks (like a sniper firing a single bullet).

elucidates, all attacks

Any

As

but

Article 52(2)

strictly limited to military objectives.

definition of military objectives appearing in Article 52(2)

word-for-word in several subsequent instruments: Protocols

II

is

and

repeated
III,

An-

nexed to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; 13 and the 1999 Second Protocol to
the Hague Cultural Property Convention. 14 It is also replicated in the
(non-binding) San Remo Manual of 1995 on International Law Applicable to
Armed Conflicts at Sea. 15 Many scholars regard the definition as embodying
customary international law. 16 With one significant textual modification to
be examined infra that is also the view of the United States, which objects
on other grounds to Protocol I. 17
Notwithstanding its authoritative status, Article 52 (2) 's definition leaves a
lot to be desired. It is an exaggeration to claim (as does Antonio Cassese) that
"[t]his definition is so sweeping that it can cover practically anything." 18 Still,
it is regrettable that the wording is abstract and generic, and no list of specific
military objectives is provided (if only on an illustrative, non-exhaustive basis).
Under Article 57(2) (a) (i) of the Protocol, those who plan or decide upon an

—

—

11.

Protocol

12.

Id. at

I,

supra note

2, at

450.

447.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10,
1980, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, at 5 15; Protocol II on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, id., art. 2(4), at 528; Protocol
III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, id., art. 1(3), at 533.
14. Second Protocol, supra note 9, art. 1(f), at 701.
15. San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to armed Conflicts at
SEA 114 (Louis Doswald-Becked., 1995).
13.

16.

See

Law

THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY

64-65 (1989).

17. See Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of
NAVAL OPERATIONS 402 n.9 (A.R. Thomas & J.C. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, US Naval
War College International Law Studies).
18. Antonio Cassese, International Law 339 (2001).
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attack must "do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be at-

tacked ... are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
19

52.

Due

to

abstract character, the definition in Article 52(2) does not

its

produce a workable acid
vergent

test for

interpretations"

in

such verification. The text lends

application,

"[a]mbiguous language encourages abuse."

The

relative

and,

needless

to

itself to "di-

say,

perhaps,

20

advantages of a general definition versus an enumeration of mili-

—

—have been thoroughly
connection with the preparation of the San Remo Manual. The present
only composite
—combining an
—can
ment with non-exhaustive catalogue of concrete
tary objectives

or a combination of both

discussed in

21

writer believes that

definition

a

illustrations 22

a

tively avoid

scenarios,

abstract state-

effec-

vagueness, on the one hand, and inability to anticipate future

on the

other.

No

abstract definition standing by itself (unaccompa-

nied by actual examples) can possibly offer a practical solution to real problems

emerging

—

—on

often in dismaying rapidity

The noun

the battlefield.

"objects," used in the definition, clearly

encompasses material

23

and tangible things. However, the phrase "military objectives" is certainly
not limited to inanimate objects, 24 and it is wrong to suggest that the Protocol's

language

fails

to cover

enemy military personnel. 25 To be on

the safe side,

the frame rs of Article 52(2) added the (otherwise superfluous) words "[i]n so
far as objects are

concerned," underscoring that not only inanimate objects

constitute military objectives.

supra note

Human

beings can categorically

19.

Protocol

20.

ESBJORN ROSENBLAD, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

I,

2, at

come within

452.

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 71

(1979).

SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 114-116. See also William Fenrick, Military
Law of Naval Warfare, in THE MILITARY OBJECTIVE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
Distinction in the Law of Naval Warfare: Report, Commentaries and
Proceedings of the Round-Table of Experts on International Humanitarian
Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea 1, 4-5 (Wolff Heimschel v. Heinegg ed.,
21.

Objectives in the

1991).
22.

This legal technique

is

epitomized in Articles 2-3 of the 1974 General Assembly consensus

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS:
Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly 392, 393 (Dusan Djonovich

Definition of Aggression, G.A. Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 15

Series

I,

ed., 1984).

23.

Claude Pilloud

&

Jean

Protocols of

8 June 1977

(Yves Sandoz et

al. eds.,

Pictet, Article 52, in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 633-4

1987).

LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 33 (1996).
Such a suggestion is made by Hamilton DeSaussure, Comment, 3 1 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
Law Review 883, 885 (1981-1982).
24.

See A.P.V.

ROGERS,

25.
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the ambit of military objectives. 26 Indeed,

human beings are not the only living

creatures that do. Certain types of animals

—can

particular

The

cumulative

and

and pack mules

in

what ingredient or dimension serves to identify a milithe face of it, under Article 52(2), an object must fulfill two

On

is

criteria in

order to qualify as a military objective:

cation, purpose or use
tion;

cavalry horses

also be legitimate targets.

pivotal issue

tary objective.

—

it

must make an

(b) its destruction,

by nature,

lo-

effective contribution to military ac-

capture or neutralization, in the circumstances

offer a definite military advantage. 27

must

ruling at the time,

(a)

However,

one cannot imagine that the destruction, capture, or
would
not be militarily advantageous for the enemy; it is just as difficult to imagine how
the destruction, capture, or neutralization of an object could be a military
advantage for one side if that same object did not somehow contribute to the
28
military action of the enemy.
In practice

.

.

.

neutralization of an object contributing to the military action of one side

Article 52(2) refers to "a definite military advantage" that

from the
gets.

(total or partial) destruction,

The

tives")

is

must be gained

capture or neutralization 29 of the tar-

expression "a definite military advantage" (like "military objec-

derived from the

Hague Rules

of Air Warfare, which resorted to the

formula "a distinct military advantage." 30 There
the present context between the adjectives

no apparent difference in
"distinct" and "definite" or, for
is

that matter, several other alternatives pondered by the framers of Article

52(2). 31

Whatever the

adjective preferred, the idea conveyed

is

that of "a

concrete and perceptible military advantage rather than a hypothetical and

26. See

Elmar Rauch, Attack

Restraints, Target Limitations

Certain Conventional Weapons, 18

GUERRE

and

Prohibitions or Restrictions of

Use of

REVUE DE DROIT PENAL MlLITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA

51, 55 (1979).

Marco Sassoli & Antoine Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War: Cases,
Documents, and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in
International Humanitarian Law 161 (1999).
27.

See

28. Id. at 140.

The term

means denial of use of an objective to the enemy
Waldemar Solf, Article 52, in NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 318, 325 (Michael Bothe, Karl Partsch & Waldemar Solf eds.,
29.

"neutralization" in this setting

without destroying

it.

See

1982).
30.

Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note

31.

See Frits Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian

Applicable in

Armed

Conflicts:

5, art.

24(1), at 144.

The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974-1977, Part

Netherlands Yearbook of International Law
143

107, 111 (1978).

Law
//,

9

Legitimate Military Objectives

The advantage gained must be

speculative one." 32

purely political

33

war

is

(hence, "forcing a change in the negotiating attitudes" of
34

of an allied country
party

itself.

The

say,

cannot be deemed a proper military advantage). But when
being waged, the military advantage may accrue to the benefit

the adverse party
coalition

and not,

military

—

or the alliance in general

—rather than the attacking

35

process of appraising military advantage must be

made

against the

background of the circumstances prevailing at the time, so that the same object may be legitimately attacked in one temporal framework but not in others. 36 A church, as a place of worship, is not a military objective; nor is it a
military objective when converted into a hospital; yet, if the church steeple is
used by snipers, it becomes a military objective. 37 In this sense, the definition
of military objectives
civilian objects

The

and

trouble

is

"relativized:" 38 there

military objectives."

force.

to

41

is

advantage

necessarily wide,

The key problem

match

"no fixed borderline between

that the notion of "military advantage"

is

helpful. Surely, military

spectrum

is

39

is

and

that the outlook of the attacking party

is

unlikely

that of the party under attack in evaluating the long-term military

Solf, supra

note 29,

Hamilton

International
34.

The

extends to the security of the attacking

it

can be made

assessment of the military advantage

32.

not singularly

not restricted to tactical gains. 40

is

benefits of any action contemplated. 42 Moreover, the

33. See

is

dominant view

is

that

in light of "an attack as a

at 326.

DeSaussure,

Remarks,

Law and Policy 511,

Forcing such a change

is

AMERICAN

2

UNIVERSITY

JOURNAL

OF

513-514 (1987).

viewed (wrongly) as a legitimate military advantage by Burrus

The Convergence of Law and Professionalism, 31
American University Law Review 861, 867 (1981-1982).
35. See Henri Meyrowitz, Le Bombardement Strategique d'apres le Protocole Additionnel I aux
Conventions de Geneve, 41 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
Carnahan, 'Linebacker IV and Protocol

VOLKERRECHT (ZAORV)

1,

I:

41 (1981).

36.

See DeSaussure, supra note 33, at 513.

37.

See B.A. Wortley, Observations on the Revision of the

British

Year Book of International Law

War and Law Since

38.

Geoffrey Best,

39.

Albrecht Randelzhofer, Civilian Objects,

LAW 603,
40.

604 (Rudolf Bernhardt

1

949 Geneva 'Red Cross' Conventions, 54

143, 154 (1983).

1945, at 272 (1994).

in

1

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

ed., 1992).

Law and the Kosovo Crisis: Lessons Learned or to
RED CROSS 129, 132 (2000).
Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of

See James Burger, International Humanitarian

Be Learned, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE
41. See

Naval Operations,

supra note 17, at 402.

42. See Dieter Fleck, Strategic

Bombing and

Yearbook on Human Rights

41,

the Definition of Military Objectives,

48 (1997).
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whole," as distinct from "isolated or specific parts of the attack." 43
ing party

may thus

advantage in
whole"

is

no perceptible military
by having misled the enemy to shift its stra-

wrong

sector of the front. 44 Nonetheless, "an attack as a

a finite event, not to be confused with the entire war. 45

The Definition

The

attack-

argue, e.g., that an air raid of

itself is justified

tegic gaze to the

The

of Military Objectives by Nature, Location, Purpose

and Use

text of Article 52(2) incorporates helpful definitional guidelines by ad-

verting to the nature, location, purpose and use of military objectives "making

an

effective contribution to military action."

The requirement

of effective

no "direct
connection" with specific combat operations. All the same, an American attempt (reflected in the United States' Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations 47 ) to substitute the words "military action" by the idiom
contribution relates to military action in general, and there need be
46

"war-fighting or war-sustaining capability," goes too

far. 48

The

"war-fighting"

may be looked upon as equivalent to military action.
But the "war-sustaining" portion is too broad. The American position
is that "[e]conomic targets of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support
and sustain the enemy's war-fighting capability may also be attacked," and the
limb can pass muster, since

it

49

example offered
territory

is

that of the destruction of raw cotton within Confederate

by Union forces during the Civil

cotton provided funds for almost
will

be seen

inasmuch

infra,

all

War on

the ground that the sale of

Confederate arms and ammunition. 50 As

multiple economic objects do constitute military objectives,

as they directly support military action. Yet, the

tion (which

may

raw cotton

illustra-

be substituted today by the instance of a country relying

43. See Stefan Oeter, Methods and

LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS

Means of Combat,

105, 162 (Dieter Fleck

in

THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN

ed., 1995).

44. See Solf, supra note 29, at 325.

Hampson, Means and Methods of Warfare in the Conflict in the Gulf, in THE
1990-91 in International and English Law 89, 94 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993).

45. See Francoise

Gulf

War

46. See Solf, supra note 29, at 324.

Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations, supra note 17, at 402.
48. See James Busuttil, Naval Weapons Systems and the Contemporary Law of
47.

War
49.

148 (1998).

Roberts, supra note 4, at 209.

50. Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on The Law of
Naval Operations, supra note 17, at 403.
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almost entirely on the export of coffee beans or bananas) 51 displays the danger
of introducing the slippery-slope concept of "war-sustaining capability."

The

connection between military action and exports, required to finance the
war effort, is "too remote." 52 Had raw cotton been acknowledged as a valid
military objective, almost every civilian activity

enemy

as indirectly sustaining the

war

might be construed by the

when

effort (especially

hostilities

an object to qualify as a military objective, there must exist a proximate nexus to military action (or "war-fighting") No wonder that
the San Remo Manual rejected an attempt to incorporate the wording "warare protracted). For

.

sustaining effort." 53

As

purpose or use" are concerned, each of these

far as "nature, location,

terms deserves a closer look.

1

.

The Nature

of the Objective

"Nature" denotes the intrinsic character of the military objective.

To meet

an object (or living creature) must be endowed with some inherent attribute which eo ipso makes an effective contribution to military acthis yardstick,

tion.

As

such, the object, person, etc., automatically constitutes a legitimate

target for attack in wartime.

Although no list of military objectives by nature has been compiled in a
binding manner, the following non-exhaustive enumeration is believed by the
present writer to reflect current legal thinking: 54
(a)

Fixed military
training

(b)

51. See
52.

See

fortifications, bases, barracks

and war-gaming

55

and

installations, including

facilities;

Temporary military camps, entrenchments, staging
positions, and embarkation points;

ROGERS, supra note

deployment

areas,

24, at 41.

SAN REMO MANUAL,

supra note 15, at 161.

53. Id. at 150.
54. Compare the various lists of legitimate military objectives offered by ANNOTATED
Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,
supra note 17, at 402; A.P.V. ROGERS & PAUL MALHERBE, MODEL MANUAL ON THE LAW OF
Armed Conflict 72 (1999). See also Leslie Green, The contemporary law of armed
CONFLICT 191 (2d ed. 2000).
55.

A question

has been raised about the status of deserted military barracks

Obradovic, International Humanitarian

OF THE RED CROSS

Law and

the

Kosovo

Crisis,

(see

699, 720 (2000)). But the whole point about military barracks

constitute a military objective per

se,

irrespective of being deserted.

When

stationed there, they qualify as military objectives by themselves (see (c)).
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that they

military units are

;
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;

;

Dinstein

and individual members of the armed

Military units

forces,

whether

stationed or mobile;
(d)

Weapon

systems, military equipment and ordnance, armor

and military vehicles of all

and

and

artillery,

types;

missiles of all types;

(e)

Military aircraft

(f)

Military airfields

(g)

Warships (whether surface vessels or submarines) of all types;

(h)

Military ports

(i)

Military depots, munitions dumps, warehouses or stockrooms for the

and

missile launching sites;

and docks;

storage of weapons, ordnance, military

raw materials
(j)

for military use,

Factories (even

when

such

privately

as

equipment and supplies (including

petroleum)

owned) engaged

in the

manufacture of

arms, munitions and military supplies;
(k)

Laboratories or other

facilities for

the research and development of

new

weapons and military devices;
(1)

Military repair facilities;

(m)

Power plants

(n)

Arteries of transportation of strategic importance, principally mainline

and

railroads

(electric, hydroelectric, etc.) serving the military;

rail

marshaling yards, major motorways

(like

the interstate

highways in the US, 56 the Autobahnen in Germany and the autostradas in
Italy),

navigable rivers and canals (including the tunnels and bridges of

railways
(o)

and trunk roads)

and any national, regional or local operational or
command, control and communication relating to
running the war (including computer centers, as well as telephone and
Ministries of Defense

coordination center of

telegraph exchanges, for military use)
(p)

Intelligence -gathering

centers

(even

when not run by

the

military

establishment).

56.

Appropriately enough, the

more than 45,000

miles)

—

mammoth US interstate highway network

initiated by

President Eisenhower

—

National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. See 26

BRITANNICA 324 (15th

ed. 1997).
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2.

The Purpose
More

ther by

of the Objective

often than not, the "purpose" of a military objective
(inherent) nature or by

its

in Article 52(2)

and

The

use.

present writer

is

(de facto) use. But

if

determined

ei-

the word "purpose"

must be distinguished from both nature
of the opinion that the purpose of an object
as

not redundant,

is

ground

a separate

its

is

for classifying

it

as a military target

it

—

—

is

determined

after the

crystallization of its original nature, yet prior to actual use. In other words, the

assumed not to be stamped on the objective from the outset
(otherwise, the target would be military by nature). Military purpose is deduced from an established intention of a belligerent as regards future use. As
military purpose

is

pointed out by the

official

ICRC Commentary:

"the criterion of purpose

cerned with the intended future use of an object, while that of use

cerned with

At

times,

its

present function."

enemy

is
is

concon-

57

intentions are crystal clear, and then the branding of an

object (by purpose) as a military target

becomes rather

easy.

A good illustra-

tion might be that of a civilian luxury liner, which a belligerent overtly plans
(already in peacetime) to turn into a troop ship at the

Although by nature

bilization.

ship,

it

may be

a civilian object,

moment

and not yet

of general

mo-

in use as a troop

attacked as a military objective at the outbreak of hostilities

no longer serving as a passenger liner)
Unfortunately, most enemy intentions are not so easy to decipher, and
then much depends on the gathering and analysis of intelligence which may
(assuming that

be

it is

faulty. In case

ing that the

does not

enemy intends

justify

been moved

of doubt, caution

in.

is

called for. Thus, field intelligence reveal-

to use a particular school as a munitions depot

an attack against the school
58

The

Allied

bombing

in

as long as the

munitions have not

1944 of the famous Abbey of Monte

on flimsy intelligence reports, linked to a firm supposition ("the abbey made such a perfect observation point that surely no army could have refrained from using it") which
turned out to have been entirely false. 59 This writer cannot accept the conclusion that the Abbey was a military objective only because it appeared to be
important to deny its potential use to an enemy (who in reality refrained from
using it) 60 Purpose is predicated on intentions known to guide the adversary,
and not on those figured out hypothetically in contingency plans based on a
Cassino

is

a notorious case of a decision founded

.

"worst case scenario."

57.

Pilloud

58.

See

& Pictet, supra note 23, at 636.

ROGERS, supra note

24, at 36.

59. Id. at 54-55.
60.

Id. at

55.
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of the Objective

Actual "use" of an objective does not depend necessarily on
ture or

on any

(later)

intended purpose.

A leading example

commandeered

brated "Taxis of the Marne"

is

its

original na-

that of the cele-

September 1914 to transport
French reserves to the frontline, thereby saving Paris from the advancing
German forces. 61 "So long as these privately owned taxicabs were operated for
profit and served their normal purposes, they were not military equipment.

Once

in

they were requisitioned for the transportation of French troops, their

function changed." 62

They became

military objectives through use.

Article 52(3) of the Protocol prescribes: "In case of doubt whether an object

which

is

normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of wor-

house or other dwelling or a school,

ship, a

contribution to military action,

it

shall

is

being used to

make an

effective

be presumed not to be so used." 63

There are three elements here:
Certain objects are normally (by nature) dedicated to civilian purposes

(a)

and, as long as they

fulfill

treated as military targets.

only their essential function, they must not be

The examples given

are places of worship, civilian

dwellings and schools.

The same

(b)

making an

objects

may

nevertheless be used in actuality in a

effective contribution to military action.

When

manner

(and as long

as)

they are subject to such use, outside their original function, they can be

The dominant consideration should be

treated as military objectives.

cumstances ruling

cir-

at the time" (referred to in the text of Article 52(2)).

Article 52(3) adds a caveat that, in case of doubt whether an object

(c)

normally dedicated to civilian purposes
contribution to military action,

presumption has given
clause,

and an attempt

rise to

it

is

actually used to

must "be presumed not

make an

effective

to be so used."

The

controversy at the time of the drafting of this

an exception with respect to objects located
the ensuing vote. 64 While the results of the vote

to create

in the contact zone failed in

may

"the

combat" in some situa(which is
tions,
it must be taken into account that the presumption
rebuttable) comes into play only in case of doubt. Often there is no doubt at
all, especially when combatants are exposed to direct fire from a supposedly
reflect a "[r]efusal to recognize the realities of
65

See
George Schwarzenberger, 2 International Law as applied by
International Courts and Tribunals: The Law of Armed Conflict 112 (1968).

61.

62.

Id. at

63.

Protocol

64.

See Solf, supra note 29, at 326-327.

65.

See

113.
I,

supra note

2, at

450.

W.Hays Parks, AirWar and the Law of War, 32 A\K FORCE LAWREVIEW
149

1,

137 (1990).
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civilian object. 66

nest, the

If,

for instance, the

presumption

military objective.

67

is

The

minaret of a mosque

rebutted and the

exist in the

is

entitled to treat

it

as a

degree of doubt that has to exist prior to the emer-

gence of the (rebuttable) presumption

doubt has to

enemy

used as a sniper's

is

mind of the

is

by no means

attacker, based

clear.

But surely that

upon "the circumstances

ruling at the time."
It

every civilian object

—

—can become

in hello

4.

more precisely, abuse) virtually
deemed worthy of protection by the jus

follows that, by dint of military use (or,

The Location

albeit, innately,

,

a military objective. 68

of the Objective

"Location" of an objective must be factored

purpose and use thereof. Logic dictates that,
a supermarket)

mune from
comes a

The

is

merchant vessel

is

of the nature,

civilian-by-nature object (like

located within a sprawling military base,

attack. If a

it

cannot be im-

anchored in a military

port,

it

be-

military objective by location.

real issue

vations.

if a

in, irrespective

with respect to location goes beyond these elementary obser-

The notion underlying

the reference to location

area can be regarded per se as a military objective.

69

is

that a specific land

Surely, the incidence of

such locations cannot be too widespread: there must be a distinctive feature
turning a piece of land into a military objective
cific hill

(e.g.,

a

mountain

pass, a spe-

of strategic value, a bridgehead or a spit of land controlling the en-

trance of a harbor). 70

5.

Bridges

The quadruple
and location

is

subdivision of military objectives by nature, purpose, use

not as neat as

it

sounds, and certain objectives can be cata-

logued within more than one subset. Bridges

may serve

as a

prime

illustration.

Bridges constructed for the engineering needs of major motorways and

rail

and the
they constitute military objectives by nature. But even

tracks are surely integrated in the overall network: like the roads
tracks that they serve,

where bridges connect non-arterial

lines of transportation, as long as they are

66. See Solf, supra note 29, at 327.
67. Countless other

examples can be postulated. Rogers

refers to the case of a cathedral

used as

ROGERS, supra note 24, at 35.
68. See SASSOLI
BOUVIER, supra note 27, at 161.
69. For the underlying reasons, see ROGERS, supra note 24, at 38-39.
70. See Elmar Rauch, The Protection of the Civilian Population in International Armed Conflicts and
the Use of Landmines, 24 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 262, 273-277 (198 1).

divisional headquarters.

&
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apt to have a perceptible role in the transport of military reinforcements
supplies, their destruction

havoc with enemy

is

almost

self- explanatory as

wrong

logistics. It is

assume

to

(as

a

and

measure playing

does Michael Bothe in

campaign of 1999) that
bridges can be attacked only "where supplies destined for the front must pass
over" them. 71 The destruction of bridges can be effected to disrupt any
movements of troops and military supplies, not necessarily in the direction
the context of bridges targeted during the

Kosovo

air

of the front.
If

not by nature, most bridges

use or

—above —
all

location.

72

may qualify

by purpose,

Every significant waterway or similar geophysi-

cal obstruction to traffic (like a ravine)
barrier,

as military objectives

must be perceived

as a possible military

and there comes a time when the strategy of either belligerent would

dictate that all bridges (even the smallest pedestrian overpass) across the obstacle

have to be destroyed or neutralized. Surely, there

is

nothing wrong in a

military policy striving to effect a fragmentation of enemy land forces through

the destruction of

wide

river.

all

bridges

—however minor

in themselves

—spanning

a

Thus, in the Gulf War in 1991, destruction of bridges over the Eu-

phrates River impeded the deployment of Iraqi forces and their supplies (sev-

communications cables). 73
has been asserted that "[b] ridges are not,

ering also
It

as such, military objectives," 74

and that a bridge is like a school: the question whether it "represents a military
objective depends entirely on the actual situation." 75 However, the comparison between bridges and schools

is

meretricious.

A school

is

recognized as a

military objective only in the extraordinary circumstances of military use by

the adverse party.

A bridge, as a rule, would qualify as a military objective

nature, location, purpose or use).

It

would

under exceptional conditions, when it
military use to the

is

fail

(by

to be a military objective only

neither actually nor potentially of any

enemy.

71. Michael Bothe, The Protection of the Civilian Population and NATO Bombing on Yugoslavia:
Comments on a Report to the Prosecutor of the ICTY, 12 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL

Law
72.

531, 534(2001).

For the view that bridges are military objectives by location, see Pilloud

& Pictet, supra note

23, at 636.

ROGERS, supra note 24, at 42.
Hampson, Proportionality and Necessity in the Gulf Conflict, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF
the american society of international law 45, 49 (1992).
73.

See

74.

Francoise

75.

Frits

Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of
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Exempt from Attack

6. Military Objectives

The determination

that an object constitutes a military objective

is

not

al-

ways conclusive in legitimizing an attack. Some objects are exempted from attack, notwithstanding their distinct character as military objectives. The most
illustration appears in Article 56(1) of the Protocol:

extreme

Works

or installations containing dangerous forces,

nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be

namely dams, dykes and

made

the object of attack,

even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian
population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works
and installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause
the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent
severe losses

the civilian population. 76

among

Granted, according to Article 56(2), the special protection
fied:

it

ceases

when

not unquali-

the dam, dyke or nuclear electrical generating station

regularly, significantly

and

directly supports military operations,

other feasible way to terminate such support.
lation of Article 56

is

77

and there

is

no

In any event, the entire stipu-

innovative and binding only on contracting Parties.

is

For their part, the Geneva Conventions prohibit attacks against protected
military persons,

those combatants

i.e.,

who become

hors de combat, either by

choice (through surrender) or by force of circumstances (being wounded, sick
or shipwrecked); 78 fixed establishments and mobile military medical units of

the Medical Service;

engaged
to the

hospital ships; 80 medical aircraft; 81 medical personnel

79

in the treatment of the

armed

forces

supra note

76.

Protocol

77.

Id.

78.

Geneva Convention

I,

83

(to

2, at

(I)

,

name

wounded and

sick;

82

and chaplains attached

the most important categories). Protection

45 1.
art.

12, supra

note

6, at

379;

Geneva Convention

(II)

for the

Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,

art. 12,

Geneva Convention

(III)

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note

81.

Geneva Convention
Geneva Convention
Geneva Convention

82.

Id., art.

79.

at 221, 226-7;

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,

13, at 243, 250.

80.

2,

(I),

supra note 6,

(II),
(I),

art. 19, at

supra note 78,

supra note

205.

art. 22, at

6, art.

230.

36, at 210-1.

24, at 207.

83. Id.
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customary international law to other categories,

84

Additionally, an attack against a military objective
as

such

—may be

"collateral
cessive.

—which

is

not protected

owing to the principle of proportionality, whereby the
damage" or injury to civilians (or civilian objects) must not be exillicit

This issue

dealt with separately by the present writer.

is

General Problems Relating to the Scope of Military Objectives

The

definition of military objectives, as discussed supra, raises a

number of

question marks:

1.

Retreating troops

sometimes contended that when an army has been routed, and

It is

diers are retreating in disarray

the Gulf War

conception.
selves

—

as epitomized

— they should not be

by the

further attacked.

85

Iraqi land forces

But

this

is

its sol-

during

a serious mis-

The only way for members of the armed forces to immunize them-

from further attack

is

to surrender, thereby

becoming

hors de combat. 86

Otherwise, as the Gulf War amply demonstrates, the fleeing soldiers of today
are likely to regroup

2.

tomorrow

as viable military units.

Targeting Individuals
Is

it

armed

permissible to target specific individuals

As a rule, when
member of the armed

forces?

form

as a

emy

attack (even

if

a person takes
forces,

who

members of the

are

up arms or merely dons a uni-

he automatically exposes himself to en-

he does not participate in actual

pose an immediate threat to the enemy)

.

The jus

hostilities

in bello prohibits

assassination, yet nothing prevents singling out as a target

emy combatant

(provided that the attack

is

gets."

84.

88

on

specific individuals

The United

who

treacherous

an individual en-

carried out by combatants). 87

prohibition of assassination does not cover "attacks, by regular
forces,

and does not

armed

military

are themselves legitimate military tar-

States was, consequently, well within

its

rights during

See Louise Doswald-Beck, Vessels, Aircraft and Persons Entitled to Protection during

Conflicts at Sea,

65 BRITISH

The

YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

21

1,

Armed

239 (1994).

David, Principes de Droit des Conflits Arm£s 246 (2d ed. 1999).
86. See Peter Barber, Scuds, Shelters and Retreating Soldiers: The Laws of Aerial Bombardment in the
Gulf War, 31 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW 662, 690 (1993).
87. See ROGERS & MALHERBE, supra note 54, at 62.
88. Burrus
Camahan, Correspondent's Report, 2 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
Humanitarian Law 423, 424 (1999).
85.

See Eric
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when

Commander-in-Chief of the
Japanese Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, whose plane was ambushed (subsequent
to the successful breaking of the Japanese communication codes) and shot
down over Bougainville in 1943. 89 The ambush of the car of SS General
Heydrich in 1942 is different, but only because he was killed by members of
the Free Czechoslovak army (parachuted from London) who were not wearing uniforms and were therefore not lawful combatants: otherwise,
Heydrich as a military officer was a legitimate target, just like
Yamamoto. 90
^Vo^ld

II

it

specifically targeted the

—

—

3. Police

Can

and other law enforcement agents be subsumed under
the heading of members of armed forces (who are legitimately subject to attack) ? The answer to the question depends on whether the policemen have
been officially incorporated into the armed forces 91 or (despite the absence of
92
If integrated into the
official incorporation) have taken part in hostilities.
armed forces, policemen like all combatants "may be attacked at any time
simply because they have that particular status." 93
police officers

—

—

4. Industrial plants
It is

draw a dividing line between military and civilSometimes, even the facts are hard to establish. Who is to say

exceedingly

ian industries.

whether a

difficult to

textile factory

is

producing military uniforms or civilian clothing?

In wartime, civilian consumption gives
priorities.

Can one

way

as a

matter of course to military

seriously asseverate that certain steel

works ought not to

be classified as military objectives only because their output has heretofore

been channeled to the civilian market? The long-time civilian-oriented character of an industrial center in peacetime provides no guarantee that production would not transition in the course of hostilities into war materials. A line
of production, even when introduced for plainly civilian ends (e.g., tractors
for agricultural use), can often be swiftly adjusted to military use (in this

89. See Joseph Kelly, Assassination in

War

Time, 30 MILITARY

LAW REVIEW

101,

102-103

(1965).
90.

See Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the

Law

of Armed Conflict, 43

MERCER LAW REVIEW

615, 628 (1991-1992).
91.

On such incorporation, cf. Article 43(3)

of Protocol

I,

supra note

2, at

444.

See Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1 999: The Air Campaign, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE
CROSS 147, 150-151 (2000).
92.

93.

Id.

at 151.
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instance, the assembly of tracked vehicles, such as tanks)
factory of today

may become tomorrow's

.

The

children's toys

leading manufacturer of electronic

precision-munitions. Besides, in the present era of high technology, the construction of any

computer hardware architecture or software program can

turn into a central pillar of the war effort. 94

"The problem

puter] technology capable of performing

[military] functions differs little,

if

at

from that used in the

all,

civilian

.

.

.

community." 95

If

that

subcontracting in the manufacture of components of modern
causes a dispersion in the fabrication of war materials which
ble to trail.

96

All in

dustrial plant

5. Oil, coal

What

is

all, it is

from the

list

that the [com-

is

not enough,

is

weapon systems

is

almost impossi-

easy to object to the automatic removal of any in-

of military objectives.

and other minerals
the status of

and

oil fields

mineral extraction plants,

which

rigs, refineries,

coal mines,

them can be

tion? In the final analysis, despite their civilian bearings, all of

deemed

to constitute the infrastructure of the military industry.

argued that

"oil installations

belligerent." 97

As

only those functioning in civilian residential areas

ways

It

can well be

of every kind are in fact legitimate military objec-

open to destruction by any

tives

and other

are not ostensibly tied to military produc-

—may be exempted from

for petrol filling stations,

—away from major motor-

attack.

6. Electric grids

Can power

plants in civilian metropolitan areas be set apart from military

power plants? During the Gulf War, the Coalition

air

campaign

in 1991

and
Unde-

treated as a military target the integrated Iraqi national grid generating
distributing electricity (used

both by the armed forces and

civilians).

98

an integrated power grid makes an effective contribution to modern
military action: 99 any shortfall in military requirements can be compensated at
niably,

94.

As

regards the growing military reliance

Network Attacks and

the

Use of Force

on computers,

in International

see Michael Schmitt,

Computer
Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 885, 887 (1998-1999).
95. Michael Schmitt, Future War and the Principle of Discrimination, 28 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON

Human

Rights

68 (1998).
96. See Parks, supra note 65, at 140.
97.

51,

Green, The Environment and

Leslie

Yearbook of International Law
98. See Christopher

1977
99.

in the

Id. at

the

Greenwood, Customary

Gulf Conflict,

in

Law

of Conventional Warfare, 29

CANADIAN

222, 233 (1991).

THE GULF WAR

International

Law and

the First

Geneva

1990-91, supra note 45, at 63, 73.

74.
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the expense of civilian needs. Indeed, the Coalition attacks against Iraqi power

generating plants and transformer stations had a great impact

on the Iraqi air
defense structure (supported by computers), unconventional weapons research
and development facilities, and telecommunications systems. 100 The largealbeit inevitable
scale attacks also had unintended
non-military conse-

—

—

quences, such as the disruption of water supply (due to loss of electric pumps)

and the

inability to segregate the electricity that

electricity in the

same

lines.

from the standing of the
7. Civilian airports

101

powers a hospital from "other"

But these unfortunate

results did

not detract

Iraqi electric grid system as a military objective. 102

and maritime ports

would be imprudent to disregard the possibility that civilian airports and
maritime ports can become hubs of military operations, side by side with continued civilian activities (which can conceivably be a fig leaf) No wonder that
It

.

the 1954
port"

—

Hague Cultural Property Convention

in a generic fashion

—

refers to

as a military objective.

"an aerodrome" or "a

103

<

8. Trains, trucks

and barges

If strategic arteries

objectives (as

of transportation

come within

the bounds of military

stated), should the definition not incorporate

all

the railroad

rolling stock, the truck fleets which are the backbone of motorway

traffic,

and canals? The consequences for civilian
traffic are palpable. Unlike passenger liners or airliners (mentioned infra)
passenger trains do not have any visible hallmarks setting them apart from
troop-carrying trains. If an inter-urban train (as distinct from a city tram) is
sighted from the air, there being no telling signs of the civilian identity of the
train riders, this writer believes that the train would be a legitimate military
objective. In the Kosovo air campaign of 1999, a passenger train (not targeted
as such) was struck while crossing a railway bridge. 104 In analyzing the case,
and the barges plying the

rivers

,

100. See Daniel Kuehl, Airpower

Operations, 18
101.

Id. at

International

Electric

Power

as a Target for Strategic Air

237, 251-252 (1995).

Law of Armed Conflict: Weapons, Targets
SINGAPORE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND

Greenwood, Current

Criminal

COMPARATIVE LAW
103.

Electricity:

254.

102. See Christopher

and

vs.

JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

Liability,

1

Issues in the

441, 461 (1997).

Hague Cultural Property Convention,

art.

8(1) (a), supra note 8, at 376.

Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, HU 58-62, 39 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1257, 1273-1275 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A [hereinafter
104. See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the

Report to the Prosecutor]
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—although the bridge was

Natalino Ronzitti seems to take the position that

no doubt
tacked.

a legitimate military objective

105

However,

—

a passenger train should not be at-

in the opinion of this writer

it

would

whether or not the passengers were identified by the aviators
9. Civilian television

and radio

depend on

all

as civilians.

stations

In wartime, control of civilian broadcasting stations can at any time be as-

sumed by the military apparatus, which may wish to use it in communications
(e.g., summoning reservists to service), in pursuit of psychological warfare,
and for other purposes. In April 1999, NATO intentionally bombed the
(State-owned) Serbian Television and Radio Station in Belgrade. 106

bombing

NATO

legally

warranted?

Bombing Campaign

averred that

if

The Committee

Was

the

Review the

Established to

against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

the attack was carried out because the station played a role in

the Serbian propaganda machinery,

its legality

might well be questioned. 107 In

the Committee's opinion, the attack could be justified only
dio transmitters were integrated into the military

munications network.

108

However,

it is

if

the

command and

TV and ra-

control com-

noteworthy that the Hague Cultural

Property Convention of 1954 refers to any "broadcasting station" as a military

same breath with an aerodrome and
covers civilian TV and radio stations. 110

objective (in the
clearly

10.

Government

It is

The

phrase

offices

occasionally questioned "whether government buildings are excluded

under any clear rule of law from enemy attack." 111 But
is

a port). 109

this

sweeping statement

wrong. Government offices can be considered a legitimate target for attack

only

when used

in

pursuance or support of military functions.

the Ministry of Defense have already been mentioned.

The

premises of

Any subordinate

or in-

dependent Department of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Munitions and so forth
105. Natalino Ronzitti,
the

NATO

Is

the

Non Liquet of the Final Report by

Bombing Campaign

against

the

International Review of the Red Cross
106. See Report to the Prosecutor,
Id.,

11

108.

Id.,

H 75.

109.

Hague Cultural Property Convention,

1

10.

Committee Established

to

Review

82

1017, 1025 (2000).

Appendix A, H

107.

the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Acceptable?,

75.

76.

art.

8(1)

(a),

supra note 8, at 376.

For reference to a radio broadcasting station in the Vatican City, see the

UNESCO

Commentary on the Hague Cultural Property Convention: THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict: Commentary 106 Oiri Toman ed., 1996).
ill. Ingrid Detter, The Law of War 294 (2d ed. 2000).
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is

embraced. As for the edifice of the Head of State, circumstances vary from

one country to another. Whereas the White House in Washington would
constitute a legitimate military target (since the American President is the
Commander-in-Chief of ail US armed forces), Buckingham Palace in London

would not (inasmuch

as the

Queen

has no similar role).

11. Political leadership

Obviously,

members of the

attacked (even individually)

when civilian leaders are

political leadership of the

if

they serve in the armed forces. 112 Additionally,

present in any military installations or government of-

fices constituting military objectives

line or

ger.

—

command

when they are visiting either the front
areas, when they board military aircraft

or

munitions factories in the rear

or are driven by military

cars, etc.

However, notwithstanding the personal

objective, a civilian

member of the

tary objective by himself

enemy country can be

—they expose themselves
risk

to dan-

run when present in a military

political leadership

does not become a mili-

and cannot be targeted away from such

objective.

Defended and Undefended Localities in Land Warfare

The real

whether a given place, inhabited by civilians,
is actually defended by military personnel. Should that be the case, the civil
owing to its use a military objective. The criterion of the
object becomes
land warfare

test in

—

is

—

defense of an otherwise civilian place

is

highlighted in Article 25 of the

"The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns,
dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." 113

Regulations:
lages,

Hague
vil-

Similar language appears in Article 3 (c) of the Statute of the International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 114 Article 8(2)(b)(v) of
the

Rome

Statute brands as a war crime: "Attacking or bombarding, by what-

ever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and

ROGERS & MALHERBE, supra note 54, at 62.
Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to 1899
Hague Convention (II) and 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS,
RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 63, 83-84 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d
1

12. See

1

13.

ed. 1988).

The words

"by whatever means" were added to the text in 1907.

114. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for

Serious Violations of International Humanitarian

Law Committed in the Territory of the Former

Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY), Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 32

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS

(1993).
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military objectives." 115
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The

words are plainly an addition to
the original Hague formula. They sharpen the issue by denoting that some un-

which are not

defended civilian habitations may
Article 59(1) of Protocol

place

it is

it

ployed by the Protocol,

whole

city or

always

be

large-scale

is

on

analyzed

building-by-building

a

117

military objective."

—may be regarded

In extreme cases,

immaterial.

when

(a la Stalingrad), a

a

em-

The

infrequently,

area, particularly a

fierce fighting

whole

city

—

block

as a single military objective: partly

use).

a given building within that block or section
is

"localities,"

if

"any building sheltering combatants be-

and partly by purpose (namely, potential
tary unit

localities." 116

that counts:

Not

basis.

conducted in an extensive built-up

is

ducted from house to house
section

prohibited for the Parties to the

important to bear in mind, for land warfare cannot

large city. It goes without saying that

comes a

is

wider than single buildings, albeit narrower than a

is

town. This

combat

sets forth: "It

Hague criterion of defending a place
may be attacked. But the expression

the

defended,

is

constitute military objectives.

by any means whatsoever, non-defended

conflict to attack,

Once more

I

still

last

The
is

is

con-

or even

by (actual) use

fact that, in the

meantime,

not yet occupied by any mili-

reasonable expectation

is

that, as

soon

as the tide

would be converted into a military stronghold. Hence,
it may be bombarded even prior to that eventuality. Yet, the old Hague
sweeping reference to a town in toto (defended or undefended) must be reof battle gets nearer,

it

garded as obsolete. 118

A belligerent desirous of not defending a city—with a view to saving

harm's way

—can convey

it

from

that message effectively to the enemy. Article 59(2)

of the Protocol prescribes:

The

appropriate authorities of a Party to the conflict

non-defended

locality

are in contact

which

is

may

declare as a

any inhabited place near or in a zone where armed forces

open

for

occupation by an adverse Party. Such a

locality

shall fulfill the following conditions:

(a)

all

combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment,

must have been evacuated;
(b)

115.

no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments;

Rome

Statute, supra note 10, at 676.

Protocol

1

16.

1

17. Pilloud

1

18. See

I,

supra note

2, at

454-

& Pictet, supra note 23, at 699, 701,

Oeter, supra note 43, at 171.
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(c)

committed by the authorities or by the

acts of hostility shall be

no

population; and
(d)

no

activities in support of military operations shall

be undertaken. 119

There seem to be some complementary implicit conditions not enumerated in
the text: roads and railroads crossing the locality must not be used for military
purposes, and factories situated there must not manufacture products of military significance. 120 Nevertheless, the presence in the

non-defended

police forces retained for the sole purpose of maintaining law

and order

under Article 59 (3).
Apart from the explicit and implicit cumulative conditions,

non that

per-

and that (ii) it would be open
defended locality cannot be situated in the

—

it is

sine

qua

the declared non-defended locality would be in or near the con-

(i)

tact zone, 122

zone

is

121

missible

tact

locality of

reason that

for the simple

the attacker's land forces."

124

Au

it is

for occupation. 123

hinterland

—

far

A declared non-

away from the con-

not yet within "the effective grasp of

fond, a

non-defended

locality

cannot be

established in anticipation of future events, but only "in the 'heat of the

ment',

i.e.,

when

the fighting comes close."

on

mo-

125

mentioned in paragraph (2)
defining as precisely as possible the limits of the non-defended
locality
is to be addressed to the adverse party, which must treat the locality
as non-defended unless the prerequisite conditions are not in fact fulfilled. 126
The outcome is that, subject to the observation of all the conditions (specified
and unspecified in the text), the unilateral declaration of a locality as nonArticle 59(4) goes

—
—

to state that the declaration

defended binds the adverse party by virtue of the Protocol. 127

1

19.

Protocol

I,

120. See Pilloud
121. Protocol

122.

I,

supra note

454.

2, at

& Pictet, supra note 23, at 702.
supra note

2, at

454.

A contact zone means the area where

the most forward elements of the

both sides are in contact with each other. See Pilloud &. Pictet, supra note 23,
123. Indeed, prior to Protocol

I,

the expression

commonly used was not

armed

at

a

forces of

701 n.2.

"non-defended

The Concept of Open
J.
Cities in International Humanitarian Law, 56 AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL 593-597 (1982).
124. Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict: A Treatise on the
DYNAMICS OF DISPUTE— AND
LAW 622 (2d ed. 1959). The comment was made prior to
locality"

but an "open

city."

For the transition in terminology, see

Starke,

WAR—

the drafting of Protocol
125.

Claude Pilloud

I,

but

it is still

ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS,
Security 99

valid.

& Jean Pictet, Localities and Zones under Special Protection, in COMMENTARY
supra note 23, at 697. See also

REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

126. Protocol

I,

supra note

2, at

454.

127. Solf, Article 59, supra note 29, at 379, 383-384.

160

M.

Torrelli, Les Zones de

787, 795 (1995).

Yoram
Article 59(5) adds that the

tablishment of non-defended
met.

128

two

Dinstein

parties to the conflict

localities,

But manifestly, in that case,

it is

may

agree

on the

es-

even when the conditions are not
the bilateral agreement (as distinct

Geneva Conprovides that the belligerents may establish in the combat zone
vention (IV)
neutralized areas intended to serve as a shelter for (combatant or noncombatant) sick and wounded, as well as for civilians who perform no work of a milifrom the unilateral declaration) that

is

decisive. Article 15 of

129

tary character, but the creation of

such areas and their demarcation

is

contingent on the agreement of the parties.
Special Problems Relating to Sea Warfare

1.

Areas of Naval Warfare
Hostile actions by naval forces

may be conducted

in or over the internal

waters, the territorial sea, the continental shelf, the exclusive

economic zone

and (where applicable) the archipelagic waters of the belligerent States; the
high seas; and (subject to certain conditions) even the continental shelf and
the exclusive economic zone of neutral States. 130 Military objectives at sea include not only vessels but also fixed installations (especially

weapon

facilities

—

and detection or communication devices), which can be emplaced on or
beneath the seabed, anywhere within the areas of naval warfare. 131 Cables
and pipelines laid on the seabed and serving a belligerent may also constitute

—

legitimate military objectives. 132

2.

Warships
Every warship

is

a military objective.

The

locution "warships" covers

all

military floating platforms, including submarines, light craft (e.g., torpedo

and even unarmed auxiliary naval vessels (except hospital ships). A
warship can be attacked on sight and sunk (within the areas of naval warfare).
"These attacks may be exercised without warning and without regard to the
boats),

safety of the

enemy crew." 133

128. Protocol

supra note

129.

I,

Geneva Convention

130. See

2, at

454.

(IV), supra note 6, at 307.

SAN REMO MANUAL,

supra note 15, at 80.

131. See Tullio Treves, Military Installations, Structures,

and Devices on

Journal of International Law 808, 809, 819 ff (1980).
132. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 1 1 1.
133. William Fenrick, Legal Aspects of Targeting in the Law of Naval
Yearbook of International Law 238, 269 (1991).

161

the Seabed,

74

Warfare, 29

AMERICAN

CANADIAN

.
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3.

Enemy Merchant Vessels
Enemy merchant

vessels are generally

deemed

to be civilian objects,

and

exempt from attack (even though they are subject to capture as
Still, the San Remo Manual lists no less than seven exceptions to the
In these seven instances, merchant vessels may be attacked and sunk

are therefore
prize).

134

rule. 135

as military objectives:
(a)

When
(e.g.,

(b)

(c)

an enemy merchant vessel is engaged
laying mines or minesweeping).

When

an enemy merchant vessel

forces

(e.g.,

When

an enemy merchant vessel engages in reconnaissance or otherwise
in intelligence gathering for the enemy armed forces.

assists

(d)

directly in belligerent acts

acts as

an

auxiliary to the

enemy armed

carrying troops or replenishing warships).

When an enemy merchant vessel refuses an order to stop or actively resists
capture.

(e)

When

an enemy merchant vessel

damage on

is

armed

to

an extent that

it

can

inflict

a warship (especially a submarine)

When

an enemy merchant vessel travels under a convoy escorted by
warships, thereby benefiting from the (more powerful) armament of the

(0

latter.

(g)

When

an enemy merchant vessel makes an

effective contribution to

military action (e.g., by carrying military materials). 136

—above
passengers —

Some
civilian

vessels

all,

passenger liners exclusively engaged in carrying

are generally

senger liner

is

exempted from

attack. 137

Even

if

the pas-

carrying a military cargo in breach of the requirement of

134. See Natalino Ronzitti, he Droit Humanitaire Applicable aux Conflits

RECUEIL DES COURS

9,

Armes en Mer, 242

69-71 (1993).

135.

San Remo Manual,

136.

The war materials under this

supra note 15, at 146-151.
rubric cannot be exports. Except in the context of refusing

an

order to stop while blockade running, a private tanker would not constitute a military objective

when

carrying oil exported from a belligerent oil-producing State, even though the revenue

derived from the export
Neutrality in

may prove

Naval Warfare: What

Is

essential to sustaining the

war

effort.

See Michael Bothe,

Left of Traditional International Law?, in

HUMANITARIAN

Law of Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honour of Frits Kalshoven
387, 401 (Astrid Delissen &. Gerard Tanja eds., 1991). C/. the
in the

137.

American

Civil

comments supra about raw cotton

War.

On passenger liners,

see

SAN REMO MANUAL,

162

supra note 15, at 132.
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exclusive civilian engagement, an attack against

would be
4.

it

clearly disproportionate to the military

may be

unlawful because

advantage expected.

it

138

Neutral Merchant Vessels
Neutral merchant vessels are generally

ject to visit
sible

immune from

and search by belligerent warships (and

capture for adjudication as prize

in

attack, although sub-

military aircraft)

appropriate

circumstances. 139

San Remo Manual, neutral merchant
if they were enemy military objectives
in the

Nevertheless, according to the

—

are liable to attack

and pos-

as

—

vessels
six fol-

lowing cases: 140
(a)

When a neutral merchant vessel is engaged in belligerent acts on behalf of
the enemy.

(b)

When

a neutral

merchant

an auxiliary

vessel acts as

to the

enemy armed

forces.
(c)

When a neutral merchant vessel

(d)

When a neutral merchant vessel is suspected of breaching a blockade or of
carrying contraband

and

assists

the enemy's intelligence system.

an order

clearly refuses

to stop, or resists visit,

search or capture.
(e)

When a neutral merchant vessel travels under a convoy escorted by enemy
warships.

(f)

When

a neutral

merchant

enemy's military action

vessel

(e.g.,

makes an

effective contribution to the

by carrying military materials). 141

Thus, "[t]he mere fact that a neutral merchant vessel
grounds

for attacking it." 142

As

for traveling

armed provides no

under convoy, the entitlement to

attack a neutral merchant vessel exists only

enemy warships. Neutral merchant vessels

is

when

the convoy

traveling under

is escorted by
convoy escorted by

neutral warships, in transit to neutral ports, cannot be attacked (and are not

and search). 143 The neutral escort can also belong to a State
other than the State of the flag. 144 During the Iran-Iraq War, the practice developed of reflagging the merchant vessels of one neutral State (like Kuwait)
subject to visit

138. See

id.

139. See

id.

at 154,

212-213.

140. Id. at 154-161.
141. See supra note 136.
142.

San Remo Manual, supra note 15, at 161.
george politakis, modern aspects of the laws of naval warfare and

143. see

Maritime Neutrality 560-561
144. See

id.

at

(1998).

571-575.
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escorted by warships of another (like the United States). 145 But reflagging (in
the absence of a "genuine link" between the merchant vessels and their
146

) is not
conclude an agreement enabling the

flag State

strictly necessary. Suffice it for

new

the two neutral States to

flag State of the escorting warships to

and warrant that the merchant vessel (flying a different neutral flag) is
not carrying contraband and is not otherwise engaged in activities inconsisverify

tent with

its

neutral status. 147

Of course, neutral passenger liners would benefit from special protection. 148
5.

Destruction of Enemy Merchant Vessels after Capture

When enemy

merchant vessels are protected from attack that does not
mean that they cannot be destroyed. The rule is that warships (and military
aircraft) have a right to capture enemy merchant vessels, with a view to taking
them into port for adjudication and condemnation as prize. 149 As an excep-

when circumstances preclude taking it
merchant vessel may be destroyed. 150 The legality of
tional measure,

captured ship

is

to be adjudicated by the prize court.

into port, the captured

the destruction of the

151

between the destruction of an enemy merchant
vessel subsequent to capture and an attack launched against it on the ground
that it constitutes a military objective. An enemy merchant vessel liable to attack as a military objective can be sunk at sight with all those on board. Conversely, the destruction of an enemy merchant vessel in the exceptional
circumstances following capture can only take place subject to the dual condition that (i) the safety of passengers and crew is assured; (ii) the documents
and papers relating to the prize proceedings are safeguarded. 152 A special

There

is

a vital distinction

at

560-571.

145. See

id.

146. See

Myron Nordquist

and Laying of Mines

& Margaret Wachenfeld, Legal Aspects of Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers

in the Persian Gulf,

31

GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

138,

140-151 (1988).
147. See

SAN REMO MANUAL,

supra note 15, at 197-199.

George Walker, Information Warfare and
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1079, 1164 (2000).
148. See

149.

SAN REMO MANUAL,

150. See

id.

Neutrality, 33

supra note 15, at 205, 208.

at 209.

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare:
The Traditional Law, 29 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 283, 309

151. See

Part

I,

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF

(1991).
152. See

SAN REMO MANUAL,

supra note 15, at 209.
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Proces-Verbal of 1936 applies this general rule to submarine warfare. 153

The

Proces-Verbal specifies that the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of
safety for the passengers

sea

and crew unless that

safety

is

assured by the existing

and weather conditions, the proximity of land, or the presence of another

them on board. 154 The San Remo Manual

vessel in a position to take

follows

the Proces-Verbal, adding an important caveat: the vessel subject to destruc-

must not be a passenger

tion

liner. 155

Exclusion Zones

6.

The San Remo Manual
self

of

its

—

and

in the Falkland Islands

War.

157

International Military Tribunal at

chant vessels without warning
sion zones,

merchant

is

unlawful.

vessels in

158

World Wars

I

The

practice of establish-

and

II,

such zones.

that the sinking of neutral mer-

when

entering unilaterally proclaimed excluis

not germane, however, to enemy

159

that, given the

on-going practice, the

some manner.

160

legality of

The San Remo

concedes that belligerents may establish exclusion zones

—and no

War

Nuremberg

ceptional measures, subject to the condition that

quired

in the Iran-Iraq

from the 1946 Judgment of the

exclusion zones should be acknowledged in
itself

—

and was resorted

clear

It is

This holding

Most commentators agree

Manual

156

with considerable conceptual differences

albeit

enemy merchant

to attack

it

and even neutral ships entering the zones.

ing exclusion zones evolved during
to

it-

duties under international humanitarian law by establishing mari-

time "exclusion zones," which might enable
vessels

may absolve

rejects the notion that a belligerent

existing duties be absolved

no new

—through such

rights

as ex-

be ac-

establishment. 161

153. Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part

IV of the Treaty of

London of 22 April 1930, 1936, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note

13, at 883, 884.

1

154. Id.
155.

San Remo Manual,

supra note 15, at 210.

156. Id. at 181.
157. See William Fenrick,

The Exclusion Zone Device

Yearbook of International Law 91-126

159. See

172,

Law of Naval Warfare,

Judgment and Sentence, 41 AMERICAN

Edwin Nwogugu, 1936 London Proces-Verbal Relating to
IV of the Treaty of London of 22 April 1 930, in THE

the Rules of

Submarine Warfare

LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A

Collection of Agreements and Documents with Commentaries
(Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1988).

161.

POLITAKIS, supra note 143,

San Remo Manual,

CANADIAN

304 (1947).

Set Forth in Part

160. See

24

(1986).

158. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg),

Journal of International Law

in the

at 145.

supra note 15, at 181-182.

165

349, 358-359
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The condition is somewhat softened when the Manual adds

that,

should a bel-

an exclusion zone, "it might be more likely to presume that
ships or aircraft in the area without permission were there for hostile purligerent create

poses." 162 This proviso "allows a 'grey area,'" 163 although incontestably exclu-

sion zones must not

become

"free-fire zones,"

and

specified sea lanes ensuring

must be made available. 164
Evidently, the specifics of a new law regarding exclusion zones have not yet
crystallized. 165 Until the new law emerges in detail, the lex lata remains valid,
safe passage to hospital ships, neutral shipping, etc.,

so that "an otherwise protected platform does not lose that protection by

crossing an imaginary line

The

drawn

reverse side of the coin

tives subject to attack at sight

ocean by a

in the

that

is

belligerent." 166

enemy warships

—do not

claimed exclusion zone

(in the

ARA

Bombardment

legal fault in the sinking

General Belgrano outside a pro-

course of the Falkland Islands

an enemy warship "has no right to consider
the range of an exclusion zone. 167
7.

military objec-

gain any protection by staying away

from an exclusion zone. Consequently, there was no
by the British of the Argentine cruiser

—being

itself immune"

War

of 1982):

from attack beyond

of Coastal Areas

A special problem arises with respect to the bombardment from the sea of
enemy

coastal areas.

The matter

1907, which sets forth in Article

defended

is

1:

governed by Hague Convention (IX) of

"The bombardment by naval

ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings

2, for its part, clarifies

is

forces of un-

forbidden." 168 Article

that military works, military or naval establishments,

depots of arms or war materials, workshops or plants which can be utilized for
the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and warships in the harbor, are excluded
162. Id. at 181.

163. Fausto Pocar, Missile Warfare and Exclusion Zones in Naval Warfare, 27

on Human Rights
164. See

ISRAEL

YEARBOOK

215, 223 (1997).

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Law of Armed Conflicts at Sea, in THE
Law in Armed Conflicts, supra note 43, at 405, 468.

HANDBOOK

of Humanitarian

165. See L.F.E. Goldie, Maritime

OPERATIONS
International

156,

Law

War

Zones

&

193-194 (Horace B. Robertson

Exclusion Zones, in
ed.,

1991) (Vol. 64,

THE LAW OF NAVAL
US Naval War College

Studies).

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
Naval Operations, supra note 17, at 395-396.
167. See Howard Levie, The Falklands Crisis and the Laws of War, in THE FALKLANDS WAR:
Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law 64, 66 (Alberto Coll &
166.

Anthony Arend eds., 1985).
168. Hague Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct.
18, 1907, Documents on the Laws of War, supra note 2, at 1 1 1, 1 13.

166

Yoram
from

169
Article 3
this prohibition.

naval warfare"

170
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—which

is

"a throwback to a bygone era of

—permits the bombardment of

authorities (having

been summoned to do

naval force before them.

ports, towns, etc., if the local

so) fail to furnish supplies to the

171

bombardment a land
warfare rule, laid down in Article 25 of Hague Convention (IV). As noted,
the sweeping reference in the Hague Conventions to entire towns as either
defended or undefended (and accordingly subject to, or exempted from, attack) is obsolete, and the term "localities"
employed by Protocol I is
more precise. Additionally, coastal bombardments are in general different
from land warfare. Whereas on land a bombardment usually serves as a prelude to assault on the target with a view to its occupation, naval bombardment is more frequently intended to inflict sheer destruction on the enemy
rear (only exceptionally is the intention to land troops). 172 If there is room for
some elasticity in treating whole sections of a city as a single military objective
when house-to-house combat is raging no similar impetus affects
coastal bombardment. The grafting of a land warfare rule onto coastal bomArticle

1

of Hague Convention (IX) applies to coastal

—

—

—

bardment

A

—

is

therefore inappropriate. 173

specific issue in the context of coastal

houses.

Can

bombardment

they be treated as military objectives?

is

that of light-

On the one hand,

they de-

serve protection as installations designed to ensure the safety of navigation in
general. 174

On

the other hand, the French Court of Cassation held in 1948
is

a military objective, since

it

can be used

The

present practice of States

is

certainly not conclusive.

that a lighthouse
hostile fleet.

175

for the

needs of a

169. Id.

Horace Robertson, 1 907 Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces
Time of War, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 159, at 149, 166.
171. Hague Convention (IX), supra note 168, at 113.
1

70.

172. See

US

ROBERT TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA
War College International Law Studies).

in

143 (1955) (Vol. 50,

Naval

173. See Robertson, supra note 170, at 163-164.
in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
220 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1997).
175. In re Gross-Brauckmann (France, Court of Cassation [Criminal Division], 1948), 1948
Annual Digest and Reports of public International Law Cases 687, 688.

174. See

Matthias Hartwig, Lighthouses and Lightships,
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Special Problems Relating to Air Warfare

1.

Military Aircraft

Enemy

military aircraft

—and any other
—

military aerial platforms, including

are legitimate targets for attack. In

gliders, drones, blimps, dirigibles, etc.

combat is intrinsically different from land or sea combat, considering
that (i) it is most difficult for a military aircraft in flight to convey a wish to
surrender (i.e., there is no effective counterpart in the air to the land or sea
method of hoisting a white flag, striking colors or in the case of submasurfacing) and (ii) it is generally permissible to continue to fire upon a
rines
military aircraft even after it has become clearly disabled. 176 (Although, under
Article 42 of Protocol I, persons parachuting from an aircraft in distress
in
contradistinction to airborne troops
must not be made the object of attack
during their descent, and upon reaching hostile ground must be given an opfact, air

—

—

;

—

—

portunity to surrender. 177 )
2. Civilian Aircraft

Enemy civilian

do not constitute military

objectives. Still,

civilian aircraft are subject to rather stringent strictures

under the non-

aircraft per se

binding Hague Rules of Air Warfare, whereby
are liable to be fired

upon

—

enemy

civilian aircraft in flight

were military objectives

as if they

—

in the follow-

ing circumstances:
(a)

When

flying within the jurisdiction of their

military aircraft

own

State, should

enemy

approach and they do not make the nearest available

landing. 178
(b)

When

flying (i) within the jurisdiction of the enemy; or (ii) in the
immediate vicinity thereof and outside the jurisdiction of their own State;

immediate vicinity of the military operations of the enemy
land or sea (the exceptional right of prompt landing is inapplicable). 179

or

(iii)

in the

Even neutral

civilian aircraft are

exposed to the

risk of

by.

being fired upon

if

they are flying within the jurisdiction of a belligerent, are warned of the ap-

proach

176. See

of

military

aircraft

of

the

opposing

side,

and

do

not

land

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF

Naval Operations,
177. Protocol

I,

supra note 17, at 407-408.

supra note

2, at

444.

178.

Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note

179.

Id., art.

5, art. 33, at 147.

34.
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immediately. 180 Thus, the only advantage that neutral civilian aircraft have

over belligerent civilian aircraft within
vilian aircraft

tion

must

must be warned

establish at their

first

own

enemy

airspace,

is

that the neutral ci-

(belligerent civilian aircraft in that situa-

whether the enemy military

aircraft are

criticized as impractical, addressing

an improb-

peril

approaching)

These provisions have been

able contingency (of civilian aircraft venturing into the enemy's jurisdiction),

and creating new and difficult categories (what is the vicinity of the enemy's
jurisdiction?). 181 Although the Hague Rules have generally had a substantial
and their iminfluence on the evolution of customary international law 182
pact on the terminology adopted by the framers of Protocol I has been
noted it is impossible to forget that they were enunciated in 1923, at the
dawn of civil aviation and prior to the exponential growth of passenger traffic
by air. The normal modern procedure of declaring air exclusion zones in wartime is supposed to preclude any type of undesirable overflight in sensitive
areas. 183 But even within a "no-fly" zone, it is arguable that attack against

—

—

civilian aircraft in flight should follow a

due warning. 184 Outside

"no-fly"

zones, the contemporary jus in hello (as corroborated by military manuals) forbids attacks against civilian aircraft in flight unless they are utilized for military

purposes or refuse to respond to interception signals; and civilian airliners (en-

gaged in passenger

traffic) are

singled out for special protection. 185

demonstrated by the lamentable 1988 incident of the
Vincennes shooting
board)

,

down an

the speed of

modern

US

Still,

cruiser

as

VSS

Iranian passenger aircraft (with 290 civilians

on

electronics often creates insurmountable prob-

lems of erroneous identification. 186

The

status of civilian aircraft

is

different

when

they are not in

flight (nor in

the process of taking off or landing with passengers), but parked
180.

Id., art.

on the

35, at 148.

SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 402 (3d ed. 1947).
See Richard Baxter, The Duties of Combatants and the Conduct of Hostilities (Law of

181. See J.M.
182.

183.

the

INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 93, 115 (1988).
See F.J.S. Gomez, The Law of Air Warfare, 38 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS

Hague),

in

347, 356 (1998).
184. See Torsten Stein, No-Fly -Zones, 27

ISRAEL

YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS

193, 196

(1997).
185. See

Horace Robertson, The

Status of Civil Aircraft in

Armed Conflict, 27 ISRAEL YEARBOOK

on Human Rights 113, 125-126 (1997).
186. On this incident, see Jose Reilly & R.A. Moreno, Commentary, in THE MILITARY
Objective and the Principle of Distinction in the Law of Naval Warfare, supra
note 21, at 111, 114-115.
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ground.

It

must be recalled that the

to be

deemed

to

mere presence

its

airport in

which they are parked

a military objective, so the civilian aircraft
there. 187

may be

liable

is

at risk

owing

Moreover, irrespective of where they are

ated, civilian aircraft are often

situ-

viewed as constituting "an important part of

the infrastructure supporting an enemy's war-fighting capability," since they

can be used

188
later for the transport of troops or military supplies.

3. Strategic

and "Target Area" Bombing

The most
bombing of

crucial issue of air warfare

targets in the interior,

Conditions of

air

is

that of strategic bombing, to wit,

beyond the front

line (the contact zone)

warfare have always defied the logic of the distinction be-

tween defended and undefended sites, enshrined in the traditional law of Article 25 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, although the words "by whatever
means" were inserted into the Article with the deliberate intention of covering "attack from balloons." 189 After all, there is no real meaning to lack of defenses in situ as long as the front line remains a great distance away. First, a
rear zone

the

actually defended (however remotely) by the land forces facing

is

enemy on the

front line. Secondly, the fact that a place in the interior

is

undefended by land forces while the front line is far-off is no indication of future events: it may still be converted into an impregnable citadel once the

and most significantly for air warfare, the emplacement of anti-aircraft guns and fighter squadrons en route from the front
line to the rear zone may serve as a more effective screen against intruding
bombers than any defense mechanism provided locally. 190
For these and other reasons, the Hague Rules of Air Warfare introduced
with a
the concept of military objectives, endorsed and further elaborated
new definition by Protocol I. However, strategic bombing triggers the complementary question whether it is permissible to treat a cluster of military objectives in relative spatial proximity to each other as a single "target area."
The issue arises occasionally in some settings of long-range artillery bombardment. But it is particularly apposite to air warfare, in which target identificafront line gets nearer. Thirdly,

—

—

tion

may be

detrimentally affected by poor visibility (especially as a result of

187. Cf. Leslie Green, Aerial Considerations in the

Space

Law 89,

Law of Armed Conflict,

5

ANNALS OF AIR AND

109(1980).

188. Robertson, supra note 185, at 127.
189.

Thomas Holland, The Laws of War on Land (Written and Unwritten)

46

(1908).
190. See R.Y. Jennings,

Open Towns, 22 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL

261 (1945).
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Yoram
inclement weather), effective

air

Dinstein

defense systems, failure of electronic devices

(sometimes because of enemy jamming), sophisticated camouflage,

when the

target

is

screened by determined

air defense,

etc.

Thus,

the attacking force

may

be compelled to conduct a raid from the highest possible altitudes, compromising precision bombing (especially

when

"smart bombs" are unavailable). 191

which evolved during World War II was that of "saturation
bombings," aimed at large "target areas" in which there were heavy concentra192
Such air attacks were
tions of military objectives (as well as civilian objects).
designed to blanket or envelop the entire area where military objectives

The

practice

abounded, rather than search

for a point target. 193

The

operating assumption

one military objective would be missed, others stood a good chance
of being hit. This practice (entailing, as it did, immense civilian casualties by
way of "collateral damage") was harshly criticized after the war. 194
was

that,

if

The World War
bombing

Germany

is

II

experience

may create

the impression that "target area"

relevant mostly to sizeable tracts of land

—where

—

like

the

Ruhr Valley

in

the preponderant presence of first-class military objectives

stamps an indelible mark on their surroundings, thereby creating "an

indivisi-

195

But the dilemma whether or not to lump together as a single target several military objectives may be prompted even by run-of-the-mill
objects when they are located at a relatively small distance from each other.
ble whole."

The dilemma

where it is prohibited to conduct "an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
is

addressed by Article 5 1

(5) (a)

of Protocol

I,

military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a
similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects." 196

While placing

a reasonable limitation

bombing, Article 51 (5)
legitimate

is still

191.

It

(a)

when

on the concept of

does not completely ban

must be appreciated that "smart bombs" are not

STONE, supra note

"Target area" bombing

the military objectives are not clearly separated and

much can go wrong even
Warfare, 82 INTERNATIONAL

a panacea:

when they are available. See A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty
Review of the Red Cross 165, 170-172 (2000).
192. See

it.

"target area"

124, at 626-627.

International Law, 15 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL
MlLITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 53, 63 (1976).
194. See, e.g., Hans Blix, Area Bombardment: Rules and Reasons, 49 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF
International Law 31, 58-61 (1978).

193. See E. Rosenblad,

195.

Area Bombing and

Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare 335-336

196. Protocol

I,

supra note

2, at

651.
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distinct.

and

Understandably, "the interpretation of the words

distinct' leaves

particular, the

some degree of latitude

adverb "clearly" blurs the

to those

issue:

is

'clearly

mounting an

separated

attack." 197 In

the prerequisite clarity a mat-

ter of objective determination or subjective appreciation (depending,

the degree of visibility

when weather

e.g.,

on

conditions are poor)? 198 Another ques-

what a "similar concentration" of civilian objects within the "target
area" means in practice. The ambiguities are regrettable, keeping in mind that
"target area" bombing stretches to the limit the principle of distinction between military objectives and civilian objects.
tion

is

Conclusion
It is difficult

to overstate the importance of establishing authoritatively the

compass of military objectives in conformity with the jus in hello. In exposing
military objectives to attack, and (as a corollary) immunizing civilian objects,
the principle of distinction provides the main line of defense against methods
of barbarism in warfare.

The

validity of the principle

cannot be seriously con-

and it may be regarded as lying at the epicenter of the law regulating the conduct of hostilities. Unfortunately, the Devil is in the detail. As
this paper should amply demonstrate, the detail is far from resolved by the current lex scripta (specifically Protocol I). There is an evident need for further
expounding quite a few aspects of the accepted definition of military objectives. This need becomes more urgent with the dramatic changes in the modern techniques of combat. The jus in hello cannot afford to lag far behind the
tested today,

changing conditions of combat.

197. See Pilloud
198. See

& Pictet, supra note 23, at 613, 624.

Hamilton DeSaussure,

Belligerent

Annals of Air and Space Law

Air Operations and the 1977 Geneva Protocol

459, 471-472 (1979).
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I

which determine whether certain targets
may or may not be lawfully attacked are based on one of the pillars of
the international law applicable in armed conflicts, namely the distinction between the civilian population on the one hand and the military effort of the
State on the other. The development of this distinction is a historical and cultural achievement of the age of enlightenment. This fact needs to be emphahe international

when

sized

there

distinction as too

is

legal rules

a temptation to consider certain consequences of this

cumbersome

for

what

is

supposed to be a necessary military

operation.

Distinction

In the centuries before the enlightenment, war was often, and then lawfully
so,

conducted

in a

way

that

made

the "civilian" population suffer very drasti-

was in particular the philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau who, in the
second half of the 18 th century, developed the idea that war did not constitute
a confrontation between peoples, but between States and their rulers ("sovercally.

1

It

eign's war"). 2

This principle limited both the group of persons entitled to per-

form acts harmful to the enemy (combatants) and the scope of persons and

which may be the target of such acts (combatants/military objectives).
In the 18 th and early 19 th century, this distinction corresponded to the reality of the conflicts of those days. It was possible and practicable to keep
objects

1.

Fritz

1386
2.

Munch, War, Laws

et seq.

of,

(Rudolf Bernhardt

History, in
ed.,

4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

2000).

WlLHELM GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 267

(2000).
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from the day-today

military activities well apart

life

of the citizens, unless

was the technological developments of the late 19 and early 20 century which created the fundamental challenge to this distinction, namely the development of long-range
weapons, in particular air warfare. The first rather comprehensive reaction to
this challenge was an attempt at international rule making, the so-called
Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923, 3 drafted by a group of experts based on a
mandate given by the 1922 Washington Conference on Disarmament. These
such unusual things as a

levee

en masse occurred.

It

th

th

rules constituted a confirmation of the old distinction

and developed

its

con-

new situation. Rules elaborated by scientific bodies
International Law Association were formulated along the same

crete application to the

such as the
lines. 4

The

great practical challenge to the traditional principle of distinction oc-

curred during the Second

so

many

violations of the

was quite appropriate to ask the question whether
had survived or whether it had become obsolete. 5 The biggest chal-

traditional principle that

that rule

World War. There were

it

lenge to the traditional rule of distinction was the development of nuclear

weapons.

It is,

thus, necessary to critically analyze the attitude

which States

and other relevant actors adopted after the war in relation to that rule.
State practice immediately following the Second World War was somewhat
puzzled and puzzling.

The

national Military Tribunal
tion

definition of war crimes in the Statute of the Interis

based on the assumption that the rule of distinc-

was applicable ("wanton destruction of

cities,

towns or

villages, or

devastation not justified by military necessity"). But neither the judgment of

American mililimitation on the

the International Military Tribunal nor the judgments of the
tary courts really address the principle of distinction as a

choice of targets for bombardments. 6 Furthermore, there was a kind of re-

sounding silence of States in relation to that

many ways

rule.

The Geneva Conventions of

and develop the law taking into account the
experience of the Second World War, do not address the question, yet most
1949, which in

3.

clarify

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR

139

(Adam Roberts and Richard

Guelff eds.„3d. ed.

2000).
4-

Draft Convention for the Protection of the Civilian Population Against

New Engines of War,

adopted by the 40 th Conference of the International

Law Association, Amsterdam 1938. THE
Law of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other

DOCUMENTS
5.

223 (Dietrich Schindler

Neutrality 402
6.

&

Jiri

Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988).
THE PRESENT LAW OF

For a brief analysis of the practice, see ERIK CASTREN,
et

WAR AND

seq (1954).

Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
12 AUGUST 1949, H 1828 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).

CONVENTIONS OF
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bombing

writers were loath to accept that the

changed the law.

war had

practices of the

7

In 1956, the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) made an

attempt to have the question of the validity of the principle of distinction
ified

clar-

by what was meant to become the Delhi Rules for the Limitation of the

Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War. 8 This attempt
was based on the assumption that the traditional rule of distinction was still
valid,

clear

but

it

failed. It

weapons

or,

became, so to

more

precisely, of a dispute

military establishment of the day,
legal discourse

say, the victim of the

concerning the

it

development of nu-

concerning their

legality.

The

appears, remained completely outside the

legality of those nuclear

weapons, of which the

resolution of the Institut de Droit International of 1969 9 concerning the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction

is

a lively testimony.

That insulation of the legal discourse disappeared when the issue of the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law came on the
political agenda as a consequence of the debate about the conduct of the
Vietnam War and the issue of "human rights in occupied territory." 10 In 1968,
the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed the traditional principle in
its resolution "Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts," which declared:

"That

as such;

That

it is

prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population

distinction

part in the hostilities

The

must be made

and members of the

at all times

between persons taking

civilian population.

."
.

n

.

negotiations from 1974 to 1977 that led to the Additional Protocol

I

12

1949 Geneva Conventions and the reactions of States, including
major military powers, after the adoption of the Protocol in 1977 are clearly
to the

based on the assumption that the basic content of the rule of distinction
part of customary international law. This

is,

is

in particular, reflected in the for-

mulation of the declarations made by the United States and the United King-

dom on

the occasion of the signature of the Protocol. In respect of so-called

7.

CASTREN,

8.

The Law of Armed Conflicts,

9.

The

supra note

5, at

200

et seq.

particularly the

4, at

251.

Problems Associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, Resolution adopted by

the Institut de Droit International at
10.

supra note

Distinction between Military Objectives and Non-Military Objects in General and

Michael Bothe

in

its

session at Edinburg

on September

9,

1969.

MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL PARTSCH AND WALDEMAR SOLF,

for Victims of Armed Conflicts

GAOR,

Id. at

265.

NEW RULES

2 (1982).

U.N. Doc. A/7128 (1969).
12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
11.

G.A. Res. 2444, U.N.

12.

Protocol Additional to the

23rd

Sess.,

Supp. No.

18, at 50,

Geneva Conventions of

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,

supra note

175

3, at

422 [hereinafter Protocol
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non-conventional weapons, they deny that the "new rules" of the Protocol apply to those weapons, the clear implication being that the "old,"

ary law rules

among

do

apply.

these old rules.

It is

made

i.e.,

custom-

clear that the principle of distinction figures

13

In addition, a legal discourse developed which

now

included military law-

yers dealing with practical implications of this rule. Military lawyers explained

and continued to explain that major bombing campaigns like those during the
Vietnam 14 and 1991 Persian Gulf15 wars were indeed conducted on the basis of
these rules. Thus, it can safely be concluded that the rule has survived all major challenges; that it is still part and parcel of customary law. This, however,
raises the question of the interpretation of the rule in the light of changing
circumstances.

The Two-Pronged Test

As

of the Military Objective

and in air warfare in particular, the
basic rule that follows from the distinction between the civilian population
and the military effort is the distinction between military objectives and civilian objects. That distinction is to be made on the basis of two interrelated elements, namely the effective contribution the military objective makes to
military action and the "definite military advantage" that the total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization of the objective offers. There is no
doubt that this is a rule of customary international law and its binding force is,
thus, not limited to the parties to Protocol I, which formulates this very printo the selection of targets in general

ciple as follows in Article 52(2): "military objectives are limited to those ob-

which by

jects

their nature, location, purpose or use

make an

effective

contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military

advantage." 16

13. See inter alios
14-

Waldemar

Solf, in

Burrus Carnahan, "Linebacker

BOTHE, PARTSCH AND SOLF,

II"

and Protocol

I:

the

supra note 10, at 276, 282.

Convergence of Law and Professionalism,

American University Law Review 861 (1982).
Theodor Meron, The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol I, 88
American Journal of International Law 678, 681 (1994).
31

15. See

16. Protocol

I,

supra note 12, at 450.
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The most

recent practical confirmation of the customary law character of

these principles

is

the experts report 17 published by the Chief Prosecutor of the

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia concerning the question whether

NATO

bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) involved the commission of crimes which were subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
a report which constitutes an important document if
lessons are to be drawn from the Kosovo experience.
the

—

The

difficulty of the Article 52(2) definition

are, of course, clear cases

is its

general character. There

of "pure" military objectives: military barracks,

trenches in a battlefield, etcetera.

Where

objects are used or usable for differ-

and non-military purposes (dual-use objects), their qualification
as a military objective or civilian object becomes more difficult. What constitutes an "effective contribution" to military action? What is a "definite" military advantage? What is the difference, if any, between an "indefinite" or a
ent, military

"definite" military advantage? This brings us to the crucial problems of target-

must be realized that the application of rules formulated in general
terms is a problem lawyers often encounter, not only in the law of war, but also
in international law in general
even law in general. Legal rules expressed in
general clauses need concretization for their practical application. The question, thus, is how to render the general principle of distinction more concrete
in order to have secure standards for targeting.
ing. It

—

A standard legislative method of rendering a general rule more concrete
the establishment of a
tive.

list

it

exhaustive or

This approach has been proposed by Professor Dinstein.

few problems of its own.
but

of cases of application, be

it

18

It

is

illustra-

presents a

An illustrative list may be useful for certain purposes,

cannot terminate the discussion because the qualification of items that

are not

17. Final

on the

list

remains open.

The

exhaustive

list is

dangerous, because

Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the

Bombing Campaign

against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

MATERIALS 1257

(2000),

reprinted

herein as Appendix

Prosecutor]. For an analysis, see, inter

Kosovo, 12

alia,

Symposium: The

A

it

NATO

39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
[hereinafter

Report to the

International Legal Fallout

European Journal of International Law 391

from

(2001), in particular the

NATO Bombing
Campaign against Yugoslavia, at 489, Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY's Prosecutor and the Revievj of the
NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at 503, and Michael Bothe,
The Protection of the Civilian Population and NATO Bombing on Yugoslavia: Comments on a Report
to the Prosecutor of the ICTY, at 53 1. In addition, see Natalino Ronzitti, Is the non liquet of the Final
Report Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia Acceptable?, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1017 (2000).
contributions by William Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionality during the

18. See, e.g. Professor Dinstein's

paper in this volume.
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can exclude clear cases
ten or not foreseen

falling

when

under the general

such a

list

list.

list

of military objectives.

versial questions, this

list

just forgot-

list

Despite these deficiencies of the
to draft

which were

was drafted. Thus, there is often a tendency
the end of a list. 19 At that point one is for all practi-

the

add a catchall clause at
cal purposes back to the illustrative
to

rule,

shows

method, the ICRC
20

in

1956 attempted

In relation to the difficult or contro-

the problems of this method.

all

The

list is

based on the undisputed fact that there are certain typical military objectives

which can indeed be listed, but this is possible only to a limited extent. There
are objects that in one context may constitute a military objective, making an
effective contribution to military action, while in other circumstances they

not. This

is

shown in the items on the list that have become quite conthe context of the Kosovo campaign, namely lines and means of

clearly

troversial in

communication and

As

do

in particular

telecommunication

to traffic infrastructure, the formulation of the

facilities.

ICRC

list is

as follows:

and means of communications (railway lines, roads,
bridges, tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental military importance."
Thus, a distinction has to be made between those lines and means of communications that are of fundamental military importance and those that are not.
Only those lines of communication that are of fundamental military impor"Those of the

lines

tance are military objectives. This
the

ICRC

clearly stated in Article 7, Paragraph 3 of

is

Draft Rules to which the

they belong to one of those categories,
objective

where

their total or partial destruction, in the circumstances ruling

at the time, offers

As

no

military advantage."

a consequence, in every instance the question of the military impor-

tance of a bridge or railway line
very question

no

was to be annexed: "However, even if
they cannot be considered as a military

list

is

is

unavoidable.

rule saying that railway lines

19. See, e.g., Article 61(a) (xv)

list

was drafted by the

of Protocol

ICRC

is

and bridges are always a military objective.
be ascertained in each particular case. This is
I

("complementary

any of the tasks mentioned above, including, but not limited

The

this

the only correct application of the rule of distinction. There

Their military importance has to

20.

submitted that to ask

It is

"as a

activities necessary to carry

to,

out

planning and organization").

model" to be annexed to the "Draft Rules

for the

Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Times of Armed Conflict" (see

ICRC submitted in 1956 for consideration by the Red Cross Conference
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 6, H 2002. These rules became the victim of bitter

note 8 supra) which the
of 1957. See

controversies between governments during that conference (see
Bericht tiber Entwicklungen

und Tendenzen des Kriegsrechts

ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES
(1975).

178

seit

J.

Pokstefl

and Michael Bothe,

den Nachkriegskodifikationen, 35

RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 574,

575, 601

Michael Bothe

the crucial problem of dual-use
structure,

facilities.

This problem applies to

traffic infra-

telecommunication infrastructure and also to energy production

and transmission

facilities.

In the traditional context of land warfare, the military importance of traffic
infrastructure

is

quite obvious. This traffic infrastructure

needed

is

in order to

may be, to allow a swift retreat of the
afterwards. The examples given by Profes-

bring supplies to the front or, as the case

may then

troops which
sor Dinstein

21

reorganize

in order to prove his thesis are

all

bombing of Hanoi,
support that was put forward as a

taken from

this context.

Dur-

was the use of railway

lines

ing the so-called Christmas

it

for logistical

justification for choosing cer-

tain targets (mainly railroads) in the very center of this city. 22

Danube River that
Kosovo campaign? There was no front to which

the military importance of the

were destroyed during the

many

But what was

bridges crossing the

was the declared policy of the NATO
States not to create such a front but to renounce to ground operations and to
restrict military action to an air campaign. In such a situation, it is very hard to
supplies could

have been moved.

It

see any military importance of this traffic infrastructure. If there
military importance, these

means of communication

is

no such

are civilian objects, not

military objectives.

With respect to the telecommunication network, the situation may be
somewhat different. This network is of military importance even in the conwhere one side uses the strategy of air warfare only, while the
other side, by necessity, would have to rely on anti-aircraft defense. This defense certainly depends on telecommunications, but it remains questionable
whether each facility using telecommunications equipment that may be found
in the country belongs, for that reason, to a network of military significance. Is
there a kind of presumption that telecommunication facilities are always, untext of a conflict

less

the contrary

is

apparent, related to the military network?

This seems to be the underlying rationale of the Report to the Prosecutor. 23
It

brings us to a question of precautionary duties, duties of due diligence in

evaluating the military importance of certain objects and

decision-making process to which we

will revert

more

generally the

below. This was the crucial

problem in evaluating the lawfulness of the attack against the television
ties in

Belgrade.

Could the

target selectors just proceed

on the

sumption or presumption that the technical equipment of
21.

See Professor Dinstein's paper in the present volume.

22.

Carnahan, supra note

864 et seq.
Appendix A, H

14, at

23. Report to the Prosecutor,

72.
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basis of the as-

this station

was so
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network that, although there was an obvious cimilitary importance was significant enough that its destruction

closely linked to the military
vilian use,

its

provided a definite military advantage?

So

far,

the notion of contribution to the military effort or of military advan-

tage has been discussed in tactical or operational terms.

whether

arises

this

The

question then

notion could also be understood in a broader sense.

Can

objects that are not related to specific military operations also "contribute to

the military effort?" Air attacks have a definite impact
entire population and, thus, also

may

on

and

political

on the morale of the

military decision-makers.

It

was not only the diplomatic efforts by
Chernomyrdin and Ahtassari, but also or even mainly the impact of the bombing campaign that finally induced Milosevic to agree to a withdrawal of the
Serbian military and police forces from Kosovo. Did the bombing for that reawell

be

argued

that

it

son provide a "definite military advantage"?

As
cutor,

is

rightly pointed out

24

this type of

by Professor Dinstein and the Report to the Prose-

"advantage"

is

not military.

political,

population and of political decision-makers

is

The morale

of the

not a contribution to "military

action." Thus, the advantage of softening the adversary's will to resist

is not a
one and, thus, cannot be used as a legitimation for any targeting deIf it were otherwise, it would be all too easy to legitimize military action

"military"
cision.

which uses bombing
words for this.

The

just as a psychological

practical importance of this limitation

weapon
is

— and

there are other

considerable and not new.

It

would indeed be impossible to make any meaningful distinction between civilian objects and military objectives as the psychological effect can be produced
by an attack on any target, including entirely civilian living quarters. The morale of the civilian population and of political decision-makers was the main
target of the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
not a legitimate one. During the bombing of North Vietnamese targets, already men-

—

tioned, in addition to the military significance of the traffic infrastructure as

channels for military supplies, "forcing a change in the negotiating attitudes of
the North Vietnamese leadership" was also recognized as a goal of the
ing campaigns against that country.

the

FRY was

The

25

NATO bombing campaign against

also designed to induce the Belgrade leadership to accept a set-

tlement of the status of the Kosovo along the lines of

24. Professor Dinstein's paper in the present
("civilian objects

25.

bomb-

and

civilian

Carnahan, supra note

morale

.

.

.

NATO terms. Although

volume and Report

to the Prosecutor,

are not legitimate military objectives")

14, at 867.
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the psychological impact of a certain attack
in choosing

between

that impact alone

is

may be

a legitimate consideration

targets that are for other reasons of a military character,

not sufficient to establish the qualification of a certain

tar-

get as a military objective.

This legal situation introduces a basic ambiguity, or a

fictitious character,

made within the framework of an armed conflict
conducted for humanitarian purposes. As the goal of such a "war" is not the
military defeat of an adversary, but the protection of the human rights of the
population, the traditional notion of military advantage loses much of its significance. In the Kosovo campaign target selection was made on the basis of
into targeting decisions to be

the fiction that military advantages and military victory in the traditional
sense were sought, although this was not the case.

The

only real goal was a

change of attitude of the Belgrade government. Thus, the question of what really constitutes a military objective within the framework of a humanitarian
intervention has to be asked.

It

would better correspond to the

acter of that particular type of military operation
tives, in

if

specific char-

only "pure" military objec-

the sense mentioned already above, were considered to be legitimate

targets.

The Environment

—A Military Objective?

An additional comment is necessary concerning the environment as a military objective or civilian object.

The

rules of Protocol

I

relating to the protec-

and 55, not only limit the
permissible collateral damage to the environment caused by attacks against
military objectives, but also limit permissible attacks where the environment
itself constitutes a military objective, which is quite possible. Military objectives are not just persons or manmade structures: a piece of land can become a
tion of the environment,

military objective

terdiction fire

is

if its

i.e.,

Articles 35(3)

neutralization offers a definite military advantage. In-

an example. This type of military action

geted at combatants.

The

of cover

is

fire,

down, or defoliating,

another example.

ronment may be

not directly

tar-

military usefulness consists of the fact that by

bringing a certain area under constant
ing that area. Cutting

is

the

enemy

such cases,

deterred from enter-

trees in order to deprive the

The consequences

disastrous. In

is

enemy

of such actions for the envi-

for the reasons indicated, the rules

of Articles 35(3) and 55 protect the environment

when

it

is

a military

objective.

An

attack against the environment, however,

damage caused

or expected

is

is

unlawful only where the

"widespread, long-term and severe." These
181
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three conditions are cumulative. All three must be
tion. Therefore,

concretization.

we

many

favored a very high threshold. 26

I

Kosovo campaign has not

their

It

ap-

any new impetus to

really given

concretize this threshold, as the actual environmental

The

be a viola-

of the delegations present at the confer-

ence in Geneva that drafted Protocol
pears that the

for there to

back to the problem of general clauses and

are

true that

It is

met

damage remained be-

an open question, but the very fact that
the Report to the Prosecutor starts its legal assessment of the bombing campaign by analyzing the question of environmental destruction 27 shows that environmental considerations have indeed become an important restraint on
low that

limit.

threshold

is still

military activities, although the legal reasoning of the report in this respect

highly questionable.

In a

is

28

approach, the Report to the Prosecutor uses Articles 35(3) and 55

first

of Protocol

I

as the basic yardstick to

determine the

legality of

any damage

caused to the environment. It does not give a final answer to the question
whether these provisions have become a rule of customary international law.

The

report simply finds that the

does not meet the

damage caused by the

NATO air campaign

cumulative threshold established by these provisions

triple

of being "widespread, long-term and severe."
If one

takes the factual findings of the Balkan

United Nations Environment Programme,
avoidable.

What

is

however,

interesting,

committee does not stop

is

as a

a

means

is

which

is

made by the
environmental damage

against military targets. This,

a valid point. This line of argument could be used as

tablished that collateral environmental
military advantage anticipated,

and

probably un-

is

the usual test for the ad-

to lower the difficult threshold of Articles 35

spread, long-lasting

by, the

that the assessment

damage caused by attacks

matter of principle,

conclusion

this

at this point. It also analyses

in the light of the proportionality principle
missibility of collateral

Task Force established

it

would

damage was

and

55.

Once

it

was

es-

excessive in relation to a

also be unlawful

even

it

was not wide-

severe.

A systematic interpretation of Protocol

would lead to the conclusion that
the environment is protected by the combined effect of the general provision
limiting admissible collateral damage and the particular provision on environmental damage. It would mean that in a concrete case, the stricter limitation
26.

27.

I

BOTHE, PARTSCH AND SOLF, supra note 10, at 346
Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 1iH 14-25.

28. Bothe, supra note 17, at
conflict - not

Cross 1029

"really"

532

et seq.;

a matter of criminal

et seq.

Thilo Marauhn, Environmental damage

responsibility?,

(2000).
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would apply. Unfortunately, the report does not draw
it

refers to the

formulation of Article 8(2)

Court (ICC) Statute
ternational law."

29

as

(b) (iv)

this conclusion. Instead,

of the International Criminal

"an authoritative indicator of evolving customary

This provision, which

is

in-

quite unfortunate from the point

of view of environmental protection, creates a different type of cumulative ef-

on the protection of the environment and the proportionality
Causing environmental damage is only a war crime if it goes, first,

fect of the rules

principle.

beyond the threshold established by the triple cumulative conditions and, second, beyond what is permissible according to the proportionality principle. In
the light of the reservations which the military establishment shows vis-a-vis
taking into account environmental concerns as a limitation on military violence, this

is

probably as far as one could go in the definition of a war crime.

It

should be stressed, however, that this stance can be accepted only for the definition of the

war crime, not

as far as the interpretation of the primary rules of

behavior relating to the protection of the environment in times of armed conare concerned.

flicts

The damage caused

to the

environment

is

unlawful

if it is

and severe. Causing the damage,
a war crime only if damage fulfils both criteria.

either excessive or widespread, long-term

however,

is

Decision-Making: Ascertaining Relevant Facts

As

already pointed out, a targeting decision must involve a certain factual

evaluation of the actual or potential use of specific objects as to whether they

make

or do not

that efforts
objective.

30

make

a contribution to military action. Protocol

I

prescribes

have to be made in order to ascertain the military character of an
On the other hand, the targeting decision is certainly one which

has to be taken in a context of uncertainty.

It is

unrealistic to require absolute

certainty concerning the military importance of a specific object before

be lawfully attacked, but not requiring absolute certainty

is

it

can

not the same as

permitting disregard of the facts.

Whatever the actual standard of due

diligence, there

is

an obligation of due

diligence in ascertaining the character of a proposed target. This question
arises, in

modern decision making, on two different

tion at the

command

level

levels, that of target selec-

and that of launching the actual attack, which

is

not the same, as the case of the attack on a bridge which also hit a civilian

29.

Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, H 21.

30.

Article 57(2)(a)(i).
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train (not a selected target) demonstrates. 31

igence

is

a violation of the law of

against the Chinese

armed

A violation of this duty of due dil-

conflict. In

Embassy in Belgrade, there

deed the selection of that particular building

such cases as the attack

are reasons to believe that in-

as a target

was due to a violation

of this obligation of due diligence and therefore a negligent violation of the

law of armed

conflict.

Decision-Making: Balancing Processes and Value Judgments

The evaluation of the military advantage
only a matter of the relevant
constitutes an advantage

is

facts,

to be derived

from an attack

but also a matter of value judgments.

is

not

What

a matter of subjective evaluation. This raises the

question of "whose values matter?" In a somewhat different context, namely
the value judgment involved in the assessment of proportionality, the Report
to the Prosecutor states that this
itary

commander."

glance,

is

32

must be the judgment of the "reasonable

This statement, plausible as

it

may appear

mil-

at a first

problematic. In a democratic system, the value judgment which

matters most

is

that of the majority of the society at large.

The

military cannot

and may not constitute a value system of its own, separated by waterproof
walls from that of civil society. Such separation would be to the disadvantage
of both the military and civil society. A dialogue between the two, critical and
constructive in both directions, is needed.
This is essential for a number of reasons. There is no denying the fact that
public opinion in

many

countries views the military with a critical eye. This

particularly true for certain organizations of civil society

motion of human

rights. It

is

is

engaged in the pro-

and
based on

certainly in the interest of both the military

civil society organizations to avoid a situation where such critique

is

and on misconceptions. 33 Furthermore, the practice
recent conflicts indeed recognizes that targeting decisions have

a lack of understanding

observed in

political implications.

This

is

why

certain decisions are reserved to persons

31.

Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A,

32.

Id.,

33.

A good example for the problem was the case of a German organization for the preservation

11

1111

58-62.

50.

of the language which chose "collateral damage" as the "bad expression of the year" for 1999. See

Unwort des Jahres website at http://www.unwortdesjahres.org. The mistake was on both
The organization was unaware of the technical character and meaning of the term, and the
NATO spokesmen who had used it did not realize that the term transported a wrong message to
the public, namely that damage to the civilian population and civilian objects were something
which was unimportant and negligible for those who decided on targets in the Kosovo conflict.
the

sides.
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that are very high in the governmental hierarchy. Targeting decisions engage

the political responsibility to the electorate,

high governmental
able

offices.

and acceptable

to civil society;

case of the Chinese Embassy,

this

is

of those holding

hence the need

for a dialogue.

of Errors

of values or value judgments leads to the problem of error or

mistake in judgment. Such an error

made

civil society,

Therefore, these decisions have to be understand-

The Problem

The question

i.e.,

it

may relate

to the facts or to the law. In the

was an error of fact.

When

the decision was

to attack a particular building, the decision-makers thought, or at least

what we were

sion-makers did not

had a military use. The deciwas the Chinese Embassy, which was obvi-

told, that the building

know

that

it

ously not a military objective.

In relation to attacks against railways and bridges, another question arises,

namely the error of law. In

tion of the actual use of those bridges
essential error,

if

and railway lines

the view submitted by this paper

mistaken view of the law that considered
jectives

was probably no erroneous evalua-

this case, there

is

as a

matter of fact.

The

correct, consisted in a

traffic infrastructure as military

ob-

without asking the question of their military importance in the con-

crete context.

As

a matter of principle, an error of law does not exclude

responsibility. Ignorantia iuris

is

no excuse or even circumstance excluding the

wrongfulness of the behavior.

What are

the consequences of these problems of due diligence and error

criminal accountability?

The

on

definition of war crimes contained in the statute

of the permanent International Criminal Court 34 requires intent. 35 Violations
of the laws of war committed by negligence are not subject to the jurisdiction
of that court.

The

situation

is,

however, different with respect to the ad hoc

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

.

Any viola-

and customs of war comes within the jurisdiction of that court
according to Article 3 of its statute. 36 Thus, the ICTY would have had jurisdiction to prosecute and punish negligent violations of the laws of war which,
tion of the laws

as indicated,

appear to be quite possible in

this case. It

the question of error becomes most relevant.
34.

U.N. Doc. A/CONF/183/9, July

17, 1998,

An

is

in this context that

error concerning the facts

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note

3, at 667.

30, at 690.

35.

Id., art.

36.

Statute of the International Tribunal, U.N. Doc. S/25704,

Statute

is

reprinted in
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192 (1993).
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___

may entail

a negligent violation of the respective rule,

an error concerning the

law, as a rule, does not constitute a valid defense.

The Law

of

—Some General

War and Humanitarian Intervention
Reflections

must be stressed that all these considerations concerning lawful means
and methods of combat are independent from the question whether the
Kosovo air campaign was or was not a violation of the rules of the United NaIt

tions Charter prohibiting the use of force. Jus ad helium

be kept separate. This

armed

is

in hello

have to

the essential basis for a realistic approach to the law of

conflict that has to treat

Questions of the

and jus

both parties to a conflict on an equal footing.

legality or illegality of the use of force in a particular

context

have to be raised in other contexts, not in that of the application of the jus
hello.

The

equality of the parties in relation to the jus in hello

is

an essential pre-

condition to the effective functioning of this body of law. This

Preamble to Protocol

I

is

why

the

no uncertain terms: "Reafof the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and

reaffirms this principle in

firming that the provisions

of this Protocol must be fully applied in
verse distinction based

in

all

on the nature or

circumstances

origin of the

.

.

armed

.,

without any ad-

on the

conflict or

causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict."

The principle of the equality of the parties to a conflict does not exclude the
need to consider the entire context of a conflict, its intrinsic character, when
determining the concept of military objective. Military advantage, as already
pointed out,
action

is

is

a contextual notion.

limited from the outset,

something

else,

it is

difficult to

Where

the declared purpose of a military

where the goal pursued
ignore this limitation

is

not just victory, but

when

it

comes

to the

question what constitutes an advantage in that particular context. Thus,

where the exclusive purpose of a military operation

is

to safeguard the

rights of a certain population, this very context excludes,

it is

human

submitted, a legal

construction of the notion of military advantage or contribution to the military
effort

which disregards the

life

and health of

this very population. In

other

words, in this context, the notion of military objective has to be construed in a

much

narrower way than in other types of conflict.

This contextual concept of military advantage

is, it is

submitted,

lex lata. It

must not be confused with proposals de legeferenda demanding special rules for
the conduct of so-called humanitarian interventions. If such rules were to be
adopted, they could only mean an additional unilateral restraint imposed on
those States or organizations which intervene for the sake of safeguarding the
186
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human rights
fect the rights

More

of a certain population. Such rules could not and should not

and duties of the other party to the

critical

af-

conflict.

review of the notion of military advantage

is

needed.

If

the

law were to be developed by a specific legal instrument relating to humanitarian intervention,

human

why not impose on the forces maintaining the rule of law and

rights, obligations that are stricter

valid for

any belligerent?
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Tony Montgomery
The Beginnings

D

uring Operation Allied Force

ropean Command

Chief, Operations Law.

My responsibilities included being the legal member of

the group that reviewed
the

(EUCOM)

was assigned to Headquarters, US Euas the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate and

I

all

fixed targets. In early July 1998,

I

attended one of

meetings of the Kosovo Planning Group. This cross-functional group

first

of officers was formed to evaluate the situation in Kosovo and

mendations on possible courses of action
military confrontation

seemed more

support each of the various

cussed along with each

The

make recom-

(COAs). As the months passed, and a

likely, sets

of targets were developed to

COAs. Target sets were refined, modified and dis-

COA.

legal advisor's role/responsibility in this process

is

to offer well-rea-

soned advice, based on relevant data, in accordance with existing law and policy guidance. In the target

development process,

legal advisors help to

that a decision to attack a target or set of targets

is

based on

known

ensure

facts or

reasonable assumptions. Usually, only after sifting through the facts do the as-

sumptions come to

weapon

light.

There are always assumptions: about the weather,

effectiveness, absence or presence of people, impact

on the enemy

and others. Legal advisors identify and then voice concerns when the assumptions being made go beyond the reasonable person standard. This requires
knowing the law, awareness of other restrictions, understanding of the military

and

political objectives, familiarity

with the methods of achieving those

Legal Perspective from the

EUCOM Targeting Cell

objectives and, finally, the ability to synthesize

on

and make a recommendation

a target or set of targets.

Actions

at the

time of the attack will be held to the standard of reasonable-

on the evidence available at the time, factoring in the situation,
attack and enemy actions. A commander must be reasonable in un-

ness; based

time to

covering facts but clairvoyance

—

ing their job

is

—

not a requirement. The legal advisor

if do-

point out where in the rush for victory the line of

will

reasonableness appears about to be crossed. Legal advisors provide recom-

mendations on whether the proposed use of force abides by the law of war and
do this by offering advice on both restraint and the right to use force.

Oi course,

the final decision

on attacking

human

assessing the value of innocent

stroying a particular military objective.

a target

lives against

To

subjective determination, a legal advisor

assist a

is

the subjective one of

the value of capturing/de-

commander

—

just like

in

making

anyone involved

this

—can

provide an opinion and, a recommendation on a target or any other aspect of
the operation. However, the final decision will always be the commander's.

Legal advisors do not set the political or military objectives of a campaign, nor

do they approve or disapprove

targets.

—Some Basics

Targeting

>

For those with no personal experience,

may come

as a surprise to

know

some "things" and deciding that today those will be destroyed. Objects are selected as targets based on campaign
goals, intent, guidance, military objectives, and compliance with the law of
war. Targeting is the process that identifies, detects, selects, and prioritizes
targets in order to achieve a specific result based on the commander's objectives, guidance, and intent, then matches weapons systems to achieve that reand finally assesses the results. Target selection is not at all
sult,
that targeting

haphazard

The

—

is

more than just looking

it

at least

at

not at the planning

level.

current theory around which targets were developed during Operation

Allied Force
orizes that

is

known as

"effects

by attacking specific

based targeting." Effects based targeting the-

links,

nodes, or objects the effect or combina-

tion of effects will achieve the desired objective. If the theory

is

correct,

following this approach will conserve resources, reduce the overall risk to
friendly forces

and

civilians and, ultimately,

shorten the conflict. However,

the increasing ability to routinely hit targets with great accuracy has not been

commensurate understanding of exactly which targets must be
achieve specific outcomes. Establishing a causal link between targeting

matched by
hit to

a
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some "thing" and achieving the desired ultimate

outcome

political

is still

the

challenge.
I

say "challenge" because once a decision to use force has been made, un-

enemy well enough to accurately predict the enemy's reaction
being bombed is key to the overall efficacy of effects based targeting. Ulti-

derstanding the
to

mately the goal of Operation Allied Force was to coerce Milosevic to comply
with the demands of NATO. Without Milosevic explicitly telling us
yielded

achieve

when he
its

did,

we

know

simply do not

for sure.

We

know

why he

NATO did

principal military objective of a Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo;

however, we were not able to halt ethnic cleansing before

was

it

essentially

complete.

The Mechanics

of the Operation Allied Force Targeting Process

EUCOM

CINC
-Campaign
Objectives

Targeting

-

Strategy

JCS/J2T

Task IC to Develop

Tgt Materials

CINC
-J3/DC1NC Review

-

Approves Tgt

-

Some on

to

NCA

Review and
Forward to NCA

EUCOM

EUCOM S

"Prioritizes Tgts

-Tasks Execution

!

CINC

-

Forward
or

_

Forward

for execution

NAC approval

Gains NAC Approval
(As Required)

for

execution

Figure 3.1

Recognizing the acronyms in Figure 3.1

is

not as important as knowing that

each fixed target basically followed the above route to approval. During Allied
Force, those who had authorized the use of force very much wanted to limit
the consequences and this process helped achieve that objective. Legal input

was embedded throughout the process, with issues being addressed
point where they were identified. However, this paper will focus on the

191

at the
efforts

Legal Perspective from the

related to obtaining the approval of the

ropean

EUCOM Targeting Cell
commander

of the United States Eu-

Command (EUCOM/CINC).

Once

the air campaign began, a daily

list

of proposed

new

targets (or targets

had been previously reviewed, but additional information had been obtained on) was provided to those working within the targeting group. All target nominations were maintained on a spreadsheet that was electronically
updated and available for review on a classified website. I would review the inthat

formation on the

new

targets using this

list.

and unfettered access to data is critical for an effective and efficient
target review. During Operation Allied Force, target data was stored on and
accessed through our classified computer system. Those with access to the
system had the ability to have most of the data on any individual target available for review with just a few keystrokes and mouse clicks. This information
consisted of imagery, descriptions of the facility and its functions, analysis on
impact (military advantage anticipated) if destroyed, possible collateral damage concerns, and historical information on the target. There, literally at my
fingertips, was all the data needed to make a good initial legal evaluation of
Early

the target.

The

results of the legal reviews

using two primary methods.

were inputted into the targeting process

A spreadsheet format that was provided to those

working within the targeting group and updated as new targets were proposed.
This spreadsheet contained the target identification information, collateral

damage concerns,

and a law of war determination or
recommendation. This method ensured a permanent record for each target reviewed and provided an easy means of recalling inputs on each target.
justification for attack,

The second method
(CTT)

of input was through the collaborative targeting

These sessions were an outgrowth of Serbia's failure to acquiesce as quickly as some had hoped would happen. Continuing the conflict
translated into a demand for more and better targets, and faster identification.
sessions.

Increasing the pace of target development meant, in part,

voted to the task. Throwing more people into the mix

more people de-

initially

created addi-

Groups worked and coordinated target products in a serial
fashion. One group would forward its work as e-mail attachments, message
traffic, fax, and/or phone calls to others with responsibility for different portions of the process. The next group would make changes and forward (or, detional problems.

pending on the changes, return to the

first

group for reconsideration) to other

groups involved in the process. This process continued until the lead group
believed the proposed target was ready for decision-maker review. Deci-

sion-makers would receive an e-mail with the attached product information
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and would either accept the product information or send

it

back

for further

development.

The

disadvantages of this early process were information overload, uncer-

and duplication of effort. Using a serial workflow extended the process
timeline and provided more opportunities for confusion, ambiguities and ertainty,

There was no consensus among the participants on the rationale for attacking targets. While no illegal targets were attacked during this period,

rors.

others and myself were concerned that as the

tempo increased our

ability to

provide the necessary oversight would continue to degrade.

The solution to
targeting sessions.

this serial process

The

was the development of the collaborative

CTT sessions ensured ail targeting organizations had a

common understanding of objectives and guidance, built consensus, validated
and integrated operational and legal concerns early into
the targeting process. Using NetMeeting, a Microsoft product, on the classified internet system, the sessions "virtually" united representatives from comtargeting assessments

mands throughout the

theatre and the United States. Similar in concept and

format to an internet "chat room" conducted over our classified computer
tem, these sessions brought

all

of the players into the same "virtual"

the same time. All participants could see the proposed target

on

sys-

room

at

com-

their

puter monitor, could talk via headsets in real time to each other, and could
ask questions and resolve issues. This format enabled everyone's input

cluding legal

—

to get to all those involved at the

same time. With

all

—

in-

the rele-

vant functional experts gathered together, questions could be asked and
resolutions

made

in minutes rather than days.

What might have

taken a week

before could be done in one night's session.

Collaborative targeting sessions were generally conducted every night.

During a

CTT

session, the

group reviewed proposed targets to determine

whether they could be forwarded
volved around three

for approval.

For each target, discussion

issues: 1) the linkage to military effects

ing legal approval, 2) the collateral
civilian casualty estimate.

The one

of the time was the collateral

damage

estimate,

and

— the key

3) the

aspect of this process that

damage

estimate.

Whether

it

re-

to gain-

unintended

consumed most

was the nature of

the conflict, an outgrowth of the ever increasing visibility of the results of military actions, over sensitivity by political authorities, the desire to

sion based

on some objective "number" (no matter how

make

a deci-

unscientifically

reached or misunderstood) rather than a subjective "value," or a combination
of the above, the collateral
of the targeting process.

damage estimate quickly became

central to

much

An integral part of this estimate was the Tier System.
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The Tier System was developed prior to Operation Allied Force

as

an effort
damage.

methodology to be used for estimating collateral
Though some aspects of this methodology are classified, the unclassified information provides a general understanding. The system currently has four tiers
or levels. Each tier represents an ever-increasing level of analysis. Tier 1 conto standardize the

sists

of a 1500-foot circle drawn around the outer boundary of a proposed tar-

no collateral damage concern within that circle, then there is no
move on to the next tier. Tier 2 involves applying fragmentation data

get. If there

need to

is

of a specific munition to the actual target. This results in a smaller circle being

drawn around the
is

target. If a collateral

damage concern still exists, then Tier 3

used. This involves taking a specific munition, applying

racy, along

record of accu-

with the possibility of error, and determining the probable or possi-

damage.

ble extent of collateral

damage

its

is still

Finally,

the level of possible collateral

if

viewed as unacceptable; and the target in question

sufficient value,

is

deemed of

then a Tier 4 analysis, involving computer simulation and

modeling can be conducted.

Here is an illustrative analogy: Tier 1 is like looking at an object with the
naked eye, Tier 2 is like using a hand held magnifying glass, Tier 3 is like using
a microscope, while Tier 4

The

tier

system

is

is

like using a

high-powered electron microscope.

a useful tool that provides a

methodology

for evaluating the

damage and possible effects upon any human within the
However, it does not provide the actual number of injuries. Also,

structural collateral
target area.
just

because a target

is

Tier

1

or Tier 4 does not

tell

the reviewer anything

about the actual value of striking that target within the context of the ongoing campaign.

Whether

or not destroying a particular target

achieve the stated military or political objective

is

is

not a part of the

going to

tier

system

analysis.

A target may have zero possibility of collateral damage, but if
impact on the campaign, then bombing that target
ing aircrews
it is

and

solely

also has zero

wasting resources, putt-

and possibly violating the law of war. Still,
the tier level of some target and make a value

civilians in danger,

very tempting to point to

judgment

is

it

on those

criteria.

Returning to the target approval process, once a collaborative targeting

ses-

was sent forward to the decision authority. Obtaining approval from both the appropriate authorities within the United
States and NATO was required before any target could be attacked. (Note
sion approved a target,

that as

I

it

was not involved in the

exclusively

on the

NATO process,

my

discussions are focused

US process.) Upon this final approval,

(JTF) could add the target to the master
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the Joint Task Force

and schedule

it

for attack.
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However, approval to strike meant much more than just satisfying the rather
low thresholds set out by the law of war. The intense concern over the issue of
collateral damage meant that targets were approved for strike only at a certain
tier level. To achieve that level often meant that only a certain type of munition could be used or the target could only be attacked at certain times of the

change in munition could raise the level of
collateral damage above what had been approved and, thus, remove a target
from the "approved for strike" category.
day. Thus, something as simple as a

As

a result, though not listed as an official step in the targeting process, re-

viewing the daily

list

of proposed strikes for the next two days became a part of

the process. This review was simply a quality check

would intentionally ignore

—not because people

orders, but because people enter the data into the

make mistakes. A single
personnel who actually had to exe-

computers, people hit the wrong keys and people

wrong entry or a miscommunication to the
cute the mission could mean an attack occurring that had not been approved.
This is not saying that a law of war violation would occur, just that a target
would be struck in a manner that our civilian authorities had not authorized.
In contrast to the hi-tech world of the collaborative targeting sessions, this

review was a simple line-by-line comparison of the strike
target

list

and the

legal review. Usually, this

however, on occasion targets

list

to the

approved

review found no discrepancies;

had not yet been
approved at the appropriate level or were being attacked with a munition that
raised the possible collateral damage above that approved for the target.
When such discrepancies were found, the target would be expedited through
the approval process if possible, or the munition would be changed to bring
the collateral damage estimate back down. Sometimes this necessitated canceling a strike. After this quality review, the proposed new list of targets would
arrive and the process would begin for another day.
listed as

approved

for attack

Conclusion
After giving this presentation to various audiences,
there

is

generally surprise at

how

I

have found that

the targeting process worked. People are

was devoted to each individual target. Of
the nearly 2000 fixed targets that were reviewed, each received an independent evaluation within the requirements of the law of war. Is the target
a military objective? What military value or advantage is gained from destroying this target? Are we being proportional? Are there any issues with

surprised to hear that such effort

distinction/discrimination?
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who
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disagree with the decisions to attack individual targets,

I

would simply suggest that the laws of war are certainly subject to different interpretations. It is easy to state that there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects. In
reality, whether a specific set of results is "acceptable" is going to depend on
the objectives being sought, as well as both the military and political risk those
in charge are willing to take. Human rights activists and experienced combat
commanders will often not agree on individual targeting decisions. The legal
advisor must keep both views in mind and still be able to make a recommendation

on

a target without losing perspective.

Legal involvement in the targeting process was not limited to just
Just as

each

level of

my level.

command has its own operators and intelligence officers,
own legal advisor. The legal advisors were in con-

so too do they have their

stant contact discussing both the broad impact of changes in guidance, as well

on individual targets.
Operation Allied Force had its share of mistakes, errors, miscalculations
and systems malfunctions. Those usually made the evening news and are the
subject of continuing, intense discussion and condemnation. The literally
as specific issues

thousands of decisions that were made in order to reduce casualties, to limit
effects

those

and

who

do not make the news. The result can be that
or watching come away with a very one-sided view of

to deflect the impact

are listening

the events.
This, in

my own view, was

to explain before, during

—and

and

still is

—our

biggest miscalculation. Failing

after the fact the efforts that

went into the

bombing campaign allowed others to interpret it as they saw fit. It did not take
being clairvoyant to know that no matter how "just" our cause (at least in the
minds of some), our actions would be scrutinized. No one liked what was going on in Kosovo but no one wanted Serbia bombed to oblivion either. This
simple truth apparently came as a surprise when the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

—

in compliance with

its

charter

—asked

questions about the bombing.

Even when we make some

feeble attempt at explaining our efforts,

not provide the depth or detail necessary. Saying we
of war

is

will

we do

comply with the law

a conclusion that does not do justice to the efforts expended. Further,

as a conclusion, there

is

the statement "we will comply with the
are in place,

what

guidelines,

The assumption

What does
law of war" actually mean? What steps

nothing for people to evaluate and judge.

what processes

we think our cause is "just" that people
accept everything we do is born out of arrogance. The

that just because

are going to blindly

to ensure compliance?
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price paid for that arrogance

that

may be kept

the "bad" guy.

If

at

is

a lack of trust, a disbelief, a lingering disquiet

bay only so long as those being opposed can be viewed

we

as

care about our obligations under the law of war, then

Kosovo means that the next time we will do a better
job of educating people about the process ahead of time. I am confident that
this lesson has not been learned.
learning the lesson from
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A

am standing

want to approach this
from the standpoint of the legal counsel to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff the position that then Captain Lohr held during Operation
Allied Force. I will explain the process he employed in providing legal advice to
the Chairman and to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense with
respect to targeting in Kosovo. We have heard from the former General Couns I

in for

Admiral Michael Lohr,

I

—

Ms. Judy Miller, from Judge Jamie Baker who provided the National Security Council point of view, and from Lieutenant Colonel Tony Montgomery
sel,

who provided the US European Command point of view. So this is another link
in the legal chain in terms of targeting

and the approval of targets

at the na-

tional level.

At

was expected that Operation Allied Force
was going to be quick and easy. There were about fifty to seventy-five predesignated targets approved in advance. These were very traditional targets
that were chosen for immediate military impact. They involved command and
the outset of the conflict,

it

control, integrated air defense system, airfields,
ditional military targets.

and

aircraft

—thoroughly

tra-

But Operation Allied Force was not quick and short

lived.

We realized very quickly that the Serbs were not going to leave Kosovo

easily.

This caused two things to happen: there was a need for more targets,

and there was a need to move to different type of

targets other

than

just the

traditional military targets.

The requirement
gets,

the

for

more

targets led to

mainly the traditional military

US European Command. These

level,

two routes

targets,

for approval.

Most

tar-

were approved in the theater by

targets did not

come up

to the Joint Staff

or up to the General Counsel level, or to the Secretary of Defense or

Commentary
So

president.

approved each and every target is
The vast majority of targets were approved in-theater. Some

this idea that the president

simply not true.

have to come back to the Pentagon for review and approval. The
military industrial targets, the electric power grids, certain infrastructure, any
targets did

and those targets that were assessed to have a high
damage did have to be reviewed by the Pentagon.

targets within Belgrade,

potential for collateral

When

a target

came

to the Pentagon,

and

this

is

a

little bit

different

from

what happened at the European Command, two things happened. The J2,
which is our intelligence division, and the Joint Staff immediately began an independent assessment of the target. Aside from what the European Command
had done in-theater, the Joint Staff intelligence division started an immediate
assessment of the target. This included what Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery
referred to as the four- tier assessment. That is a refined assessment that tries
to determine as accurately as possible the potential collateral damage that
might be sustained in attacking a

target. Slides

were then produced

for brief-

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, if necessary, the secretary of
defense and the president. The contents of the slides showed the objective or
military linkage of the target. Was it command and control, was it integrated
air defense, was it industrial-military, and what was the collateral damage estiing the

mate? The assessment might include "high collateral damage," or
clude a specific

number of

it

might

anticipated unintended civilian casualties.

in-

The

would also have a casualty estimate which would include sometimes both
the combatants and the noncombatants.
slide

The Joint Staff then produced a matrix, which I don't think they did at European Command. This matrix rated the military significance of the particular
whether it was so important that it might cause the termination of
hostilities or whether it was a target that merely sustained the military or sustained the Serbian operations in Kosovo. Collateral damage was given a rating
target,

i.e.,

of high, medium, or low.

Next came the

risk

assessment of outliers

— the

potential for a

bomb or mis-

and land somewhere else. This assessment was particularly important where we were using bombs or missiles and where there was a
heavily built-up area with large urban structures around the target. There was
a greater risk of outliers in those situations. Finally, the matrix would indicate
whether the recommendation was to approve the target, disapprove the target, ask for more information, or hold it while we received additional
sile

to miss

its

target

information.

Based upon

and based upon the target folders that were
the legal counsel would conduct a legal assessment.

this information,

received by the Joint Staff,
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This was a basic law of armed conflict legal assessment: operations
rected only against military objectives, the civilian population
object of attack, there can be

no intent

to spread terror

population, indiscriminate attacks are prohibited, and the

is

may be

di-

not to be the

among

the civilian

damage

to civilian

property cannot be excessive in light of the anticipated military advantage.
Military objectives were those objectives

purpose or use

make an

whose destruction

which by

their nature, location,

effective contribution to the military action

and

in the circumstances ruling at the time offered a definite

That was the rule that was employed in terms of what is a
military objective. Take all precautions in means and methods of attack to
avoid and minimize incidental injury and death and damage to civilians. This
in many cases influenced the aim points of the weapons to try to direct the
weapons and the effects of the weapons away from civilians, civilian objects,
military advantage.

civilian places.

A number of targets were sent up for further review by the secretary of defense and, occasionally, the president.
target packages.

mentary

The

The

four-tier analysis

was part of those

damage by fragwindow breakage (be-

four-tier analysis tried to estimate the

blast, skin piercing

fragments from the blast,

damage and incidental injury), building
collapse (the possibility of building collapse or which buildings would be expected to collapse), and eardrum rupture, which obviously causes civilian injuries. Those were the four types of injuries that were modeled and simulated
by computer with each type of weapon that was considered as a possible
weapon to be employed. This made a lot of difference. It was all visualized, displayed, and we could actually determine to a reasonable degree the extent of
cause that could create a

collateral

lot

of

damage.

This was the type of analysis that was done by the lawyers, the intelligence

community, and the operators. .This is what went to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. There may have been ten targets every four or five days that
were carried to the president. The chairman would brief those targets to the

and the president would make the decision to approve, disapprove,
request more information, or hold the target. That was essentially the process
that the chairman's legal counsel was involved in.

president,

Of course

the military objective overall was to force the Serbs to withdraw

NATO

no way unleashed an unlimited war; it was very
tightly controlled. There was always some element of political control at all
times, which was necessary because we had to hold the coalition together. We
did target some of the propaganda capabilities of the Serbs primarily through

from Kosovo.

information operations

in

—non-lethal

type attacks.
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We

hit military industrial,

Commentary
dual-use electric power, petroleum because petroleum always supplies the mil-

and the military runs on petroleum products, and infrastructure.
Note the comments by Professor Bothe about the type of infrastructure that
can be targeted. In our targeting and in our legal review there were a number
of bridges, roads, infrastructures that had no military value whatsoever. We
had a couple of targets nominated that were two-lane wooden bridges across
drainage ditches. They had no military value whatsoever, and those targets
were not approved. So even though it was hostilities, we did not go after all
military objects. We went after those that counted, or least the ones we
itary

thought counted.

One

final

comment

—

I

hope you don't get the impression that we are pat-

on the back. We did not come here to talk about the wonderful
job we did. We came to talk about the process that we went through, and the
process that we will hopefully go through and approve each time we employ
the use of force. I do think it is necessary that people are aware of the great
ting ourselves

care and the great effort that goes into targeting, including
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Wolff H. von Heinegg

most remarkable contributions;
however, congratulation does not mean agreement. This again does not
mean that I'm in complete disagreement with all three of them, rather to say
that my agreement varies. I will not be able to touch upon all the issues addressed. Hence, I will briefly refer to some details, and then I will close with
some more general remarks on some fundamental issues that I'm afraid are too

I

must congratulate our presenters

often

left

out of sight.

Convention

IX.

I

I

will

will start

Professor Bothe
1

I

is

for their

not go into the question of the relevance of Hague

with the natural environment.

seemingly willing to apply the rules contained in Protocol

on the natural environment

as

customary international law.

to be

emphasized that Articles 35(3) and Article 55 of Protocol

"new

rules" and, thus, binding only

even when Protocol
flict,

I is

upon

First, it

needs

are so-called

I

States parties to the Protocol. But

formally applicable, in an international

armed con-

the question remains as to the possible practical impact of these provi-

Remember, they merely prohibit the employment of methods and
means of warfare that do or may inflict damage to the natural environment
that is "widespread, long-term and severe." 2 There is no conventional method
or means of warfare the use of which will clearly be illegal under this prohibition. Even the sinking of an oil tanker cannot always be subsumed under those
sions.

rules.

Moreover,

I still

have not seen a convincing definition of natural envi-

ronment. The often-used term "ecosystem"
1.

Protocol Additional to the

is

not a definition, but merely a

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating

Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.

ON THE LAWS OF WAR 422 (Adam
2. U, arts. 35(3) and 55.

Roberts

3,

to the

DOCUMENTS

& Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000).
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_____

and not of much help. Hence, the only

substitute

fairly

on

secure statement

the legal status of the natural environment during international armed conflict is

which

that

contained in the United States Navy's Commander's

is

Handbook. 3 Please note that while the wanton destruction of the natural environment
sity,

it

is

illegal

because

of course

is

it

cannot be

justified

by reason of military neces-

never a war crime entailing individual criminal

responsibility.

Secondly,

I

would

like to address the list

approach.

The combined

list

ap-

proach suggested by Professor Dinstein seems to be based on quite a condensing logic. Professor Dinstein correctly referred in his paper to the

on whether it was

process and the very intense discussion

San Remo

preferable to merely

have an abstract definition of military objectives or to also have a non-exhaustive

and merely

objectives.

4

1

illustrative list of objects that

believe that the decision of the

an abstract definition was

correct.

Such

lists

would usually

Round Table

qualify as military

to be satisfied with

would be counterproductive be-

cause in the eyes of many, the exclusion of certain objects will

mean

that they

may be attacked in exceptional cases only. All legal methodology will not prevent them from such a misunderstanding. I cannot imagine two or more international lawyers, not to speak of government officials, who could reach an
agreement on such a list. The papers presented by Professors Bothe and
Dinstein illustrate this point.
Thirdly, let us

come

to the definition of military objectives. First the ques-

tion of effective contribution to military action.

I

fully agree

Dinstein that the concept of war-sustaining capability

more importantly has no foundation

is

much

oil,

from

more contempo-

only under exceptional preconditions and circumstances are

subject to military measures,

i.e.,

only

if

naval warfare, to give but one example,
transported

too wide, and

in international law. This follows

the simple truth that objects such as raw cotton or, to take a
rary example,

with Professor

on neutral

vessels.

Only

there the opportunity to capture

it.

they are used for military purposes. In

oil

exports are not subject to capture

in the case of a breach of a blockade

Capture, however, has to be

guished from targeting even though

I

if
is

strictly distin-

must admit that the dividing

line

is

not

always so clear.

Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on The Law of Naval
OPERATIONS 405 (A.R. Thomas and James Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, US Naval War
College International Law Studies).
3.

4.

See Professor Dinstein's paper in

this

volume.
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Professor Bothe also maintains in his paper that there are
5

permanent military objectives.
made in such an absolute form.
impressive
tives

number of objects

1

am

no standing or

unable to agree with such a statement

if

beyond any doubt that there are quite an

It is

that always qualify as legitimate military objec-

because by their nature, and by their very nature, they effectively con-

To

tribute to military action.

military airplane.

give but one example, take a warship or a

A discussion like

Belgrano in the Falklands

War

that following the sinking of the General

should not be repeated, and that discussion

should not contribute to casting doubt upon this fact of law and
Let

me

shortly refer to the definite military advantage

life.

and the circum-

stances ruling at the time. Here as with regard to the effective contribution to
military action, Professors

Bothe and Dinstein have presented quite different

must confess that I'd rather follow the Dinstein approach because
of fundamental considerations. To start with the details and by concentrating
on the broadcasting station, I would like to add and emphasize that we must
admit that under the laws of war, enemy means of communication have always been and always will be considered legitimate military objectives. It must
also be emphasized that this is true regardless of the overall aim of the war or
of the armed conflict. Professor Bothe maintains that tradition should not be
overestimated, but, in my opinion, tradition has a lot to do with State practice,
which is not only of significance when it comes to the formation of rules of
customary international law.
positions.

me

I

some fundamental issues. Even though Professor
Bothe correctly holds that the jus in hello and the jus ad bellum have to be distinguished and kept apart from each other, I wonder whether he doesn't pay
just lip service to that distinction. In view of his further thesis, I have some
Let

finally turn to

doubts. In any event, the distinction
overall

aim that led one of the

armed

force

may not be brushed

parties to

when

comes

an armed

aside.

Moreover, the

conflict to resort to use of

whether certain objects effectively contribute to military action of the adversary or whether their
neutralization offers a definite military advantage. Apart from the problem
is

irrelevant

it

to the question

that such aims will be merely political, the actual or potential tactics
strategies

taken by the adversary or the attacker are decisive.

forget that the law of armed conflict

into operation

if

for

should not

designed as a order of necessity that comes

whatever reasons States are unwilling or unable to refrain

from the use of armed

force. It

customary international law
5.

is

We

and

See Professor Bothe's paper in

is

this

is,

so to speak, the ultimate legal yardstick that

willing to accept.

volume.
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The law of armed

conflict does not ask for motives, political aims, or the le-

gality of the first use offeree. It takes as a fact that the jus

to function properly. Thus,

it

ad bellum has

failed

accepts that the parties to an international

do apply certain methods and means of warfare in order to
harm the respective enemy and by keeping to a minimum one's own losses.
This means that the law of armed conflict sets up certain limits, but it has
never been designed to prevent armed conflict.
armed

We
made

conflict

as international lawyers should

-

never forget that international law

means by those who

bound by

is

But the consenhave reached a certain level, we
are not allowed as international lawyers to ignore this and to replace the missing basis by pure hermeneutics or to equate what we wish the law to be with
by States

that

sus of States can only be verified,

let

are

us say to

the existing law.
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Henry Shue

7T7*
r<| ocusing

on dual-purpose

J-L

do a

want

to

I

want

fessor Dinstein began,

to go

I

would

tell

me whether

onto something that

is

how we

I

it is

would

ask

some other

if

is

a real issue here or

there

is

fairly

concrete.

When Pro-

talk

about proportionality.

me

seems to

that

it is

if this

maybe

that

is

so.

thing

is

civilian or military

it is

eligible to

where you

and the answer

be a legitimate

destroy this thing without causing collateral

which

not abso-

as separate in the case of dual-purpose tar-

clearly military, so

we can

I

inconclusive and re-

just like to raise this question. In the really clear case

that this thing

Now we

is

It

in the case of other targets although

have an object, and you ask
is

will

think about things.

lutely clear that proportionality

gets as

is

is

things. First,

he made the traditional point that today we are talking

about discrimination and tomorrow we

Normally that

do two

like to

of abstract worrying, which

little bit

other people to

ally just a plea for

not. Secondly,

targets,

target.

damage

to

So there is a military object, there are
other civilian objects located nearby, and so we ask how much damage will
there be to the co-located civilian objects? That is the discussion about proobjects

portionality.

are civilian.

But the thing about dual-purpose targets

doubtedly military, but they are also undoubtedly

is

that they are un-

civilian.

So rather than

having two different objects, we have one object that has two different pur-

Now maybe

no reason not to treat this in essentially the same
way, but I am sort of bothered by that. That is, you can say just as we first ask
is this object military, and then we go and look at whether the damage to ciposes.

vilian objects will

there

is

be disproportionate

have a military purpose.

—why

can't

we

just say okay, here

we

Commentary

Now let's

talk about

whether the frustration of the

civilian purpose,

which

same object also plays, is proportional. But because this is after all only
one object, I wonder whether the proportionality shouldn't come up a bit
sooner. One way of raising the question is to ask something about Professor
Dinstein's list. I do not think I am actually disagreeing with him, but the question is what does it mean to say a certain object is, for example, by nature a
military objective. If that just means it's over the first hurdle
that it's now eligible for consideration of whether destroying it will cause proportional damthen that's fine. That is, if all we're saying is that everything that's
age or not
on the list are military objects about which we now need to ask about proporthis

—

—

tionality,

then

that's okay.

seems to

me

there's

reading of the

list

that

It

—

some danger

when one

nature military objectives, then one
especially
will

on

—though maybe

says that all the

may

this

main

is

just

an unfair

railroad lines are by

think that the burden of proof

lies

damage

proportionality. In order to establish that the civilian

be disproportional, one somehow has to show more than one would have

show if this thing was not already on the list. I hope that's just a misreading of what Professor Dinstein is saying. If not, then I would be a bit
had

to

worried.
I

wonder about the

gets in particular.

cause

it

role of proportionality with respect to dual-purpose tar-

Now to get a little more concrete

does seem to

me

and

specific,

I

ask this be-

that in the case of the dual-purpose targets,
.

everything really turns on proportionality. Academic theorists tend to think
that proportionality

is

not

much of a task

—

that

it's

so vague that

it's

not going

do much work. I want to say two things. The first is that I do take
some comfort from what has been said by Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery,
Ms Judith Miller and Colonel Sorenson. Based on their testimony anyway, it
does appear that in the case of the Kosovo bombing campaign proportionality
really did do serious work. To the extent that this is true, I guess I do disagree
with Professor Dinstein's comment that World War II would still be going on
if the same review had been applied.
I certainly don't think we should take the targeting in World War II as any
kind of example of acceptable targeting. There was a lot of targeting in World
War II that was completely disproportionate. My understanding is that the
war might have ended a lot sooner if we had wasted less stuff trying to break
civilian morale and used it in more militarily useful ways. So whether or not
this whole process, which I don't pretend I actually understood, is needed, I
don't know. That there is some such process seems to me to be actually quite a
good thing.
to really
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Henry Shue

Why do we

have the

jus in bellol

having total war. The point of jus

We

have

it

because we're trying to avoid

some semblance of normal
civilian life should continue even during the war, even while the fighting is
occurring on the land and the sea and in the air. Babies are to be born. Old
in hello

people should be able to finish out their

is

lives.

that

People

who need medical

atten-

There has to be at least some civilian life that is protected from the war. So one of the questions about proportionality is "would the elimination of a particular target make it impossible for
tion should be able to get medical attention.

even elemental civilian processes to continue?" It seems to me that if it would,
the answer is that damage is not proportional unless the military value is of
some extraordinary significance of a kind rarely found. It seems to me that this
is

almost always true of the basic energy sources of the society and especially

the electrical grid, the destruction of which makes

water so children
business.

It is

will get

it

impossible to purify the

waterborne diseases and hospitals are put out of

going to be a rare military advantage that

is

actually proportional

to that.
I

am not

saying

we

did the contrary in Kosovo.

Maybe

about the change in the way we bombed electrical

bit

not.

facilities

I

worry a

toward the end

of the war, but I'm not even sure that there's any objection there.

sound

as if

we

much made

pretty

little

does

It

a point of not permanently causing pro-

longed damage.
Just

one

have not seen the RAND study Ms. Judith Miller was
morning that apparently argues that a fear about the extent

final point.

talking about this

I

of the civilian damage was part of the reason that Milosevic conceded.

very impressed with the argument in Robert Pape's Bombing

am

sure

many

of you know. His thesis
2

never succeeded. That

is

is

to

Win book

basically that strategic

1

I

am

that

I

bombing has

that the attempt to break the will has never suc-

ceeded. Pape's argument mainly being that there

is

a missing

mechanism. The

argument is that if you caused the civilians enough pain, then they will want
to change the government or end the war, so they will. But the "so they will"
part is what is usually not there. In the case of many governments if they could
have done that, they might have done it a long time ago. It's especially unlikely they'll

be able to do

it

under the conditions of a national security

emergency.

So

I

viously

doubt very
I

much

need to look

that that was true in the case of Serbia, although ob-

at that report. If so, of course, that

1.

See Ms. Miller's commentary in

2.

Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion

this

is

very different from

volume.
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War

(1996).
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the position that says the civilian

damage

is

unintended but proportional.

you're hoping for this effect, then you are hoping for the civilian damage.

If

That
then has become strategic bombing of the World War II sort, not an example
of unintentional civilian damage that might then be proportional. That is a
very different matter and, as far as I can see, an unacceptable way to proceed.
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Reasonable Military Commanders and Reasonable Civilians
Charles Dunlap:
I

found Professor Bothe's comment about the reasonable military com-

mander and that we ought to have reasonable civilians very interesting. What
kind of training regime would you suggest for the civilians to have the competence of the reasonable military commander? Because we find it very difficult
to teach even lawyers the art of war sufficiently so that they can render appropriate legal advice.

Michael Bothe:

The point with the
deed

is

"training,"

a dialogue. This

know

better

and

democratic system.

We

that

I

is

I

think

is

not well taken.

What is required in-

a two-way street, of course, but "training" implies

have to teach the others. That's not the point in a
have to have two-way communications and to start a
I

well

on that assumption. "I know better" is just the wrong way. I am quite
prepared to tell the same story to some of the human rights organizations

who

think they

dialogue

know

better. This

is

a lesson

I

think that both sides should

learn.

Harvey Dalton:
I'm a bit worried about that answer.

employ the
to his

Tomahawk

A military commander knows how to

land attack missile

(TLAM)

better. I'm going to defer

judgment in terms of weaponizing and employing

him my

legal advice in respect to targeting,

TLAM. may provide
I

but he knows better in terms of

that weapon.

Leslie Green:
I,

too,

am

worried about this "reasonable civilian"

nary civilian and the ordinary soldier.

It

reminds

—

this idea of the ordi-

me of the

attitude sanctioned

Discussion

many war crimes

by too

A reasonable man
soldier.

fenses

One

is

is

tribunals.

the

man on

of the reasons that

that they don't

know

I

What was the
a

downtown

thought of a reasonable man?

bus; that

is

not the reasonable

don't like civilian judges trying military of-

the circumstances that were prevailing at the

time that led to the soldier's actions.

The

question of what

is

reasonable in

on what is reasonable in the eyes of the man who is
involved in that conflict. That would only be accepted by those who have similar background knowledge, not by one who has been securely moved up in
some Inn of Court.
times of conflict depends

Michael Bothe:

Maybe
of

my

the

much under the impact of the constitutional development
after the war. One of the lessons that the persons who drafted

I'm too

country

German

constitution after the war wanted to draw from historic experi-

ence was to integrate the military into a

civilian

system of values, not to have

the military as a state within the State. Arguing that military matters are

something which the military knows and the

civilian doesn't

is

utterly a step in

the wrong direction.

Natalino Ronzitti:

Ruth Wedgwood and Admiral Robertson have advocated the wisdom of
having military people sitting on courts that apply international humanitarian
law. I have mixed feelings on this point because you are referring to your
American tradition. You have military people with the necessary knowledge
of international humanitarian law, but
are military people or military judges

I

don't

know if in other countries

who have

a

there

good knowledge of interna-

tional humanitarian law.
I

guess I'm

more concerned because not

all

wartime crimes are battlefield

There are courts such as the ICC and ICTY that, are competent to try
not only war crimes, but also crimes against humanity and genocide. Genocide
crimes.

is

very, very hard to establish.

It is

easy to define, but

it is

really difficult to

prove that the person, the head of State, has committed genocide. So

I

believe

that civilian judges can play a role, but you can have special chambers to deal

with battlefield crimes. In those cases

it

would be best

the experts.
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on the opinion of

Discussion

Legal Advisors and Time*Sensitive Targets

Charles Dunlap:

Kosovo was

in

many ways

a sort of a set-piece operation

where you had the

we

are building tech-

luxury of multilevel reviews of targets and so forth, but

Cen-

nological systems to try to close the decision loop in the Air Operations
ter to literally

minutes where, at best, we are going to be able to have a JAG at

some instantaneous advice regarding targets of opportunity. I'm not sure how these processes will be able to work except by having the JAG being able to make some kind of instantaneous judgment, but this
again reflects back on training and the need to know the operational art.
the table to try to provide

Harvey Dalton:

The dynamic

during Kosovo was that

we would

get these nominations

maybe two to three days in advance and we had a constant input of nominated
targets. So what we reviewed and approved would be the targets two days
down the road. Your point is well taken about the timeline and the fact it's going to get faster. My only suggestion would be that we're going to have to have
a lawyer in the loop twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.

It will

be a

continuous review process and the lawyer can be there for the targets of opportunity.

But

for the

most part

this process

is

a revolving process that

may be

two days ahead of when you actually use the weapon.

Tony Montgomery:
For time-sensitive targeting in Kosovo, these issues did not even come up
to the

European Command, much

targets or mobile targets

less

go to the Joint

Staff.

Time-sensitive

were delegated down and the guys on the ground

could address those using the same practices they've always used, which are
basically using their best judgment.

There were people

in the

Combined Air

Operations Center that provided legal advice to General Short.

What the
lates to

targeting process that everyone

what we think of as

and

I

have been talking about

strategic targets, not the ones that

re-

pop up and we

Though I will say that the issue of dealing with the tanks
and artillery in houses and how to deal with that from a political level as opposed to just if you see a tank in the house you go and whack it, that did get up
hit opportunistically.

to the higher levels just because of the

consequences that would

fall

from

NATO forces being seen to go in and take down some houses that supposedly
had tanks inside of them.
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Coalition Approval of Targets

Charles Kogan:
It

appears that there was a certain dissatisfaction on the part of the Europe-

ans with some aspects of their input into the target approval process. This,

came out

believe,

French after-action report by their defense ministry
raids from Missouri were conducted outside the NATO

in the

stating that the B- 1

chain- of-command.

ment on

I

I

wonder

if

Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery could com-

that?

Tony Montgomery:
As far as I know, and

have to qualify it in that way, there was no target
struck unilaterally by the United States. What I mean is that everything that
I

was struck had some approval by NATO. Now that does not necessarily mean
that each of the nineteen countries sat down and approved each of the individual targets. The Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) had

been delegated certain authority. The

NATO

delegated certain authority. Since the

US

was not
just

in that chain of

how much

command,

authority

French after-action

I

SACEUR

report.

I

Secretary-General had been

European

Command (EUCOM)

have never seen and
had been delegated.

have read

it. I

am just

where there was a unilateral attack by the United
if there had been one.

I
I

have no

am

real idea

aware of the

not aware of any instance

States.

I

would be surprised

There was a great deal of effort made to do as much as possible to provide
information, but EUCOM did not work for NATO. All of my efforts and all of
the efforts of the EUCOM targeting cell were directed solely towards satisfying
the US desire for information on the targets. We did not provide that targeting data directly to NATO. We were never authorized to do that and we did
not take that step. Our data went to the Joint Staff. It went to our political authorities and our military authorities. We were aware that there was some dissatisfaction within certain

but

we could not

fix

NATO channels concerning the targeting process,

that ourselves.

When Civilian Objects Become Military

Objectives

Charles Garraway:
I

would

like to discuss objects

because there has been considerable confu-

sion over the definition of military objective in Article 55(2) of Protocol

I.

I

think the problem has been slightly expanded by some of the language used
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today such as "traditional military objects" and "dual-use

problem with the definition
jects. Civilian

Not

all

objects are defined as anything that

military objects are military objectives.

Constitution in

Boston Harbor

facilities."

between military objectives and

is

I

is

The

civilian ob-

not a military objective.

would suggest that the USS

a military object, but not necessarily a military

is

which may not be being used by the military in any way but may be interrupting a tank advance, can by its location be a
military objective. So certainly on the European side of the pond, there is a lot
of confusion about military objects and civilian objects with people saying that
civilian objects cannot ever be attacked, forgetting about the distinction between civilian objects as defined in Protocol I and civilian objects as used in the
ordinary common sense term. Would the panel have anything to say on that?
objective. Similarly, a civilian house,

Yoram

Dinstein:

A few words about defended and undefended localities on the frontline. It
must be understood that in a frontline situation, as a rule, the pertinent issue
is less whether an object constitutes a military objective and more whether it is
part of a defended locality. The term "locality" (introduced in Protocol I) is
narrower than the expression "village, town or city" originally employed by the

Hague Regulations. Whatever language
scribed area

is

is

used, the point

is

that

if

a pre-

defended, any building within the area (other than an assembly

point for the collection of wounded,

marked

as such)

would be exposed

to at-

tack, irrespective of its ostensible status as a civilian object.

This

particularly relevant to scenario of house-to-house fighting epito-

is

If

house-to-house fighting goes on in a particular city

no need

to evaluate the legal standing of every edifice within

mized by Stalingrad.
block, there

is

Any such edifice can be shelled, bombed or otherwise attacked notwithstanding the fact that for the moment it does not serve a military functhe block.

tion.

The reason is

the underlying expectation that the tide of house-to-house

fighting will ultimately engulf

it

although, as yet, this has not

Obviously, the result can be grave collateral

The

issue of collateral

tionality.

The phrase

damage

sive."

The question

objects

is

to civilians

proportionality

not mention proportionality at

all.

damage

is

is

come

to pass.

to civilians.

tied in with that of propor-

often misunderstood. Protocol

The

only expression used there

is

I

does

"exces-

whether the injury to civilians or damage to civilian
excessive compared to the military advantage anticipated. Many
is

people tend to confuse excessive with extensive. However, injury/damage to

non-combatants can be exceedingly extensive without being excessive, simply
because the military advantage anticipated
215

is

of paramount importance.

Discussion

___________

Consider the rudimentary example of the bombing of a major munitions
tory.

The

may have thousands

factory

be injured in an

air raid.

likely to ensue, the

A related point

enemy

is

of civilian employees

who

air force is

allowed to strike the factory.

party shielding a military objective with civilians
it

are liable to

Notwithstanding the enormous civilian casualties

that of shielding combatants with civilians.

of armed conflict, and

fac-

bears

A belligerent

acting in breach of the law

is

full responsibility for

the civilian blood shed by

an enemy attack against that military objective. Coming back to my Stalingrad example, once the Soviets decided to turn the city into a battlefield, it
was their responsibility to remove civilians from the line of fire. A residential

on the

can be saved from destruction by being declared
non-defended. But a belligerent party cannot eat the cake and have it. Logic
and experience militate against an attempt to defend a place to the hilt and at
locality

frontline

the same time expecting the civilian population in

situ to

be protected from

the ravages of war.

Relating the Permissible Mission to the Military Advantage

Christopher Greenwood:

between taking into account what a belligerent
is seeking to achieve and trying to determine whether a particular attack will
give it a military advantage. Professor Bothe seemed to suggest that we must
account for what the belligerent is entitled to seek to achieve. Now it seems to
me that an attack does not offer a military advantage if you will destroy some-

There

thing,

is

surely a difference

when its destruction is not going to make

the blindest difference to your

own military tactics, or to what you expect the enemy's military tactics to be.
To say that a State must not destroy something that does indeed interfere with
its

game plan because

that should not have been

place because, for example,

seems to

me

to be

an

it

is

game plan

in the

first

acting out of humanitarian motives, that

entirely different matter.

clarification of the distinction

its

I

would be

grateful to see

some

between the two.

Michael Bothe:
This

is

of course the fundamental issue:

itary operation

how far does

the context of the mil-

have an impact on the notion of military advantage?

that the overall context of a military operation has an impact

considered as advantage in this particular context.
that any conflict
tion of Professor

is

like

any other

von Heinegg

conflict.

in his

This

is

What you

think

on what can be
are suggesting

is

also the basis of the objec-

Commentary. You say
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I

for the purposes of

Discussion

the jus in

hello,

recognize that

any armed conflict
if

I

make

try to

is

like the other.

distinctions,

then

I

There

is

no

distinction.

I

am very close to mixing jus in

and jus ad helium. I repeat that is something I do not want to do because it
means foregoing one of the essential bases of the application of the jus in hello,

hello

which

is

Anything which

reciprocity.

risks negatively affecting reciprocity,

I

think, should be out.

There,
so,

I

I

agree with

the objections that have been made. But this being

all

am still not convinced

out of its context.

If

that you can take the notion of military advantage

the declared purpose of a military operation

is

limited, as

was in Kosovo, you cannot divorce the notion of advantage from that purpose. It is not just the subjective intent; it is the objective character of the
entire mission. The Independent Commission on Kosovo comes up with
something similar and even goes a little further. They say there should be a
protocol three on humanitarian intervention, because it is not appropriate to
have the whole spectrum of otherwise lawful means of combat for an exclusively humanitarian intervention. I am not sure whether I would go that far,
but I think that without changing the law, my interpretation of military adit

vantage

is

a possible restraint.

This brings

me

to the

Wolff von Heinegg.
law? This

is

Is it

more fundamental question which was asked by

wishful thinking?

a distinction that sometimes

is

Or

is it

a real

development of the

hard to make

if

we

are in a situa-

We

do not yet know whether Kosovo is transition or not.
Operation Allied Force was for some something novel. It is a part of a process,
as the United Nations Secretary-General put it, of redefining sovereignty and
drawing different conclusions from the requirements of sovereignty than we
did before. I am not so sure whether this is the case, but we are entering the
question of the jus ad helium here, and I refrain from commenting on that. If
tion of transition.

new

types of military operations are developing, having completely different

purposes from traditional war, then
It's

it is

not only a matter of the jus ad helium.

means how these

also a matter of the

conflicts are conducted.

This also goes into the question of the ethical considerations which are
cussed in relation to Kosovo.

view

is

The

standard objection from the moral point of

from the traditional helium iustum theory (there was a

not a just means). This
things are linked.

And

is

dis-

just

cause but

standard in the literature on that subject. So these

the relationship between jus ad helium and jus in hello

not one watertight compartment. That

where the law might change, and
about the direction in which
in terms of the question

it

I

is

wishful thinking.

think

changes.

it's

My

are at a point

absolutely legitimate to think

conclusion

is

than in terms of a statement of lex
Ill

We

is

formulated farther
lata.

Discussion

Yoram
I

Dinstein:

have already

underscore in

tried to

military advantage. Let

me add

my

paper the

relativistic

nature of a

here that often, whereas you do not

know

for

what you would like to deny to
one belligerent party would sim-

sure what's good for you, you clearly perceive

the other side. Thus, a military advantage to

ply be a mirror image of a military disadvantage to the adverse side. This brings

me to my disagreement with Professor Bothe regarding the issue of bridges and
At

may just be
standing there, without anyone appreciating its military value. It is only when
a belligerent party calculates of what value the bridge could be to the enemy at
railroads.

a certain juncture in the course of hostilities a bridge

a later stage that

it

dawns on

thing to eliminate the

military

commanders

that they'd better

do some-

The issue is not always destruction or capture: neuthe enemy is another form of military advantage.

risk.

tralization of a bridge to

The momentous significance of some bridges should be manifest to all
when it is borne in mind that World War II may have been prolonged by some
six

months only because of a

British failure to capture a crucial bridge

And

on the

added that, had not the US
Army captured intact the rail bridge at Remagen, the issue of the crossing of
the Rhine might possibly have plagued the Allies a lot longer than it did.

Rhine

("a bridge too far")

.

it

may

What is true of bridges may also be
the Battle of

Normandy

as well be

true of railroads.

The Panzer divisions in

fought superbly. But since the

rail

system had been

paralyzed by Allied bombings, the Panzers had to reach the frontline

times from the other side of France

—on

their

own

—some-

power. This took a long

up to two weeks), denying the Germans the opportunity
to stop the Allied forces at the beaches. Moreover, by the time that the German armored units arrived at the frontline, they were (1) out of fuel, (2) in
dire need of repair of many machines (while lacking the facilities to undertake
the repair), and (3) the crews were tired and in some instances expecting defeat. In all, the dramatic Allied victory in June 1944 probably owes more to the
systematic bombings of the French railroads than to the actual matching of
time

(in

some

cases,

tanks against tanks.

"DuaLPurpose" Targets

Yoram Dinstein:

A question was posed to me about "dual purpose" targets.
I

nor in any other

know where

am

not enam-

my paper. It appears neither in ProLOAC instrument that I am familiar with. I do not

ored of this phrase and have not used
tocol

I

it

in

"dual use" comes from, and can only surmise that
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it

has
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human rights (rather than
of my knowledge, references to

penetrated the lingo through articles published by

law of armed conflicts) scholars.

To

the best

"dual use" started with ill-founded criticisms of coalition bombings of the
electric grid in Iraq in 1991. Since the electric grid in Iraq

grated, attacks against

mendous
erating,

etc.),

—and

advantage

military

computers,

it

its

installations

(shutting

filtering facilities

totally inte-

resulted not only in a tre-

down

but also extensive damage to

water pumping and

—

was

radar

civilians: hospitals

came

military

stations,

stopped op-

From

to a standstill, etc.

legal viewpoint, a "dual use" of Iraq's electric grid did

not

alter its singular

a

and

unequivocal status as a military objective. There was, as usual with military

where collateral damage to civilians is concerned. But the extensive damage to civilians was not excessive in
relation to the military advantage anticipated. What was true of Iraq is
objectives, the question of proportionality

equally true of Kosovo.

is

One has to constantly bear in mind that war is war; not a chess game. There
always a price-tag in human suffering. Admittedly, Kosovo is not a very apinasmuch

propriate backdrop for such a point to be made,

ducted on

NATO's

as the

war was con-

on the assumption of zero casualties (although that
meant zero casualties to NATO). In any event, no serious war can be founded
on such an assumption. Some wars are more unfortunate than others in terms
part

of actual bloodshed, but in the long run civilian suffering cannot be utterly
avoided.

John Murphy mentioned that in present-day wars it may paradoxically be
safer to be a combatant than a civilian. This shocking truth has become a governing factor of

modern

Earlier, the situation

hostilities

was entirely

only since the outbreak of World
different.

As

late as

World War

Western Front at least, civilian casualties were mild while
of young combatants was destroyed in the trenches.

The
totally

I,

unacceptable.

must

Anyone even

strive to bring

II.

in the

whole generation

current disproportion of the civilian/combatant ratio of casualties

tarian law

is

mildly interested in international humani-

about a better world in which

war are minimized. Nevertheless, the
alties,

a

War

realistic goal

not to eliminate them altogether. There

is

is

civilized losses in

to minimize civilian casu-

no way

to eliminate civilian

deaths and injuries due to legitimate collateral damage, mistake, accident and
just sheer

bad luck.
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Targeting Regime Elites

John Norton Moore:
As we seek to stop aggressive war and to end the all too frequent slaughter
of civilian populations as we saw in Bosnia and had begun to see in Kosovo be-

NATO intervention, there has been increasing theoretical interest in

fore the

the focusing of deterrents, including intra-war deterrents,

who were

ordering the aggressive war or the genocide in the

that observation,

who would

have a couple of questions

I

like to

respond.

First,

did

for

laws of war constrain
if

NATO

place.

From

any member of the panel

henchmen? Second,

any way from targeting the regime

did the

elites in

NATO had wanted to do so? And third, if there were any such condo you believe that

straints,

in

first

elites

NATO in fact consider that in relation

to targeting Milosevic or his assets or his principal

Serbia

on the regime

it is

necessary to modify the law of war to permit

the kinds of targeting of assets of regime elites or at least those that are ordering the continuation of such wars?
straints

if

And

if so,

what kinds of constraints or

re-

any would you put on them?

Michael Bothe:
Well,

cannot of course comment on what

I

respect were, as these were not privy to me.

cerned, targeting the elite
ters
If

is

NATO considerations in this

As

the law of war

is

con-

perhaps not the right term in this respect.

It

mat-

far as

whether the persons in question are combatants or military commanders.

the president happens to be the military

he or she can

be targeted. If not, no. This

commander,
is

as said earlier today,

of course a certain constraint.

I

would not like to see the laws of
war modified in this respect because that would really open the door to do
away with the distinction which I think is a healthy one.
think

it is

Robert

We
view

is

F.

a healthy constraint if you ask

I

Turner:

are trying to distinguish jus ad bellum
(at least

when you're

You

and

jus in bello,

but the modern

dealing within the setting of aggression) that the

prevailing responsibility of States

is

not to be neutral but to be in opposition to

you are not supposed to be
favor of the aggressor. If you are in a setting where international law allows

aggression.
in

me.

are not obliged to send troops, but

the use of lethal force in self-defense or collective self-defense in response to

the aggression, then the question becomes not are you assassinating a leader,

which

is

by definition murder, but rather which target do you use lethal force

against. If

one of your choices in your best professional judgment
220

is

that

we

Discussion

can stop this aggression by taking out the head aggressor, the head war crimieven if he doesn't wear a uniform, but is the person who made the decinal

—

sion to

commit the

aggressive act

—

are

you saying that

it is

in every instance

we would rather slaughter twenty or thirty thousand soldiers out on the field who may have had nothing to do with the policy and may
have had no chance of going to Canada? Saddam Hussein, for example, was
preferable to say no,

rough on

when you

How do you

his deserters.

say

better to

it is

deal with the doctrine of proportionality

kill thirty

danger the key war criminal

who

thousand innocent soldiers than to en-

started the entire attack?

Does

that

change

anybody's attitude?

Wolff H. von Heinegg:

What you just asked only at first glance seems to be logical, because it does
not matter. What the law of armed conflict has achieved from 1977 and beyond

is

something that we should not underestimate. There

is

the principle of

distinction not only with regard to targeting, but also with regard to the ques-

between combatants and noncombatants. So if there is a
person that is not a combatant, a noncombatant I must say, then this person
may not be attacked period. It doesn't matter whether this decision will lead
to twenty thousand deaths in the field, because those who are dying in the
tion of distinction

—

field or in

They

the air or in the sea are combatants.

are legitimate military

targets.
If

we

what
you ac-

are trying to modify the existing law by such considerations, then

we have achieved

until

now

will

be destroyed very

formed. Suddenly

somebody

it

else (like

hello,

the jus in hello

doesn't depend only

Her

on the

as

lessened.

is

It is

question

being de-

parties to the conflict, but

on

Majesty's government, for example) to determine

whether certain measures taken during armed
conflict are legal or not

As soon

when it comes to the

cept that jus ad bellum considerations play a role
of applicability of the jus in

easily.

under the laws of war.

conflict by the parties to the
I

laws of war and leave the law of armed conflict as

say

we must

it is

rather leave the

with the principle of dis-

between combatants and noncombatants and not modify
considerations taken from outside the law of armed conflict.
tinction

it

with any

Robert F. Turner:

The concept
person's

life

of the noncombatant was one of innocence.

It

was that

this

has no effect on the outcome of the war, and therefore they

should not be harmed.

If

you trace the history of the law or the rule that says

you cannot touch the other guy's king, Vattel and Grotius and others point
221

Discussion

out this

made

is

an agreement that the leaders
own safety in an era where waging aggressive war was

not the logical rule of law. This

to protect their

the sovereign prerogative of kings.

moved on

to

make waging

What

aggressive

is

I

am

saying

war a war crime,

now that we have
why do we still decide
is

an innocent party who should be given the same
protection as a Red Cross worker at the expense of all these young kids that
get sent out there and slaughtered?
that the head war criminal

is

Harvey Dalton:

The study that Judith Miller cited

morning did conclude that there was
an effort to impose pressure on the elites of Yugoslavia so as to have them impose pressure on Milosevic to terminate the conflict. That was done by target'
ing military-industrial plants and facilities owned or run by these elites and, as
Ms Miller mentioned this morning, the Rand Study found that that was in fact
more effective than the attacks on the military objectives. Now that is a very
disturbing conclusion. I think it is very disturbing, because I do think the laws
of armed conflict still apply. At least from our standpoint in targeting and approving these targets, there had to be a very clear military link between these
industrial facilities and the war effort. We required that, but the pressure later
on may be otherwise.
this

John Norton Moore:
I

think this does raise some very important questions because

have and

all

that

we do and

all

that

we should do

all

that

in the law of war, as in

other area of law, needs to serve a variety of important goals.

we
any

We are trying to

serve the humanitarian goals of preventing aggressive war, of minimizing casu-

and preventing genocide. If, in fact, we discover as a significant body of
newer information such as the Rand study is suggesting that a focus on regime
elites, including the head of the State if necessary, is more effective than a variety of other applications, then it seems to me that is something that deserves
alties

very careful consideration.
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PART IV
COLLATERAL DAMAGE

Introduction

John Norton Moore

W;

e

have a distinguished panel of experts addressing

issues associated

with collateral damage. That general rubric would include issues

that are dealt with in Protocol

tacks

on otherwise lawful

I,

referred to as excessive civilian

targets,

and

damage

in at-

issues regarding feasible precautions in

attacking.
I

have three brief points that

the panelists.

The

first is

I

would

like to

for us to consider just

put before us before turning to

how

far

we have come

in rela-

tion to the systematic inclusion of the laws of war in military operations

and

to

moment on the creation of the field called operational law in the
United States. As I think everyone in this room knows full well, the United
reflect for a

US

had a sorry experience in Vietnam.
When the war was over and we looked back and sought to look at the lessons
learned about Vietnam, a number of things emerged that were very important
in relation to the laws of war. The first of those is that we had not trained as
adequately in the laws of war as we should have. The result was a My Lai
which had enormous cost for the United States in that war. We also found
that one of the problems was a series of areas of advice given and constraints
placed on the United States military ostensibly designed for ethical and law of
war reasons, but in fact uninformed about proper targeting and correct operation of the law of war. The result was a series of inhibitions that were not required by the law of war and which dramatically stretched out the war and
perhaps in the end cost the United States the war in Vietnam.
States and particularly the

military

After Vietnam there was a review, led for the most part by the

US

military,

that said in effect "We're going to have to in the future have a cadre of people
that are extraordinarily well trained in the law of

war so that we won't be

Introduction

making the mistakes on either side of this equation
hibiting targeting that

is

—

either unnecessarily pro-

essential for warfighting, or

on the other hand not

controlling activities that are violations of the laws of war."

The

result has

been an extraordinary input of good legal advice regarding US military activities. Indeed I think we can say that the first real test of this came during the
Gulf War in which we saw extremely careful vetting of virtually every target
with equal emphasis on both sides of the equation

—permitting

effective

on the one hand, and on the other hand preventing problems that
could be serious humanitarian violations that would undermine the war effort.
warfighting

seems to

It

me

that the

same thing has happened again

put this in perspective, the real starting point

been

campaign

a military

sues than in the Gulf War

in the history of the world that has

and again

in the

As we

to notice that there has never

input and consideration of targeting, proportionality and

ful

is

is

in Kosovo.

had such a care-

all

of the other

is-

Kosovo operation under NATO.

It

a sea change.

My second

point

that while this colloquium

is

is

quite properly focused

on

NATO campaign in Kosovo, let us at least re—quite apart from NATO activities—a very seri-

the issue of lessons from the

mind ourselves

that there

is

ous enforcement problem in relation to massive noncompliance with the laws
of war by the opponents that

we were

facing.

We

can go

all

the

way back

to

Vietnam and the massive violations of the laws of war by North Vietnam, not
unintended by the government as in the case of My Lai, which was carried out
by an out-of-control second lieutenant who was poorly trained. We saw the
same problem in Bosnia with the slaughter of people in that conflict. We saw
it in Kosovo, and we saw it in Rwanda. It has not gone away. It is still with us
in the modern world. So one of the jobs for us as academics and members of
the government and those that are interested seriously in humanitarian law is
never to forget that we have a fundamental enforcement problem in relation
to the

non-democratic governments that are

and other massive

cide

The

third

and

us that as with

final

all

this

committing democide, geno-

insults in relation to the laws of war.

context point

law, the laws of

They must be judged

still

in the

I

would

like to

make

all

simply to remind

war are intended to serve important

end by their effectiveness

context of the laws of war,

is

of us

know

goals.

in serving those goals. In

that there

is

in fact a careful bal-

ance that has to be met. For a variety of ethical, moral and other reasons we

want

to

make

sure that

we

protect against unnecessary and excessive damage.

All of us are very aware of principles of discrimination, of proportionality, of

avoidance of unnecessary suffering and other important principles of the laws
of war that lead in that direction. Let

me
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just suggest that there

is

another

Introduction

critical

reason for democracies to support such laws. That

is

for

democracies

it

comply with humanitarian objectives in wartime. To fail
to do that has extraordinary cost for the democracies and the entire political-military effort. If we learned anything from the Vietnam context, it is the
great importance of democracies fighting wars in strict compliance with huis

essential that they

manitarian objectives.

There is another consideration that makes the issue far more complex and
far more difficult because we also learned in the Vietnam context that excessive constraints can be highly costly. If all we had was the one side of the equation, it would be tempting simply to say that we can always keep placing more
and more constraints on the warfighting effort. Unfortunately we know in the
real world that if we place too many constraints on that effort it will have costs
that will undermine the very goals that we seek to support through the laws of
war. We can endanger our own military when we have constraints that are too
great. In addition, we may end up prolonging the war
mitigating the shock
value necessary to promptly end the conflict
and as a consequence end up
with many, many more combatants and civilians killed than if the war had
been properly fought and ended at an early time.

—

—

was the Counselor on International Law to the US Department of State
during the Vietnam War and I witnessed with great interest what happened
I

in a three-week period

when

the President of the United States, President

—

war the proper way not by violating
the laws of war or engaging in carpet bombing or anything of that sort
but
instead by doing what the Joint Chiefs had suggested that he do many years
before. He simply mined Haiphong Harbor, which as far as I know had zero
casualties on all sides but suddenly prevented 90% to 95% of all the importation of war supplies into North Vietnam. In addition to that, he carried out
the "Christmas" bombing, which was not an area bombing of Hanoi or
Haiphong, but was instead a careful attack on rail lines in the Hanoi area.
The result was North Vietnam came to the table for the first time in the entire history of the war seriously seeking the end of the war. Within three
weeks, the Paris accords were agreed and the United States decided the war
was over and came home. The point is this could have been done at any point
in the preceding years of the war and casualties on all sides would have been
Nixon, suddenly decided to

fight the

—

reduced very dramatically.

There
point

if

is

yet another problem

if

the constraints are too excessive.

At some

the cost of war fighting by the democracies in resisting aggression,

genocide and democide

is

from undertaking those

efforts.

too high,

we

will in fact

That of course
227

discourage the democracies

in the

end

is

what happened

in

Introduction

Vietnam when the United States finally came home. The other party then
simply had a regular army invasion of the south and the result was a blood'
bath, which we now know resulted in at least one hundred thousand killed in
the south, a million boat people, with a half million dying at sea, and somewhere between one and three million dying in Cambodia. So what we do in
relation to advice on the laws of war is important in terms of the real world
and real human lives and real effectiveness in preventing aggression, stopping aggression and in fact stopping genocide as well. I simply place these
points in front of you as context as we move forward to our discussion on collateral

damage.
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Some Legal (And A Few Ethical)
Dimensions Of The Collateral Damage
Resulting From NATO's Kosovo Campaign
John

F.

Murphy

Introduction

A

ny analysis of the
should

first

is

dimensions of

NATO's Kosovo campaign

between the jus ad helium, the law of resort to
and the jus in hello, the law regulating the way the armed

distinguish

the use of armed force,

force

legal

employed, of that conflict.

rating the jus ad helium

and jus

To be

no "Chinese wall" sepaof the Kosovo campaign. For ex-

sure, there

in hello aspects

is

ample, assuming arguendo, as some have argued,

1

that international law

recognizes a doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and this doctrine serves as

NATO's

a justification for

resort to

armed

force in the

Kosovo campaign,

it is

arguable that the military action undertaken must be designed to prevent the

humanitarian catastrophe unfolding. 2 Nonetheless, the focus of

this

paper

is

not the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the bombing to prevent or minimize
Serbian "ethnic cleansing" or other war crimes in Kosovo. Rather,
collateral

damage

it is

on the

to civilians caused by this bombing.

According to the organizers of

this

colloquium, this panel

is

to address in

particular the following issues:
*

The author would

and Andrew Kenis,
1.

See, e.g.,

like to

thank Kevin Jarboe, a graduate of Villanova University School of Law

a third year student at the

Michael Glennon, The

Law School, for research and assistance on this paper.

New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law,

78 Foreign Affairs 2 (May-June 1999).
2.

I

have so argued

in

my

chapter on Kosovo Agonistes,

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES (Chi Carmody,

in

TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON

Yuji Iwasawa, and Sylvia

Rhodes

eds., 2002).

Legal and Ethical Dimensions of Collateral

(1)

Damage

Does the use of precision- guided munitions (so-called "smart bombs")
lead to a duty to use those types of weapons exclusively in future
conflicts?

(2) If so,

does

legal

it

mean

that two adversaries

may be

and ethical regimes, dependent on

subjected to differing
level of

their relative

technological sophistication?

(3)

What

degree of injury and damage to civilians can be regarded as

and consequently disproportionate,

excessive,

as

compared

to the

military advantage gained?

(4)

What

and

are the legal

efforts to

minimize

its

ethical implications of

NATO's

apparent

own combat

bombing and avoidance of

a

casualties through high-altitude
ground campaign, and did this greatly

increase the risk of civilian casualties?

Each of these

issues,

along with issues related thereto, will be addressed

seriatim in this paper.

Precision-Guided Munitions and International

Law

Before turning to the issue of whether international law does or should require the use of precision-guided munitions in future conflicts,

few terms. The

fine a

US

we need

to de-

Department of Defense defines precision-guided

munitions as "a weapon that uses a seeker to detect electromagnetic energy
reflected

from a target or reference point, and through processing, provides

guidance

commands

get."

3

to a control system that guides the

weapon

Like Stuart Belt, in his extensive treatment of the subject,

to the tar4

this

paper

does not discuss the use of air-to-air missiles, because they normally do not

produce collateral damage. Rather, the focus of the paper

is

on air-to-ground

munitions. Again like Belt, this paper does not distinguish between smart, accurate, or precision

weapons but instead groups them together

guided weapons.

does distinguish the precision-guided weapon from an

It

as precision-

Weapons, available at http://www.dtic.mi1/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/ 04864.html,
in Stuart Belt, Missiles Over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of
a Customary Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL LAW
3.

Precision

last visited

REVIEW
4. Belt,

Dec. 27, 1999, and quoted

115, 118(2000).

supra note 3, at 118.
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unguided weapon by noting that the former has some type of
ance system. This
so-called

Paveway

in-flight

guidance system may or

series of

weapons,

for

in-flight guid-

may not be powered. The

example, are laser guided. 5 For a de-

tailed discussion of various kinds of precision-guided munitions, the reader

should consult Belt's

article.

In his article, Belt notes that

US

military operations or US-led military op-

erations have seen a dramatic increase in the use of precision-guided munitions

from the "opening salvo of Operation Desert Storm" to the "closing shot

of Kosovo" 6

—

Between the Desert Storm
and Kosovo campaigns, Belt points out, there was Operation Desert Fox, an
intensive four-day US bombing campaign against Iraq, with the stated goal
"to degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors." 7 According to
Belt, Operation Desert Fox offered the US military an opportunity to "battle8
test some new smart weapons and reaffirm lessons learned in Desert Storm."
Belt quotes David Isby, writing for Jane's Missiles and Rockets, who reportedly stated: "Operation Desert Fox was the largest air offensive to be waged
largely with guided weapons rather than 'dumb' munitions that [had] predominated in all previous major offensive uses of air power, including the
1991 Gulf War." 9
As elaborately detailed by Belt, there seems to be no question that the
United States has made increasingly heavy use of precision-guided munitions
in recent military operations. Whether it now has an obligation under international law to do so in future conflicts is the issue to which we now turn.
a five-fold increase to be precise.

Does International Law Now Require the Use of Precision~Guided
Munitions in Future Conflicts?
It is

clear that there

is

no requirement under international law

sion-guided munitions be used exclusively in future conflicts.

that preci-

A strong advo-

cate of the use of precision-guided munitions, Belt admits that they have their
limitations:

5. Id. at

118-19.
126.

6.

Id. at

7.

Statement by President William Clinton, quoted by Richard Newman, in Bombs over Baghdad,

U.S.

NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,

8.

Belt, supra

9.

David

ROCKETS

note

Dec. 28, 1998, at 32,

cited in id. at

131 n.108.

3, at 131.

Isby, Cruise Missiles

(1999), cited in

id.

at

Flew Half
132

the Desert

n.l 10.
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Fox

Strike Missions,

JANE'S MISSILES

AND

Legal and Ethical Dimensions of Collateral

The

Damage

function of the precision-guided weapon, however, has

its

limitations.

There are limitations on its efficacy and missions that are clearly better suited
for mass bombing. Large maneuvering units in the field are excellent targets for
unguided, gravity bombs (carpet bombing) and much less so for
precision-guided weapons. Not only does the carpet -bombing produce favorable
psychological impact, but also the number of precision-guided weapons
required to hit the large number of open field targets would be prohibitively
expensive. This idea was confirmed by W. Hays Parks, who concluded that
B-52s were the right platform to use because they were able to drop a large
number of bombs into an area where no protected objects existed and where
Iraqi troops were entrenched in the desert and difficult to attack. In essence, the
use of precision-guided weapons and that of unguided, en masse bombs have a
complementary role. Precision-guided weapons are particularly useful against
strategic targets that often times have a locus near heavily populated civilian
areas whereas en masse bombing is useful for targets where the goal is
widespread damage and the demoralization of troops. This was the practice
during Operation Desert Storm. 10
Accordingly, the issue should be restated as whether there

is

an obligation

under international law to use precision-guided munitions in attacks on urban
areas. Belt

At

is

of the opinion that there

is.

the risk of oversimplification, one

may

say that treaties and norms of

customary international law are the primary sources of international law, as

Court of Justice. 11 Both sources
in the law of armed conflict. We begin with norms of

reflected in the Statute of the International

have played a major

role

customary international law.

Id. at

10.

130.

11. Article

38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3

Bevans 1179, provides:
1

.

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes

as are submitted to
(a)

it,

shall apply:

international conventions,

whether general or

particular,

establishing

rules

expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b)

international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

(c)

the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

(d) subject to provisions

no binding

of article 59 [which states that "The decision of the Court has

between the parties and in respect of that particular case"],
and the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.
force except

judicial decisions

nations, as
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A. Customary International
Parenthetically,

it

should be noted that the basic concept of customary

ternational law has recently

gone so
that as

Law
come under

far as to call for its elimination as

it

in-

and one commentator has
a source of international law. 12 Be

attack,

may, the law of armed conflict has long recognized the importance of

customary international law through the so-called "Martens Clause," which

Hague Conventions on

appears in the preambles to both the 1899 and 1907

Laws and Customs of War on Land, as well as in Article 1 (2) of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and which
provides in pertinent part: "In cases not included in the Regulations

.

.

.

the in-

habitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of the law of nations, as they result

among

civilized peoples,

public conscience."
"it

13

war

at

take

from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the

The

contains a built-in

from the usages established

practical significance of the

mechanism

any particular time."

on added importance

14

to

fill

Martens Clause

is

that

in the lacunae existing in the law of

For the United States, the Martens Clause may

at the present time, since

it is

not a party to either

of the 1977 Additional Protocols.

The

classic description of the process of creating

customary international

O. Hudson, a Judge on the International Court of Justice
and an eminent authority on international law. According to Hudson, the essential elements of the customary international law process include:
law

is

1.

that of Manley

concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of
situation falling within the

2.

domain of international

relations;

continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of
time;

3.

conception that the practice
international law;

4.

is

required by, or consistent with, prevailing

and

general acquiescence in the practice by other States. 15

The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
International Law 449 (2000).
13. For a brief discussion of the Martens Clause, see Howard Levie, The Laws of War and
Neutrality, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 307 (John Moore, Frederick Tipson, and Robert
Turner eds., 1990).
14. Edward Kwakwa, The International Law of armed Conflict: Personal and
12.

J.

Patrick Kelly,

Material Fields of Application

12 (1992).

Manley Hudson, [19501 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/Ser. A/1950/Add.l.
15.
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There is general agreement that the first, third and fourth of Hudson's elements are the most crucial under modern approaches to the customary international law process. At the same time, however, each of these three elements
has been subject to critical scrutiny and debate.
There is, for example, no agreement on what constitutes State practice. 16
The US Department of State emphasizes the acts of governments but not UN
resolutions. This approach supports the claims of States, such as the United
States, with strong centralized governments. In contrast, some scholars and
less powerful States would include as State practice normative statements in
drafts of the International Law Commission, resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, and recitals in international instruments. 17
Hudson's requirements that States engage in a practice with an understanding that

it is

required by, or consistent with, prevailing international law

and that there be general acquiescence in the practice by other States raises
the complex issue of opinio juris, which is the general acceptance of a norm as a
legal obligation by the world community. The concept of opinio juris introduces a subjective element in the customary international law process because
it requires that States when engaging in or refraining from a particular practice
do so under an understanding that they have a legal right to engage in the
practice or a legal obligation to refrain from engaging in the practice.

With

respect to the methodological problem of determining opinio juris

Professor

Anthony D'Amato has suggested

of opinio

an objective claim of

juris,

that, as a

legality

y

requirement for a finding

be articulated in advance

of,

or

concurrently with, the State practice allegedly required or permitted by cus-

tomary international law. 18 Interestingly, under D'Amato's approach, the
ulation of a claim of legality could be
writer, or a court.

19

To

made

either by a State, a recognized

others, however, this "'claims approach' defines

the requirement of the normative conviction of the community."

D'Amato concedes

that

it is

not possible to determine

are conscious of any international obligation.

artic-

if

20

away

Moreover,

a majority of States

21

Other commentators would dismiss or at least minimize the importance of
an articulation of a claim of legality on the ground that the "best evidence of

16.

See Kelly, supra note 12, at 500-07.

17.

Id. at

18.

ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM

501.

(1971).
19.

Id.

20.

See, e.g., Kelly, supra

21.

D'AMATO,

note 12, at 479.

supra note 18, at 82-85.
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opinio juris

is

actual practice consistently and generally followed." 22 According

to this view, a record of consistent

and widespread practice

raises strong infer-

ences of opinio juris without need of further evidence. Before turning to a consideration of

whether customary international law requires the use of

on urban or other highly popumind a famous statement of the

precision-guided munitions in aerial attacks
lated areas,

it

may be

appropriate to keep in

Permanent Court of International Justice

in the Lotus case:

International law governs relations between independent States.

law binding upon States therefore emanate from their

The

rules of

own free will as expressed

in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law

and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.
Restrictions on the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed. 23

Although the Lotus case has been "strongly criticized for its 'extreme positivism' and especially for asserting that restrictions on the freedom of states
cannot be presumed," 24 it has never been repudiated by the International
Court of Justice. Moreover, its positivist approach may be particularly well
suited to issues of the law of armed conflict, which, by their very nature, implicate the vital interests of States.

Let us turn then to State practice regarding the use of precision-guided
nitions.

As noted

previously, the United States has

made

mu-

increasingly heavy

weapons in aerial attacks on targets in urban or other heavily
populated areas, and this was especially the case in the Kosovo campaign.
What is less clear is the extent to which other States have made use of precisionguided weapons in armed conflict. Belt reports that more than 34 countries
are using or have access to the Paveway laser guided bomb series and gives
other examples of precision-guided weapons used by various countries. 25 His
study is extremely thin, however, on the extent of actual use by countries of
precision weapons in armed conflict. On the contrary, Belt admits that Russia
has made relatively little use of precision weapons in Chechnya, although he
attempts to explain this away by noting that there has been some Russian use
of such weapons in the conflict and that Russia has never asserted the right to
use of precision

22.

Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom,

PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN
23.

The

24.

Louis Henkin et al, International

25.

Belt, supra

S.S. Lotus (Fr v. Turk.), P.C.I.J. (Ser.

note

in

INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF

HONOR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 7 17, 731

3, at

A) No.

Law

125.
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(YoramDinsteined., 1989).

10, at 18 (Sep. 7).
(

3d

ed., 1993).
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use non-precision

bombs

Damage

indiscriminately near civilian areas. 26

The

limited

evidence of use of precision-guided munitions to date would seem to indicate

an absence of any widespread State practice. Significantly, the International
Court of Justice has stated that: "Although the passage of only a short period
of time

is

not necessarily ... a bar to the formulation of a

ary international law

.

.

.

State practice

.

.

.

new

rule of

custom-

should have been both extensive

," 27

and virtually uniform.
Assuming arguendo the existence of sufficient State practice to support the
existence of a norm of customary international law requiring the use of precision weapons in attacks on urban or other heavily populated areas, even Belt
admits that the "harder issue" is whether opinio juris is present. 28 In his attempt
.

.

to prove the existence of opinio juris, Belt cites statements by

US

officials or

US government documents that confirm the US desire to conGulf War in a manner consistent with international legal obligations

statements in

duct the

armed conflict principle
or discrimination that commanders and others planning an at-

or that recognize the long-standing customary law of

of distinction

tack take

all

possible feasible steps, consistent with allowable risk to aircraft

and aircrews, to minimize the risk of injury to noncombatants. 29 He fails to
cite any statements by US officials regarding the Gulf War, Desert Fox, or
Kosovo campaigns that in any way recognize a legal obligation to use precision-guided munitions. To be sure, with respect to the Kosovo campaign, Belt
is able to quote Lord Robertson, who, when serving as NATO SecretaryGeneral, said that "international law and public opinion" required the use of
precision weapons in the Kosovo campaign. 30 With respect, this appears to be
a weak reed upon which to lean.

26. Id. at 161.
27.

North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v.Den./F.R.G. v.Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.

28.

Belt, supra

29.

Id. at

note

3,

43 (Feb. 20).

3, at 163.

163-64. Belt quotes from a study of the Gulf War commissioned by the Department of

Defense that concluded:
Coalition forces took several steps to minimize the risk of injury to noncombatants.

To

the degree possible and consistent with allowable risk to aircraft and aircrews, aircraft

and munitions were selected so that attacks on

targets within populated areas

would

provide the greatest possible accuracy and the least risk to civilian objects and the
civilian population.

30.

Vago Muradian,

DAILY, Dec.

8,

Robertson: Europe

Must Spend More Wisely

1999, at 6, quoted and cited in

id.

to

at 165 nn.294, 295.
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B. Treaties

and Conventions

A major problem one

faces in analyzing treaty law to determine

whether

the United States has an international obligation to use precision weapons
that the United States

is

not a party to Additional Protocol

major treaty on the law of armed

the most recent

Nonetheless, in the section of his

ar-

discussing the relevance of treaty law to precision weapons, Belt focuses

ticle

his

conflict.

I,

is

primary attention on Protocol

I.

Obviously, for the United States, Protocol

I

would be apposite only if its relevant provisions represent a codification of
customary international law. Belt appears to assume sub silentio that they do, a
highly debatable proposition, as
ever,

we need

examine

to

United States has

briefly

is

some

treaties

how-

and conventions that the

1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws

and Customs of War on Land 31
tion

shall see. Before turning to this issue,

ratified.

A primary premise of the
of injuring the

we

enemy

is

is

means
Although the 1907 Hague Conven-

that "the right of belligerents to adopt

not unlimited."

32

a relatively (for the time) comprehensive codification of laws governing

land warfare, Articles 25 and 27 apply as well to aerial bombardment. 33 Article
25 provides that "the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings

which are undefended

is

prohibited." Article

27 states that
In sieges and

bombardments

all

necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as

possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes,

historic

monuments,

hospitals,

and places where the

collected, provided they are not being used at the

sick and wounded are
same time for military

purposes.

Hague Convention IX of 1907 Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War 34 built upon and improved the
For

31.

36

part, Article 2 of

its

(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 69 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds.,

Hague Convention
Stat. 2277,

3d. ed. 2000).
32.

Id., art.

33.

Much

22.

of this discussion of the 1907

Hague Convention draws from Danielle

Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; But

is

Infeld,

a Country

Obligated to use Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage?, 26

George Washington Journal of International Law

& Economics

109 (1992). Ms.

on the magisterial examination of applicable law in W. Hays Parks,
Air War and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 1 (1990).
34. Hague Convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct.
Infeld in turn relies heavily

18, 1907,

26

Stat. 2351,

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
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approach taken by Hague Convention IV in that

damage

"identified particular mili-

be attacked, and recognized the inevitability of collat-

tary objects that could
eral

it

Damage

in the execution of such attacks." 35 In addition, Article 2

explicitly absolved the attacker of responsibility for "unavoidable" collateral

from the attack of such military objects. 36 Also, as Hays
Parks has noted, these and other provisions in the two Hague Conventions

damage

resulting

placed primary responsibility for collateral damage on the defender because

had the superior

ability to control the civilian population.

37

it

The civilian popu-

remove itself from
an indiscriminate attack would the com-

lation itself also had, to the extent possible, to take steps to

the conflict.

Only

if

he engaged in

mander be responsible

for collateral

damage. In Parks' view, "responsibility

avoidance of collateral civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects ...
shared obligation of the attacker, defender, and the civilian population."

for
is

a

38

This "shared obligation" approach continued under subsequent treaty de-

velopments in the law of armed

Geneva ConvenTime of War (Geneva

conflict. In particular, the

tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in

Convention IV) 39 defines a person protected by the Convention as anyone
who, during a conflict or occupation, is "in the hands of a Party to the conflict
or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals." 40 Any person suspected
of, or engaged in, activities hostile to the security of the State will not be afforded protection as a civilian. 41 For their part, States are required to take
steps to ensure that their private citizens

that could endanger innocent civilians.

According to Hays Parks, however,

do not take part in

this tradition of

broken with the adoption of Additional Protocol

I.

way

shared obligation was

In a lengthy exegesis of the

Protocol, especially Articles 48 through 58, the articles
to

hostilities in a

42

most

directly relating

combat operations, Parks demonstrates that these provisions

shift

the

35. Parks, supra note 33, at 17.
36.

The second paragraph

"incurs

no

Hague Convention IX provides that the commander
any unavoidable damage which may be caused by a bombardment

of Article 2 of

responsibility for

under such circumstances."
37.

Parks, supra note 33, at 28-29.

38. Id.
39.

Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons

1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75

U.NT.S.

287,

Id., art. 4.

41.

Id., art. 5.

Geneva, Aug.

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 31,

301.
40.

in Time of War,

42. Parks, supra note 33, at 118.
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responsibility for the protection of the civilian population

fender almost exclusively to the attacker.

43

He

away from the de-

concludes:

Customary international law requires that an attacker exercise ordinary care

in

the attack of military objectives located near the civilian population, to

minimize injury to individual civilians or the civilian population as such
incidental to the attack.

The

an equal
and the civilian population as such

defender's responsibility

degree of care to separate individual civilians

is

to exercise

from the vicinity of military objectives. Where a defender purposely places
military objectives in the vicinity of the civilian population or places civilians in

proximity to military objectives, in either case for the purpose of shielding

from attack, an attacker is not relieved from his obligation to
exercise ordinary care. Responsibility for death or injury resulting from the
illegal action of the defender lies with the defender, however. The language of
particularly as it has been interpreted by the ICRC and many of the
Protocol I
military objectives

—

known

Conference as the Group of
77 casts doubt upon whether the limited credibility of the law of war relating
to war-fighting per se will survive any serious challenge. 44

nations

—

in the course of the Diplomatic

Interestingly, in his discussion of relevant provisions of Protocol

I,

Belt does not

acknowledge, in text or footnotes, Parks' critique or that dissatisfaction with
Articles 48 to 58
tocol.

45

was a primary reason

for the

US decision not to ratify the Pro-

Nonetheless, he concludes that

The language

was not specific enough, either in form or from a
review of travaux preparatories, to mandate the exclusive use of precision-guided
munitions (PGMs) in urban areas. Therefore, even if it were declaratory of
customary international law norms at the time of its signing in 1977, it would
in Protocol

I

not be dispositive as to use of PGMs. 46

Accordingly, Belt and Parks appear to be in agreement that treaty law does

not require the use of precision-guided munitions in future conflicts. They
agree

43.

as

Id. at

dis-

whether customary international law requires the use of

to

112-202.

44. Id. at 168.
45.

Belt, supra

note

to ratify Protocol

I,

3, at

145-5 1. For other commentary on why the United States decided not

see Michael Matheson, Session One:

The United

States Position

on

the Relation

Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2
American University Journal of International Law & Policy 419 (1987); Abraham

of Customary International

Sofaer, Agora:
Protections of

46.

The U.S. Decision Not

War Victims,

Belt, supra

note

3, at

82

to Ratify Protocol I to the

Geneva Conventions on

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 784

167.
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(1988).
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on urban

precision-guided weapons in attacks
Belt, as

we have

seen, believes that

with Danielle Infeld that
pressed

it

it

Damage

or other highly populated areas.

does. Parks has indicated that he agrees

does not. 47 Previously in

this paper,

have ex-

I

my agreement with the Parks/Infeld position as to the lex lata

law). Still to be considered, however,

is

(existing

whether the Belt position has merit

as

a lex ferenda (law in formation) proposition.

C. Should International

Law

Require the Use of Precision-guided Munitions in

Urban or Other Highly Populated Areas?
There seems to be little disagreement that, as a policy matter, precisionguided weapons should normally be used in aerial attacks on urban or other
highly populated areas. Under many, perhaps most, circumstances, there is a
happy congruence between the needs of military efficiency and the avoidance
of unnecessary injury to civilian persons or property. 48 That is, the use of
precision-guided weapons will more thoroughly destroy the target, while
avoiding or minimizing collateral damage, than will so-called "dumb" bombs.
In such cases, the attack is being conducted in complete accord with Article
57(2) (a) (iii) of Additional Protocol I, which requires commanders and others
planning an attack to "take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects." The problem is that in some circumstances this happy congruence is
not present.
Belt admits that precision-guided

weapons

are not suitable for

all

circum-

49

and indeed cites Hays Parks in acknowledging this fact. His acknowledgment, however, appears to be limited to attacks on targets far from
heavily populated areas, such as large maneuvering units in the field. In constances,

trast,

Parks has discussed in detail several circumstances

when

precision-guided weapons might not be suitable, even in attacks

populated

areas.

50

These circumstances include, in

weather conditions, technological malfunction,

the use of

on highly

particular,

human

error,

adverse

or heavy

which decreases the accuracy of
an attack. When such circumstances are present, an attacker might reasonably conclude that the use of precision-guided weapons would not be
anti-aircraft fire that requires pilots to zigzag,
51

47. See

W. Hays

Human

Rights

The Protection of Civilians from Air Warfare, 27 ISRAEL YEARBOOK
85-86 n.57 (1998).

Parks,
65,

117-37.

48.

For examples, see Belt, supra note

49.

Id. at

50.

Parks, supra note 33, at 185-202.

51.

For further discussion, see Infeld, supra note 33, at 131-33.

3, at

130.
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appropriate.

A hard and fast "black letter rule" requiring the use of precision-

guided weapons in any attack on an urban area would be dysfunctional under

such circumstances. Better perhaps to rely on the judgment of the commander
in

such cases. Hays Parks emphatically states
Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)

(iii)

planning an attack to "take

[of Protocol

all

I]

his view:

commanders and others
means and

requires

feasible precautions in the choice of

methods of attack with a view

and in any event to minimizing,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects."
An inevitable question is, "If a commander has a choice between two means for
attacking a target, one less accurate than the other, is he obligated to use the
most precise means?" Common sense, the definition of feasible by many States in
the

process

of

to avoiding,

respective

their

or

ratification

accession

—

a

definition

subsequently adopted by the community of nations in their drafting of Protocol
III on Incendiary Weapons to the 1980 United Nations Conventional Weapons
Convention and a reading of the relevant punitive provisions of Additional
Protocol I clearly indicate that not to be the case. A commander's good faith
judgment remains essential to effective implementation of this provision. 52

—

The

definitions of feasible referred to by Parks lend substantial support to

his position.

In a footnote, he quotes the statement of Italy accompanying

ratification of Protocol

I

that

it

"understands

.

.

.

that the

word

its

'feasible' is to

be understood as practicable or practically possible, taking into account

all

circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations." 53 Similarly, Article 1(3) of Protocol

on Incendiary Weapons to
the 1980 United Nations Conventional Weapons Convention defines "feasible precautions" as "those precautions which are practicable or practically
possible taking into account

all

III

circumstances ruling at the time, including

humanitarian and military considerations." 54 This recognition that combat
decisions vary depending

on the "humanitarian and

military considerations"

existing at the time argues in favor of maximizing the discretion of the

com-

mander rather than imposing a hard and fast rule. Finally, Article 85(3) (b) of
Protocol I, which classifies an action as a grave breach only if it involves
"launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or

civil-

ian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of

52.

Parks, supra note 47, at 85-86.

53.

Id.

at85n.54.

54. Id.

at86n.55.
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injury to civilians or

damage

Damage

to civilian objects," 55 lends a

measure of support

to this thesis.

To

this

commentator, Parks and Infeld have the better of the argument.

appears to be the case that the use of precision-guided weapons
suitable,

even with respect to

targets in heavily populated areas.

also appears to be impossible to predict in

stances might arise that would

make

not always

Moreover,

it

advance of an attack what circum-

the use of precision-guided weapons in-

appropriate. If these two propositions are correct,

have a "black

is

It

it

would make no sense to

letter" rule requiring the use of precision-guided

weapons, since

would introduce a degree of undesirable rigidity into the law of armed
conflict. The better approach is to leave the decision whether to employ
precision-guided weapons to the individual commander whose decision turns
on the particular circumstances he faces at the time of armed conflict.
Since he contends that present customary international law requires the
use of precision-guided weapons in attacks on urban areas, Belt recognizes
that this raises the second issue the organizers of the colloquium have posed:
whether two adversaries may be subjected to differing legal and ethical regimes, dependent upon their relative level of technological sophistication.
Belt contends that they may. 56 He suggests that the problem may be minimized if not eliminated by technology transfer that narrows the gap between
the level of technological sophistication of developed countries and that of
developing countries, quoting one writer who urges that developed countries
this

provide subsidies to developing countries to enable

weapons.

57

The one

to acquire precision

In Belt's view, however, the "most balanced approach"
similar to the environmental stance of

responsibilities."

relativism."

and

them

As

"common

is:

but differentiated

This has been coined in the law of war arena as "normative

the divide between countries grows in regard to military prowess

capability, "there will be subtle stressors that

encourage an interpretation of

the law of armed conflict relative to the state to which

it is

applied." In the

the same standard applies to both states (developed vs. less developed)
the need to minimize collateral
the developed state.

The

damage

—but there

will

—

end

that

is

be a higher standard on

theory of normative relativism essentially supports the

conclusion that "belligerents are held to the standards to which they are capable
of reasonably rising." 58
55.

Id.at86n.56.

56.

Belt, supra

57. R.

note

3, at

167-73.

George Wright, Noncombatant Immunity:

A Case Study in the Relation Between International

Law and Morality, 67 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
58.

Belt, supra

note

3, at

172-73.
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335, 336-37 (1991), quoted

in id. at 172.
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In sharp contrast, Michael Schmitt has contended, "[i]t

is

simply beyond

credulity to suggest that the acceptability of striking a particular type of target

or causing a certain

amount of

collateral

damage or incidental

one day depend on the characteristics of the attacking

state."

injury might

59

For his

part,

combat actions are not subject to some
sort of 'fairness doctrine,' and neither the law of war in general nor the concept of proportionality in particular imposes a legal or moral obligation on a
nation to sacrifice manpower, firepower, or technological superiority over an
Hays Parks has observed

opponent." 60

It

that: "Lawful

might be suggested further that

but differentiated responsibilities" in the
law seems misplaced.
subjected to
or cleaning

It is

one thing

field

Belt's reliance

of international environmental

to suggest that developed States should be

more onerous standards than developing countries

up the environment.

on "common

It is

in protecting

quite another to propose that developed

them in armed
conflict. Since many, perhaps most, developing countries would be unable to
comply with a rule requiring the use of precision weapons in attacks on urban
countries should accept standards that could disadvantage

areas, this

a

is

good reason not to have such a

What Degree
Excessive,

The

of Injury

and Damage

rule in the first place.

Can

to Civilians

be Regarded as

and Consequently Disproportionate, as Compared
Advantage Gained?

question of what degree of injury to civilians

is

"excessive" and there-

by an armed attack

fore "disproportionate" to the military advantage gained

cannot, of course, be answered in the abstract.

to Military

It raises

in sharp relief,

how-

ever, the issue of the role the principle of proportionality does or should play in

the law of armed conflict. Judith Gail
ality is a

59.

60.

"fundamental" component of the

Michael Schmitt, The

Rights

Gardam

Parks, supra note 33, at 169-70.

inexperienced

Parks

Army

jus in hello

Principle of Discrimination in 21

& Development Law Journal 143,

proportionality,

has suggested that proportion-

sets

forth

instructor at

As an

the

st

and described

Century Warfare, 2

it

as "the

YALE

HUMAN

176 (1999).

egregious example of the misuse of the concept of

following

hypothetical

that

was presented by an

The Judge Advocate General's School of the U.S. Army:

An enemy platoon of forty men is in a defensive position on a hill, armed only with small
You have been assigned the mission of capturing the hill. You have the capability
hill with a company of two hundred men, supported by artillery, tanks,
helicopter gunships and close air support fixed-wing aircraft. The "rule"of
proportionality requires you to eschew the use of anything more than an infantry
platoon armed with small arms.
arms.

of attacking the
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balance to be struck between the achievement of a military goal and the cost
in terms of lives." 61

Although she acknowledges that some civilian casualties
have always been accepted as the inevitable consequence of a military attack,
has assumed the pivotal
she contends that "the concept of proportionality
role in determining the extent to which civilians are entitled to be protected
from the collateral effects of armed conflict." 62
Hays Parks is much more skeptical. He reports that the American military
.

.

.

concluded that the concept of proportionality is not a rule
of customary international law and argues that, judged by US domestic law
review of Protocol

I

standards, "the concept of proportionality as contained in Protocol
constitutionally void for vagueness."

63

To support

his "void for

I

would be

vagueness"

ar-

gument, Parks further contends that
more than

[F]ollowing

contained in Protocol

and meetings of
implement the language
advances the law of war and the

a decade of research [as of 1990]

international military experts
I

who

are anxious to

to the extent

it

protection of the civilian population, there remains a substantial lack of

agreement

meaning of the provisions

to the

as

proportionality. This

is

in Protocol

I

relating to

a rather disconcerting situation given that other lawyers

are claiming that the concept of proportionality

is

customary international

law. 64

Gardam acknowledges

For her part,

the significant juridical impact the

had on the role the concept of proportionality plays
armed conflict. She concludes:
position has

In the final analysis,
its

allies

in the

US

law of

appears that the interpretation by the United States and

it

of their legal obligations concerning the prevention of collateral

and the concept of proportionality comprehends only two types of
attacks: first, those that intentionally target civilians; and second, those that
involve negligent behavior in ascertaining the nature of a target or the conduct
casualties

of the attack

conduct of

itself,

so as to

amount

to the direct targeting of civilians.

The

Gulf conflict indicates that the concept of
"excessive casualties" was restricted to that context; the military advantage
hostilities

in the

always outweighed the civilian casualties as long as civilians were not directly

61. Judith

Gardam,

International

Proportionality

Law 391

and Force

in International

(1993).

398.

62.

Id. at

63.

Parks, supra note 33, at 173.

64. Id. at 175.
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targeted and care was taken in assessing the nature of the target and the carrying

out of the attack

The impact

itself.

of the practice of states such as the United States and

on the formation of custom

partners

is

its

coalition

considerable and cannot be overlooked.

seems inevitable that the concept of proportionality as a customary norm is
currently limited to the situations outlined above. Moreover, it seems likely that
It

the interpretation of the conventional requirements of Articles 51 and 57 with
respect to "excessive casualties"

may

be similarly limited. 65

Michael Schmitt approaches the problem of "excessive casualties" with a
focus

on the

principle of discrimination that

mandates discrimination be-

and legitimate targets. 66 He suggests that
the principle of discrimination comprises two primary facets. The first facet
limits or prohibits the use of weapons that are by their nature indiscriminate.
One example he gives is "biological weapons that spread contagious diseases,
for such weapons are incapable of afflicting only combatants and difficult to
tween

civilians

and

their property

The second

control." 67

facet of the principle prohibits the indiscriminate use

of weapons, regardless of their innate ability to discriminate.

he

cites Iraq's use of

SCUD

missiles against Israel during the

As an example,
Gulf War. This

second facet of discrimination, he suggests, in turn consists of three components: distinction, proportionality,

and minimizing

collateral

damage and

in-

cidental injury.

The concept of distinction, which prohibits direct attacks on civilians or civilian objects, finds

its

primary expression in Article 48 of Protocol

I,

which

provides that parties to a conflict must "distinguish between the civilian populations

and combatants and between

and accordingly

civilian objects

and military objectives

direct their operations only against military objectives."

Un-

der Article 52(2), military objectives are "those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use

whose

make an

effective contribution to military action

total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the

and

circum-

stances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."

65.

Gardam, supra note

disagreement

among

61,

at

410.

In footnote

102

Gardam

recognizes that there

scholars as to whether the practice of specially affected States

is

is

more

important in the formation of custom from conventional norms than that of other States but
suggests that

it

"may, however, be more influential in reality by virtue of being more frequent and

better publicized."
66.

Schmitt, supra note 59.

67.

Id. at

147.
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an abstract proposition,

the concept of distinction has given rise to considerable controversy. For ex-

Red Cross (ICRC) defines the
In the ICRC's Commentary on Pro-

ample, the International Committee of the

terms "effective" and "definite" narrowly.
tocol

I,

effective contribution includes objects "directly used

by the armed

weapons and equipment), locations of "special importance for
operations" (e.g., bridges), and objects intended for use or being used

forces" (e.g.,
military

68
for military purposes."

The Commentary

also interprets the phrase "definite

military advantage" to exclude those attacks offering only "potential or in-

determinate advantages." 69 Under Article 51(3) of Protocol I, civilians are
legally protected from attack unless they take a "direct part in the hostilities."

According to the ICRC Commentary, such participation is limited to "acts of
war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the
personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces." 70 Under Article 50(1)
of Protocol

I

doubts as to the character of an individual are resolved in favor of

finding civilian status, and Article 52(3) provides the

same presumption

for

civilian objects.

The ICRC

interpretation has been subject to scathing criticism. 71 In tem-

perate tones, Schmitt has noted:
less protective approach to the limitations. The United States, for
would
include economic facilities that "indirectly but effectively
example,
support and sustain the enemy's war-fighting capability" within the ambit of
appropriate targets. Similarly, some have cited mission-essential civilians
working at a base during hostilities, even though not directly engaging in acts of
war, as legitimate targets. Thus, while there is general agreement that the

Others take a

Protocol accurately states customary international law principles, notable

disagreement persists over exactly what those standards

Schmitt goes on to suggest that proportionality
terms of scienter,
attacker

knows

i.e,

differs

that an attack

on

a legitimate military target will result in in-

To

Schmitt, this

Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
12 AUGUST 1949, at 636 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987), cited and quoted in

CONVENTIONS OF
id.

at 148.

quoted and cited

69.

Id.,

70.

Id. at

in

Schmitt, supra note 59, at 149.

619, quoted and cited

in

Schmitt, supra note 59, at 149.

See especially Parks, supra note 33, at
72. Schmitt, supra note 59, at 150.
71.

from distinction in

the issue of proportionality arises in situations where the

jury to civilians or civilian property.

68.

are. 72

1

13-45.
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[R]enders the discrimination decision matrix
first tier

much more

of discrimination analysis, the question

is:

'May

complex. With the
I

an

lawfully target

With proportionality, an additional query must occur: 'Even if
I conclude that targeting the person or object is unlawful, may I nevertheless
knowingly cause him or it injury or damage in my attack on a legitimate

object or person?'

objective?' 73

The

of answering the additional query arises in particular because

difficulty

[T]he actor must not only struggle with issues of inclusiveness (what are the
concrete and direct consequences?), but he must also conduct a difficult

compare like values.
However, proportionality calculations are heterogeneous, because dissimilar
value genres
military and humanitarian
are being weighed against each

jurisprudential balancing test. Optimally, balancing tests

—

—

other. 74

To

be sure, in some cases the proportionality calculation would be

Hays Parks

tively simple.

cites as the "classic

rela-

example" of a disproportionate

action the destruction of a village of 500 persons simply to destroy a single en-

emy
were

sniper or
five?

machine gun. 75 But what

Would

if

the likely cost in civilian lives lost

(should) this be regarded as "excessive" and disproportion-

between the miliand humanitarian "value genres" referred to by Schmitt might well arise.
Moreover, Parks has suggested three "fundamental" problems with implementation of the concept of proportionality. 76 The first is the definition of military advantage, and the level at which a determination should be made
(tactical or strategic) the second is who should be responsible for the probable
civilian losses resulting from the attack (the attacker, defender, or the civilians themselves), and the third concerns what Parks calls the "friction of war."
To Parks, this friction is caused in large measure by uncertainty, and he quotes
ate to the military advantage gained? In such a case, a clash
tary

,

Clausewitz's observation that

of the factors

on which action

lesser uncertainty."

77

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

To

in

is

war

the realm of uncertainty; three quarters

is

This uncertainty

of information regarding the
ing process.

"War

Parks,

it

based are wrapped in a fog of greater or
is

based in considerable part on a lack

enemy and greatly complicates

also counsels against

the decision mak-

any attempt "to establish an

at 151.

75.

Parks, supra note 33, at 168.

76.

Id. at

77.

CLAUSEWITZ,

175.

ON WAR

1

19-20 (M.Howard
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& P. Paret trans.,

1976), quoted in

id.

at 183.

Legal and Ethical Dimensions of Collateral
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form of accountability

Damage
occur incidental

for civilian casualties that

to legitimate military operations." 78 In his view, this

is

what Protocol

I,

espe-

cially as interpreted by the ICRC, attempts to do.

In

my view, it is not necessary to decide whether "proportionality" is part of

customary international law or simply a policy consideration or a "principle"

commanders should take into account during the course of armed conflict. The conscientious commander will make every effort to avoid launching
an armed attack when the likely outcome is a clearly disproportionate amount
of collateral damage. Under any other than the easy case scenario, however, as
that

Parks and especially Schmitt have noted, the calculation of whether a particular

damage
be remembered

attack will result in proportionate or disproportionate collateral

becomes exceedingly

difficult

and problematic.

It

must

also

that a mistaken calculation of proportionality could result in individual liability for a

armed

war crime

conflict

to limit

such

position:

for the

by the commander's country. Accordingly,

liability to

where

the circumstances summarized by

civilians are deliberately targeted or there

ior in ascertaining the

amounts

commander or in liability for a violation of the law of
it

would seem best

Gardam
is

as the

negligent behav-

nature of a target or the conduct of the attack

to the direct targeting of civilians.

unacceptable dilemma for the

US

itself that

Any other standard would pose an

commander operating under exceedingly stress-

ful conditions.

To

return to the point

made

at the

beginning of

the question of what degree of injury to civilians

this section

is

of the paper,

excessive and therefore

disproportionate to the military advantage gained by an armed attack cannot

be answered in the abstract. Accordingly, in the next section

we

turn to the

and ethical implications of NATO's apparent efforts to minimize its
own combat casualties through high-altitude bombing and avoidance of a
ground campaign.
legal

and Ethical Implications of NATO's Apparent Efforts
to Minimize Its Own Combat Casualties Through High-Altitude Bombing
and Avoidance of a Ground Campaign and Did This Greatly Increase the

What Are

the Legal

Risk of Civilian Casualties?

At
is

the outset of our discussion in this section,

a crucial factual issue to be addressed: did

and avoidance of a ground campaign in
78.

it

should be noted that there

NATO's

high-altitude

bombing

fact greatly increase the risk of civilian

Parks, supra note 33, at 202.
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Some

casualties?

critics

of the Kosovo campaign have so alleged. 79 Charles

Dunlap, however, has challenged
titude attacks
trary^

this thesis. 80

According to Dunlap, lower

were attempted but did not prove very

effective.

he contends, the nature of precision-guided munitions

are often optimally targeted at the altitudes

is

On

al-

the con-

such that they

NATO employed. He further sug-

would have increased the chances of success for Serbia's antiaircraft and short range missile systems and that "[a]
crippled twenty or thirty- ton airplane loaded with fuel and high explosives
crashing out-of-control into an urban neighborhood can create as much or
more devastation among civilians as any errant bomb." 81 Similarly, in his
view, a ground assault would have increased the risk of civilian casualties
artillery, multiple rocket launchers,
because the weapons of land warfare
and machine guns and other small arms lack the precision quality of highaltitude bombing, and ground combat in an urban environment is a casualtyintensive affair for both combatants and civilians. Finally, Dunlap notes that
reportedly, out of the more than 25,000 weapons used in Kosovo, only twenty
resulted in collateral damage incidents, "a phenomenal record in the history
gests that flying at lower altitudes

—
—

of warfare." 82

Let us assume arguendo that the

critics are right

and the high-altitude

bombing and the avoidance of a ground campaign did increase the risk of
civilian casualties. What, if any, are the legal and ethical implications of these
decisions?

We turn to the legal implications first.

A. Legal Implications
There seems to be little question that the decision to engage in high-altitude
bombing did not by itself constitute a violation of the law of armed conflict. As
Dunlap points out, although the law of armed conflict seeks to protect noncombatant civilians from the adverse effects of war, there is "nothing in that

79.

See, e.g.,

(2000),

HUMAN

available

RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS

at

IN

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/;

NATO AIR CAMPAIGN 2
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,

THE

NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslovia: "Collateral Damage" or Unlawful Killings?, Violations
of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force 17 (2000), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcarn/kosovo/docs/natorep_all.doc; Richard Bilder, Kosovo and

Promise or Peril?, 9 JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 153,
Ved Nanda, NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo and International Law, 10 US AIR
Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies 1, 9 (1999/2000).

the

New lnterventionism:

171 (1999);

80. Charles Dunlap, Kosovo, Casualty Aversion,

and

the

American Military Ethos:

US Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies
81.

Id. at

97.

82.

Id. at

103.
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regime [that] expressly requires an assumption of more risk by a combat-

legal

ant than a noncombatant." 83 Similarly, the Final Report to the Prosecutor by
the Committee Established to Review the

NATO

Bombing Campaign

Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter

concluded "there

is

ICTY

Final Report)

nothing inherently unlawful about flying above the height

which can be reached by enemy defenses." 84 To be

NATO

nized that the principle of distinction required

Committee recogair commanders to

sure, the

"take practicable measures to distinguish military objectives from civilians or

and that the 15,000 feet minimum altitude adopted for
part of the campaign may have meant the target could not be verified by the
naked eye. But it concluded that "with the use of modern technology, the obligation to distinguish was effectively carried out in the vast majority of cases
during the bombing campaign." 85 Lastly, the Report of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, established at the initiative of the Prime
Minister of Sweden, Mr. Goran Persson, concluded that the "high-altitude
." 86
tactic does not seem to have legal significance.
The legal issue, then, would seem to be whether the bombing campaign resulted in injury and damage to civilians that can be regarded as excessive and
therefore disproportionate to the military advantage gained
more or less the
same issue we considered in the abstract in the previous section of this paper.
Any determination as to whether injury and damage to civilians is "excessive"
in relation to the military advantage gained by the bombing necessarily includes a measure of subjectivity that may lead reasonable persons to differ
over the proper conclusion to be reached. It is accordingly noteworthy that
the Independent International Commission on Kosovo was
civilian objectives,"

.

.

—

[I]

impressed by the relatively small scale of civilian

damage considering the

magnitude of the war and its duration. It is further of the view that NATO
succeeded better than any air war in history in selective targeting that adhered
to principles of discrimination, proportionality, and necessity, with only
relatively minor breaches that were themselves reasonable interpretations of
'military necessity' in the context. 87

83.

Id.

at 99.

84. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the

Bombing Campaign

MATERIALS U 55

(2000), reprinted herein as

to Review the NATO
39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL

Committee Established

against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

Appendix A

[hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor].

85.

Id.

86.

The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report

181 (2000).
87.

Id. at

183-84.
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For

ICTY

part, the

its

Final Report noted that the

NATO bombing campaign

involved 38,400 sorties, including 10,484 strike sorties, and the release of

23,614

air

munitions, yet only approximately 500 civilians were killed during

The conclusion of the Report was that "[t]hese figures do not inthat NATO may have conducted a campaign aimed at causing substan-

the campaign.
dicate

civilian casualties either directly or incidentally." 88

tial

One

of the allegations that led to the establishment of the Committee that

issued the
lessly

ICTY

Final Report was that

NATO

forces "deliberately or reck-

caused excessive civilian casualties in disregard of the rule of propor-

by trying to

tionality

Interestingly, in

its

fight

a 'zero casualty war' for their

own

side." 89

discussion of the "principle [not rule] of proportionality,"

Committee expressed some of the same concerns and reservations that
have troubled Hays Parks and the US military in their review of Protocol I.
They are worth quoting at length.
the

The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not
exists but what it means and how it is to be applied. It is relatively simple to

48.
it

that there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate

state

destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects. For example,

bombing a

is that
camp is
people in the camp are knitting socks for soldiers. Conversely, an air strike on an

obviously prohibited

refugee

if its

only military significance

ammunition dump should not be prohibited merely because a farmer is plowing
a field in the area. Unfortunately, most applications of the principle of
proportionality are not quite so clear-cut.

It is

much

principle of proportionality in general terms than
set of circumstances

because the comparison

and
One cannot
opposed to capturing a particular

The

easier to formulate the

to apply

it

to a particular

often between unlike quantities

easily assess the value of

values.

49.

is

it is

innocent

human

lives as

military objective.

questions which remain unresolved once one decides to apply the

principle of proportionality include the following:

(a)

What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage gained
and the injury

(b)

What do you
What

(c)

is

to

noncombatants and/or the damage to

include or exclude in totaling your sums?

the standard of measurement in time or space? and

88.

Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A,

89.

Id.,

11

civilian objects?

11

54.

2.
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To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his own forces

(d)

to

danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects?

The answers to these questions are not simple. It may be necessary to resolve
them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ depending on the

50.

background and values of the decision maker. It is unlikely that a human rights
lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign the same relative
values to military advantage and to injury to noncombatants. Further, it is

commanders with
degrees of combat experience

unlikely that military
differing

always agree in close cases.

It is

backgrounds and
or national military histories would
different doctrinal

suggested that the determination of relative

commander." Although there
will be room for argument in close cases, there will be many cases where
reasonable military commanders will agree that the injury to noncombatants or
the damage to civilian objects was clearly disproportionate to the military
values must be that of the "reasonable military

advantage gained.

51.

Much

of the material submitted to the

OTP

[Office of the Prosecutor]

consisted of reports that civilians had been killed, often inviting the conclusion

drawn that crimes had therefore been committed. Collateral casualties to
civilians and collateral damage to civilian objects can occur for a variety of
to be

reasons. Despite an obligation to avoid locating military objectives within or

near densely populated areas, to remove civilians from the vicinity of military
objectives,

and

very

prevention

little

to protect their civilians

may be
many

society has given rise to
rarely

pay heed to the

from the dangers of military operations,

many

cases. Today's technological

facilities

and resources. City planners

feasible in

dual-use

possibility of future warfare. Military objectives are often

located in densely populated areas and fighting occasionally occurs in such
areas. Civilians present within or near military objectives must,

however, be

taken into account in the proportionality equation even if a party to the conflict
has failed to exercise

its

obligation to

remove them.

52. In the Kupreskic

Judgement (Case No: IT-9546-T 14 Jan 2000) the

Chamber addressed

the issue of proportionality as follows:

"526.

As an example

utilized,

of the way in which the Martens clause

Trial

may be

regard might be had to considerations such as the cumulative

damage to
civilians. In other words, it may happen that single attacks on military
objectives causing incidental damage to civilians, although they may
raise doubts as to their lawfulness, nevertheless do not appear on their
face to fall foul per se of the loose prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 (or of
effect of attacks

on

military objectives causing incidental

the corresponding customary rules). However, in case of repeated
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attacks, all or

most of them

within the grey area between

falling

indisputable legality and unlawfulness,

it

might be warranted to conclude

that the cumulative effect of such acts entails that they

keeping with international law. Indeed,

may

this pattern

may not be

in

of military conduct

turn out to jeopardize excessively the lives and assets of civilians,

contrary to

demands of humanity."

This formation in Kupreskic can be regarded as a progressive statement of the
applicable law with regard to the obligation to protect civilians.

import, however,

is

somewhat ambiguous and

its

Its

the committee's view that where individual (and legitimate) attacks
objectives are concerned, the

practical

application far from clear.

mere cumulation of such instances,

all

It is

on military

of which are

have been lawful, cannot ipso facto be said to amount to a crime. The
committee understands the above formulation, instead, to refer to an overall

deemed

to

assessment of the totality of civilian victims as against the goals of the military

campaign. 90

One may assume

that the Committee's

acknowledgment of the ambiguous

and controversial nature of the principle of proportionality contributed to its
conclusion that NATO had not conducted "a campaign aimed at causing substantial civilian casualties either directly or indirectly."

For

its

part, the

Independent International Commission on Kosovo ac-

cepted "the view of the Final Report of the

ICTY that there

is

no basis

in avail-

able evidence for charging specific individuals with criminal violations of the

laws of war during the

NATO campaign."

It

did add, however, rather crypti-

"some practices do seem vulnerable to the allegation that violations
might have occurred, and depend for final assessment upon the availability of
cally, that

further evidence." 91

Pending the presentation of further evidence, one may
the injury and

damage

to civilians caused by the

safely

conclude that

NATO bombing campaign

were not excessive but rather proportionate to the military advantage gained.

Hence the bombing did not violate the law of armed

conflict merely because

it

resulted in collateral damage.

B. Ethical Implications

There remains the
ing

issue of the ethical implications of the high-altitude

bomb-

and the avoidance of a ground campaign. According to the Independent
MI 48-52.

90.

Id.,

91.

The Independent International Commission on Kosovo,
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Commission on Kosovo, although the high-altitude bombing
significance, "it does weaken the claim of humanitarianism to the ex-

International

lacked legal
tent

it

appears to value the lives of the

NATO combatants more than those of the

." 92
Kosovo and Serbia.
If, however, Charles Dunlap's
bombing
was more protective of civilians than lower
claim that the high-altitude
would
have
been
is
correct,
the suggestion of the Commission is
level bombing
clearly invalid. Moreover, even if he is incorrect and the high-altitude bombing
and the avoidance of a ground war resulted in a higher number of civilian casualties than would have been the case if low level bombing and a ground campaign
had been launched, it does not necessarily follow that such a decision violated
ethical or moral precepts. As Dunlap points out, "Americans do not instinctively
draw a distinction that finds its soldiers' lives less precious than those of the citizens of an enemy state. This is traceable to the American concept of who composes its military: citizens with just as much right to life as enemy citizens." 93
Reasonable persons may disagree with Dunlap's reasoning and the values it
reflects. But at a minimum the ethical and moral case against NATO's
high- altitude bombing and avoidance of a ground campaign on the ground that
they caused excessive collateral damage is debatable.

civilian population in

.

.

A Few Concluding Thoughts
Regardless of whether they have an international law obligation to do so,
is

likely that the

United States, other

make

it

NATO members, and developed States

and greater use of precision-guided munitions in
in Michael Schmitt's
future conflicts because as the technology develops
they will be 'brilwords, "the weapons of future wars will be more than smart
94
liant'"
the "happy congruence" between the needs of military efficiency
and the avoidance of unnecessary injury to civilian persons or property will increasingly be present. At the same time, however, as also noted by Schmitt,
the protections the law of armed conflict affords to civilian persons and property are likely to be less and less effective in practice. This is because the technologically weaker States, as well as terrorists or other non-governmental
actors, may increasingly conclude that they must attack the civilian
in general will

greater

—

—

92. Id. at 181.
93.

Dunlap, supra note 80,

94.

Schmitt, supra note 59, at 164.

at 100.
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population of the enemy State to offset the

power.
[I]n

As Schmitt
many

puts

latter's great

advantage in

fire-

it,

hope is not to prevail in combat, but rather to raise
opponents to an unacceptable level. The fewer targets the

cases, their only

the costs for their

States with lesser technology are permitted to strike, the less opportunity they
will

the

have to impose costs on

more

limits placed

their

advantaged opponents. By the same token,
greater the advantage to these

upon their opponents, the

States. 95

This "normative relativism," Schmitt suggests, bodes

ill

for the principle

of dis-

crimination in the future. 96

To this observer,

it is

ironic that so

much attention has been devoted to the

NATO complied with the jus in hello in

Kosovo campaign.
For when one looks at practices in other armed conflicts around the
world Chechnya, Afghanistan, the Sudan, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, to
name just a few one sees not only no effort to comply with the jus in hello but
barbaric practices that flout even the most elementary dictates of humanity.
Accordingly, the most strenuous efforts should be made to induce States and
other combatants to adhere to at least the ethical and moral dimensions of inissue of whether

—

its

—

ternational humanitarian law, regardless of the presence or absence of a for-

mal

legal obligation to

do

the scope of this paper.

so.

Steps that might be taken to this end are beyond

97

95.

Id. at

171.

96.

Id. at

172.

97.

For discussion of some steps that might be taken, see

note

2.
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T
Were

My

approach

what happened

in

be a functional one: did the generally recognized

will

rules of international

humanitarian law function during the conflict?

they complied with? Did they prove to be adequate for the Kosovo inter-

vention type of armed conflict?

on

earlier discussion of relevant interna-

tional humanitarian law principles as they relate to

Kosovo.

combat

on the

his presentation will build

Is

there a need for a de lege ferenda discussion

rules protecting the civilian population in interventionist types of conflicts?

These are the

issues

The Additional

I

would

Protocol

like to address.
I

of 1977

ping principles of customary law in the
civilians: the principle

has codified three somewhat overlap-

1

field

of targeting and the protection of

of distinction, the principle of proportionality and the

principle of feasible precautions.

The

principle of distinction

to the definition of military objectives. In fact, the principle
ingless if

it

were not substantiated by a

set of

norms

is

closely linked

would be mean-

clearly indicating

where

drawn between protected civilian lives and objects on the
one hand, and legitimate military objectives on the other. This issue should be
addressed first since much of the criticism directed against NATO's methods
of warfare in Kosovo was based on the perception that many of the attacks
the line should be

1.

Protocol Additional

(I)

to the

Geneva Conventions of

Protection of Victims of International

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
[hereinafter Protocol

I].

WAR

Armed

12 August 1949, and Relating to the

Conflict, June 8,

1977,

422 (A. Roberts and R. Guelff

1125 U.N.T.S.
eds., 3d. ed.

3,

2000)
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were directed against people, houses and materiel that were protected under
international humanitarian law.

Another focal point of criticism, both during and after the conflict, was the
extent of damage caused incidentally by attacks against military objectives

—the

issue of collateral

damage. This

issue, as

an element of the over-

arching principles of proportionality and feasible precautions, will be discussed
later in this paper.

Distinction

The

principle that a distinction shall always be

between protected and non-protected values
I.

It

is

made

in military operations

found in Article 48 of Protocol

includes the following language: "In order to ensure respect for and pro-

tection of the civilian population

and

civilian objects, the Parties to the

con-

and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives." During the Kosovo air campaign,
flict

shall at all times distinguish

.

.

.

NATO complied with this principle in the sense that
only objectives that

it

it

attempted to attack

perceived to be of a military nature. In other words,

NATO tried to distinguish.
Basically, a violation of the principle of distinction implies action

an intentional disregard

for civilian values (e.g., attacks of terror against civil-

ians) or a reckless disregard for

military objectives

and

civilians

such values

I.

(e.g.,

attacks of a nature to strike

without distinction).

prohibition against indiscriminate attacks
tocol

mala fide,

—

is

The

latter aspect

—the

covered by Article 5 1 (4) of Pro-

This prohibition flows from the principle of distinction and could

in-

The Gulf War offers
Saddam Hussein was not

clude both intentional violations and reckless behavior.

some examples on mala fide behavior

in this respect.

sensitive to the prohibition of Article 51(4), outlawing, inter alia, attacks

"which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a
specific military objective." Iraq fired SCUD missiles into Saudi Arabian and
Israeli territory, well

knowing that these

through sheer luck. Clearly,

missiles could hit military targets only

NATO did not act in this way during the Kosovo

media reporting that came out of Belgrade gave the
impression that NATO was not in compliance with the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks. The alleged compliance or collateral damage problems
conflict. Nevertheless, the

that were at issue were not linked to the principle of distinction as such, but

rather to the definition of military objectives.
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Definition of Military Objectives

As

has been stated already, the definition of military objectives

lary to the principle of distinction. Article 52(2) of Protocol

Attacks shall be limited

strictly to military objectives.

I

is

a corol-

states that:

In so far as objects are

concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use

and whose

total or partial

make an effective

contribution to military action

destruction, capture or neutralization, in the

circumstances ruling at the time, offers a

definite military advantage.

1

Thus, the requirements of "effective contribution" and "definite military advantage" are of crucial importance.
points out:

As

the

"Whenever these two elements

ICRC Commentary

are simultaneously present, there

a military objective in the sense of the Protocol."

seem

to Protocol

3

I
is

Together the two elements

However, the current interpretation of the
rule is not so strict. It includes the right to attack objectives that have a potential
of being militarily useful at some point in the future. This does not explicitly
to produce quite a strict rule.

follow from the text, although the

ICRC Commentary

has indicated that the

phrase "objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use" should be given
the following interpretation:

"The

criterion of purpose

tended future use of an object, while that of use
function."

4

This

may be

true,

is

is

concerned with the

concerned with

but even so the quoted phrase

is

its

in-

present

subordinate to

the proviso that the objects so defined shall "make" (in the present tense) "an
effective contribution to military action,"

and

it is

further required that their

destruction "offers" (in the present tense) "a definite military advantage."
Protocol's definition of military objectives has often

been perceived

cation of traditional customary law applied during

World War

This perception

is

probably correct, but

it

brings with

it

II

The

as a codifi-

and

this flexible

earlier.

and

fu-

ture-oriented interpretation of legitimate military targets that does not explicitly

follow from the text of Article 52(2).

2.

Emphasis added.

3.

Commentary on the Additional Protocols

Conventions of 12 August 1949,
[hereinafter
4. Id. at

at

635

(Y.

of 8 June

Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B.

1977

to

the

Geneva

Zimmerman eds.,

1987)

ICRC COMMENTARY].

636, H 2022. See also

Anthony Rogers who accepts

future intended use of an object.

where 'purpose'

will

He

adds, however, "[i]t

is

the

ICRC view that "purpose" means

hard to think of an example or a case

be the deciding factor, especially given the limitation of

circumstances ruling at the time'." A.P.V. ROGERS,
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The future-oriented approach was clearly manifested
crisis. At a NATO press conference on March 26, 1999,
armed attacks were directed against the adversary's

Sufficient?

during the Kosovo
it

was said that the

"ability to

coordinate his

and "his abilview on what

military forces in the field, his ability to attack innocent civilians"
ity

to

command and

control his military forces."

constitutes legitimate military objectives

campaign
large

as

it

was

typical for

number of dual-use

vilian use

had

World War

targets,

i.e.,

a military potential.

to their military potential

and

it

was

5

This

liberal

as typical for the

NATO

air

Kosovo it tended to include a
objects which besides their ordinary ciII.

In

A few of these targets were controversial as

was sometimes argued that they were not to

be considered as legitimate military objectives.

The requirements
tage" have to be

of "effective contribution" and "definite military advan-

met no

with regard to attacks against dual-use or

less

dual-purpose objects. Typical dual-use objects are transportation systems like

and other power installations, and communication installations like radio, television, telephone and telegraph stations.
Although it is clear that broadcasting facilities could have a military function,
NATO's bombing on April 23, 1999 of the Serb Radio and Television Station
(RTS) in Belgrade seems difficult to justify under the circumstances ruling at
the time. The Serb media was hardly
to quote from the Report to the ICTY
Prosecutor "the nerve system that keeps a war-monger in power and thus
perpetuates the war effort" nor was it "used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda." 6
Any or both of these things could of course have materialized later, but at the
time of the attack on April 23, when 10-17 civilians were killed, the military
nature of the RTS was in some doubt. At a press conference on April 27,
NATO officials justified the attack with the need to disrupt and degrade the
Yugoslav command, control and communications (C3) network The argumentation was partly of a general nature: "everything is wired in through dual
use. Most of the commercial system serves the military and the military system
can be put to use for the commercial system." 7 It was not clear, in concrete
roads, bridges

and railway

lines, oil

—

—

5.

6.

Emphasis added. See www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990326a.htm.
Committee Established to Review the

Final Report to the Prosecutor by the

Campaign
11

against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39

55 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix

comment by William Fenrick

that

it is

NATO Bombing

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS,

A [hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor]. C/. also the

"highly debatable that the media in the FRY, which was

even if it was re-labeled as
must be more than a symbol of the regime."
William Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionality during the NATO Bombing Campaign against
Yugoslavia, 12 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 497 (2001).
7. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 11 72.
state -controlled to a degree, constituted a legitimate military objective

a propaganda source.

To

be a military objective,

it

260

Ove Bring
terms, the degree to

which the attack against the

The ICRC Commentary

RTS was

militarily useful.

states with regard to Article 52(2) of Protocol

I

that

the destruction in question:
[MJust offer a

definite military

In other words,

it is

advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time.

not legitimate to launch an attack that only

or indeterminate advantages.

offers potential

Those ordering or executing the attack must have

sufficient information available to take this

requirement into account; in case of

doubt, the safety of the civilian population, which

is

the aim of the Protocol,

must be taken into consideration. 8

Another dual- use discussion during and after the Kosovo bombings focused
on whether or not different bridges in Serbia that were attacked by missiles really made an effective contribution to military action. NATO spokesmen
have said that bridges and roads were used to send military forces into Kosovo
and that those put on the target lists had been thoroughly screened and found
militarily useful. Some bridges may have been selected because they were conduits for communication cables. 9 Nevertheless, in order for the attacks to be
lawful the objects in question had to make
in each instance
an "effective
contribution to military action." Was this really the case in Kosovo? Human
Rights Watch reported in February 2000 that seven of the bridges that were
attacked had no military functions at the time and could not be classified as

—

—

military targets. 10

With

regard to dual-purpose objects, Article 52(3) of Protocol

I

adds the

following to the definition of military objectives: "In case of doubt whether an

which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes ... is being used
make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not

object

be so used." In other words, in case of doubt there
status. It

is

this rule of

On

to

a presumption of civilian

more than doubtful whether NATO always complied with

of doubt or principle of presumption.

whether

is

to

the other hand,

it is

this rule

also doubtful

doubt has the status of customary law and thus

is

binding

for non-parties to the Protocol.

8.

ICRC Commentary,

9.

Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in The NATO Air Campaign

supra note

3, at

636.

available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/.
10.

Id. at 1.
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Damage

Collateral

A general impression conveyed by the media during the Kosovo crisis was
Amnesty International's report on
Kosovo of June 2000 is titled "Collateral Damage or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force." Amnesty
that there was a lot of collateral damage.

International believed that in the course of the operation "civilian deaths

could have been significantly reduced
the laws of war."
tain case

—

is

collateral

if

NATO

damage

forces

had

fully

adhered to

—even extensive damage

in cer-

permitted under the principle of proportionality, but the propor-

tionality issue

the time.

Some

11

The

was not discussed

as

such in relation to the media coverage

at

impression of unnecessary civilian losses during the spring of

1999 has to be tested against the frequent (but occasionally
accusations that

politically biased)

NATO was not acting in compliance with basic international

humanitarian law principles.

The

principle of proportionality flows from the prohibition against indis-

criminate attacks. In fact, in Protocol
tion. Article 5

1

(5) (b) prohibits

incidental loss of civilian

a combination thereof,

life,

I it is

"an attack which

injury to civilians,

may be expected

damage

direct military advantage anticipated."

ity"

is

to civilian objects, or

not used, the text clearly conveys a proportionality message.

ple expressed here

is

to cause

which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
Although the term "proportional-

and

this

presented as a part of that prohibi-

The

princi-

arguably a codification of traditional customary law. In

context the concept of "collateral damage"

is

always referred

to,

although

The language of Article 5
focuses on what may be called "incidental damage," a certain amount of which
that terminology

is

legally

is

not used either in the Protocol.

accepted as

it is

unintended and perhaps unavoidable in the circum-

stances at the time.

Another way of describing the
presumption that the attacker

is

principle of proportionality

to start with a

complying with the principle of distinction.

In fact, the principle of proportionality rests

when

is

on

that presumption. So, even

make sure that an attack is directed against a military
objective, the commanders must avoid an attack where the military advantage
cannot outweigh the civilian damage that can be expected from the attack. In
military planners

11. Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, "Collateral
Damage" or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during

OPERATION

ALLIED

FORCE

29

(2000),

ailib/intcam/kosovo/docs/natorep_all.doc.
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other words, decision-makers should ensure that civilian casualties should not

be disproportionate in relation to the military advantage anticipated.

Although the principle of distinction was complied with during the
campaign over Kosovo,

it is

NATO

submitted that this was perhaps not always the

case with regard to the principle of proportionality. In comparison, the proportionality requirements
e.g.,

when

were not always complied with during the Gulf War,

coalition attacks deprived Iraqi hospitals of electricity

ated adverse cumulative effects

on

and gener-

civilians in those hospitals. Proportionality

assessments are difficult to accomplish.

To

the extent things went wrong in

Kosovo, these things may be easier to grasp and discuss under a heading of
"the principle of feasible precautions," rather than under the principle of
proportionality.

Feasible Precautions

The

principle of feasible precautions requires that military

plan their attacks in such a way that constant care
ian population, civilians and civilian objects.

is

taken to spare the

A summary of Article

on the following requirements
relevance during the Kosovo operation:
Protocol

I

has to focus

Those who plan or decide upon an attack

(1)

do everything

commanders

that were

all

civil-

57(2) of

of special

shall:

feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are

military objectives;
(2)

take

all

feasible precautions in the choice of

means and methods of attack

with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing, incidental
civilian

(3

refrain

of

from deciding to launch an attack that may be expected to cause

such incidental

and

loss

life;

loss,

which would be excessive

in relation to the concrete

direct military advantage anticipated;

becomes apparent that it may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, "which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated;" and

(4)

suspend an attack

(5)

in addition, "effective

if it

advance warning

affect the civilian population, unless
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shall

be given of attacks which

circumstances do not permit."

may
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Since there were a number of mistakes in targeting in Kosovo, the principle
of feasible precautions seems to be the one most clearly deviated from during
the air campaign.

The

mistakes included the two

on

air strikes hitting a train

on April 12; an attack on vehicles in a
convoy of refugees near Djakovica in Kosovo on April 14; an attack south of
Belgrade on April 28 hitting a residential area instead of army barracks; an attack against the Lusana Bridge north of Pristina on May 1 hitting a civilian
bus; a cluster bomb attack against the Nis airfield on May 7 hitting a market
place and a hospital; and the attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on
the Grdelica bridge in southern Serbia

May 8.

In the case of the Embassy,

NATO used inaccurate intelligence infor-

mation and believed that it was attacking the Federal Directorate of Supply
and Procurement for the Yugoslav Army. Further cases where there may have

been a lack of necessary precautions are the bombing of the village of Korisa in
Kosovo on May 13, the attack on the Varvarin bridge in Serbia on May 30,
and the attack against military barracks in Surdulica on May 30 in which a
hospital was struck. In all these attacks there were civilian casualties. 12
When evaluating these and other mistakes in targeting, however, they
must be related not only to the number of civilian casualties, but also to the
total number of air strikes, and to the military efficiency of these strikes. In
that regard, between March 24 and June 9, 1999, 10,484 strike sorties were
flown by
sualties

NATO aircraft and 23,614 munitions were released. No NATO ca-

were reported

arising out of these strikes.

The damage caused

to the

Yugoslav forces in Kosovo alone was reported to include 181 tanks, 317

mored personnel
pieces.

carriers,

600 military vehicles and 857

and mortar

13

When

in February

ian Deaths in the

2000

Human

Rights

NATO Air Campaign,"

Watch

it

published

became

its

report "Civil-

clear that about

ian lives were lost as a consequence of the campaign, a

than

artillery

ar-

much

500

civil-

higher figure

NATO had previously admitted. By comparison, the numbers of civilian

deaths given by the authorities in Belgrade varied between 1,200 and 5,000.

Even the lower number of 500

civilian deaths raises questions of efficiency

with regard to precautionary measures.

500

civilian casualties

lasting about three

is

It

could also be argued that, even

not a high figure for an international armed conflict

months,

it is

arguably too high a figure for a military opera-

tion with humanitarian motives; for

an operation that many would

"humanitarian intervention."

12.

See the case studies in

13.

NATO Press Conference held on

id.

if

at

33-74.
16 September 1999.
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The Human

Watch report claimed that the casualties had occurred
occasions, and that 50% of the victims died in circum-

Rights

during 90 separate

ConBelgrade heating plant and

stances where the identification of targets as military was questionable.

on the New
the Serb TV and Radio Station (RTS) in Belgrade. With regard to the latter,
it has already been indicated that no assessments seem to have been made to
clarify to what extent the RTS dual- use facility actually was contributing to
troversial cases included the attacks

the Yugoslav military effort.

An indirect early warning of the

attack seems to

have been communicated to the authorities in Belgrade, but since the attack

em-

did not occur shortly thereafter, the warning was not effective. Civilian

ployees working the night

shift,

who had emptied

the building at an earlier

point in time, had during the night of the attack returned to the building. 14 In
this case,

seems

it

from clear that

far

NATO,

in accordance with Article

communicated an "effective advance warning."
The RTS case signifies a mix of intentional damage (the building) and collateral damage (the 10 or more civilian casualties). Like in some of the other
cases that resulted in civilian casualties, it is not clear whether there was compliance with the precautions in attack required by Article 57. There seem to
be enough dubious cases to warrant a conclusion that violations of interna57(2)

tional

(c),

humanitarian law precautionary standards did in fact take place.

The Moral Dimension: "Ready

to Kill

But Not

to

Die"

Kosovo conflict that
only a small number of the aircraft available to NATO had a precision-bombing capability. In Kosovo, as in the Gulf War, events have shown that even
with smart bombs and missiles, air attacks do result in unplanned damage and
In London, the Foreign Secretary admitted during the

loss

of civilian

life.

High-tech developments increase the

possibilities for suc-

and better protection of the

civilian population,

cessful target discrimination

14.

According to the committee which prepared the Report to the Prosecutor,
[I] t

would

.

.

appear that some Yugoslav

.

officials

may have expected

that the building

Although knowledge on the part of Yugoslav officials of the
impending attack would not divest NATO of its obligation to forewarn civilians under
was about to be struck.
Article 57(2),

it

may

.

.

.

nevertheless imply that the Yugoslav authorities

may be

partially

and may suggest that the
been sufficient under the

responsible for the civilian casualties resulting from the attack

advance notice given by

NATO

may have

in

fact

circumstances.

Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, H 77.

The

uncontroversial.
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phenomenon

will in fact

protect them.

In Kosovo, the risk of unwanted
titude of 15,000 feet at

damage increased due

which NATO

been argued that by setting

this

aircraft

civilian population.

However, the

minimum al-

operated most of the time.

15,000 feet level

to avoid aircrew casualties, but in so doing,

to the

It

has

NATO politicians managed

were transferring the

British Ministry of

risks to the

Defence has stated that

some aircraft "operated down to 6,000 feet when target identification or a
weapons delivery profile required it." 15 Nevertheless, "the no-body-bags policy" posed and poses a moral dilemma. It implies that the lives of your own pilots
are worth more than the lives of the innocent civilians on the ground, since
the acceptance of some collateral damage relates to the "others", while the
aim of "zero-casualty warfare" only relates to "yourself." The discrepancy is
troublesome and indicates that future humanitarian interventions or
peace-enforcement actions should rely also on low flying aircraft to make possible genuine target identification
and arguably also ground troops if that
is necessary in order to protect the civilian population. One expert on the law

—

—

of the battlefield has written that in taking care to protect civilians, "soldiers

must accept some element of risk to themselves." 16 He notes that the law is
unclear as to what degree of care is required of a soldier and what degree of
"Everything depends on the target, the urgency of the morisk he must take
ment, the available technology and so on." 17
In the autumn 1999 issue of the Canadian International Journal Mr. Paul
Robinson of Toronto wrote an article with a sensational heading: "Ready to
18
The author was of course referring to the NATO strategy
kill but not to die."
in Kosovo. Robinson made the point that in high-tech, standoff warfare there
is no chivalry, no military honor. In Kosovo NATO pilots did not see the peo-

—

ple they

were

fighting.

This type of warfare,

it

was argued,

is

problematical not

only from a humanitarian but also from a security point of view.

Its clinical

character results in a temptation to resort to military force in international
crises. It

lowers the threshold for military force as such. Although this conclu-

sion does not

seem

to be empirically sound, the broader

argument

question whether existing international humanitarian law

15.

Lord Robertson, Kosovo: An Account of the

16.

A.P.U. Rogers, Zero-casualty warfare, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW

is

raises the

appropriate for

Crisis (1999).

OF THE RED CROSS

165,

177 (2000).
17. Id.
18.

Paul Robinson, 'Ready

Journal 671

to kill but not to die:

NATO strategy in Kosovo,

(1999).
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An increased use of standoff weapons is not to

dealing with high-tech warfare.

The

the advantage of civilians.

solution

is

not a prohibition of such weapons,

but rather a reconsideration of the parameters for modern warfare as

it

affects

civilians.

Did Protocol

I

Mean Anything in Kosovo?

Kosovo crisis was discussed in the March 2000 issue of the International Review of the Red Cross.
A perspective de lege ferenda was put forward in an article by Peter Rowe, ProInternational humanitarian law as

fessor of

Law

whether

in fact the constraints

related to the

it

Rowe first put the question of
of modern IHL influenced NATO behavior

at the University of Lancaster.

during the conflict.
tional Protocol

I

The

subtitle of his article

withstood the test?"

19

is:

"Have the provisions of Addi-

Rowe's position

that Protocol

is

I

did

not add anything to the protection of the civilian population beyond the cus-

tomary law protection that was already applicable before 1977.
that the Protocol

campaign
tle

—

had

little

He

concludes

impact or influence upon the decisions of the

air

that "all the detailed rules so carefully drafted in 1977 were of lit-

consequence." 20 In his view, the objects that military commanders for mili-

tary reasons

wished to attack were attacked. There was nothing more to

argumentation

If this

played no part in the

is

it.

intended to imply that modern international law

crisis, it

should be refuted. International humanitarian

law clearly influenced decision-makers in Kosovo. Moreover, Additional Protocol

I

contributed to the role that law played in decision-making. During the

conflict, as

both cases

during the Gulf War, legal advice was sought and considered. In
it

was extremely important,

for political

and public image reasons,

to be seen as acting in conformity with international law.

The

opposite would

imply a political cost and setback that had to be avoided at a time
cal support

mant

was

essential.

that "we didn't

obviously dominated

though

it

During the Gulf War General Schwarzkopf was ada-

want any war crimes on our hands." 21 The same

NATO

19.

has not been ratified by

all

NATO States
is

now

a party), has contributed
circles.

159.

Id. at

21.

Norman Schwarzkopf,

It

Doesn't Take a Hero 465
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al-

much

The United

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED

147 (2000).

20.

I,

(not by the United States,

awareness of IHL standards in military and political

Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The air campaign, 82

Cross

feeling

thinking in the spring of 1999. Protocol

France and Turkey at the time; France
to the

when politi-

(1992).

International Humanitarian

States position

is

that

Law After Kosovo:

many of the

rules of Protocol

I

Is

Lex Lata

Sufficient?

are applicable as custom-

ary law. Moreover, the non-governmental organizations

and informed public
opinion are very much aware of the IHL standards. They continuously moniand the politicians know it. Thus, it was in the
tor relevant situations
self-interest of NATO to involve its legal advisers in the planning and target-

—

ing process.

The US

James Burger has written in the same March issue
of the International Review of the Red Cross the following: "While there may
be disagreement over the application of the rules by commentators who write
about it after the event, there can be no doubt that full consideration was
given, as required by the laws of armed conflict, to the advice of legal counsel
military lawyer

and the application of the rules." 22 We can probably safely conclude that in
Kosovo there was a greater respect for humanitarian normative restraints than
would have been the case had the adoption of Protocol I never taken place.

The Weakness

The

of Protocol I

and

weak protection

the

Need for Reform

Here one could easily agree with Peter Rowe, when he argues that the Protocol, when it comes to
the test, is very weak in determining what may and what may not be attacked.
"It is when civilians are most likely to be placed in danger that Protocol I, designed to protect them, shows its faults." 23 One reason for this is that the Protocol sets the dividing line between legal and illegal attacks on the basis of
military expectations before the attack is commenced. As Rowe states: "At
this stage of military operations those planning the attack are at their most optimistic and civilians are at most risk." 24 This criticism mainly relates to the
principle of proportionality and the acceptance of collateral damage. An even
more important flaw with the Protocol, in this writer's view, is the wide interProtocol only offers

for civilians.

pretations of legitimate military objectives that the Protocol harbors. This interpretation flows only indirectly from the text of Article 52, but rather

through a perception that the Protocol has codified a

liberal

customary law

re-

The effect is an increased risk of extensive collateral damage.
With regard to Kosovo it has already been indicated that collateral damage
was a serious problem, but that the problem was not so much related to
gime.

James Burger, International humanitarian law and the Kosovo crisis: Lessons learned or
learned, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 129 (2000).
23. Rowe, supra note 19, at 160.
22.

24. Id.
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Ove
violations of IHL standards as

Brinj

was to the flexible interpretation of the definition of military objectives. Should a reform of IHL be considered to address
these matters, one point of departure would be that Additional Protocol I
should stand as it is. A revision of the Protocol is neither realistic nor necessary.

There

is

it

another way to approach the problem.
Suggestions

De Lege Ferenda

Rowe suggests a new additional protocol to the 1980 Conventional
Weapons Convention. Such an additional protocol would be adapted to the
use of air-delivered "smart" weapons and
tions

on such weapons

as

now

it

would introduce the same

restric-

with regard to air-delivered incendiary

exist

weapons. The relevant formulation would then read as follows:
It is

prohibited to

make any military objective

civilians the object of attack,

except

located within a concentration of

when such

separated from the concentration of civilians, and

military objective
all

is

clearly

feasible precautions are

taken with a view to limiting the effects of the attack to the military objective

and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 25

The

lex specialis for

mainly

air warfare,

life,

warfare. According to such a lex specialis

—no

ficult to

principle

It

overriding the balancing act of

the principle of proportionality, a principle that has

itary

of civilian

suggested text almost copies the 1980 restrictions on incendiaries. 26

would be a

tory

loss

its

main application

— and rethinking

air

in air

warfare in his-

Baghdad or Belgrade could be attacked. It is difbelieve that States would be willing to accept an erosion of the
of proportionality and give up their military freedom of assessing milbuildings in Berlin,

advantage against civilian damage. Protocol

I

has established a sort of

balance between military necessity and proportionality and also between pro-

and feasible precautions. It does not seem realistic to expect that
States would be willing to renounce the advantages of that approach.
Another problem with the text suggested by Rowe is that it is envisaged as a
protocol additional to the 1980 Weapons Convention, although the text only
portionality

25. Id. at 162.
III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary
Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF

26. Cf. Article 2(3), Protocol

Weapons, annexed

WAR,

supra note

1,

to the

at 533.
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covers methods and not means of warfare.

attached to the

though

Weapons Convention)

may indirectly focus on

it

It

does not

Is

Lex Lata

(like

refer to a specific

Sufficient?

the other Protocols

weapon category,

al-

air-delivered "smart" weapons.

On the other hand,

one could imagine another solution. The Independent
International Commission on Kosovo has suggested the drafting of an additional protocol III to the Geneva Conventions. 27 Such a protocol would not
detract from or compete with Protocol I, because the new protocol would
have another scope of application. It would be limited to conflicts of an interventionist nature where the intervening side is a coalition enforcing a mandate against a militarily inferior party to the conflict. The coalition would not
be fighting for

its

national security, vital interests or political survival, but for

management. The new protocol would be limited
to peace-enforcement operations conducted on behalf of the international
community, or other interventions within the framework of regional crisis
management, whether they are labeled humanitarian or not. It is important to
state that such a new protocol would not address the jus ad bellum legality of
humanitarian or other interventions (it would not introduce a "Just War"
doctrine) it would stick to the traditional IHL method of describing a scope of
application based on factual circumstances. In this case the scope of application would be linked to the limited nature of the international armed conflict.
Should the State under attack plead self-defense and respond with counter-attacks, thus escalating the level of armed conflict, the limited scope of application of the new protocol would no longer describe the situation
accurately and Protocol I would become applicable. In line with this thinking
Michael Hoffman, the American Red Cross Officer for International Humanithe purpose of limited

crisis

;

tarian

Law,

has

"interventional
tions,

suggested

armed

we may

that

conflict," for

whether authorized by the

by regional organizations.

UN

witness

emerging rules

for

example in peace enforcement operaSecurity Council or conducted otherwise

28

The UK Secretary of State for Defence said about the Kosovo air campaign
on March 25, 1999 that "This is not a war, it is an operation designed to
prevent what everybody recognizes
ethnic cleansing, savagery.

27.

.

.

.

is

That

about to be a humanitarian catastrophe:
is

what we are

in there to prevent, that

The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report,

5,31, 165-66(2000).
28.

Michael Hoffman, Peace-enforcement

"interventional

armed

conflict,"

actions

and humanitarian law. Emerging

82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE

(2000).
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is

not war,

it

Nevertheless,
inter-State

is

a humanitarian objective very clearly defined as such." 29

NATO

armed

on the

relied

traditional law of

war developed

for

conflict during the air campaign, including the definition of

military objectives

and the

rules

on

targeting, proportionality

and

collateral

damage linked to that definition. The liberal definition of military objectives
and the generous acceptance of collateral damage are part of a legal regime
that envisages a full-scale war. The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I were drafted against the background of World War II and partly with a
possible clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in mind.
International humanitarian law is built upon a balance between acceptance
of military interests on the one hand and humanitarian concerns on the other.
NATO's "no-body-bag policy" showed that this balance was upset in the
Kosovo conflict's limited type of war. NATO could use the liberal definition
of military objectives

rules favorable to the military

same time attacking from such altitudes that humaniconcerns could not be met. This problem could be addressed in a new

interest

tarian

—while

— thus benefiting from the

at the

protocol for interventional types of conflict, through a sharpening of the definition of military objectives.

One

could require that only those objectives be

attacked which are making an effective contribution to military action, or

which imminently are about to make such a contribution. 30 A requirement of
imminence should be added, somewhat along the lines of the famous Caroline
case. This would protect a number of dual-use objects and increase the protection of the civilian population.

Such
have

its

a sharpening of the definition of legitimate military objectives

would

consequences with regard to the implementation of the principles of

proportionality and feasible precautions.
principles will follow

from a more

A stricter

strict definition

application of these two

of military objectives.

stricter application of the principle of proportionality

A

would somewhat reduce

damage flowing from that principle. The concepts of
proportionality and feasible precautions would not themselves need to be
sharpened. They would stand as they are today in all types of international
armed conflict. However, in interventionist conflicts a better balance with regard to precautionary measures would result from the suggested change; i.e.,
the problem of collateral

—

29.

Quoted

30. C/. the

in

Hoffman,

id.

at 195.

ICRC Commentary

to Article 51 (5) (b) of Additional Protocol

I

that the military

advantage "should be substantial and relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly
perceptible

and those which would only appear

Commentary,

supra note

3,

in the long

H 2209.
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precautionary measures would, as intended by the drafters of Protocol

I,

genu-

on the ground, and not only the attackers flying high.
Although the above suggestion is the main de lege ferenda thrust of this paper, it should be mentioned that a further additional protocol could be imagined
a protocol attached to the 1980 Weapons Convention that would
inely protect civilians

—

explicitly prohibit the use of cluster

bombs. This type of multiple sub-muni-

tions affected the civilian population in
sions, often

Kosovo and Serbia on

more so than the intended military

weapons was

in fact debated, in the years

tional Protocols

and

I

II

for inclusion in the

Convention. But time was not ripe

seem

situation does not

to have

for

it

targets.

1977 - 1980,

several occa-

A protocol on multiple
as a follow-up to

Addi-

1980 Conventional Weapons

then, during the Cold

War, and the

changed that much today. Or has it? During
alarming media reports about civilian casual-

the

Kosovo

ties

caused by cluster bombs, some decision-makers reconsidered things.

air

campaign,

after

The

NATO attack targeted on the Nis airfield on May 7 went wrong. The cluster
bomb

container opened right away after release from the

opening over the

airfield.

As

a

consequence

into the city of Nis. Following the

it

aircraft, instead

of

projected the sub-munitions

media coverage of this incident there was a

White House to prohibit the further use of cluster bombs during the conflict. However, this was a unilateral US decision. The British command in London did not follow suit and more cluster bombs were dropped on
targets in Serbia and Kosovo in the spring of 1999.
Whether States in the future may in fact be willing to forgo weapons of the
decision by the

cluster

bomb

thinking

on

type in interventionist types of conflicts

this issue of means of warfare

into the kind of discussion

on the

possibilities

I

have

is

not

clear.

Further

could perhaps usefully be channeled

tried to

promote in

this paper, a discussion

of increased protections for civilians in conflicts of a lim-

ited nature.
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Yves Sandoz

As

I

have been Director of International Law and Communication

the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) an
,

at

institution

which devotes much energy to promote the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
their Additional Protocols of 1977, for 16 years

Commentary to those

Protocols,

you

will

and

as

I

am

not be surprised that

co-editor of the
I

don't share the

negative views expressed by John Murphy, echoing those of Hays Parks,

on

both the Additional Protocols and their Commentary, even if they are certainly

from being

far

What can
words

is

that

perfect.

at least
it is

be said about the Additional Protocols of 1977 in a few

not possible simply to affirm that they are or that they are not

part of international customary law.

As

stated in the

title

of the Diplomatic

Conference of 1974-1977, which negotiated and adopted the Protocols,

this

Conference had the double ambition to reaffirm and to develop international
humanitarian law (IHL) That means that in part the Protocols reaffirm and
.

clarify

customary rules of IHL and in part they develop that law. For the

part their rules bind

all

States, for the

second only the States parties to the

Protocols are bound. But the borderline

two reasons. The
clared

some

first is

is

not always easy to determine for

that the Diplomatic Conference has not clearly de-

what was reaffirmation and what was development. The second

rules

which were considered

as a

development

in

next points on the very good papers presented by John

Bring and enter into discussion on the Protocols and their

on the occasion of remarks

to those papers.

is

that

1977 may be consid-

ered today as part of customary law. But being commentator

my

first

I

will

now

base

Murphy and Ove
Commentary only

Commentary

me start with some words on international customary law. John Murphy
has quoted an author who went as far as questioning even the existence of in*
Let

ternational customary law.

I

will

not

comment on

this

not very serious decla-

would have something to add on the description given by John
Murphy on how to establish that there is customary law, with a particular foration, but

I

cus on the difficulty of establishing State practice.

A reference

to the notion of "specially affected States" by the ICJ in the

North Sea Continental Shelf case would be, for example, an important additional
tion,

element to mention.

but

I

I

will

not go further here and

wish to mention that lawyers from the

ICRC

now on

that ques-

are finalizing a broad

study on the customary rules of IHL, done with the contribution of legal and

governmental experts, and based on the work of working groups, from all regions of the world. This study will be published next year. Of course, the question to

know how

to establish the practice

and the

opinio juris of States

is

discussed in that study to determine the existence of customary rules and the
criteria

taken into account

will

be explained. That being said and without en-

would like to stress three points. First,
the aim of the study is to determine if a rule can or cannot be considered as a
customary rule, but not to give an in-depth interpretation of that rule. For
that reason we cannot expect too much from this study for the clarification of
the exact and practical meaning of existing rules, which is the central problem
tering into the substance of this study,

debated by

this

I

colloquium. Secondly, there will always remain a certain de-

gree of uncertainty as to the customary nature of certain rules, and therefore

customary law

is

not a substitute to the formal adoption by States of treaties

aiming to be universally accepted, as those of IHL. Thirdly, the problem of the
existence or not of a normative restriction

emergence of new weapons, due to the

is

particularly delicate with the

fact that there

cannot be a largely

tablished practice during a long period of time in those cases.

I

will

es-

come back

to this last question later.

My

next remark

will

be on the principle of proportionality, to affirm

which
do more than what is

strong conviction that this principle does exist in jus ad bellum

has to use force as a

last resort

does not have the right to

—

—

—

my

a State

imposed by the situation as in jus in hello there is an obligation in military
operations to keep a balance between the military advantages anticipated and

even a central principle of those
laws. I was therefore surprised to read in the paper of John Murphy that Hays
Parks has reported that "the American military review of Protocol I concluded
the expected incidental civilian damages.

that the concept of proportionality
law." All that

I

is

read and even what

It is

not a rule of customary international

we heard
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yesterday from James Baker

Yves Sandoz

reinforce

my

conviction. James Baker reminded us that this principle was at

on legitimate targets during the Kosovo bombmembers party to Additional Protocol I as for those,

the center of the discussions
ings, as well for
like the

NATO

United States, that were not. Therefore

can conclude in quoting

I

Bill

Fenrick, the well-known Senior Legal Adviser of the Office of the Prosecutor

of the International Criminal Court
portionality exists
is

is

on Yugoslavia: "That the

not seriously disputed."

the interpretation of the principle, not

its

principle of pro-

The problem we have

to address

existence.

Without entering in-depth into this issue, I would signal that another problem is the confusion in some military operations between the political objective and the military objectives stricto sensu. Such confusion took place in the
NATO operations in Kosovo, where the political objective to oblige
Milosevic to accept conditions previously fixed
was not well distinguished
from military objectives. In fact, the question was not to win the war, but to
put enough pressure on Milosevic to cause him to end the conflict. Therefore
traditional notions of military objective and military advantage were used in
an ambiguous way. This question would need serious consideration for operations of this nature. But I do not pretend to start a serious discussion here and
now. It would require in-depth analysis of this and other concrete cases.

—

—

My next remark is that I cannot agree with the affirmation that the balance
between the obligations of the defenders and those of the attackers has been
broken down in Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the detriment of the attackers.

col

In reality, the obligations of the defenders are very clearly stated in ProtoI,

as

we can read

The presence
shall

or

particularly in Article 51(7):

movements of the

civilian population or individuals civilians

not be used to render certain points or areas

immune from

military

operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or
to shield, favor or

not direct

impede

military operations.

The

Parties to the conflict shall

movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to

attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military
operations.

Article 58 then goes

The

on

to provide:

maximum

Parties to the conflict shall, to the

extent feasible;

prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to
civilian population, individual civilians

and

from the vicinity of military objectives;
within or near densely populated areas;

(b)

(c)
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civilian objects

under

(a)

without

remove the
their control

avoid locating military objectives

take the other necessary precautions

Commentary

____

and civilian objects under

to protect the civilian population, individual civilians
their control against the dangers resulting

Thus, as we can

see, the Protocol

is

from military operations.

very clear in imposing on a Party to the

conflict a requirement not to use civilians to protect

Nevertheless,

it is

also true that

consideration the situation as
that civilians are used as

your

it

requires as well that the attackers take into

it is

"human

military objectives.

its

in reality.

shields."

They

But

this

can't just ignore the fact

is

common sense.

Imagine

own citizens being used; you cannot pretend you just don't care. And it is

also true

if

innocent civilians of one party, particularly children, are used for

this purpose.

crime of your

This element has to be taken into account in the balance and the

enemy does not give you

the right to ignore the situation created

by that crime. But the Protocol doesn't prohibit action;

requires that

it

all

of

these elements be taken into account in the appreciation of the situation.
think, as

was

I

was adopted withbombings in Kosovo.

clearly explained yesterday, that this position

out hesitation by those deciding on the

Where I am

in total

NATO

agreement with John Murphy

problem of clarification remains

is

that a real and crucial

for the definition of a military advantage,

and

ascertaining the level where a decision must be taken or the determination of

These are undoubtedly delicate questions which can only be
clarified through practical examples in order to establish a kind of jurisprudence. We could certainly add some other questions to the list, as the one just
mentioned by Ove Bring on the dual-use objects, which precisely has, in my
responsibilities.

—

opinion, a close link with the principle of proportionality

in fact the attack

of a dual-use object can be considered as the attack of a military objective with
collateral

damages.

Mentioning again the principle of proportionality I want to stress another
element of this principle, the fact that it has to be observed at different levels.
Some would confine this principle to the strategic level and I cannot agree
with that opinion. There is no doubt, for example, that a soldier cannot blow
up a school full of children under the pretext that an enemy solider has enthe miltered the school. Such a restriction is an application of the principle

—

itary

advantage being overthrown in such a hypothesis by the expected

collateral

damages

—even

if

the

enemy

soldier has himself

committed a

viola-

tion of the law in taking children as a shield.

That being said, I don't deny that the appreciation of those rules is complex,
but we cannot totally avoid such complexity. War is complex; life is complex;
and the complexity of a problem is not a good reason to refuse facing it. We
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have to solve those questions because they are

at the heart of the necessary

limitations in war.

On the other hand, am the first to admit that the military must have preI

and that the trend to take more seriously the obligation to punish
war crimes renders still more indispensable this clarity, even if I cannot share
the criticisms of the ICRC lawyer's commentary, in particular on the meaning
of military objectives. In reality, the recent German military manual goes exactly in the same direction, as well as the excellent commentary written by
Michael Bothe, who is present with us, and by the late Karl Josef Partsch and
Waldemar Solf, the latter playing, as you know, a very important role in the
American delegation to the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference. That being
said, I do agree that this Commentary does not give a precise reply to all those
cise orders

delicate questions.

Therefore
that,

I

think

we have
it is

and
worth reading what
to go further

to find the best

way

to

do

it.

And

for

Fenrick has written in a recent

Bill

article:

and proportionality is to
become more transparent and, one hopes, more humane, outsiders, including
military experts and legal advisers not directly involved in particular conflicts,
should learn from the military planning process. A vigorous informed discussion
of targeting and proportionality issues based on case studies, both historical and
hypothetical, can contribute substantially to clarification of how the law can
and should be applied.
If

the application of the law applicable to targeting

Then Fenrick draws

the conclusion that "[t]he law applicable to targeting

and proportionality must be brought down to earth." I totally agree with this
statement and I think that the Naval War College is precisely the type of place
where the discussion suggested by Fenrick could take place.
I

will

not really enter into the problem of high-altitude

have not the basic factual elements to do
that

it is

important to reaffirm at

this

it

air

bombings, as

I

But I think nevertheless
least one basic principle on

seriously.

occasion at

which a certain confusion emerged in the discussion on those bombings: one
cannot affirm that the security of its own soldiers have an absolute priority
over the protection of the civilian population. Both elements have to be put
into the balance and taken into account. If the price to absolute security of
one's own soldiers is heavy casualties among civilians, this price is too high.
Allow me then a further comment on the
nition.

I

agree with John

sively. In fact

there are

issue of precision-guided

Murphy that there is no obligation to use it
many interdictions and restrictions on the
277

ammuexcluuse of

Commentary
weapons
weapons
weapons
for

in IHL, but

no obligation

to use a specific

weapon.

I

don't think those

an exception. But that does not mean the possession of these
without legal consequence in certain circumstances. It may help,

are
is

example, to keep the military action in conformity with IHL, particularly

in densely populated areas, in changing favorably the balance

ticipated military advantages

and the expected

between the an-

civilian collateral

damages.

Another question is the following: if you have the choice between weapons
causing more or less collateral damages to obtain the same military advantage,
have you an obligation to use the second? My reply is yes, and that even if the
principle of proportionality would still be in a favorable balance with the use of
weapons of the first type i.e., that the anticipated military advantage would
overcome the expected incidental civilian damages. This affirmation is based
on another principle which has been reaffirmed in Protocol I and which is of-

—

ten confused with the principle of proportionality, the principle of the least
feasible

damage, which

quires those

who

is

clearly stated at Article 57(2)

(ii).

plan or decide upon an attack to "take

tions in the choice of

means and methods of attack with

and

in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian

ians

and damage

Let

me now

opinion

is

that

This provision

all feasible

re-

precau-

a view to avoiding,
life,

injury to civil-

to civilian objects."

on the ethical dimension of the question. My
the problem has not been correctly posed. To have or not to

say a few words

have a weapon doesn't change the ethical

basis of

your action, even

if it

can

change your behavior, because this one depends on one hand on your ethical
values, which remain constant, but on the other hand on the means you have
your disposal, which vary. As an example

would take a medical doctor. If
he practices here or in a region of Africa far from any well-equipped medical
center, he will keep the same ethic. But his decision and responsibility will be
different if he has the capacity to test blood before an emergency transfusion
or if he hasn't, with the same objective to best serve the interest of his patient.
It is exactly the same if you have or don't have certain weapons.
at

Finally

I

would

like to

sympathy the suggestions
cific rules

I

make some comments on the future. I heard with
made by Ove Bring. I agree with him that some spe-

could be elaborated, or at least that an agreed interpretation of ex-

isting rules

should be discussed, about enforcement measures, where there

am not sure

remain some unsolved questions. That being

said,

way to do it would be to
Geneva Conventions.

an additional protocol

start the drafting of

Just recently the Secretary-General of the

the rules of IHL which must be applied by
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UN

I

that the best
III

to the

promulgated in a bulletin

UN forces engaged in enforcement

Yves Sandoz

_

operations. This was the result of fruitful informal discussions organized by the

ICRC between senior UN
experts. This informal

officials, military experts,

and smooth way

the

ICRC and other legal

to deal with such problems could in-

spire us for other necessary clarifications or

developments.

I

am

afraid that if

we open formally the procedure to adopt a third additional protocol (or even a
fourth as we know that there are ongoing discussions on the elaboration of a
third additional protocol on the protective emblems) so many obstacles and
oppositions will emerge that it would require very long and tremendous work
an end

for

which has a good chance to be very disappointing. My hesitais on the procedure, not on the necessity to clarify the points

result

tion, therefore,

mentioned by Ove Bring.

My second remark for the future is

on the importance to discuss further the practical meaning of some IHL provisions on the conduct of
hostilities and to find the right place to do it. I insist again on the fact that a
place like this prestigious Naval War College would be ideal for such
to insist again

discussions.

my last remark is

Finally

the following. There are no doubts for

me

that the

United States has to play a leading role in further discussions on IHL provisions, particularly those

concerning the conduct of hostilities.

It is

the greatest

many recent war experiences. But those discussions and
this leading role would be much easier and more credible if everyone accepted
the same basic rules. The crucial problem nowadays is the application of the
rules as we have seen in the discussion on the NATO operations in Kosovo.
military power, with

But

as long as the

will

be some hesitations on what rules can be taken as a basis for

United States

is

not party to Additional Protocol

I,

there
this

discussion.
I

know

that there are

still

many

obstacles to United States' ratification of

the 1977 Additional Protocols, but

conviction that the
in using,

I

cannot refrain from affirming again

my

US could ratify them without endangering its own security

where deemed necessary, the

many other States did. Over

possibility of express reservations, as

this internal

problem,

I

would

stress also

my con-

viction that the ratification of the United States would have a decisive effect

on the uniformity of IHL in the whole world, in the universal acceptance of
this law, and on the possibility for United States to play a leading role in the
necessary clarification of some of its provisions. We need the United States in
that role.
I

hope you

will

strong conviction

accept

on

my

apology for using this opportunity to reaffirm

this issue

and

I

thank you very much
279

for

my

your patience.
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role of a commentator to comment on the program offered, the
Ittopicthebefore
the panel, or the papers offered before that panel. While my
is

emphasis

will

be on the

The premise

for this

NATO

latter, necessarily it will

conference

—

range over

all

three.

lessons learned from Operation Allied

—

campaign against Serbian forces in Kosovo raises
many questions. Allied Force may be a classic example of the adage, "Bad
cases make bad law," with few valid lessons. As NATO's first military operation, a prime objective was keeping the nineteen-member alliance intact. Another was continuation of the Clinton Administration's objective in each of
its peace operations after Somalia of using military force, but with the admonition to commanders to "do no harm," a flawed philosophy akin to wanting to
make an omelet without breaking any eggs. In Allied Force, uncommon steps
were taken by NATO forces to reduce to an absolute minimum collateral
civilian casualties and collateral damage to civilian objects, and in some instances avoiding Serbian military casualties as well. These steps could be
Force, the

air

1

1.

This

generated

considerable

criticism

in

the

official

Air

Force

evaluation.

See

Headquarters United States air Force, Initial Report: The Air War over Serbia,
aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force pp. x, 54 (2000). Of particular note is the
following

(p. x):

assumed that political conditions will allow the most
employment of aerospace power, giving planners the latitude to optimize
survivability, target effects, and and collateral damage considerations. During the air
war over Serbia, such latitude did not exist. Not all members of the 19-nation Alliance
would have accepted the intensity and violence required to fight this war if military
planning had followed optimum Air Force doctrine. As long as Serbia was unable to
inflict significant Allied casualties, NATO accepted some operational inefficiencies

Traditionally, air planners have
efficient

associated with those political restraints.

Commentary
taken because the United States and one or two of its

had the capability
to do so, not because they necessarily felt legally obligated to do so. Professor
Murphy's articulation of the essential elements of the customary international
law process would indicate that these voluntary actions offer little, if any, precedent as to future law of war interpretation. 2
The questions my two colleagues were asked are somewhat troubling, as
they limit the scope of the inquiry. Specifically, they focus entirely on the obligations of the force engaged in offensive operations, to the neglect of the defending ground force. 3 This flows in part from the incorrect, perhaps
intentional, use of the word "attacks" in the 1977 Additional Protocol I 4 to refer to actions taken either by an attacker or defender. 5 Use of "attacks" to refer
to acts of defense is etymologically inconsistent with its definition and customary use in any of the six official languages of Additional Protocol I, a point
conceded in the Official Commentary of the International Committee of the

Red

allies

Cross. 6 Limiting the definition of attacks to "acts of violence against the

adversary"
tially

is

inconsistent with the customary law principle of distinction, par-

codified in Article 48, 7

and other provisions of Additional Protocol I that

prohibit the use of the civilian population or individual civilians as

2.

See Professor Murphy's paper in

3.

This unfortunate and incorrect effect

this

human

volume.
is

demonstrated in

articles critiquing

Operation Allied

Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The air campaign, 82 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 147 (2000) and A. Rogers, Zero-casualty warfare, 82
INTERN ATIONAl REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 165, 176 (2000). The former examines only the
Force. See, for example, Peter

efforts of the attacker to

reduce collateral civilian casualties, while the

latter offers only three

sentences on the obligation of the defender.
4.

Protocol Additional

to the

(I)

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating

Protection of Victims of International

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
[hereinafter Protocol
5.

1

of Additional Protocol

whether

I

means

states, "'Attacks'

acts of violence

in offense or defense."

Commentary on the additional Protocols of 8 June
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 603 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds.,
6.

7.

to the

June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
422 (A. Roberts and R. Guelff eds., 3d. ed. 2000)
Conflict,

I].

Article 49, paragraph

against the adversary,

WAR

Armed

Article 48 states: "In order to ensure respect for

1977

to the Geneva

1987).

and protection of the

civilian population

civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish

between the

and

civilian

population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives."

conflict" rather

government

than "States Parties"

Using the term "Parties to the

(to the Protocol) ignores the

customary law obligation of a

to take reasonable measures to separate military objectives from civilian objects, and

vice versa, in peacetime

and war.
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shields. 8

That

this definition

customary law principle of

framed

for this session,

tions. Professor

the sources he

This second point

is

evident not only in the questions

notes this inconsistency. Others, including some of

have
is

distinction

slippery slope to erode the

but also in the answers of the two primary presenta-

Murphy

cites,

was the beginning of a

failed to

do

so.

offered to emphasize a concluding

Murphy. As he notes,

9

comment

of Profes-

committed to the rule of
law, that has spent billions of dollars
in all likelihood more money than all
other nations combined
to develop the most sophisticated target intelligence systems, weapons systems capable of the most accurate weapons delivsor

it is

ironic that a nation

—

—

ery, precision-guide

and

women who

munitions, that provides the best training for the

men

operate them, and employs a multi-level, redundant, disci-

plined target approval process, has

microscope, while the

illegal

its

operations placed under a post-conflict

actions of

its

opponent

in using

human

shields,

and gross violations of the law of war in other conflicts occurring simultaneously around the world, are ignored. It is doubtful that others who purport
to follow the rule of law could have conducted the same campaign with fewer
collateral civilian casualties. This "Do as I say, not as I can't do" approach

8.

Article 5 1 paragraph 7 states:
,

The presence

or

movements of the

used to render certain points or areas
to shield military objectives

civilian population or individual civilians shall

immune from military operations,

from attacks or to

Parties to the conflict shall not direct the
civilians in order to

shield, favor or

movement of

not be

in particular in attempts

impede military operations. The

the civilian population or individual

attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military

operations.
Article 58 provides:

The
(a)

.

Parties to the conflict shall, to the

.

.

endeavor to remove the

maximum extent

feasible:

civilian population, individual civilians

and

civilian

objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives;
(b)

avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas;

(c)

take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual

civilians

and

civilian objects

under their control against the dangers resulting from

military operations.
9.

Professor Murphy's paper in this volume.
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also suggests a double standard

—

a very high standard for the United States

and a limited number of other Western democracies, and a lower standard for
the rest ofthe world. 10 Hence the adage "Be careful what you ask for" is appropriate in considering the law related to collateral casualties with respect to the

precedent of Allied Force.

Emphasis on the predominantly airpower focus of Allied Force neglects the
historic lesson that ground force operations cause greater civilian casualties
than

air

operations. 11 For this reason, historically a distinction was

tween the

risks to the civilian

enemy

made

be-

population in the "operational zone," that

is,

and civilians more distant from the line between
opposing forces. The former were assumed to remain at their own risk. Several efforts have been made to define the degree of protection afforded civilians not within the zone of operations, the most recent being Additional
Protocol I. 13 This historic struggle has not been answered satisfactorily to date,
but seems to have been lost in the post-Kosovo debate and in the questions
within

artillery range,
12

posed at

10.

This

by some

is

this conference.

true within

NATO

itself.

Targeting and collateral damage limitations insisted upon

NATO governments during Allied Force, as noted in footnote

their inability to

meet the same standards. As the Air Force report

Interoperability achieved

many successes

contrast markedly with

in terms of Alliance cooperation, but also

fell

As the United States military continues to

short in areas such as precision munitions

move toward

1,

states:

a 21st century force propelled by the revolution in military affairs, the

resulting gaps in capabilities with

its

Allied must be addressed. In future conflicts, the

U.S. Air Force must also discover methods to integrate
less-technologically

advanced

allies

.

.

.

its

assets with those of

without resorting to a "lowest

denominator" solution. In the face of a more sophisticated threat,

this

common

could be an

increasingly significant limitation for those states expecting to participate in a coalition

with the United States.

Initial Report, supra note

l,

at 47.

war compliance is particularly hypocritical when the criticism
comes from citizens of or private organizations in a neutral nation, whose government and people
have "opted out" of assuming their share of responsibility for a safer world.
11. See this author's Air War and the law of War, 32 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 1 n.l (1990)
providing World War II German casualty figures and Charles J. Dunlap, Kosovo, Casualty
Aversion, and the American Military Ethos: A Perspective, 10 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Academy Journal of Legal Studies 95, 103 (1999/2000).
12. See, for example, M. W. Royse, Consultation, in LA PROTECTION DES POPULATIONS
CIVILES CONTRE LES BOMBARDMENTS 72, 88 (1930). This program of contributions by
international law experts was hosted by the International Committee of the Red Cross.
13. This history is summarized and analyzed in Parks, supra note 11.
Post-conflict reviews of law of
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To close

this portion of

my remarks,

the picture posed by the questions, the

responses thereto, and sources cited therein, offer a clearer picture than the

one seen by the battlefield commander. Appreciating the fog of war in which a
commander must operate, the threshold for violation of the law of war is high,
whether in the grave breach provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or
the 1977 Additional Protocol

I,

each of which requires mens

rea. 1 * In establish-

upon information
and not what may be learned

ing mens rea a commander's decisions must be based
y

sonably available to him at the time,
alleged

—long

after the conflict has

ended.

rea-

—

or

15

those involving any of the following acts, if
14. Article 147, GC, defines a grave breach as ".
committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: willful killing,
torture or inhuman treatment
willfully causing great suffering or serious bodily injury to body
or health
extensive
destruction
and appropriation of property, not justified by military
for]
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly" [emphasis supplied].
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Article 85, paragraph 3, Additional Protocol

I,

defines a grave breach (for the circumstances of

making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack; [or]
launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in

this panel) as "(a)
(b)

the

knowledge that such attack

will

cause excessive loss of

civilian objects, as defined in Article 57,
15.

paragraph 2(a)

.

See, for example, the reservation taken by Switzerland

Protocol

I

.

.

damage

commanding officers at
information available to commanding officers

Similarly, at the time of

its

upon

ratification of Additional

commanders and others

2,

create

the battalion or group level and above.
at the

time of their decision

ratification (January 28, 1998), the

to

."[emphasis added].

(February 17, 1982), which states, "The provisions of Article 57, paragraph

obligations only for

"Military

injury to civilians or

life,

(iii).

is

The

determinative."

United Kingdom declared that

responsible for planning, deciding upon, or executing attacks

have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all
sources which is reasonably available to them at the relevant time." This approach was taken in
the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
necessarily

Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
1257 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A [hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor] with respect
to NATO's mistaken attack of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on July 5, 1999. See id., 1111
80-85, which found no criminal responsibility.
,
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In considering ways in
tion

must be placed in

which

its

to reduce collateral civilian casualties, distinc-

historic context. It

is

a

mutual obligation,

as seen in

the following:
Distinction

16

Defender's obligations

Attacker's obligations

Design/employment of weapon systems

Separation of

Training

civilian population

Target intelligence

military objectives

Air raid precautions

Target acquisition

Warning

to civilian population

17

shelters

evacuation
civil

The United

more than its fair share
improving bombing accuracy: 18

States has done

with respect to

defense

to

fulfill its

obligations

U.S. Bombing Accuracy

War

Number

World War II
Korean War
Viet

of

Circular
20
Error Probable

Bombs 19

9,070

3,3000 feet

1,100

1,000 feet

Nam War

400
200

176

Desert Storm

30

Modern weapons systems, such as

the McDonnell-Douglas

F15E Strike

feet
feet

Eagle, us-

ing the Global Positioning System (GPS), account for ever-increasing accuracy with

"dumb") bombs. Today, the

gravity (so-called
strike aircraft:

made

dropping "dumb" bombs

in a source of Professor

is

less

circular error probable

than

forty feet.

I

(CEP)

for

US

say this to note an error

Murphy's that incorrecdy assumed that increased

bombing accuracy has occurred only through use of precision-guided munitions. 21

W. Hays

16.

Parks,

Human
17.

Annex,
note
18.

The

Rights 65, 88
Hague Convention
art. 26,

5, art.

R. P.

Protection of Civilians from Air Warfare, 27

(IV) Respecting the

YEARBOOK ON

Laws of Customs of War on Land, Oct.

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note

57(2)

ISRAEL

(1998).

5, at 69, 78;

18, 1907,

Protocol

I,

supra

(c).

Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air power and the Gulf

War 283

(1992).

Table computed for 90% probability of a single bomb striking a 60x100 foot target, dropping
500-lb. unguided bombs. For discussion of the relative accuracy of World War II strategic
bombing, see W. Hays Parks, 'Precision and 'Area Bombing: Who did Which, and When?, 18
19.

Journal of Strategic Studies 147-174

(1995).

"the radius of a circle within which one-half of an aircraft's or
missile's projectiles are expected to fall." U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02,
20. Circular error probable

is

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1994).
21. Professor Murphy's paper in this volume quoting Stuart Belt, Missiles Over Kosovo:
Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas,
47

Naval Law Review

115, 118 (2000).
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Precision-guided munitions were used with great effect during the 1972

Linebacker campaigns over North Viet

Nam. They

received greater public at-

tention during the 1991 Coalition war to liberate Kuwait, and have been im-

proved since that time. Today the
munitions

(PGM)

is

When

for a laser-guided precision

three meters, with at least eighty per cent (rather than the

CEP standard of fifty per cent)
weapon.

CEP "norm"

within that

circle.

But

PGMs are not a panacea

a precision-guided munition goes awry,

it is

considerably

less

accurate than gravity bombs. For example, in the April 15, 1986 air strike
against terrorist-related targets in Libya, the

Mk-84 2,000-pound

precision-

guided bombs of one F-l 1 IF assigned to attack Aziziyah Barracks struck 7,400

and 3,700 feet left of the intended target. 22 PGM accuracy may be affected by weather and/or defeated by simple countermeasures. Obscurants,
such as smoke, may defeat laser-guided bombs, while electro-optical munitions
have similar vulnerabilities. 23 As is true of many aspects of warfare, the simple
answer often masks myriad complexities. Who bears the responsibility for colfeet long

lateral civilian casualties resulting

from successful obscurant use to defeat

precision-guided munitions?

Part of the problem in suggesting an obligation to use precision-guided
nitions

is

almost

all

mu-

neglect of the factors that can result in collateral civilian casualties,

of which were evident to one degree or another in Allied Force:

Factors Affecting Collateral

Damage and

Collateral Civilian Casualties

24

Target intelligence

Distance to target

Target winds, weather

Planning time

Force training, experience

Effects of previous strikes

Force integrity

Weapon

Enemy

Target identification

Enemy

intermingling

25

availability

defenses

Target acquisition

Rules of engagement

Human factor

Equipment

failure

Fog of war

Not

all

noted in a presentation
a "rush to

As Professor Adam Roberts
the US Institute of Peace on March 1, 2001, there is

are within the attacking force's control.
at

judgment that anything that

affects the civilian

population

is illegal.

22. Brian L. Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on
Libya (1990).
23. Gary S. Ziegler, Weather Problems Affecting Use of Precision Guided Munitions, 32 NAVAL

WAR COLLEGE REVIEW (May-June 1979), at 95; John P. Bulger, Obscurants: Countermeasures
Modern Weapons, 62 MILITARY REVIEW (May 1982), at 45.
24.

Parks, supra note 11, at 184-202.

25.

That

is,

enemy

to

intermingling of military objectives with civilian objects and the civilian

population, including the use of

human

shields.

Photographic examples are contained in Parks,

supra note 16, at 112-113.
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_____

assume that the law of war provides absolute protection for everything that may be civilian." It also is an error to view every civilian casualty
It is

an error

as a

war crime, and/or

on the party

to

to place the entire responsibility for civilian casualties

to the conflict that has the least control over them.

Offsetting the law of war principle of distinction

is

the continuing emer-

gence of a 'counter' targeting practice by some governments. In order to reduce or defeat an opponent's military superiority, particularly with respect to

many governments have taken no or limited air raid precautions or
to evacuate the civilian population. Some have purposely located objects

airpower,
steps

of strategic importance in urban areas, in order to use the civilian population
as

human shields.

This practice became evident in the Korean War.

perienced in the Vietnam War, both in the

air

It

was ex-

campaigns over North Vietnam

and ground operations in South Vietnam; in the 1991 Persian Gulf
conflict; and in Allied Force. 26 It is not unique to air operations, as members of
Task Force Ranger discovered in their battle in Mogadishu on October 3,
and

in air

1993 (relearning a lesson experienced a generation

earlier in

Vietnam). In

US air strike against terrorist-related targets in
Moammar Gadhafi threatened to round up all foreign

April 1986, just prior to the
Libya, Libyan dictator

them in and around his most important facilities. In the
decade, members of United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Balkans

nationals and place
last

were taken hostage and placed adjacent to military objectives as

human

one nation, one of the first to ratify Additional Protocol I, an entire
downtown city block was razed. A major military command and control censhields. In

was built underground. The structures that existed on that block previously were meticulously rebuilt, including a school and a mosque. The intent
was clear: to use civilian objects and the civilian population to shield this important military objective, and to exploit damage to them and civilian casualter

ties

should the military objective be attacked. 27

Article 5 1

,

paragraph 8 of Additional Protocol

party to a conflict

from the

fails

to

fulfill its

I

states that

even where a

obligations to separate military objectives

civilian population or, worse, uses the civilian population as

shields, the

opposing party

to the civilian population

is

not released from

and

I,

legal obligations

with respect

Although the United States

civilians.

State Party to Additional Protocol

its

this

statement

is

human
is

not a

consistent with

its

26. See, for example, W. Hays Parks, Rolling Thunder and the Law of War, 33 AIR UNIVERSITY
REVIEW (Jan.-Feb. 1982), at 2 (Vietnam War); and U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FINAL
Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War 608, 614, 615 (1992).
27. See, for example, W. Hays Parks, Crossing the Line, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS

(Nov. 1986), at 40, 50, and DAVIS, supra note 22, at 15, 18, 19.
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post- World

War

practice.

II

A point this conference might have addressed

In light of the increasing, illegal reliance

extent can

it

upon human

is:

what

shields by some, to

be expected that the other side can assume the responsibility for

minimizing collateral civilian casualties beyond

new

Professor Bring suggests a

its

legal obligation?

additional protocol to limit

(if

not prohibit)

28

on military objectives in urban areas. Recent State practice suggests
this would merely exacerbate the problem, encouraging many to make increased use of civilian objects and the civilian population to shield military obattacks

jectives

from attack.

Professor Bring also suggests
ing of the Final Report to the

ing

NATO's

which I see
of

more

ICTY

effective warnings.

I

differ

from

his read-

Prosecutor regarding Allied Force regard-

on the Serbian Television and Radio Station in Belgrade,
corroborating General Wesley Clark's statement that as a result

attack

as

NATO warnings that the Serb Television and Radio Station building was

about to be attacked, the Serbs ordered international journalists to report to

them

the building, using
28.

as

human

shields. 29

Professor Bring's paper in this volume.

Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War 264 (2001) and Alex Todorovic, Serb TV Chief
Accused Over Air Raid, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 14, 2001, at 19. The ICTY
Prosecutor's report does not support Professor Bring's argument. The report states in part:
29.

[S]ome doubts have been expressed

NATO

as to the specificity of the

warning given to civilians

and whether the notice would have constituted
"effective warning ... of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless
circumstances do not permit" as required by Article 57(2) of Additional Protocol I.

by

of

intended

its

strike,

somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, NATO officials
have told Amnesty International that they did not give a
specific warning as it would have endangered the pilots.
On this view, it is possible
that casualties among civilians working at the [radio and television station] may have
been heightened because of NATO's apparent failure to provide clear advance
Evidence on

this point

is

in Brussels are alleged to

.

.

warning of the attack, as required by Article 57(2).

On

the other hand, foreign media representatives were apparently forewarned of the

As Western

were reportedly warned by their employers to stay
away from the television station before the attack, it would also appear that some
attack. ...

journalists

may have expected that the building was about to be struck.
Prime Minister Tony Blair blamed Yugoslav officials for not
evacuating the building, claiming that "[t]hey could have moved those people out of
the building. They knew it was a target and they didn't
very
[I]t was probably for
Yugoslav

officials

Consequently,

UK

.

clear

propaganda reasons."

.

.

.

Although knowledge on the part of Yugoslav

the impending attack would not divest
it

may

NATO of

its

warning given by

11

77.
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of

officials
.

.

.,

may be partially responsible for
and may suggest that the advance

NATO may have been sufficient under the circumstances.

Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A,

.

obligation to forewarn civilians

nevertheless imply that the Yugoslav authorities

the civilian casualties resulting from the attack

.

Commentary
This issue

is

not new, nor changed by Additional Protocol

I.

Hugh Tren-

chard, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, identified the problem in 1928:

As regards the question of legality, no authority would contend it is unlawful
bomb military objectives, wherever situated. Such objectives may be situated

to

in

centers of population in which the destruction from the air will result in
casualties also in the neighboring civilian population.

The

may have

bombing

provided

this result

all

is

no reason

reasonable care

is

for regarding the

fact that air attack
as illegitimate

taken to confine the scope of the bombing to the

would be able to secure complete
war manufactures and depots merely by locating them in a
a position which the opposing belligerent would never accept. 30

military objective. Otherwise a belligerent

immunity

for his

large city ...

A parallel issue relating to interpretation of Additional Protocol

I

with

re-

World Wars I and
I Marine Corps aviator, went on to a
Harvard. In 1928 he authored what re-

spect to precision-guided munition use was raised between
II.

Professor

M. W. Royse,

a

World War

long and respected academic career at

mains the best work on the law of war
Speaking

at a

as

it

relates to aerial

1930 conference of international

legal experts

bombardment. 31
hosted by the In-

Committee of the Red Cross, Royse noted "It is possible to gauge
the immunity of civil populations by noting restrictions on 'permissible violence.' Rules of war restrict the means and methods of warfare only
when
the rule does not have the effect of placing one or more States at a disadvantage." 32 The increasing conduct of some States in using human shields, and
some interpretations of Additional Protocol I offered in this meeting that
place the entire responsibility for civilian casualty avoidance on nations employing more advanced weaponry, are likely to erode rather than enhance respect for the law of war and civilian protection.
Comments also are necessary regarding two arguments made by Professor
ternational

.

Bring in his paper.

The

first

.

concerns counting civilian deaths within a mili-

tary objective as "collateral civilian casualties." 33

would be a

.

military objective in war.

It

It is

clear that the

Pentagon

should be equally obvious that a

30. Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST
GERMANY 1939-1945, Vol. IV, Annexes and Appendices, 73 (1961).
31. M. W. Royse, Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of
WARFARE (1928). This comment is made with full and great appreciation and respect for the
many works by James Maloney Spaight, including his three-edition AIR POWER AND WAR

RIGHTS, published in 1924, 1933 and 1947.
32.

Royse, supra note 12, at 77.

33. See Professor Bring's paper in this volume.
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civilian

working there assumes a certain

Parks

risk.

His or her presence would not

change the nature of the Pentagon as a legitimate

target. Civilians killed

within an obvious military objective are not "collateral civilian casualties."

Counting

civilians

casualties"

employed within a military objective

would only encourage increased

jective in order to

make

its

as "collateral civilian

civilian presence in a military ob-

attack prohibitive in terms of collateral civilian

casualties.
Finally, Professor

Bring declares without any documentation or authorita-

tive reference that the proportionality

graph 5 (b) of Additional Protocol

customary law."

34

language contained in Article 51, para-

I is

"arguably a codification of traditional

The principle of proportionality has gained importance

over

the past thirty-five years, but within the limited audience of Western

democracies. The principle of proportionality is important today to the US and its
NATO allies. I do not disagree with its intent. I do disagree with some of the
radical interpretations being offered of it.

bad

history, as

One

I

have shown elsewhere.

To suggest that it is customary law is

35

"Does the use of precision-guided munitions lead to a duty to use those types of weapons exclusively
in future conflicts?" The answer should not be viewed solely through the US
defense budget, which (misguidedly) some see as unlimited. Were I a lawyer
for another government, my advice to that government would be: Don't buy
them. There is no legal obligation to acquire them. But if you do buy them,
you may be required to use them or face criminal prosecution for failure to use
them when some believe you should have. Also, it may encourage an oppoquestion asked by conference planners

nent to use

human

is:

shields to offset your technological advantage.

Another answer is a question: How far does one take this argument? Two of
the most precise attacks in recent years were the 1983 truck bomb attack on
United States peacekeepers in Beirut, and last year's suicide barge attack on
the USS Cole. Had a State party to an armed conflict carried those out, would
it be legally obligated to continue precision suicide attacks? Similarly, on April
16, 1988, an Israeli special operations team entered the home of Khalil
el-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad, the military commander and chief of
34. See Professor Bring's paper in this volume. Following the colloquium, Professor Bring

advised

me

that this statement was based

upon the argument

Bombardment: Rules and Reasons, 49 BRITISH

31-69 (1980). While

I

practice of nations offers
35.

offered by

Hans

Blix in his

YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Area

1978, at

hold both Hans Blix and Professor Bring in the highest respect, the

no evidence

to substantiate this claim.

Parks, supra note 16, at 90-97.
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operations for the Palestine Liberation Organization, in Sidi Boussaid, Tuni-

Abu Jihad was

sia.

he reached

killed as

dren, present in the room, were
distinction. Is

this

it

weapon. His wife and two chilunharmed. That is the epitome of

for his

left

not a logical and inevitable extension of the question posed to

panel to suggest that a nation that has such a special operations capability

would be legally obligated to use it against military objectives in urban areas
even before resorting to precision-guided munitions? Such a suggestion is absurd, of course, but no less than the argument some have made with respect to
precision guided munitions.
I

will close

with one

final

advocates to some degree

comment, and

may be

that

is

victims of their

grees of accuracy that cannot always be

met

to suggest that air

own

power

hype. Promising de-

raises public expectations,

and

allows critics to argue that collateral civilian casualties resulting from the

fric-

tion of

war may have been intentional. Touting technological precision may

lead to expectations that are unrealistic. 36

a case of let the advocate or

It is

proponent beware.

36.

The

official

US

Air Force analysis of Allied Force, received after

this author's

comments

were given, agrees: "The benchmark for high bombing accuracy and low collateral damage,
however, may create unrealistic expectations for political leaders and the public at large in future
."
INITIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at
air operations fought under very different circumstances.
.

54.
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Barry Strauss

I

would

first like

papers,

their part

in this

to

thank Professors Murphy and Bring

and the organizers

because

I

room fit one

for

or the other

if

or as

comment
Let
to tell

me

some would put

it

is

not both of these categories, so

remarks towards you. In particular,

method

I

such excellent

an act of faith on
know that most of you

having invited me. This

am neither a warrior nor a lawyer.

for

I

will try to avail

I'll

direct

my

myself with the Socratic

the 'Jeopardy approach.' That

is, I'll

pose

my

in the form of questions.

point out

you that

I

first

that

I

am

a historian.

And

as a historian,

it's

my duty

represent a guild that has a fundamental skepticism about our

enterprise here because historians are famously cautious about the possibility

of learning from history. Historians would ask can

we

learn any lessons from

Kosovo conflict? Some of you will know the anecdote about the historian
who was asked, 'What do you think of the French Revolution?' And he rethe

plied,

'It's

too soon to

tell.'

Well,

it

may

or

may not be

too soon to

Kosovo, but we need to ask about the Kosovo conflict

from

tell

about

—what can we learn

it?

We begin by asking what can we learn about the role of lawyers?
Moore has

told us that lawyers played a unique role in the

Kosovo

Professor

conflict in

the history of modern warfare or indeed the history of warfare, in the role they

played in advising

on the

tactics of this conflict.

We need to ask

Kosovo the
wars? Or was
is

wave of the future? Will lawyers play a similar role in future
Kosovo unique? Was it an abrogation? To what extent do the unique characteristics of the Kosovo warfare shape what happened there? In particular let
me pose a question what would have happened during the Kosovo war if
groups of Serb terrorists had bombed hospitals in NATO countries? Would

—

Commentary

this

have affected

to convince

NATO's

tactics in this

commanders and indeed

More

generally

think

—and

this

is

my

—when we think about the Kosovo war, should we think of

damentally a humanitarian intervention, or should
conflict

lawyers have been able

to convince politicians to be similarly re-

strained in their response in Serbia?

question

Would

war?

whose aim was

we have

to stabilize

to ask this question

NATO's

when we

we

it

second
as fun-

think of it as a political

volatile southeastern flank?

I

look more broadly at the strategy

of the Kosovo conflict.

Some

of the questions and

cause us to ask whether

comments

NATO's

that arose yesterday

strategy in

Kosovo was

I

think would

strictly military or

was it rather following a political and psychological strategy? Did NATO plan
to win the war by destroying Serbia's military potential for action in Kosovo, or
was

NATO rather aiming at delivering a message to Mr Milosevic and other

members of the Serb

elite that if

the war were to continue, that eventually

NATO would flatten the economic infrastructure of Serbia?
to ask that as a factual question.

We also need to ask

What

about the ethics of NATO's strategy in

to ask

it

about the question of dual-use

we need
an ethical question.

as

war? In particular we need

this

targets.

it

think

I

NATO did target a number of

and so was legally proper to target, but
they also were very important for the Serb economy. The question is to what
extent were they targeted because of their military use? To what extent were
they targeted because of their economic and therefore their political use? If
this targeting was legal, was it also ethical?
dual-use

To

facilities

that had military use

turn the question around, to ask

heard that the strategy in

this

it

in a

war was not to

somewhat

strike a

different way, we've

quick devastating knock-

was a strategy of slow escalation. The war lasted seventy-eight days when it could possibly have ended much sooner. We need to
ask the ethics of this strategy and in particular how many additional Kosovars
suffered or died as a result of the prolongation of the war? How would we balout blow, but rather

it

ance that number against the number of civilians
Serbia because of the particular strategy that

Now let's
eral

who were

NATO followed?

turn from strategy to tactics and look more specifically at collat-

damage.

On

the subject of collateral damage,

stating the obvious.

The term

collateral

damage

let

is

a

deed Orwellian. We're asking of course how many

many

perhaps spared in

how many
conduct of war? The
deaths,

injuries,

how much

me

be forgiven for just

euphemism

—

if

not in-

civilian casualties,

civilian suffering

is

how

permitted in

hundred civilian deaths in Serbia is before us. We need to ask the question, was this an excessive number of deaths
in this conflict? Or does it reflect restraint? Does it reflect admirable restraint?
the

figure of five
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From

this

we need

war were there

to ask about

NATO commanders. In their behavior in this

sible precautions..7

Was

fea-

there to a significant degree too liberal an interpreta-

tion of what a military objective

was in Serbia and Kosovo?

we need to go to a factual question. It's one that's been raised
but I think we need to raise it again and ask for clarification from the

From
fore,

from the rules of proportionality and

significant deviations

this

perts. It's

bombing

a factual question regarding high-altitude bombing.

at 15,000 feet rather

than going lower as a general

That

rule, did

is,

beex-

by

NATO

Did it increase the number of civilian casualties? Depending on what our answer to that question is, I think
we come up with a serious ethical question. That is, how do we weigh in the
balance concern for the safety of soldiers' lives as opposed to concern for civilian lives? To ask the question in a different way, just what risks can we ethically ask soldiers to undertake? Can we for example ask soldiers to expose
themselves to hostile fire from other soldiers in order to minimize the number
of civilian casualties? Is that a fair and ethical thing for us to demand? To go a
increase the possibility of civilian casualties?

step further,

Now

I

is it

a democratic thing for us to

raise the question of

whether

cause the question of chivalry has
tary honor.

To my

talking about
I

come up

me

ears, these strike

modern warfare.

it's

When

I

demand?

a democratic thing to

—the question of
as rather

demand

chivalry

and

be-

mili-

unusual terms to hear in

hear about chivalry and military honor,

have to ask myself whether these are appropriate terms or whether they are

not instead aristocratic hangovers from an age of gentlemen warriors.
certainly ask soldiers never to deliberately target civilians.

ask soldiers never to deliberately target civilians.
follow the laws of

armed

We can

We certainly must

We must ask commanders to

But again, can we
in order to minimize civilian

conflict in choosing their targets.

ask soldiers to knowingly risk their

own

lives

casualties?

Moving on from

wanted to ask some questions about Professor
Bring's proposal for defining military objectives more tightly in future multinational humanitarian interventions. In particular I wanted to ask the following
questions. What would the effect of his proposal be on the safety of soldiers
following this much more restricted definition of military objectives? What
would its effect have been in the Kosovo campaign? What would its effect
have been on Kosovars in prolonging the campaign? And what would its effect
have been on enemy power?
this,

I

Turning to Professor Murphy's discussion of the
munitions in urban and highly populated areas,

we ought not

to

employ any black

it

letter rule in

295

role of precision-guided

may indeed be
demanding

the case that

that precision-

Commentary
guided munitions be used. But would

it

not make sense to say that depending

—

upon feasibility the feasibility of using them and upon the discretion of the
commanders that indeed precision-guided munitions should be used in urban and highly populated areas whenever possible. So not a black letter rule,

—

but something that should be striven for in the interest of minimizing civilian
casualties.

tent

A follow-up question on that for the experts would be to what ex-

would finances make

The

this possible or impossible?

question of finances brings

me

to

my final question. That

is

one about

the differences of the different kinds of States that fight war, the differences in
ethics might be expected
cally rich

between technologically poor States and technologi-

and sophisticated

countries to fight their wars by democratic principles?
ocratic countries particularly

when

they are engaging in humanitarian inter-

ventions to fight wars by humanitarian principles?
that

it's

we expect democratic
Should we expect dem-

States. In particular, should

Or

rather, should

we

say

simply impossible to expect that of democratic countries and unfair to

we say that war is not a humaniand that the proper role of democratic principles in the conduct of war is making democratic political decisions about the nature of war,
the aims of war, the purpose of war and having made those decisions to fight
war cleanly and fairly and according to the laws of armed conflict, but fighting
the war using all force at a country's disposal in order to win the war as quickly
as possible, to achieve a political goal that is in and of itself humanitarian and
expect that of democratic countries? Should
tarian business

humane?

I'll

leave that as

my final question.

further.
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Modern Technology:
Brian O'Donnell:

Is

There

An Obligation to

Use

It?

1

We

had some discussion on the precision-guided munitions issue and I'd
like to turn that to the targeting analysis issue for collateral damage purposes.
Colonel Montgomery's presentation yesterday discussed the highly technical
nature of some of the new technology that we Ve used to determine the blast
patterns of buildings whether it's going to be walls falling in, walls falling out
and so forth. Are we establishing in the panel's opinion probably Hays Parks
would be the best person to answer this a new standard that if we don't take
advantage of that new technology in future operations, then we have failed to
utilize all reasonable means to minimize collateral damage?

—

—

W. Hays
I

don't

Parks:

know enough about

ians are likely to be inside
ties

there

target

may be.

package

for

I

will

an objective or how many

note that years ago

North Vietnam.

an estimate that there were 2.7
that

.7

the formulas for determining

I

how many

civil-

collateral civilian casual-

looked at the

Top

Secret original

was written in August of 1964 and gave
persons living in each structure. I feel sorry for
It

may be. I'll let Tony Montgomery really respond
that we know what munitions can do. The JDAM that

person whoever that

more to that, but I feel
we have is very well developed, quite sophisticated. So I feel fairly good about
that side of it provided you have accurate delivery. I have not seen the formulations for how we determine that there's going to be X number of civilians in
a particular structure or how likely it is we'll have X amount of collateral civilian casualties. I do think that we may be again creating expectations there
1.

Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy; International

Development Command.

Law

Advisor, Naval Warfare

Discussion

that

when

these formula do not work, people will look at

them

in the

most

negative fashion.

Mike Newton: 2
In fulfilling the obligation of the law to take

which

all

feasible measures,

it's

easy to

what the media and
much of the public has done. But in point of fact, I think the targeteers and
our Air Force colleagues would agree that what really is done is an assessment
of how to weaponeer a target, how to attack it, when to attack it in the way
most likely to minimize collateral damage. I would give you just one exam-

jump

pie

to precision-guided munitions

— the MUP [Yugoslav Ministry of

tacked

think

is

Internal Affairs police forces] police sta-

on an east-west axis, there were four-story
side. They didn't do that. They athundred pound dumb bombs on a north-south access.

tion in Jackavitza. If you attacked
civilian

I

it

apartment buildings on either
it

with

There's a big

five

bomb

crater in the road in front of the building.

devastated. There's a big

bomb

The

building

is

crater in the parking lot behind the building.

Beautiful weaponeering, and the civilians

on either

side weren't affected

— the

windows weren't even broken. I think that's an example of the kinds of things
that US militaries do precisely to minimize collateral damage which lead into a
question really for the panel as a whole.

Human Shields: Can Abuse of the Law of War Be a Force Multiplier?
Mike Newton:
There was press reporting on the attack on the RTS station where, when
you look at what happened, the US military took steps to minimize collateral
damage. It was press reporting that in fact Slobodan Milosevic had advance
notice of the attack on the RTS station and the casualties that were caused
were caused by the fact that he took people, rounded them up and locked
them in the station literally locked them into the station as a propaganda
vehicle to then exploit to the world media, which he did successfully. I mean
the very fact that people perceive of that as an unlawful attack; the very fact
that we're still discussing it is, I think, an indicator of Milosevic's success.
If you do go down the road of pursuing future legal developments, how do
you envision using the law? I mean it's pretty clear to me that people are using
the laws as a force multiplier to actually assist an unethical defendant. How

—

2.

—

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army; Office of War Crimes Issues, Department of State.
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would you guard against that because very clearly that's what we're seeing in
an unethical defender is using the law as a
the practicality on the ground

—

and constrain the attacker even when the attacker is making a
huge effort to comply with the law? So how would you address that as a matter
of law if you do try to come up with an additional protocol or further targeting

way

to limit

restrictions?

W. Hays

Parks:

think the one thing that

I

Protocol

I, I

would make

not in there.

it

I

would look

a grave

You could perhaps

we were rewriting additional
use human shields. I think that's

at if

breach to

interpret that from using the grave breach

on occupied territory. But if
you're not, I think the dilemma you have is that some nations felt then and
feel now that if I can draft my men and women into my military and have them
die in my defense, I can use my civilians the same way. If those are civilians of
another country as happened both I think in Yugoslavia and also happened
in Iraq in 1990 when hostages were taken and used as human shields
then
provision of the Civilians' Convention

if

you're

—

—

you have a grave breach of Article 147.
resolved
col

as

I

1

think, however,

we

still

have the un-

dilemma that existed at the time of negotiation of Additional Prototo what extent can the leadership of an enemy nation use its own

population as

human

shields.

John Murphy:

The
it

only

comment

I'll

make on

illustrates the difficulty

the situation that's been posed here

is

that

of getting the facts straight in an armed conflict.

Part of the problem in the situation you pose

is

that

Mr Milosevic was success-

and that if all
the facts had come out, then there really would have been no valid charge
that the United States forces had violated the law of armed conflict. In fact,
quite the contrary would have been charged. But of course getting the facts
straight during any crisis, certainly during armed conflict, continues to be a
ful in

getting a certain element of the press to believe the story

major

—perhaps

irresolvable

—problem.

Yves Sandoz:

The problem is not so much a need to change the law but
There are too many violations; but it's not drafting new laws
this.

key

We have

to find better

to

implement

that will change

ways to react to violations of the law. That

issue.
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Michael Bothe:
must admit, I have not quite seen where this problem of human shields
comes in. This is in violation of the laws of war certainly. In Yugoslavia, this is
a subject for the jurisdiction of the ICTY. As it is a violation of the laws of
war, it comes under the definition of the crimes which are subject to the
jurisdiction of that Court under Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTY. Having
said that, I entirely agree that much more attention should be paid to this curI

rent practice.

Do We Need An Additional Protocol

For Humanitarian Intervention?

Christopher Greenwood:
This question

is

tional protocol for

ply to States

for

Ove

Bring regarding his proposal for drafting an addi-

humanitarian interventions.

toward which the intervention

the coalition which

is

Which body of law would
directed? In a

carrying out the intervention

ap-

Kosovo type of
governed by a

case

if

new

protocol as envisioned on interventions because they are acting in a hu-

is

is

manitarian capacity and not self-defense, which body of law would apply to
the country in which the intervention

same body of

to the
will

for

it

own

being carried out? Will

rules about intervention because

be able to say that in

it's

is

it's

own view

that

be subject

the intervenee, or

acting in self-defense indeed

national survival and thus subject only to the more lenient stan-

dards that are the general rule in Protocol

Ove

it is

it is

it

I?

Bring:

First,

I

would

in this context,

talked about

like to say that if we
it

needs to be a balanced protocol relating to what we've

— the need

international conflicts.
tocol.

could imagine an additional protocol

just

to get rid of human shields as a

That

issue

way of defense during
has to be addressed in the same kind of pro-

But I'm not married to the idea that

could also be some

III

common

statement on

it

must be a negotiated

how

text. It

operations should be con-

document would not compete with international humanitarian law proper. It would only be something in addition to it with very
ducted. That kind of

specific
I

messages being signaled to the parties to that conflict.

agree that you have a very good point there with regard to

erned by what body of law.
uation in legal terms?
self-defense.

Although

who

is

gov-

How would Yugoslavia in this case consider the sit-

They would probably look upon
this protocol I'm talking

about

is

this as a right of

not relating to aggres-

sion or self-defense for humanitarian intervention or the opposite, they would
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certainly find themselves having the right to

mal standards of self-defense.

I

conduct warfare under the nor-

agree with you that that

is

a problem that has

to be looked into further.

have a kind of new protocol trying to limit the situation to a certain
kind of intervention, that will presume that the armed conflict will stay within
If you

the confines of the scope of application that has been drafted in that protocol.
If

the Yugoslav authorities start to upgrade and escalate the fighting under the

principle of self-defense, then that scope of application will
find yourself within those parameters

any more. You

will

fall.

You

will

not

go back to the ordi-

nary law of armed conflict.

John Murphy:

The

briefest of

lems with

it

comments regarding

just as others

been noticed

is it

intervention

is

One

thing

primarily humanitarian, to change the rules to

I

have prob-

think hasn't

make

for the

it

more

be military efficiency would obstruct bringing the humani-

That it seems to me would be dysfuncand unfortunate. It does seem to me that Professor Bring's proposal
with it a little bit of the just war concept with all of the difficulties that

tarian violations to an

brings

have expressed problems.

I

seems to be that in the case of where the motivation

difficult for there to

tional

this interesting proposal.

end

quickly.

raises.

Ove

Bring:

There have been a

lot

of points of view put forward with regard to the pro-

posed additional protocol

III.

Perhaps that suggestion should be looked upon

main focus on my paper was the definition of military objectives. At the end of the paper, I wanted to address the ethical lessons
of the Kosovo conflicts since that is part of our agenda here. During such an
assessment of the ethical dimension of the Kosovo conflict, I think it's approin perspective. Probably the

priate to bring

up the idea that

is

already floating around in the international

community about such an additional protocol
ervations and critical points with regard to

and

it

it

III. I

—

it

have taken the many

might be

might be counterproductive in certain respects.

Still, I

res-

totally unrealistic

think

it

addresses

the matter of improper balance with regard to the rights of attackers against
the hazards that the civilians

address that problem,

if

on the ground

But

in order to

we

don't

legal solution. Additional protocol III that

we've

you admit

have to be stuck to a certain

are experiencing.

it is

a

problem in these

situations,

been discussing would be a treaty. Another way would be, as I said, perhaps to
have a code of conduct which perhaps could get rid of some of the more
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technical devaluating effects that a treaty text would have
as a whole.

humanitarian law

on

Or one could imagine having

international

the Secretary-

UN

General of the United Nations issue another bulletin on observance by

on

international humanitarian law principles in

armed

That
kind of bulletin could refer exactly to these enforcement operations and it
could be a sort of a guideline for other kinds of similar interventions. That was
forces

conflict.

in the general perspective.

Reciprocity in

Leslie

War and

the

Law

of

War

Green:

In any future conflict, particularly one with a coalition character, we've got
to carry the public with us.

From

this point

of view

I'm thinking of the issue of these "clever,"

or, to

want to raise a question.
use Mike Schmitt's term,
I

bombs. We've got them. By way of contrast,

"brilliant"

conflict against

if

we

are involved in a

an enemy that doesn't have them, are we under an obligation

to use only deliberative resources that are available to him? This

par excellence!

It's

is

reciprocity

merely a modern application of the old Asian idea that

phants should only be used against elephants and

ele-

men against men. Where do

we stand from our propaganda point of view in persuading the public when we
have the means to wipe them out, but they only have the means to kick us?

W. Hays
Leslie,

Parks:
I

don't recall where that was. I've seen various versions of that.

One

of them of course was the proposal during the negotiation of Additional Proto-

made by Togo, which argued that if two nations were in a war
and one of them had an air force and the other did not, the one that had the

col

I

that was

air force

could not use

it

—nice

try!

There's a rather famous quote by Churchill about a disarmament confer-

ence where the lion wanted another animal to give up
said

we

all just

deal of that.

I

ought to hug each other

—

this

its

teeth.

And

the bear

kind of thing. So, there's a great

we have is that unfortunately our opponents
our doctrine. They don't play to our strong suit. Mr

think the dilemma

do not always follow
Milosevic would have loved to have neutralized our airpower capabilities to
force us into a ground campaign. That's the dilemma you have. However we
feel

about the obligation to use precision-guided munitions in every case;
of us would agree that

think

all

cause

we do want

to hold

down

we

are not going to say we'll not use

the collateral casualties as
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Yves Sandoz:
I

have two points.

First,

the question of determining

without important military means, could defend

was

at the heart of negotiations

The

lomatic Conference.

Additional Protocol

I

if

a poor country,

without violating

IHL

which took place during the 1974-1977 Dipof those negotiations was the introduction in

of 1977 of rules accepting guerilla warfare as a legitimate

means of warfare. The
they have to

result

itself

how

remain the same, as

mentioned before, but
be implemented in relation to the means available. Quite clearly,

the fighting

is

principles

unbalanced, there

is

a great risk, as

I

I

think John

tioned too, that respect for the law will decrease and that

we

Murphy men-

will enter into

an

era of terrorist attacks.

The second

point

is

the following: the

NATO action in Kosovo will proba-

remain a special case. I do not think we will have many cases in which
emergency humanitarian intervention doctrine will be applied. Basically,

bly

this
it is

an intervention to ensure the application of the law in stopping a violation of
it. This type of intervention is unbalanced by nature. There is no comparison
between NATO and Yugoslavian forces. But the fundamental questions for
the credibility of such interventions in world public opinion are clarity and im-

may not
step without encountering such enforcement actions and establishing who has
partiality. Clarity in setting forth

the threshold over which a State

the right to decide those actions.

And

impartiality in taking measures corre-

sponding only to the gravity of the situation and not to the economic or
cal interest of those deciding

and undertaking the action.

John Norton Moore:
When we look at imbalance, we need,
ance of the Iraq

Army

invading Kuwait.

about the imbalance of the massive

200,000

killed in disregard of the

we might

talk about the

politi-

for
If

example, to talk about the imbal-

we

human

law of war.

talk about the imbalance, talk

rights violations in Bosnia with
If

we

talk about the imbalance,

imbalance of a regular army police force directed

to-

ward killing civilians in Kosovo in a massive way that we're trying to stop. It
seems to me that the real key is to look at what the goals of the democracies
are in trying to stop democide and genocide, trying to stop aggressive war. The
reality is we want to win those as rapidly as we possibly can at the lowest cost
to all involved.

Michael Bothe:

The

question of differentiated or equal obligations has been with us

all

the

time because although legally speaking, parties to a conflict are equal, militarily
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speaking they never

We've had

are.

that in different prospects and different re-

For instance the question whether poor countries can afford to provide

spects.

for prisoners of war if they cannot nourish
one version of that. There is a tension between reci-

adequate standards of treatment

own

their

That

armies.

is

procity and the fundamental principle of no reciprocity which

You do not mete out bad treatment

in the laws of war.

action to bad treatment

if you

by Article 57 of Protocol

I

can do

which

better.

I

is

also inherent

to the other guy as a re-

think this

is all

very well covered

says in relation to the attacks that

all

feasible

precautions have to be taken in order to minimize civilian casualties.

what

is

one party

feasible for

is

not necessarily feasible for the other party, but

does not lower the standard for the party for which

this

Now

Target Priority and Collateral

this

is

feasible.

Damage

Michael Glennon:

Assume that a list of lawfully vetted targets is assembled. Assume further
that some of the targets on the list are known to carry a substantially greater
risk of collateral damage and civilian deaths. Can those targets be assigned a
higher priority? Can they be moved up on the list and hit sooner rather than
later

because the belief is the war

will therefore

mately a greater number of military and civilian

be ended sooner saving

ulti-

lives.

Yves Sandoz:
If

I

understood the question, you have a reply in Article 57(3) of Protocol

which

states that

"when

a choice

is

possible

between several

military objec-

tives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to

shall

be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the

civilian lives

and

to civilian objects."

I

"No Body Bags" War and

I,

be selected

least

danger to

think that answers your question,

the

Human Lives

Value of

Adam Roberts:
I

as

want

Ove

to raise the question of whether this really

Bring stated

it

in his paper.

Of course

it

was

was a "no body bags" war

in the sense that

we know

combat casualties, but whether it was a
clear policy from the beginning that it was a "no body bags" war is a much
more debatable proposition. Those embarking on the decision to engage in
war knew that they were taking a risk with their own servicemen's lives. I
think I'm right in recalling that that was stated in some of the speeches at the
that allied forces did not suffer any
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beginning of the war including

I

think in President Clinton's. So one has to be

wisdom which assumes that
"no body bag" war at the time. I do not

very careful before one adopts the ex post facto
this

was clearly understood to be a

think that

women

it

On the other hand,

of allied countries was in

don't think
just

was.

it's

self-evident,

and

the desire to protect the servicemen and

my

view entirely understandable. Again,

I'd like

the opinions of the panel

because there was a desire to protect their

lives doesn't

being viewed superior in value to the lives of others.

And

on

mean
it's

far

I

but

this,

they were

from

self-

evident that keeping airmen in a position of relative safety increases the risk
to the population below.

aircrews could

being

made

make

It

is

possible that in a position of relative safety

decisions that were calm and informed as distinct from

in haste,

I

come from

a country with a tradition of low-level

bombing and the risks associated with that low-level bombing are well known.
They include risks to those on the ground as well as those performing it.

Ove

Bring:

Professor Barry Strauss asked

me

if

you have

this

kind of solution, what

will

be the safety of the soldiers, the safety of the Kosovars? Will there be a prolongation of the conflict, etcetera? Well, these are

With

cussed from this ethical perspective.

quoted Tony Rogers

have to

who

said that

all

issues that

need to be

dis-

regard to the safety of soldiers,

I

under international humanitarian law, we

realize that certain risks will

have to be taken. I'm arguing here

for a

would increase the risk to soldiers and pilots. That is clear. It's a
political problem of course for those States as to whether they will or not embark in the beginning on a "no body bags" policy or something close to that.
They will have terrific problems in democratic States to accept these increased risks for pilots and soldiers. Still, I think what we need in this internamore political
tional community of today is more political leadership
solution that

—

willingness to take risks in order to secure

community. So that

many

is

common values of the international

something which I would

like to see

more of and I think

would be prepared to take risks personally in order to
achieve things like saving people from genocide or whatever. The safety of the
Kosovars in this kind of situation could have been much better with my suggestion, but of course the Kosovo conflict as Yves Sandoz said was unique. It
probably will not repeat itself again. I mean there was almost a gigantic humanitarian catastrophe with regard to the refugees in the beginning due to the
that

individuals

fact that there

were no ground troops.

political leadership

My argument goes in the direction that

has to consider ground troops in situations like

could actually shorten the conflict and

it

305

could give

this.

That

much better protection.

It

Discussion

would

signal

something to the Milosevic regime in

them from going

on

further

this case that

would deter

the track of ethic cleansing. All these are

possibilities.

Chuck Kogan:
Listening to the discussions this morning and particularly the remarks of

Mr. Strauss and Mr. Parks,

I'd like to

make

the following observation.

Kosovo war was fought on the basis that coalition lives
lives on the other side. This is what war is all about.

are

The

more valuable than

W. Hays Parks:
I

The Kosovo campaign was conducted to save
may have cost 500, it probably saved many thousands more

have to disagree with

lives.

than

Although
that.

I

it

that.

think that's something that's been neglected in these discussions.

Does Kosovo Provide Lessons For The Future?
Barry Strauss:
I'd like to

return to

my point

that the lessons of this war

must be very lim-

NATO attacks leaves us
with one dimension unknown. We don't know how NATO would respond
ited because Serbia's inability to

respond massively to

if

was provoked in ways that Serbia couldn't provoke
view of what we've learned for the future, the answer
it

it.

is

So from the point of

we

don't

know about

that yet.

Cluster

Bombs and Long-Term

Collateral

Damage

Adam Roberts:
wanted to raise an issue about this discussion and the focus here on
collateral damage and the way in which the discussion has gone. One dimension of damage got largely but not entirely excluded: that is the long-term
damage that may flow from use of certain types of weapons and may have an
impact long after the conflict. Ove Bring mentioned in his paper the effect of
cluster bombs. The principal problem with regard to cluster bombs is not the
immediate collateral damage, but rather the long-term effect. That is one issue that I think does arise very clearly from the Kosovo war. So there are other
aspects to unintended damage besides the immediate collateral damage that
I

just

certainly require attention.
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W. Hays Parks:
The answer
technical,

we

and

are calling

history.

I

to the question of cluster munitions
it's

ongoing diplomatic

—

threefold:

it's

historical,

Unexploded ordnance

initiatives.

now, explosive remnants of war

is

it's

—what

are of course part of everyone's

think the French have been clearing something like a half million

rounds of unexploded ordnance from their

We recognized

own

territory for the last fifty

some

more after Kosovo for the very simple reason that
many of the people who lived in Kosovo were allowed to go back to their homes
odd

years.

it

before the areas were cleared thus placing themselves at
I

just finished reading

Anthony Beevor's book on the

risk.

battle of Stalingrad. 3

Even in the dead of winter when that battle was over, the Soviet Army did not
let the civilians return to their homes until the unexploded ordnance was
cleared. That of course is a responsibility of a sovereign nation to do that. We
have the gap in Kosovo because there was no sovereign there to prevent people
from returning. The United Nations and others, however, have noted the activities of the United States and a number of other nations in going in to clear
not only antipersonnel landmines but to

assist in

ordnance, and they've been praised for that

clearance of

all

unexploded

effort.

September the International Committee of
the Red Cross hosted a meeting in Leone that was chaired by Yves Sandoz.
While its original focus was on cluster munitions, the issue eventually evolved
to explosive remnants of war. We are in the middle of the second review
conference to the UN Conventional Weapons Convention now where this isand it
sue is under consideration. One of the things that we're looking at
Lastly, the diplomatic part. Last

—

—

some sort of a self-destruct or selfneutralization device on all ordnance. That could be very expensive, but in
the long run it will save lives and save money. It costs roughly $500 to clear
one piece of unexploded ordnance whereas something like this would be less
than $50 a round. We're looking at it very seriously. We have not only a humanitarian and technological interest in doing it, but also a military interest.
No commanding officer likes to have his own troops advance through their
own unexploded ordnance. So this may be one of those places where all of
this will come together. It may take some time because obviously some people
will say we can't afford that. It may take twenty years to do it. It's an issue bewill

be a long-term solution

ing focused on.

3.

It is

is

requiring

certainly not related just to cluster munitions.

ANTONY BEEVOR, STALINGRAD: THE FATEFUL SIEGE,
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The
John Murphy:
I want to clarify

Principle of Proportionality

Yves Sandoz' comments. I'm an agnostic as to the debate that you have with Hays Parks on whether there is or is
not a rule of customary international law called the rule of proportionality. I'll
leave

it

up to you

nostic because

I

a point with respect to

folks to

think

it's

continue to do battle on that.
really

beyond

my

am

I

similarly

an ag-

technical competence to get into

the question of whether Protocol
obligations of the attackers

my paper.
seem to me that
that in

whether the

I

I strikes an improper balance between the
and the obligations of the defenders. I did note

will say this in respect to the rule of proportionality. It

it is

collateral

whatever

applied,

damage

is

its

status, in

does

terms of a question of

excessive compared to the military advan-

and apply and I think that's
been brought out in the course of our discussions not only this morning but at
other times and no doubt it will arise again.
tage.

think

I

it is

a very difficult rule to interpret

Henry Shue:
I

would

like to say a bit

more about the

portionality play in target selection.

A lot of us were fairly skeptical about how

important proportionality can be because
proportionality absolutely did

role that the considerations of pro-

come

it is

so vague. But you

all

say that

into consideration. There's kind of two

can work. One, effective proportionality can be that you decide that
rather than hitting a particular target the way you would like to, you hit it
some other way at night instead of in the day, or with a precision weapon inways

it

—

stead of a non-precise one

—but you

many

said of a dual-purpose target, "Yes,

cases in

value, but

its

which you

civilian value

is

still

go ahead and

so great that

sideration to proportionality?"

Were any

we

hit

it.

shouldn't hit

it

it

there very

has military

at all

with con-

targets ever totally ruled out rather

some other way? It sounds as if for example the
treated that way until the end of the bombing campaign.
than just

Were

hit

electrical grid

was

Judith Miller:
Proportionality was key in respect to any targeting decision that

I

am aware

of in Kosovo or in any other context in which military force was used by the

United States in conjunction with its allies while I was at DoD.
may sound vague, I think we all have very much in mind that it
that needs to be applied.

You

stake or civilians versus an

can't say, "Well, there are

enormous

is

while

it

a principle

X human

military value." There's
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But our intelligence people, the people who put together target folders and background information, and the modeling that

down

that

to a formula.

we've done have allowed us to actually think in specifics not just generalities.

We

knew

that there were housing developments close to something that

cared about attacking and there were a

number of occasions where

we

targets

were rejected.

number of targets

I'm confident there were a
to

my

level because

working in the

some

field,

targets that

we had
which

so
is

many

the

rejected before they ever got

other good lawyers and target people

first line

came through from the

of the appraisal. But there were

field that

we asked

questions about,

and ultimately concluded that they were not appropriate targets to
take on. So while it's not a science, I think certainly everyone I worked with
on the operational side and the Joint Staff, in the policy world of DoD, and the
legal community felt that that was the guiding principle of really paramount
looked

at,

importance.

Richard Sorenson:

We

That of course started out
fundamentally with military necessity, but then would go down to the number
of military casualties that would happen and the number of civilians that potentially would die. We were really looking at "effects based targeting." We're
not looking at simply blowing up a particular building or whatever. If we can
achieve the desired effect with some other means that minimizes the unnecessary suffering, then that was also considered- So if we could go with alternative
means to achieve the same effect that's required by military necessity. And
that was considered throughout the campaign. The bottom line is we had a lot
closely scrutinized

each and every

target.

of data.

Flying At 15,000 Feet

Susan Fink: 4

As

a military pilot who's

struck by the
really

been

number of times

I've

in

for

I've

been

how we can put our pilots
hundreds of people when the reason for this

think about in humanitarian intervention

15,000 feet and knowingly

is

humanitarian intervention, not

kill

about a year now,

heard that one of the things that we need to

at

4.

academia

just

a

is

regular international war,

Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy; Fletcher School of
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humanitarian in purpose.
is

two-fold. First,

when

it's

When I dig a little deeper,

a moral and ethical one that

argument
must be taken into account
I

find that the

decision makers at the highest level entertain a thought of humanitar-

ian intervention.

And

then deeper

number

tually increases the

it is

that the altitude at

which

of civilians killed. Pressing this a

pilots fly ac-

little

further,

some ambiguity about whether there were precision-guided munitions
available or whether we'd run out of those at this point and were reverting to
other weapons, etcetera. But my question is this it's probably more appropriate to ask this of a moral and ethical panel
but I would like to ask the legal
experts whether you entertain this from a legal standpoint. Secondly, what advice would you give to those who live in the land of the doable
those who
live in the land of the political who have to make these decisions
what advice you would give them to either rebut, entertain or take this into account
when making a decision to go in to humanitarian intervention?
there

is

—

—

—
—

Richard Sorenson:
Let

me

start

out by saying that

I

don't think there are facts to support that

The problems with hitting the convoys
occurred when Milosevic intentionally intermin-

in reality in particular with Kosovo.

from

fifteen

thousand

feet

gled combatants with noncombatants

—

it

was

difficult to discriminate.

I

think

there were relatively few civilians killed as a result of those strikes from fifteen

thousand.
oculars.

armed

And

in fact, the pilots did go

They were

down

to six thousand.

in fact complying with their obligations

They had

bin-

under the law of

between combatants and noncombatants. So I
are out there. It makes great newspaper copy, sells news-

conflict to discriminate

don't think the facts
papers, airtime

and interviews, but the

facts just simply aren't there to suggest

them we were engaging in
basically carpet bombing. I understand what carpet bombing is and that did
not happen. The A- 10 pilots did not pickle off their general-purpose bombs
anywhere. They had specific targets that they had spotted and were releasing
their ordnance against those military targets that they had identified. Sometimes there was misidentification and that goes with the fog of war. The military commanders that are in command of military forces, and the pilots that
that by keeping our pilots at 15,000 feet to protect

and releasing ordnance, use their best military judgment at
the time, assessing all the facts, knowing that they cannot intentionally target
civilians due to the training they have received on the law of armed conflict.
Plus targeting reviews happened at all levels, including during the operations
going after field forces in Kosovo proper, to ensure we were distinguishing beare flying planes

tween military and

civilian targets.
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PARTY
COALITION OPERATIONS

Introduction

Nicholas Rostow

O

ur topic

is

to follow

coalition warfare.

We will examine such issues as what rules

when different members of the coalition have different inter-

national legal obligations.

A

particular focus will be Protocol

I

since

some

NATO members are parties, while others are not. We will also examine the exwhich Protocol I is customary international law.
This whole issue of coalition warfare of course is an old one. There have
been coalitions since I suppose the beginning of recorded military history.
tent to

They always

raise very interesting political-military issues.

always complain bitterly about political interference.

One need

only read

book on the life of Marlborough to learn what real politiinterference was. I would just offer Churchill's comment that the only

Winston
cal

Commanders

Churchill's

thing worse than fighting with

your

side.

allies is fighting

without them

— that

is

on

Coalition Warfare and Differing Legal

Obligations of Coalition

Members Under

International Humanitarian

Law

Torsten Stein

W

ars

were fought by alliances or "coalitions," both before and

at

Waterloo. Indeed, coalition warfare has been a dominant theme of

armed

conflict in the 19th

and 20th centuries and

the last millennium in Operation Allied Force.

It is,

is

represented at the end of

however, a more recent de-

velopment that coalition partners do not necessarily operate separately and in
clearly distinct

segments of the theater or

and

outsiders,

such as

Today's coalitions

may be difficult, if not impossible, for adversarthe International Committee of the Red Cross

"inter-operate" so closely that
ies

battlefield.

it

(ICRC) that seek to monitor the observance of obligations under international
humanitarian law, to identify who did what and to whom.
Admittedly, the coalition partners have (almost) a clear understanding of

such matters. Moreover a participating State would, due to the pressure from
a public at

home which demands

deny responsibility and point out the responsible party,
nial of responsibility without putting the blame on any
If

own wrongdoing,
or make a plausible de-

answers, either admit to

its

specific State or actor.

the coalition consists of democracies, that process should

make

it

easier to

place the blame within a relatively short period of time. Theoretically, however,

one cannot leave out the

possibility that the coalition

may manage

to

build a wall of denial or silence.

Increasing the problems further, the various

war might have differing

legal obligations

members of a

coalition waging

under the law of armed

conflict;

.

Coalition Warfare

obligations

neous in

which are

and Differing Legal Obligations

Some coalitions might be more homogeso. The coalition conducting Operation

treaty 'based.

this respect, others less

more homogenous, even

Allied Force was certainly

not

if

all

participating

members were contracting parties to the 1977 Additional Protocol I the 1949
Geneva Conventions, than the coalition which is currently providing troops
for the Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR)
At the end of the day Protocol I may not be the biggest problem. What

UN Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols? Or

about the 1980

on anti-personnel mines? The

the 1997 Ottawa Convention

spective obligations arising from these conventions might be

30 States than with regard

coalition of over

Can
tion?

to Protocol

there be differing legal standards for various

diversity of re-

much greater in a

I.

members of a given

Could the commander-in-chief (CINC) of such a coalition ask

coali-

(or

even

order) those force -providing States not parties to the restricting treaties to un-

dertake actions which violate those treaties, while
their treaty obligations?

Does

it

make

a difference

all
if

the others live up to

the coalition

a

is

"UN

Are there
coalition war

force" or at least authorized by the Security Council to use force?

why

other reasons

the strictest legal standard should govern a

because the coalition derives the legality of
gional arrangement, or from

its

use of force from being a re-

its

humanitarian purpose? Or because

And
To the

whom would possible

the other side would be indiscriminate?

to

tionally wrongful acts

coalition

organization, to

This paper
as

be attributed?

members of the

all

will discuss all these

well as
force,

KFOR,

if

There can be no

conflicts applies to the air

calling

it

tempt to

air

a "war"

and

treat the questions

NATO's Kosovo campaign

it

NATO

probably apply to

tional law rules

all

armed

spokesmen avoided

was a "humanitarian action."

I

will at-

under a somewhat broader perspective, because

there will be other (and different) coalitions in the future,
will

as

UN Security Council to use

doubt that the whole of the law of

campaign, although

insisted that

an international

campaign of Operation Allied Force,

the ground force authorized by the

necessary.

if it is

interna-

coalition or only to the flag State?

questions using

an example, which includes the

reprisals of

and the same

rules

of them; as would, by the way, customary interna-

emerging out of Operation Allied Force.

The Factual
Examples of the

Setting

diversity of obligations during the

to the

UN

in-

and Turkey were not parties to Protocol I;
Conventional Weapons Convention or any of

clude: France, the United States

Turkey is not a party

Kosovo campaign
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was the former Soviet Union) is not a party to Protocols II and IV, nor is Poland; Yugoslavia and all its former Republics are not
parties to Protocols II and V with the exception of Bosnia, which is a party to
its

Protocols; Russia (as

Protocol

II;

and the United States

is

not a party to Protocol IV.

One

could go

on naming other force -providing States among the over 30 contributing to
KFOR and the various choices they have made with respect to ratifying the
Conventional Weapons Convention and its protocols.
It is also a fact that for probably different reasons foreign offices and defense
ministries carefully compared armed forces manuals. However, as the second
KFOR Commander confirmed, while rules of engagement contained numerous restrictions premised on grounds of domestic law, none expressly refer to
1

who served
Europe,
reports
Commander
that
while
there was resisas Supreme Allied
tried
States
when
he
to
get
additional
targets
among
NATO
approved,
tance
obligations under international humanitarian law. General Clark,

the rationale did not include "we can't do

Protocol

even

if

I."

2

it

because some of us are bound by

Nonetheless, the legal restraints of Protocol

I

were observed,

they found no expression at the CINC-level.

Has

Protocol 1

Become Customary

International

Law?

Differing treaty obligations of members of a coalition

would not pose a problem if a treaty such as Protocol I has become customary international law. No
one, however, has thus far maintained that the UN Conventional Weapons
Convention and its Protocols, or the 1997 Ottawa Convention, have become
binding upon non-parties. 3
Article 38 of the

It is

widely accepted in international law that, as

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties confirms,

treaty

and customary law obligations may coincide, because the treaty
already existing customary law, or because new customary interna-

obligations
codifies

tional law
It is

is

generated in the aftermath of a treaty.

appropriate to dwell for a

international law.
tional

As

In this respect,

it is

of creating customary

stated in Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute for the Interna-

Court of Justice

element of following

moment on the process

(ICJ),

this

such law requires both custom and the subjective

custom because one

is

so obliged by law

interesting to note the practice of the

opinio

same court

iuris.

in the

1.
Personal interview; cf. also GENERAL KLAUS REINHARDT, KFOR - STREITKRAFTE FUR
denfrieden (2001).
2.
Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War 201 (2001).
3.
The dubious process of instant customary international law will thus not be investigated

here.
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"de-emphasising of material practice as a constitutive element combined with
the tendency to "count" the articulation of a rule twice, so to speak, not only
as

an expression

opinio juris but also as State practice itself." 4

In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) disregarded

some lawyers 5

the view of

as to the

non-relevance of General Assembly reso-

when

lutions in the process of evolving customary international law,

ferred to non-binding resolutions as evidence of this kind of law.

question of who's practice
central in this process.

The

is

and

treaties of universal

The
is

North Sea Continental Shelf case 7
essential in the development of this law.

ICJ stated in
is

acceptance

its

like the

1949 Geneva Conventions, 8

to a lesser extent the Additional Protocols of 1977, 9 there are only a few

States left to create this kind of custom
has,

re-

relevant in the formation of customary law

that the practice of non-parties

With

it

6

and

opinio iuris. This Baxter

paradox 10

however, not been seen as blocking the evolution of customary law, as

exemplified by the above-mentioned decisions of the Court.

The

focus has in-

stead shifted to the activities of both the parties and the non-parties, considering a wide range of sources as evidence for both custom and opinio

With

a distinct unwillingness to focus solely

on what the

iuris.

belligerents actually

which is probably bound up with a policy of enhancing the protection of
noncombatants and combatants alike, the ICJ, and lately as well the Internado,

tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 11

have decided to

direct their focus at other sources of "evidence" for the necessary
opinio iuris.
ties

4.

and the dictates

Bruno Simma

General
5.

E.g,

and

the

6.

Amongst

number of ratifications to international treaof military manuals have been referred to in order to

these, the

& Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:

Principles, 12

custom and

Custom, Jus Cogens and

AUSTRALIAN YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

82,

96 (1992).

Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations

Development of Principles of Friendly Relations, 137 RECUEIL DES COURS 431 (1972).
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 99-100 (June 27) [hereinafter

Nicaragua case]. Though,

as stated

by Wolfke,"[t]he evaluation of the sufficiency of such

due caution,' especially as far as the
evidentiary value of non-binding resolutions is concerned." Karol Wolfke, CUSTOM IN PRESENT
evidence must, however, always be carried out 'with

International

Law

all

152 (2ded. 1993).

7.

North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G.

8.

According to a search of the

2001, there are 189 Parties to the

official

v.

Den., F.R.G.

ICRC

v.

and 151

There are 159

10.

Richard Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES

11.

Prosecutor

v.

I.C.J.

43 (Feb. 20).

on October 18

1949 Geneva Conventions.

9.

reprinted in

Neth.) 1969

website (http://www.icrc.org)

Parties to Additional Protocol

I

Parties to Additional Protocol

COURS

Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Oct.

35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 32, 55 (1996).
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27, 73 (1970).
2,
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what States consider to be binding on themselves. 12
Customary international law may also emerge from treaties because a great
number of identical bilateral treaties establish a widespread opinio iuris, or because a multilateral treaty has been ratified by the overwhelming majority of
States. Thus, quite a number of authors conclude from the fact that the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 have been ratified by more States than virtually
any other convention (the Convention on the Right of the Child being one of
the rare exceptions 13 ) that a great number of their rules have become recognized as customary rules, even as ius cogens. In some instances this might be
the result of occasional confusion provoked by renaming the "law of war" or
"law of armed conflict" as "international humanitarian law," thus blurring the
distinction between "humanitarian" and "human rights" law. 14 Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions, which does constitute a kind of human
ascertain

rights provision,

might have contributed to that confusion,

held in the Nicaragua case,

reflects

"elementary considerations of human-

and constitutes "the minimum yardstick" 16 for armed conflict. And again
the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the ICJ pronounced that:

ity"

in

it

since, as the ICJ

15

many rules of humanitarian law in armed conflict are so fundamental
that
these fundamental rules are to be
to the respect of the human person
[A] great

.

observed by
contain

all

them,

.

.

.

.

.

States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that

because

they

international customary law.

constitute

intransgressible

principles

of

17

and Report on the follow-up to the International Conference for the Protection of War
Victims, 26 th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Commission I, Item
2, Doc 95/c.I/2/2, at 7^8 (1995).
13. Mention should as well be made of the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union and the
Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, both of which have 189 parties, as
stated on their homepages http://www.itu.int and http://www.upu.int, respectively.
14. Dietrich Schindler, Significance of the Geneva Conventions for the Contemporary World, 81
12.

ld. }

International Review of the Red Cross 717 (1999). The process is well described by
Meron, who states that "the recognition of nonns based in international human rights as
customary may affect the intepretation and even the status of the parallel norms in instruments
of international humanitarian law through a sort of osmosis or application by analogy."

Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary
International

Law 68,

(1989).

15.

Nicaragua case, supra note

16.

Id.

17.

Legality of the

Use by

6, at 104.

a State of Nuclear

Weapons

0uly8).
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The

International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia joined the ICJ in this

view in the Tadic case. 18 The question remains, however, whether

much help

this

is

of

whether all the provisions of Protocol I, and in particular those that might not have been properly observed in Operation Allied
Force, are intransgressible principles of customary international law.
The gap between those coalition partners who have ratified Protocol I, and
those who have not, might not be as wide as it seems, since, for example, the
US Air Force's Intelligence Targeting Guide has incorporated almost verbatim many relevant articles from the Protocol. 19 It is of interest here to note
almost to the letter a rethat its Attachment 4.2.2 on military objects is
in determining

—

—

Attachment 4.3.1.2 on precautions and
proportionality does not mention the trinity of "excessive," "concrete," and
"direct," though these are mentioned in US Army Judge Advocate General's
School's Operational Law Handbook 2002, 20 as well as in the US Army's Field
Manual 27- 10. 21 The Handbook states that "[t]he U.S. considers these provistatement of Protocol

I,

Article 52(2).

sions customary international law." Admittedly, this statement indicates only

that the

US

recognizes

its

own

of customary international law.

As mentioned above,

interpretation of these principles/rules as part
22

the pronouncement of a rule in a national manual of

a non-party to a treaty has special relevance in the process of establishing cus-

tomary international law, notwithstanding the assertion in United
et

a\P The

fact that the entries are

ations does not

18.
19.

seem

States v. List

motivated by more than just legal consider-

to limit their legal significance. 24

Tadic case, supra note 11, 1111 96-137.
Targeting Division, Headquarters 497 Intelligence Group, Air Intelligence

Agency, USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide

(Air Force Pamphlet 14-210), Feb

1,

1998,

available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afpaml4-210/.

International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate
General's School, Operational Law Handbook 9 (2002), available at http://www.
20.

jagcnet.army.mil/CLAMO-Public.
21.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare
of the Army Field
Manual 27-10) para. 41 (1956), available at

(Department

http://www.adtdl.anny.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/27-10/Chl.htm.

Operational Law Handbook,

supra note 20, at 9.
[The Hostage case] (1948), Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. 1 1 (1950), 1230 at 1237. See as well
Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
22.

23. U.S. v List et

al.

International Law 361
24- Compare this with the

(1987).
ICJ's

accceptance of statements made by State representatives in

international fora as constitutive of opinio

range of different reasons,

I.C.J.

iuris,

although these statements are motived by a wide

Report 1986 at 98-108, Ml 187-205.
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But even

if

national military manuals

may

increasingly be looked at as im-

portant evidence of customary international law, this will only be of limited

help such

as, for

example, regarding the status of collateral damage.

The problem here

is

whether those provisions of Protocol

I

that

came

into

focus during Operation Allied Force are eligible for consideration as customary law, given that terms like "military significance," "definite military advantage,"

and

"effective contribution to military action" are not defined, not

by non-exhaustive examples as for "indiscriminate attacks?"

even

one takes only
the declaration made by Germany and the United Kingdom, according to
which "the military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer
to the advantage anticipated from the attack as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack," 25 what then is the meaning or interpretation that could become customary law for non-parties? Could it be that
non-parties have to observe stricter obligations than those who have ratified
Protocol I, but with admissible and accepted reservations or declarations? As
stated by Baxter, "[i]t would be paradoxical in the extreme if a non-party were
to be regarded as bound unqualifiedly by the obligations of the conventions,
while a party might limit its duties by the entry of reservations." 26
It could be argued that there would not be any significant problems binding
non-parties to the same extent as far as the States having made reservations
are

If

bound. The understanding that collateral casualties are both

legal

and un-

avoidable, as long as they are below a certain threshold, would thus stand.
mittedly,

only

a

few

of

the

above-mentioned reservations.
non-parties to a stricter code,

parties

A

i.e.,

to

Protocol

case could thus be

what the

I

have

made

for

made

Adthe

binding the

parties without a reservation are

bound by, as long as customary international law can be established.
Both alternatives, however, incorporate a degree of uncertainty as regards
the precise limits of the obligations, as the proportionality principle "creates
serious difficulties in practice, since

it

necessarily remains loosely defined

and

and balancing. In the framework of the required evaluation, the actors enjoy a considerable margin of appreciation." 27 It
may be correct to say that the fundamental principles repeatedly mentioned
is

subject to subjective assessment

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF

&

WAR

505 and 511, respectively (Adam Roberts
Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000). Similar statements were made by Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Spain. Id. at 500-509.
25.

See

26.

Richard Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 BRITISH
(1965-66).

Yearbook of International Law 285
27.

IN

Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat,

ARMED CONFLICTS

178-9 (Dieter Fleck

in

THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW

ed., 1995).
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by the ICJ, the basic distinction between civilians and combatants, the prohibition against directly attacking civilians,

customary international law. But
said about

all

I

—

in particular those dealing

28

not, at least not as a whole,

I is

rule of proportionality, are

very doubtful whether the same can be

the other provisions of Protocol

with collateral damage.
If Protocol

it is

and the

customary international law,

dif-

—

members of a given coalition remain even
leaving aside other restrictions on weapons and means of warfare. But there
might be other reasons why the same standard of legal obligations should apfering legal standards for various

ply to such a coalition.

Does "same standard" always mean "maximum standard"

in the sense of a

"most favored nation clause?" The answer probably depends upon

what extent the

reciprocity principle

I

(still)

and

to

applicable to the international

was to the traditional law of war. Article 96
provides that parties to a conflict which are bound by the Proto-

humanitarian law
of Protocol

is

if

col remain so

as

bound

it

certainly

vis-a-vis adverse parties also

more allied or adverse parties
States bound by the Protocol
or

bound

thereby, even

if

one

are not party to the Protocol. Consequently,

which includes
obligations. But it

participating in a coalition

States not party thereto, are not relieved of their Protocol

I

has been said that, because Iraq has not accepted Protocol

I,

those States in

War which

were bound by that
Protocol, were not directly obliged to apply it, whatever "directly" means
in that context. 29 1 will come back to the reciprocity problem later with rethe opposition coalition during the Gulf

spect to reprisals.

A Single (Maximum) Standard for "UN Forces"?
For quite some time
morally, but legally

some or
issue, a

all

it

has been debated whether

bound

UN forces were not only

to respect the existing humanitarian law,

even

if

of the force-providing States were not. But before addressing that

few words should be devoted to the differentiation of forces operating

under a United Nations mandate. Since no standing UN force has been established under UN Charter Articles 43 and 45, the UN has had to rely on

28.

For a comprehensive analysis of the customary status of the Additional Protocols, see

Greenwood, Customary Law Status of the 1977 Additional Protocols, in
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, Challenges ahead 93 (Astrid J.M. Delissen &

Christopher

Gerard

J.

Tanja

eds., 1991).

29. Christopher

Greenwood,

Humanitarian Law,

Historical

Developments and Legal Basis,

supra note 27, at 26.
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coalitions of the willing

whenever

it

decided armed force was needed. 30

In

only one instance did such a coalition of the willing operate under anything

UN command and control. These Chapter VII actions have in
general been carried out under UN authority— through the mandate
self— but under no tangible UN control. Such was the case with Operation
31

resembling

it-

Desert Storm in 1991. State practice seemed to be founded on the idea that

armed

forces acting under

Chapter VII are not bound by the Geneva Conven-

tions or other treaty-based international humanitarian law, as they act for the

UN rather than as State actors bound by those rules.
The

doctrine has,

32

on the other hand, often claimed binding

national humanitarian law in these situations.
the obligation of parties to the 1949
34

33

This claim

is

Geneva Conventions
can

effect of inter-

often based

on

to ensure obser-

presumed by the
adoption of the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, which in its Article 2(2) excludes its application to missions
authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are
engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the laws
35
of international armed conflicts applies"
vance of these

rules in all situations.

It

also be said to be

31.

The regime regulating UN authorized peace-keeping forces
The US-led coalition forces in Korea during 1950-53.

32.

Michael Hoffman, Peace-enforcement

30.

"interventional

33.

E.g.,

armed

conflict",

Leslie Green,

actions

will

not be examined here.

and humanitarian

law:

Emerging

THE RED CROSS

82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF

rules for

193 (2000).

The contemporary law of armed conflict 319

(1993).

Seyersted stated that "[n]one of the States participationg in the United Nations action in Korea
it was not governed by the general laws of war, on the
on the assumption that it was." FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS
FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR 204 (1966). The binding effect of international
customary law seems furthermore to follow from UN Charter Article 103, which seems to allow

maintained during that action that

contrary, they acted

UN obligations to supersede other obligations only when these other obligations result from
treaties. But see Paul Szasz, UN Forces and International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL
the

Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict: Essays in Honour of Professor L.C. Green
on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday 513 (Michael Schmitt ed., 2000) (Vol. 75,
U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). This in itself leaves open the question of
how the UN can be bound by the treaty obligations of international humanitarian law that do not
(yet)

have

a

customary

status.

34.

Common Article

35.

Emphasis provided by the present author. The main problem with respect to the determination of

1

to all four Conventions. See

UN missions

e.g.,

Greenwood, supra note

Greenwood

29, at 46.

where
the mission is neither an enforcement mission which undertakes military actions resembling an
armed conflict, nor a peacekeeping mission which strives to act neutrally. Christopher Greenwood,
which law

is

to apply to

is

considered by

Law and the Conduct of Military Operation: Stocktaking at the Start of a New Millennium,
International Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict, supra note 33, at 192.

International
in

to relate to those situations
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The

UN

Secretary-General's Bulletin

on the "Observance by United Na-

tions forces of international humanitarian law" of

only partial answers. First of all, the Bulletin

is

August

6,

1999, 36 provides

restricted to forces conducting

operations under

UN

this [the Military

Technical] Agreement and to respond promptly to any vio-

command and control, which is, as stated above, the
exception rather than the rule. What about forces under national or NATO
command, authorized, as KFOR, "to monitor and ensure compliance with
37

and restore compliance, using military force if required"? 38 Secondly,
the Bulletin is said not to replace the national laws by which military personnel remain bound throughout the operation. 39 What if the army, air force,
navy or marine corps manuals of States which are not a party to some or most
of the treaties on humanitarian law allow for actions and operations prohibited under those treaties? Are the manuals to prevail? Because this Section
seems to be included in order to ensure that obligations resting on parties that
are more far reaching than those flowing from the Bulletin's provisions will
lations

not be abrogated from, the object thus being the application of as

much

ternational humanitarian law as possible to the relevant force,

therefore

it is

in-

submitted that such manuals cannot validly derogate from the obligations

under the Bulletin.

The

substantive Sections 5 to 9 of the Bulletin combine fundamental prin-

ciples that

might be

classified as

stricting the use of certain

customary law with rules prohibiting or

re-

weapons, rules which are hardly customary law. 40

This raises the question as to whether the Secretary-General can issue rules

and regulations for the conduct of State-deployed forces on UN missions if
some of the provisions rely on treaties that have not been ratified by all States
participating in Chapter VII or peacekeeping operations? 41 Some authors

36.

38 International Legal Materials 1659 (1999) [hereinafter

37.

Id.,

Section

Bulletin].

1.

Agreement Between the International Security Force ("KFOR")
and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia,
Appendix B(4), available at http://www.nato.int/kfor/resources/documents/mta.htm.
38.

The

39.

Bulletin, supra note 36, Section 2.

40.

See especially Bulletin,

41.

Hoffman, supra note 32,

Military Technical

id.,

Section

6.

at 201.
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seem

when focusing on

to claim so

the Secretary-General's function as "com-

UN

mander-in-chief of operations carried out under
'

mand

—which currently includes only peacekeeping

authority and

operations.

42

It

com-

should be

pointed out here that in those situations where a coalition has been authorized

by the

UN,

but has not been obliged to operate under

its

control/com-

mand, a right for the Secretary-General to instruct the force does not exist,
which is presumed by the exclusion of missions outside "United Nations command and control" from the Bulletin's applicability. 43
A solution could be seen in the status-of-forces agreements mentioned in
Section 3, which are treaties by themselves and which are designed to ensure
that the force will conduct its operations with full respect for the principles
and rules of the general conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel. But then, also under Section 3, the obligation to respect such principles and rules is applicable even in the absence of a status-of-forces
agreement. And, finally, the Guidance has serious lacunae, not least because
it is silent on military occupation and KFOR is an occupation force par
excellence.

One

obvious way to bind the forces operating under a

UN mandate to the

highest level of international humanitarian law would be to

mandate such

compliance in the Security Council resolutions which authorize the use of
force in the

first

place. This way, contributing States

which are non-parties

to

the relevant treaties would be obliged to act in accordance with these treaties
for the

purpose of the specific mission.

effectively

undermine the

On the other hand, such a policy could

interest of these States in participating in

UN

mis-

sions, thus leading to a shortage of voluntary forces. 44
It

remains more or

should abide by
law.

The

legal

all

less a

existing principles

Szasz, supra

and

note 33, at 519. As

—

is still

or UN-authorized forces

rules of international

foundation of such an obligation

the Secretary-General's Bulletin

42.

UN

gut feeling that

open

—

as well as the legal status of

to debate.

UN Force Protection (UNPROFOR)

Yugoslavia have shown, enforcement actions can

humanitarian

I

and

become necessary even

II

in the former

in the course of

peacekeeping operations.
43.

Bulletin, supra note 36, Preamble.

44-

The

Security Council could as well decide to relieve the participating

humanitarian treaty obligations through
that this

is

UN

Charter Article 103, though

only a theoretical possibility.
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A Single (Maximum) Standard for "Coalitions"?
There are, as we have witnessed in Operation Allied Force, coalitions that
have no UN authorization whatsoever. The legality of such operations will
not be the subject of this paper. Rather, the focus here is whether the fact
alone that States form a coalition for the joint use of force oblige them to apply a single

maximum

standard in humanitarian law? In general, a State does

when

not lose or gain rights and obligations

it

operates together with other

States as opposed to undertaking operations alone.

Some arguments

in favor

NATO drew some legitimacy
that the UN Security Council

of such an obligation are, however, conceivable.

not

(if

legality) for Allied

Force from the fact

was veto-blocked, unable to do what

State

gle

(NATO)
for

sense and the humanitarian

and law expected, 45 and that the regional arhad to step in; that this was not the use of force by a sin-

agenda of present day

rangement

common

politics

purposes,

selfish

but the use of force by a coalition of

like-minded, democratic, law-abiding States for a good purpose, a "small

This might, or might not, overcome the missing

UN

UN."

mandate and might end

up setting a problematic precedent, but since it is at least not entirely clear
whether even UN forces have to apply a maximum standard of humanitarian
law, being a coalition alone does not

seem

to be a convincing

argument

in

that respect.

More compelling could be

the argument that the coalition used force for

very purpose was to end gross violations of hu-

humanitarian purposes, that

its

man

NATO

was intervening in the name of human
rights implied a perhaps heavier moral burden to respect the rules of humanitarian law, but did it also imply a legal obligation to do so? Would the same
rights. 46

The

reasoning apply

if

fact that

a coalition

is

not intervening in the

name

of human rights,

but participating in collective self-defense?
In the specific case of NATO's Operation Allied Force, one motive for re-

specting a high standard of humanitarian law was certainly to avoid the loss of

the support of even a single

ally,

and

NATO's

cisions also guaranteed that the concerns of
ously. It also has

45.

Bruno Simma,

each member were taken

been reported from the Gulf

NATO,

of International
46. V.

unanimity rule in targeting de-

Law

the
l

War

seri-

that the Royal Air Force

UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,

10

EUROPEAN JOURNAL

(1999).

Kroning, Kosovo and International Humanitarian Law,

VOLKERRECHT - INFORMATIONSSCHRIFTEN HEFTl/2000,
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at

in

Forum:

45 (2000).
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refused at least twice to

bomb

targets given

it

by American commanders be-

cause the risk of collateral damage was too high. 47

A

policy

argument that would

still

have some importance

is

streamline the planning structure of a coalition of forces. Thus,

have only one

to

ties

upon which

set of rules

it is

preferable

and since the

par-

with the most comprehensive legal bindings cannot derogate from their

obligations, unless these bindings are

other party

if

to formulate plans,

the need to

is

dependent upon reciprocity and the

maximum

not bound, the

level should

be chosen.

But the strongest incentive for a coalition to apply the maximum standard,
it is also the one applied by the other side, is, I believe, still "positive reci-

procity"

and the

risk

of reprisals. Quite a few argue that since the law of war

human

has been transformed into a

rights oriented law, belligerent reprisals

and reciprocity has therefore lost its relevance. 48 This may be
correct to a certain extent for the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, which
expressly prohibit reprisals against civilians, wounded, prisoners of war, indispensable objects, the natural environment and installations containing danare prohibited

gerous objects, etc. 49 Hostile forces, however,

still

may become

the object of

But beyond "Geneva Law," there is the UN Conventional Weapons
Convention and its Protocols. An adversary might not want, or might not be
reprisals.

between coalition partners if it decides to respond
use of a prohibited weapon in the same manner.
able, to distinguish

to the

Responsibility

Another reason,

finally, for

applying a single

(maximum) standard of in-

ternational humanitarian law in a given coalition might be responsibility for
possible internationally wrongful acts.

manitarian law

rules,

To whom will non-compliance with hu-

which bind some but not

all

in a coalition, be attributed?

H.LDebs, Vol. 600, col. 907, May 6, 1999, as mentioned in Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The
Campaign Have the Provisions of Additional Protocol I Withstood the Test?, 82
International Review of the Red Cross 158 n.4l (2000). It should here be mentioned
that one of the reasons for the US to limit the amount of States participating in the attacks on the

47.

—

Air

Taliban regime in Afganistan in the

from Nato's bombing campaign

in

fall

and delays the choice of objectives"
2001, at

of 2001 seems to be "the lesson

Kosovo

in

US military planners took

1999 [which] was that a large alliance complicates

as stated in the

FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Sep.

22/23,

1.

48.

Schindler, supra note 14, at 725.

49.

Articles 46, 47, 13

Articles 20

and 33 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and 41-56 of Protocol I.
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I, II,

III

and IV,

respectively,

and
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To

the "coalition"

tion?

To

all

if it is,

as in the case of

members of the

NATO,

an international organiza-

coalition or only to the respective flag State?

A. Responsibility of international organizations in general
It seems to be widely accepted today that the rules of State responsibility
can be applied mutatis mutandis to intergovernmental organizations having a
legal capacity of their

applies here

is

that

own

in international law.

nobody should be able

to

One

evade

relevant principle that

liability

or responsibility by

which he has co-founded and
which operates in pursuit of his own goals and under his influence in the organs of that entity. This, again in principle, entails that an international organization is responsible for its internationally wrongful acts in the same way as
would be its member States had they acted individually instead as of members
transferring activities to a separate legal entity

of the organization. 50

The
justified

attribution of responsibility to international organizations has

on

several grounds.

With

been

the major role of international organiza-

contemporary international relations, the international community
could not tolerate a situation in which such active actors in the global system
tions in

could violate binding international norms without bearing the consequences;
otherwise the basic aims of international responsibility
provision of remedies) would be undermined.

51

(i.e.,

deterrence and

Others base their reasoning for

on their international
legal personality, which entails rights and obligations, one of the obligations
being international responsibility in certain cases. 52 Again others hold that the
same "general principles of law" that are the basis of State responsibility apply
attributing responsibility to international organizations

also to international organizations which, being subjects of international law,

are

governed by identical

plicitly establish

principles. 53 Since treaties or

agreements which ex-

the responsibility of international organizations are scarce, 54

Werner Meng, Internationale Organisationen im volkerrechtlichen Deliktsrecht 45, 324-57
ZIETSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 324 et seq
(1985) and MOSHE HlRSCH, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Toward Third Parties: Some Basic Principles passim (1995).
51. See HlRSCH, supra note 50, at 8.
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
52. See Konrad Ginther, International Organizations, Responsibility,
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1336 et seq (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1995).
50. See

53.

See

Mahnoush

Arsanjani, Claims Against International Organizations, 7

World

YALE JOURNAL OF

Public Order 131 (1981).
54. See Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects, Jan. 29,
1972, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/conf.62/122, reprinted in 21
International Legal Materials 1261-1354 (1982).
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the principle that international organizations
sponsible for their acts

is

held internationally re-

mostly classified as being part of international cus-

tomary law. But practice in

this field

consistent, since "responsibility"

guished.

may be

and

is

also rare and, furthermore,

"liability" are

not always clearly

not

distin-

55

A number of preconditions seem to be unanimously required for the responone being that the organization
has legal personality, i.e., a legal capacity of its own. There is little doubt that
the member States of an international organization in most cases have accepted that legal status by either founding the organization or by joining it later
on. But what about third States? The majority opinion still appears to be that
international organizations have legal capacity with respect to third States
only if those third States have recognized the organization, either explicitly or
implicitly through establishing diplomatic relations or entering into treaties
with the organization. 56 One might add that an implicit recognition could also
be found if a third State raises claims against an international organization.
Another precondition is that the act that caused damage is attributable 57 to
the international organization. Likewise, in this respect, it does not seem to be
decisive whether the act was within the power, function or mandate of the organization, or rather constituted an ultra vires act; 58 rather, it is necessary that
the international organization had "effective control" over the act. One of the
notable shortcomings of international organizations, in comparison with
States, lies in their limited resources. 59 Most international organizations lack
personnel, means, and in particular troops to administer large-scale operations. The practical solution that has been found is that the organization "borrows" the necessary resources from its member States. 60 The question that
then arises is who shall bear international responsibility, i.e., who has comof international organizations, the

sibility

mand and

55.

The

first

control, the organization or the "sending State?"

International

Law Commission makes

a distinction, using "responsibility" for cases

involving a breach of obligations and "liability" in connection with activities which have caused

damage, but are otherwise lawful. See HlRSCH, supra note 50, at 7 n.34.
56. But
see
IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN
GERHARD LOIBL,

&

INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN 90
57.

KNUT

58.

See

IPSEN,

VOLKERRECHT 573

HlRSCH, supra note

50, at

88

et seq.

RECHT

DER

(2000).

(1999).

et seq.

Law Enforcement: The Changing Role of the State
as Law Enforcement Agent, in ALLOCATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY IN THE
International System 107 et seq. Gost Delbmck ed., 1995).
59.

See Torsten Stein, Decentralized International

60. See

HlRSCH, supra note

50, at

66

et seq.
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A slightly different question
tion directs or "orders"

The

tion.

Is

who

members

its

crucial factor for the

implementing act
B.

is

is

to

will

bear responsibility

if

the organiza-

implement a decision of the organiza-

determination of responsibility for the

the measure of discretion

left

to the

members. 61

NATO responsible?

If a

precondition for the responsibility of international organizations

they have legal personality with regard to the claimant third party, the

ment of

that condition vis-a-vis Yugoslavia can by

granted. There

is

mally recognized

no evidence that Yugoslavia,

is

that

fulfill-

no means be taken

for

as a non-aligned State, ever for-

NATO as a subject of international law. And Yugoslavia re-

mained excluded from the vast and rapidly developing net of NATO's
cooperation agreements with Central and Eastern European countries (North
Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace). 62 Yugoslavia has
not, in any event not yet, raised claims arising out of

NATO,

against
States.

63

This

is

—

but instead

before

the ICJ

—

Operation Allied Force

against

NATO's member

due to the fact that NATO is neither a possible
nor a possible defendant before the International

certainly also

respondent before the ICJ,

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Only States can be parties
.

and the Yugoslavia Tribunal' s jurisdiction is
limited to the individual criminal responsibility of those who have committed
grave breaches against international humanitarian law. 64 Proceedings have
also been introduced before the European Court of Human Rights. 65
to a legal dispute before the ICJ,

61. See
62.

For

id.

at 82.

details, see

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, NATO HANDBOOK 43 et seq.

(1995).
63.

For

details, see

Peter Bekker, International Decisions, Legality of Use of Force

Court of Justice, June

2,

1999, 93

-

International

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 928

(1999).

May 1999, the chief prosecutor for the ICTY established a committee to examine
and assess charges that NATO's conduct of the air campaign violated the laws of war. On June 2, 2000,
the ICTY prosecutor reported to the UN Security Council that, based on the committee's report, she
64. Nevertheless, in

found that there was no basis to open a criminal investigation into any aspect of the

NATO campaign.

had made some mistakes, the prosecutor determined that NATO had not
deliberately targeted civilians. For details, see Sean Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, NATO Air Campaign Against Serbia and the Laws of War, 94
Although

NATO

American Journal of International Law 690

(2000).

—

No. 5220/99 (Bankovic and others Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark,
France, Gemany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Turkey and United Kingdom). The applicants alleged violations of Articles 1, 2,
10 and 13 of the Convention. The application has been communicated to the respondent States
and transferred to the Grand Chamber of the Court (see Information Note No. 24 on the case-law
of the Court, November 2000). The Court held hearings on the admissibility on October 25, 2001.
65. Application
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Another question would be whether NATO acted within the framework of
its functions and powers, both defined and fixed in the North Atlantic
Treaty, 66 since some writers maintain that an international organization's responsibility presupposes that the organization has acted according to

Here, again, the answer

ute.

Atlantic Treaty

is

not that easy. The main purpose of the North

is

"to safeguard the freedom,
." 67

common heritage and civilization

There

is

nothing in the

suggest that another of NATO's purposes

is

to protect

of their (the parties) peoples.

.

its stat-

.

NATO Treaty to

human

through

rights

the use of force "out of area," as was the case with Operation Allied Force.

be able to say that

"New

Strategic

this

too

Concept"

is

68

To

one of NATO's purposes, one will have to add the
adopted during the Washington summit in April

1999, to the existing Treaty, although
Treaty, duly ratified in each

member

it is

not a formal amendment of the

State. In

its

"New

Strategic

Concept"

"non- Article 5 missions" in case of a crisis outside the
NATO pledges to
NATO Treaty area. Although the new concept a political, not a legal comfulfill

is

mitment, one could not say that Operation Allied Force has been an

ultra vires

NATO member States agreed, otherwise the
operation would not have taken place. But NATO looked more like an instruact of one of NATO's organs. All

ment than the author of or the driving force behind the operation.
Be that as it may, the next question is whether the alleged violations of inwould be attributable to NATO, because the relevant rules of
international law are binding also on NATO, and because NATO had "effecternational law

tive control"
ally

wrongful.

not

all

over the act that could subsequently be qualified as internationIs

NATO bound by the

of its members are?

The

1977 Additional Protocols even though

relevant question here

has been accused of having selected targets for
least

not

strictly,

military targets

66.

North Atlantic Treaty, Apr.

67.

See paragraph 2 of the preambula.

68.

Bulletin des Presse-

24, 1949,

(bridges,

63

"targeting."

air strikes that

power

Stat. 2241,

is

were not, or

stations, radio

and

at

TV

34 U.N.T.S. 243.

Id.

und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung Nr. 24 vom

&

NATO

3.5. 1999,

222

Schmahl, Die neue NATO-Strategie und ihre
volkerrechdichen und verfassungsrechdichen Implikationen, 35 RECHT UND POLITIK 198 (1999).

et

seq.

See also

Eckart Klein

Stefanie
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both military and civilian uses,
and attacking dual-use objects is not necessarily unlawful, provided that they
meet the definition of military objectives in Article 52, paragraph 2 of Protocol I, that the principle of proportionality is observed, and that collateral damage is minimized. 69 But did the television studios make an effective
contribution to Serbian military action and did the attacks offer a definite military advantage? If they were targeted merely because they were spreading
propaganda to the civilian population, it appears at least doubtful whether
stations).

targets certainly served

their destruction offered a definite military advantage. 70
If

these attacks were in breach of Protocol

control?"

The

targeting procedure

was

I,

did

as follows:

NATO

NATO's

have "effective

military planners

and requested specific targets. These targets were or were not approved by the permanent representatives of the member States, sometimes after consulting with their respective governments. If only one Representative
cast a negative vote, the target was not attacked. If the target was approved,
the task force received an order to attack. Every air force contingent had its
own "national commander in theater" and the pilots received their mission orders from him. The national commander could, in theory, decide not to attack
a specific target because he was of the opinion that it was not a military objective. Does this discretion of member States' authorities to implement or not a
decision of the organization remove the organization's responsibility? In reality the commander gave the order, because he knew that his government had
approved the target and because the target could be classified as a dual-use object. So the decision was in fact taken at the NATO level, and NATO, provided that all other preconditions were fulfilled, could be responsible for
identified

"illegal" targeting.

The

last

category of possible internationally wrongful acts are what one

A number of such errors were reported and some had
to do with the fact that for reasons of "force protection" NATO had decided

might

call "pilot errors."

to execute the missions from a very high altitude.

thought was a Serbian military convoy;

it

One

pilot attacked

what he

turned out to be a convoy of refu-

Another pilot attacked a bridge (certainly a dual-use object) at the very
moment at which a civilian train entered the bridge. Both bridge and train
were destroyed. It is not clear whether the pilot had the possibility to break off
gees.

69. See

Theodor Meron, The Humanization

of Humanitarian Law, 94

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW

239, 276 (2000).
George Aldrich, Yugoslavia's Television Studios as
Forum 149-50 (1999).

70. See

Law
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the attack.

If

these and other attacks constituted violations of the humanitar-

ian law applicable in

mand

—have

armed

conflicts, did

"effective control?"

Even

NATO—given

if this

should be

the chain of

so,

NATO does not

one mode of reparation that might be required in such a case: 71
plinary and penal jurisdiction remain with the force-providing State.
possess

responsibility of NATO's

The

C.

Responsibility of
tions

can be

member

direct, if

member

disci-

States

States for "their" international organizations ac-

turns out that the organization itself

it

com-

other reason not responsible in a situation in which the

is

for

one or an-

members acted

through the organization. Responsibility can also be concurrent, with the con-

sequence that a third party which

is

the victim of an internationally wrongful

can choose whether to seek redress from the organization or its members.
Responsibility of the member States can be secondary in cases in which the oract

ganization

is

primarily responsible, but, for example, lacks the necessary funds

to pay compensation.

This

is

not the place to discuss in detail the distribution of responsibility be-

tween international organizations and its member States. 72 It is, however, beyond doubt that member States would be responsible if, for general reasons,

NATO should not be responsible at
not be acceptable,
fingers at

turn, all

i.e.,

one another.

NATO

all.

A so-called "negative conflict" would

that both sides, the organization and
It

member

seems equally beyond doubt

its

members, point

that, should

it

be their

States are responsible for the decision to use force

was a unanimous decision of all member States. The
same is true for "targeting" decisions, which also, as has been shown above, required unanimity. But not all member States took part in Operation Allied
against Yugoslavia;

it

armed forces at all. 73 And not
all of the NATO member States who do maintain an air force participated.
The situation becomes even more complicated by the fact that not all
member States have accepted the same treaty obligations. The United States,
whose air force flew most of the missions, has not ratified Protocol I under
Force. Iceland, for example, does not maintain

71.

See Protocol

I,

art.

87(3).

MATTHIAS HARTWIG, DIE HAFTUNG DER MlTGLIEDSTAATEN FOR
INTERNATIONALE ORGANISATIONEN passim (1993), and HIRSCH, supra note 50, at 96 et seq.
See also C.F. Amerasinghe, Liability to Third Parties of Member States of International Organizations:
Practice, Principle and Judicial Precedent, 85 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
72.

See in

this respect

259-280 (1991).
73.

Iceland

is

a respondent in the application

pending before the European Court of

Rights (see supra note 65).
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which targeting decisions,

as well as decisions

taken by pilots during their mis'

The same was

sion,

appear to be at least problematic.

key.

Are those member States who approved the

Protocol

I,

targets

and

are

and Tur-

bound by

responsible, but not the nation that eventually attacked these tar-

gets because

who

true for France

it is

not a party to the Protocol? Does

attacked which target?

74

Can,

at the

NATO have

to disclose

end of the day, only those States

carry responsibility that have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ and could,
therefore, be sued there? 75

The

only reasonable solution seems to be that

all

NATO

member

States

any internationally wrongful acts committed during Operation Allied Force.
as such is not recognized by the possible claimant
are responsible for

NATO
(Yugoslavia) NATO
not an organization that has been created "to do business" with third States and which third States have accepted as such. NATO
is

.

is

not the "international tin council." 76 Therefore, the concept that has been

developed in international law for the sole responsibility of international orga-

and which has borrowed much from national commercial law, 77
does not really fit NATO. NATO's budget could certainly not accommodate
78
all claims for pecuniary compensation.
If it comes to individual wrongful decisions made by pilots, other NATO States could, of course, invoke the
nizations,

flag-State principle, but they should consider that

ture have to rely
"to

do the job"

on

common

a few actors for

will afterwards

be

left

NATO will also in the fu-

operations. If those

who

agree

alone to face responsibility on account of

possible internationally wrongful acts, their readiness will disappear. Al-

though, for these reasons, joint responsibility advocates strongly for a

common

standard, the concept of responsibility under international law as such does

74.

Amnesty

International concluded that

to confusion over legal responsibility

command

so that there are clear lines of responsibility,

organization, for each State
its

75.

aegis

The

(c/.

and each individual involved

Murphy, supra note
(see

structure appears to contribute

NATO

known

clarify its

chain of

within and outside the

in military operations

conducted under

64, at 692)

ICJ has dismissed, inter

jurisdiction

NATO's command

and recommended that

Bekker, supra

alia,

Yugoslavia's claims against the United States for lack of

note 63).

See also Nicholas

Alexander, Airstrikes and

Can the United States Be Held Liable for Operation Allied Force?, 11
Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 471 (2000).
76. See HARTWIG, supra note 72, at 307 et seq. and Amerasinghe, supra note 72.
77. See MENG, supra note 50.
78. Financing 85% of the costs for making the Danube again navigable has been estimated
by the European Union as requiring 22 Million Euro (Agence Europe No. 7724 of 25 May 2000,
Environmental Damage:

at 11).
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not legally mandate a single (maximum) legal standard for
coalition in case of differing individual legal obligations.

all

members of a

79

Conclusion

It is,

mum)

for practical as well as legal purposes, preferable that the

legal standard of obligations

same (maxi-

under international humanitarian law ap-

members of a given coalition, provided that the other side is bound to
obey the same rules. To the extent that treaty-based rules of humanitarian law
are at the same time regarded as declaratory of custom, the uniformity of the
ply to

all

legal standard

is

guaranteed, but

it is

doubtful whether this would reach

much

beyond the most fundamental principles. In those instances when humanitarian law obligations arise only from treaties, other possible reasons for why a coalition should apply the same (maximum) standard do not individually seem
to be compelling, although perhaps taken together, they

may be.

A solution for future coalitions could be found in the idea which underlies
and also 96(3) of Protocol I: status-of- forces agreements as well
as rules of engagement should provide that the maximum standard of obligations of one or more members of a coalition applies to all its members during a

Article 96(2)

given conflict.

Members of a coalition who so wish may make

do not intend, by accepting the

maximum

it

clear that they

standard, to contribute to the

emergence of additional customary law, but that they accept and apply the relevant rules only for coalition purposes. Such an ad hoc solution might be more
helpful than a possible "third protocol" to the Geneva conventions on rules
applicable to coalition warfare.

Such

a protocol

would be only another

treaty,

with few ratifications at the beginning and probably not in force for a long

and would give rise later to the old question whether and when
become part of customary law.
time,

79.

it

might

For more on this topic by the present author, see Torsten Stein, Kosovo and the International

Community. The Attribution of Possible

Member
Tomuschat
its

*

I

am

States,

ed.,

in

Internationally

Wrongful Acts: Responsibility of
181

KOSOVO AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

NATO or of
et

seq

(C.

2002).

very

much

indebted to

Norwegian Judge Advocate's Corps,

Magne

Frostad, a doctoral student

who

for his great support in finalizing this paper.
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To What Extent Is

Protocol

I

Customary

Law?

International

The Honorable Fausto Pocar

PHT^l
o what extent does Protocol

I

I

1

reflect

customary international law,

such that it may be regarded as binding on non-party States? The ques-

tion has

been discussed since the

Protocol

I,

early days following the entry into force of

when the number of ratifying States was still rather thin. 2 Indeed the

frequent involvement of non-ratifying States in international armed conflicts

made an answer to that question urgent,

in order to establish the scope of appli-

cation of the principles that the Protocol enshrines in a given situation. Not-

withstanding the increase in the number of States parties, 3 the problem
continues to be topical, in particular because the countries that have not yet
ratified the instrument, including

maintain serious reservations

some major

as to the

actors in international relations,

binding force of one or more principles

expressed and regulated therein. In this context,
4

attention has mainly focused on Part

III

it

has to be pointed out that

(Articles 35 to 47) of Protocol

I,

deal-

methods and means of warfare and with the status of combatants and
prisoners of war, as well as on Part IV (Articles 48 to 79), concerned with the
ing with

1.

Protocol Additional

(I)

to the

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating

Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, June

ON THE LAWS OF WAR 422
2.

Protocol

I

(A. Roberts

I;

1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.

&R. Guelff eds., 3d ed.

entered into force on December

parties to Protocol

8,

7,

3,

to the

DOCUMENTS

2000) [hereinafter Protocol

1978. By 1980 only 16 States had

I].

become

they were Bahamas, Bangladesh, Botswana, Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador,

Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Niger, Sweden, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.
3.

59 States were parties to Protocol

4. India,

Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,

August 21, 2001.
Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Turkey and the United States are some of
I

as of

the States which have not ratified Protocol

I

so

far.

To What Extent

is

Protocol 1 Customary International

Law?

protection to be afforded to civilian populations; these two parts of the Proto-

many

col being in

respects linked to each other.

undisputed that Protocol

It is

I is

aimed both

at codifying existing interna-

tional law relating to the protection of victims of international

and

armed

conflicts

As

the Pre-

developing such law in order to increase their protection.

at

amble clearly

states,

the instrument

is

based on the necessity "to reaffirm and

develop the provisions protecting the victims of armed conflicts." 5 Thus, Protocol

itself

I

explains that not

all

of

same time

its

provisions simply codify existing law,

number of them do

though

it

declares at the

One

is

therefore confronted with a problem

of

all

so-called codification conventions,

treaty provisions that reflect

that

that a

make innovations

i.e.,

common

so.

to the interpretation

the problem of identifying the

customary international law, as opposed to those

or contain additional elements, thus developing the

and content. 6 The former will have general value in that they reproduce customary rules, while the binding force of the latter will be limited to
law's scope

the States having ratified or acceded to the convention. This

is

in accordance

with the general rule that treaties do not create either obligations or rights for
a third State without
ties (pacta tertiis

its

consent and that their effects are limited to State par-

nee nocent nee prosunt). 1

making this assertion, however, some points must be borne in mind.
First, the abovementioned status of a treaty provision as reproducing or developing customary international law may change according to the time at which
In

its

status

is

assessed.

A provision that did not reflect customary law when

was drafted may subsequently become a customary rule through

its

plication by States. Similarly, although less frequently, a provision
fied principles forming part of customary law

reflect

them

at a later stage

due to changes

when

it

it

general ap-

which codi-

was drafted

may not

in general State practice. In deal-

ing with this issue, reference should therefore be

made

which the question of the binding force of a

specific treaty provision for

non-contracting States

to the point in time at

arises.

5.

Emphasis added.

6.

See Richard Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129

Zemanek, Die Bedeutung der Kodifizierung des

RECUEIL DES COURS 36
Volkerrechts fur seine Anwendung,

ft*

(1970); Karl

in

FESTSCHRIFT

VERDROSS 565 (1971); Roberto Ago, Nouvelles reflexions sur la codification du droit international,
92 Revue Generale de Droit International Public 539 (1988).
7. According to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331), "A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State
without

its

consent."
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when

Secondly, even

norm

of customary law,

a treaty provision can be considered as codifying a
it

the latter that finds application as regards

is

non-party States and not the treaty provision as such.

Court of Justice

distinct sources of
rules.

Nicaragua case,

clarified in the

8

As

the International

the two norms derive from

law and each continues to belong to a separate body of

Indeed, the Court stated:

Even

if

the customary

norm and

norm were

the treaty

to

have exactly the same

content, this would not be a reason for the Court to hold that the incorporation

of the customary

norm

applicability as distinct
for

holding that

must deprive the customary norm of its
from that of the treaty norm
[T]here are no grounds
into treaty-law

when customary

international law

is

comprised of rules

identical to those of treaty law, the latter 'supervenes' the former, so that the

customary international law has no further existence of its own. 9

Thus, their interpretation and application
ples,

although the treaty provision

will

may be

subject to different princi-

have an impact in

constitutes an assessment of the relevant rule or principle

which have entered into the

context in that

this

made by

it

the States

treaty.

Thirdly, as the codification process necessarily requires an assessment of

the customary rule or principle concerned as well as a written definition
thereof, the resulting written text

may be

new element

content. Consequently, any precision or

—

—

regarded as affecting
that

its

scope and

may have been

added as is normally the case by the treaty provision to the principle of
customary law which it codifies must be checked carefully in order to establish
whether it has come to be accepted as generally applicable. However, the addition of new elements by a treaty provision to a customary principle should be

distinguished from specifications deriving by necessary implication from the

accepted general customary principle.

it

has been pointed out, 10 such spec-

could not be regarded as requiring acceptance of the treaty in order

ifications

to

As

become

applicable to a State.

A different conclusion would result in allow-

ing a limitation of the already accepted general principle that derives from

and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar.

8. Military

v.

U.S.),

1986

I.C.J.

14,

94-5 Oune 27)

[hereinafter Nicaragua casej.
9. Id. at 95.

10.

See Georges Abi-Saab, The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law: Some

Preliminary Reflections, in

ESSAYS IN
1991),

HONOUR OF

who mentions

bombardments

HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS: CHALLENGES AHEAD,
FRITS KALSHOVEN 120 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds.,

in this regard the rules

in Protocol

concerning the protection of civilians against

I.
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customary law. The inclusion of such necessary implications in a treaty provision cannot reduce in any way for non-party States the obligations they would

have under the general principles from which those implications derive.
The elements and factors to be taken into consideration in assessing State
practice for the purposes of establishing the existence of customary rules
principles

have been widely discussed in international

law. This paper does not

aim

and

and case

legal doctrine

and implications of

at revisiting all the features

the problems arising in this area, including the issue of defining State practice.

The main principles governing

the matter have been already laid down by the
Court
of
in
the North Sea Continental Shelf case 11 and in
International
Justice
the Nicaragua case, 12 whereby the Court has stressed the respective role of the

practice of States

and

opinio juris as factors for identifying a

customary rule of

international law, as well as the place of treaty provisions codifying customary

law in

this regard.

to exist as a

Following these judgments, there

is

no doubt

that for a rule

norm of customary international law both its recognition as

obligation by States
are required.

and the

latter's

conduct which

is

a legal

consistent with the rule

13

Some issues deserve

between
has been dis-

special consideration as far as the relationship

and customary rules is concerned. In this context, it
cussed whether the practice of all States, including those which are
codified

the treaty (in our case Protocol

I)

,

parties to

should be taken into account for the pur-

A

poses of establishing the existence of a customary norm.

negative answer

would diminish the number of States whose practice is relevant to this end
and would make it more difficult to determine the status of customary law, as

1 1.

See

North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G.

v.

Den., F.R.G.

v.

Neth.), 1969

I.C.J. 3,

44 (Feb.

20).
12.

See Nicaragua case, supra note 8, at 97-8.

13.

In particular, the Court in the Nicaragua case stated:

The mere

fact that States declare their recognition of certain rules

is

not sufficient for

the court to consider these as being part of customary international law, and as
applicable as such to those States.
inter alia, international

custom

'as

Bound

Court may not disregard the essential

must

satisfy itself that

as

it is

by Article 38 of

Statute to apply,

role played by general practice.

.

.

the existence of the rule in the opinio juris of States

by practice. ... In order to deduce the existence of customary
sufficient that the

its

evidence of a general practice accepted as

rules,

.

is

law', the

The Court
confirmed

the Court deems

conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such

it

rules,

and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have
been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.
Nicaragua case, supra note

8, at

97-8.
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the acceptance of the treaty increases. However, such a conclusion (the
so-called Baxter paradox 14 )

would disregard both the

fact that the treaty itself

an important piece of State practice for the determination of customary
law, although its role in this regard must be carefully assessed, 15 and the impact that any subsequent practice of the contracting States in the application
of the treaty which establishes their agreement or disagreement regarding its
interpretation 16 may bear on the development of a customary norm. Thereis

fore,

it is

submitted that customary international humanitarian law should not

be determined on the sole basis of the practice of the States that have not
fied Protocol

rati-

I.

In addition to the practice of State parties in their application of Protocol

and the behavior of other States

vis-a-vis the Protocol itself,

any other

I

ele-

ment being evidence of State practice may come into play. Special importance
should however be attached to the case law, although limited, of international
courts,

such

as the International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

According to the Baxter paradox, "[A]s the number of parties to a treaty increases, it
becomes more difficult to demonstrate what is the state of customary international law dehors
14.

the treaty." In addition, "[a]s the express acceptance of the treaty increases, the

not parties whose practice

is

international law dehors the treaty.
15.

.

.

."

See Baxter, supra note

6, at

64, 73.

See Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81

OF INTERNATIONAL

number of states

relevant diminishes. There will be less scope for the development of

AMERICAN JOURNAL

LAW

367 (1987), which points out that although acts concordant with a
from acts in the application of the treaty, the
demonstration that an act by State parties is regarded by them as required not only by their
conventional obligations but also by general international law would show the existence of an
treaty

obviously

are

indistinguishable

which should be given probative weight for the formation of customary law.
1 (3) (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (supra note 7),
concerning general rules of interpretation, which states: "There shall be taken into account,
together with the context
[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." See on this provision

opinio juris,
16.

C/. Article 3

.

.

.

Francesco Capotorti, Sul valore
Vienna, in

della prassi applicativa dei trattati

INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE TIME OF

ITS

secondo

OF ROBERTO AGO 197 ff. (A. Giuffre ed., 1987); Fausto Pocar, Codification
Law by the United Nations, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
Jasentuliyana ed., 1995).
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(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal

for

Law?

Rwanda (ICTR). 17 As has

been pointed out, the assessment of the customary nature of treaty provisions
made by international courts has frequently proved to be regarded as determinative in subsequent debates. 18 However, even in respect of case law, it has to
be stressed that previous decisions of international courts cannot be relied on
as

having the authority of precedents in order to establish a principle of law.

The

current structure of the international community, which clearly lacks a

hierarchical judicial system, does not allow consideration of judicial precedent
as a distinct source of law. Therefore, prior case

dence of a customary rule in that

it

may reflect

law may only constitute evi-

the existence of opinio juris and

international practice, but cannot be regarded per se as having precedential

authority in international criminal adjudication.

As has been pointed

out, in-

ternational criminal courts must always carefully appraise decisions of other

17.

The

limited

number of ICTY

decisions dealing with the issue considered in this paper,

i.e.,

whether Protocol I reflects customary law, depend on the consideration that the Protocol was
referred to by the ICTY as conventional law rather than as evidence of customary international
law. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-14-T, Mar. 3, 2000, 11 172
[hereinafter BlaSkic case], where it is stated that Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina ratified
Protocol I and Protocol II (which is applicable to non-international armed conflicts) in 1992 and
that "consequently, as of January 1993, the two parties were bound by the provisions of the two
Protocols, whatever their status within customary international law." See also Prosecutor v.
Kordic and Cerkez, Decision on the Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
Portions of the Amended Indictment Alleging "Failure to Punish" Liability, I.C.T.Y. No.
IT-95-14/2-PT, Mar. 2, 1999, 11 13, where it is stated that "both the Republic of Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina are bound by Additional Protocol I as successor States of the Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia, which had ratified the Protocol on 11 June 1979." In this context see
also Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Appeal Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-96-21-A, Feb. 20, 2001, Ml
111-113, where it is stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina would have in any event succeeded to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (to which Yugoslavia was a party) irrespective of any findings
as to formal succession. The Appeals Chamber considered that "in international law there is
automatic State succession to multilateral humanitarian treaties in the broad sense, i.e., treaties
of universal character which express fundamental human rights" and that "in light of the object
and purpose of the Geneva Conventions, which is to guarantee the protection of certain
the Appeals Chamber is
fundamental values common to mankind in times of armed conflict,
in no doubt that State succession has no impact on obligations arising out from these
.

.

.

fundamental humanitarian conventions."
18.

See

THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL LAW 43

(1989). See also Christopher Greenwood, Customary

Law Status of the

1977 Geneva Protocols, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 10, at 99,
where it is noted that no decisions of the ICJ or of other authoritative international tribunals
existed regarding Protocol I and points out that international decisions are rare in respect to any
of the humanitarian law treaties, except for the decisions on war crimes cases issued after World
War II. Later on, as mentioned in the text, the international criminal tribunals established by the
Security Council have sometimes dealt with the Protocols.
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courts before relying

on

their persuasive authority as to existing law. 19

may have

quently, although judicial decisions of international courts

Conse-

a special

weight, they must be regarded as one of the elements that have to be taken
into account in the assessment of the existence of a customary rule.

Looking

at the provisions of Protocol

tomary international humanitarian law,
ferent groups of norms.

The

whose customary nature

is

the Protocol

first

and

undisputed.

I

from the perspective of existing cus-

it is

certainly possible to identify dif-

largest
It is

group encompasses the rules

widely recognized that

a codification of general international law.

is

Even

much

of

States that

have decided not to ratify it, such as the
have expressed the view that many of its provisions are either

hesitate to accept the instrument or

United States,
settled

20

customary international law or eligible

customary international law.

A

for their ultimate recognition as

21

customary status should clearly be accorded, in the

first

place, to the

Hague Regulations annexed
Hague Convention of 1907, which are generally regarded

to the Fourth

provisions that echo or restate the

19.

See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et

al.,

as reflecting

Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-16-T, Jan.

14,

2000, H 542

[hereinafter Kupreskic case].
20. See Letter of Transmittal of Protocol

II

by President Reagan to the Senate, dated January 29,

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 910 (1987), and
An Appeal for Ratification by the United States, 81 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF

1987, reprinted in 81

Hans-Peter Gasser,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

912 (1987). See also George Aldrich, Prospects for United States
Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1991), where the difficulties encountered by the United States are
discussed with a view to overcoming them by means of reservations.
21.

Indeed,

it

announcement

has been noted that statements of United States

officials

following the

would not ratify Protocol I are evidence that "the United
States regards Articles 37 (perfidy), 40 (refusal of quarter), 42 (on persons parachuting from a
disabled aircraft), 59 (non-defended localities), 60 (demilitarised zones), 73 (refugees), 75
(fundamental guarantees) and 79 (journalists) as declaratory of custom." See Greenwood, supra
that the United States

EDWARD KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED
conflict: personal and material fields of application 26 (1992); theodor
Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age 179-80 (1998).
note

18,

at

103. See also
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example, to the basic rules that concern

applies, for

methods and means of warfare, such as those contained in Article 35(1),
which declares that the right of the parties to a conflict to choose methods or
means of warfare is not unlimited, and to Article 35(2), which prohibits the
employment of weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare that
are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

provisions basically follow Articles

These

22 and 23(e) of the Hague Regulations,

which excluded the unlimited use of means of warfare and contained the prohibition on employing arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.

It

true that Protocol

is

uses,

I

additionally,

the term

"methods of warfare" in order to define the scope of the prohibition and that
the addition could be regarded as introducing a new element, which would
only have the status of a treaty rule. 23 It is submitted, however, that the addition

the

is

a

mere

customary rule reflected in

clarification of the already existing

Hague Regulations

rather than a

new

rule aiming at

its

development. In-

means of warfare appears to
include both the choice of weapons and the way in which weapons are emdeed, the prohibition against employing certain
ployed. 24

22.

It

has to be noted that a Trial

Chamber of the ICTY has considered

that:

[I]t is the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land (hereinafter "the Regulations of The Hague"), as interpreted and applied by the
Nuremberg Tribunal, which is the basis for Article 3 of the Statute. Hence, although

Article 3 of the Statute subsumes

provision inasmuch as

it is

Common Article

also based

3, it

nevertheless remains a broader

on the Regulations of The Hague which,

in the

opinion of the Trial Chamber, also undoubtedly form part of customary international law.
See Blaskic case, supra note 17,
23. See

Henri Meyrowitz, The

Declaration of

St.

11

168.

Principle of Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering:

Petersburg of 1868 to Additional Protocol

REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 98 (1994), where it is stated
HR, Article 23(e), international

principle expressed in

I

of 1977, 299

From

the

INTERNATIONAL

that "while this rule derives from the
legislation

was required to make

it

positive law."
24.

See Greenwood, supra note 18, at 104.

adopted by consensus

made declarations

at the

It

has to be noted in this context that Article 35 was

Geneva Diplomatic Conference and

particular, the Federal Republic of Germany joined the

paragraphs

1

conventional

that

some

participating States

that confirm the customary nature of paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 35. In

consensus with the "understanding that

and 2 reaffirm customary international law" and that paragraph 3 constitutes a new
rule. It should also be noted that the addition of the term "superfluous injury" to

the term "unnecessary suffering"

is

to be regarded as simply aiming at rendering in English the

expression "maux superflus" contained in the French text of Article 23(e). See Meyrowitz, supra

note 23, at 104-5.
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Similar considerations apply in this context to the provisions prohibiting

go beyond ruses of war and amount to perfidy (Article 37) or declarations that no quarter will be given (Article 40), and others that clearly follow
acts that

Hague

the corresponding provisions of the

Regulations. Equally, most of the

provisions concerning combatant and prisoner-of-war status (Articles 43 to

47) restate rules already expressed in the

Hague Regulations

or in the

Geneva

Conventions of 1949, which are largely considered as reflecting customary international law 25 even though the customary nature of some additions have

been questioned

in legal doctrine. This

is

the case, in particular, of the provi-

sion of Article 44(3) concerning the requirement that combatants distinguish

themselves from the civilian population. While this requirement clearly reflects

an existing

principle, the provision differs

from customary international

law especially as regards the situation in which combatants are unable to
tinguish themselves; therefore, the criteria set forth in Protocol

regarded as

As

new conventional

rules.

I

dis-

have to be

26

regards the protection of civilians and the civilian population against

the effects of hostilities, there

is

no doubt

that the principle of distinction as

48 of Protocol I, both as regards the distinction between
combatants and noncombatants and between civilian objects and non-civilset forth in Article

ian objects, reaffirms a general rule of international law that has never been

questioned despite being frequently disregarded in State practice.

The same

applies in this context, at least in general terms, to the definition of civilians

and the

civilian population (Article 50)

shall enjoy against dangers arising

and

to the general protection they

from military operations (Article 51), in

particular through the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, as well as to the

general rule

on protection of

civilian objects (Article 52).

The

specificity of

these provisions appear mainly to be detailed clarifications of existing recog-

nized rules rather than additions aimed at their development. 27

25. See e.g., Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian
Law: Purpose, Coverage and Methodology, 81 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 660

(1999).
26.

Penna, Customary International Law and Protocol
An Analysis of Some
AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED
in Honour of Jean Pictet 214-5 (Chnstophe Swinarski ed., 1984); and

See in particular

Provisions, in

Cross

L.

I:

STUDIES

Principles,

Greenwood, supra note

18, at 107,

where

major reason
27.

As

for

its

I,

noted that Article 44(3) was one of the most
identified by the United States as a

and has been

decision not to ratify the Protocol.

to the role of Protocol

I

in clarifying pre-existing

Negotiating the 1977 Additional Protocols:

ARMED

also

it is

controversial provisions inserted in Protocol

CONFLICTS, supra note

10, at

Was

it

customary law, see Hans-Peter Gasser,

a Waste of Time?,

85-6.
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Chamber of the ICTY has, with

respect to Articles 51(2) and 52(1) of the Protocol, expressed the view that

these provisions "are based

which

is

on Hague law

relating to the

considered as part of customary law."

[T]o the extent that these provisions

.

.

conduct of warfare,

The Chamber concluded

that:

echo the Hague Regulations, they can

.

be considered as reflecting customary law.

It is

indisputable that the general

prohibition of attacks against the civilian population and the prohibition of

indiscriminate attacks or attacks
obligations.

As

on

a consequence, there

civilian objects are generally accepted
is

no

possible doubt as to the customary

status of these specific provisions as they reflect core principles of humanitarian

law that can be considered as applying to

all

armed

to be international or non-international conflicts.

A similar consideration can be

made

as

conflicts,

concerns the principle of propor-

tionality as set forth in Article 51(5)(b), according to

when

whether intended

28

which an attack on a

would cause excessive injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 29 Admittedly, the extent to which these
provisions correspond to customary law has been questioned, because the formulation adopted appears to contain a number of specifications that can not
be found in previous declarations of the same principles. However, it has also
been pointed out that such specifications are aimed at clarifying the scope of
the principles rather than at adding new elements that would lead to the modification of their content or effects. 30 While it is possible that the interpretation of certain expressions used in Protocol I may lead to improvements that
could result in a departure from existing customary law principles, it is certain
that such improvements would be considered as forming part of the natural
development of customary law rather than as constituting mere treaty
military objective

is

prohibited

it

provisions.

same line of reasoning, it may be assumed that the provisions of Articles 57 and 58, prescribing that precautionary measures should be taken in
conducting an attack, as well as against the effects of attacks, are mere qualifications of the general principles of distinction and proportionality, although
In the

28.

Prosecutor

v.

Kordic and Cerkez, Decision on the Joint Defence Motion to Dismiss the

Amended
29.

Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on the Limited Jurisdictional Reach of
and 3, 1.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-14/2-PT, Mar. 2, 1999, 1 31.
See Greenwood, supra note 18, at 109; Penna, supra note 26, at 220.

30.

As

Articles 2

to the specifications contained in Article 51(5)(b), see, e.g.,

65.

346

MERON,

supra note 18, at

The Honorable Fausto Pocar

they

may be seen as going beyond customary law. 31

It is

interesting to note that

the customary nature of these provisions has been recently affirmed by a Trial

Chamber of the ICTY, not

only because they specify pre-existing norms, but

also because they appear to be uncontested

The Chamber went on

States.

to state that

by States, even non-ratifying

when

a rule of international hu-

somewhat imprecise, it must be defined with reference to the
laws of humanity and dictates of public conscience espoused in the celebrated
"Martens clause," 32 which constitutes customary law. As a result, the Chamber concluded that the prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58, and of the corremanitarian law

is

must be interpreted "so as to construe as narrowly
as possible the discretionary power to attack belligerents and, by the same token, so as to expand the protection accorded to civilians." 33
While most of Protocol I can undoubtedly be regarded as essentially reflecting customary international law, there are areas where this conclusion is subject to debate for two reasons. First, Protocol I clearly sets forth some new
sponding customary

rules,

Secondly, the specificity of Protocol Ps provisions add

rules.

principles that, while well established in

cretion to belligerent States.

such specifications
interpretations.
versial

col
its

customary law, leave margins of dis-

may

limit discretion if they are given certain

The scope and impact

of these additions

basis for the hesitations of

some

is

therefore contro-

States to ratify Proto-

Indeed, Protocol Ps ratification would require that the interpretation of

I.

conducted according to the relevant criteria of the law
which are not applicable to the corresponding rules as recognized

principles should be

of treaties,
in

to

Belligerent States are then free to argue that

will limit or

and may be the

new elements

customary international law.

Some

areas appear to be especially significant in this respect, in particular

those relating to the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects.

For instance, the presumption expressed in Article 50(1) that in case of doubt
as to
31.
32.

whether a person

See

is

a civilian, that person should be considered as having

Greenwood, supra note

The Martens clause

first

18, at 111.

appeared in the preamble to the Hague Convention

(II)

of 1899.

It

states:

Until a more complete code of the laws of war

think

it

is

issued, the

High Contracting

right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations

Parties

adopted by them,

populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles
of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilised
nations, from the law of humanity,
33.

and the requirements of the public conscience.

19, 1JH 521-25. The issue was not considered on appeal. See
Appeal Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-16-A, Oct. 23, 2001.

Kupreskic case, supra note

Prosecutor

v.

Kupreskic et

al.,
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and the provision of Article 52(3) that an object normally dedicated to civilian purposes shall, in case of doubt as to its being used to contribute to military action, be presumed not to be so used. These provisions do not
automatically
although
it
would
certainly
seem to derive
be
from the principle of distinction as settled in customary internadesirable 34
tional law, which appears to leave it to the attacker to decide how to determine the status of the military objective.
There seems to be no doubt that the definition of military objectives consuch

status,

—

—

tained in Article 52(2) corresponds to existing principles as reflected in cus-

tomary international law and

simply

clarifications of the definition are considered as being

pretations of the scope of the obligations imposed

However,

them.

clarifies

open

on the

the

if

to different inter-

attacker, then that

would be incompatible with a consideration of the provision as fully reflecting
customary law. Expressions such as "effective contribution to military action"
or "definite military advantage"

may not be

sufficiently precise for the

of establishing a safe basis for a rule of customary international law.

other hand,

it

only

provision

is

purpose

On

the

has also been submitted that the definition enshrined in the sec-

ond sentence of Article 52(2)
civilians,

35

is

such that

but combatants as well.

If,

it

should be deemed to include not

indeed, the implicit ratio

legis

for

such

the same that underlies the principle that superfluous injury or

no reason why the provision
members of armed forces as well. 36

unnecessary suffering should be avoided, there
should not apply to attacks against

is

Similarly, the obligation to protect the natural

environment against wide-

and severe damage, which includes the prohibition of the
use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to

spread, long-term

34.

See in particular

Applicable in

Armed

Frits

Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of Humanitarian Laws
9 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 112

Conflicts,

(1978).
35.

The

possibility of a

wide interpretation of legitimate objectives under Protocol

I

is

among others, by Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1 999: The Air Campaign: Have the provisions of
I withstood the test?, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 147
See also Penna, supra note 26, at 219, who points out that Article 52(2) may be regarded

underlined,

Additional Protocol

(2000).
as

customary law, but recognizes that the definition of military objectives contained therein

from being precise and that "customary international law

is

far

at present allows belligerents to regard

legitimate civilian objects serving directly or indirectly the

enemy war

effort

as 'military

objectives'."

36.

For this approach see Meyrowitz, supra note 23, at 115,

who

states that "strictly speaking,

the extension of the rule stated in Article 52(2) to combatants would not have the purpose of
protecting them, but of excluding them, under certain circumstances, from the definition of
military objectives that

may

lawfully be attacked."
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cause such damage (Article 35(3)), in particular

may be

of the population

when

the health or survival

prejudiced (Article 55), finds no clear precedent in

was acknowledged by some States who participated
in the drafting of Protocol I. 37 Although subsequent development of a customary principle of respect for the environment in warfare may be in progress, 38 its
scope is certainly far from being assessed and recognized. It may be also noted,
existing customary law, as

in this connection, that the said provisions appear to affirm a principle of pro-

tection in absolute terms, applicable irrespective of a reference both to the
principles of proportionality
spect, that Article

and of distinction.

It

must be noted,

55 refers to population without the qualification

A final area that may deserve special attention, since

it is

in this re"civilian."

subject to debate,

concerns the prohibition of reprisals against civilians and protected objects,

which

are referred to in Articles 51 to

the controversy

on

this

56 of Protocol

matter has been and

views have been expressed both at the

still is

It is

I.

known

well

that

important, and different

Geneva Diplomatic Conference where

was negotiated and subsequently. The dominant view is probably
that the provisions of Protocol I neither reflect pre-existing customary law nor
have subsequently reached that nature, but contain significant developments
Protocol

I

in this regard. 39

was considered by a Trial Chamber of the ICTY, 40
which discussed whether the Protocol's provisions on reprisals against
Interestingly, the issue

37. See

Greenwood, supra note

18, at 101,

where

it is

stated:

is more contentious and, unlike the rest of Article 35, was not based
upon the provisions of earlier treaties. Nor could it be said that State practice prior to
1977 provided much support for the existence of such a rule. Although the Article was

Article 35(3) ...

adopted by consensus, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that
that consensus

Subsequent
position.

.

.

United
.

See

States

Article 55

having the same
38.

on the understanding
is

it

participated in

that Article 35(3) introduced a

statements

regarding

new

rule.

35(3) take the same
and should be regarded as

Article

closely linked to Article 35(3)

status.

NATALINO RONZITTI, DlRITTO INTERNAZIONALE DEI CONFLITTI ARMATI

161 (2d ed.

2001).
39.

For the state of international customary law before Protocol

I,

see FRITS

KALSHOVEN,

BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 375 (1971), who concludes, after a thorough consideration of State
practice, that belligerent reprisals have not so far come under a total prohibition, and further
notes that "the power of belligerents to resort to belligerent reprisals can only be effectively
abolished to the extent that other adequate means take over their function of law enforcement."
For a recent consideration of the
40.

issue, see

RONZITTI, supra note 38, at 180.
The issue has not been raised on appeal. See the

Kupreskic case, supra note 19, HH 527-36.

Appeal Judgment, supra note

33.
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combat zones (Article 51(6)) and reprisals against civilian objects
(Article 52(1)) have been subsequently transformed into general rules of international law. Assuming that the mentioned provisions were not declara-

civilians in

tory of customary law, the

Chamber

expressed the view that the universal

revulsion towards reprisals, as well as their trampling

on the most fundamental

human rights, have contributed to the emergence of customary
matter. The Chamber also recalled the requirements of humanity

principles of

law on the

and dictates of public conscience espoused in the Martens clause, stating that
the pressure stemming therefrom has resulted in the formation of customary
law on reprisals. It further maintained that opinio juris existed to support the
view that these rules have become a part of customary law. It pointed to circumscriptions on reprisals in
als

modern warfare contained

manu-

in the military

of States, including the United States; the adoption by the United Nations

General Assembly of a resolution in 1970 stating that civilian populations
should not be the object of reprisals; and the ratification of Protocol
large

number of

view that

also held the

In addition,

States.

it

It

armed

stated that in the

must always be prohibited. 41

conflicts of the last fifty years, States

have normally not asserted the right to undertake
vilians in the

ment, 42

it is

combat

area.

reprisals against

Whatever consideration be given

undeniable that

it

may

by a

Chamber

further pointed out that another Trial

reprisals against civilians

I

enemy

ci-

to this judg-

play an important role in assessing the

legitimacy of reprisals against civilians and protected objects, and in develop-

ing customary international law that reflects the provisions of Protocol

in

I

this area.

Other examples could be cited
reflects pre-existing

in

examining the extent to which Protocol

customary international law and

its

I

contributions to clari-

and scope of customary law. However, at this stage
that some conclusions can be drawn in light of the present practice.

fying the content

it

seems

A slow

but continuous trend towards recognizing the general value of the provisions

contained in Protocol

I,

especially as far as they are intended to set forth

well established customary principles or improve their definitions,

41. See Prosecutor v. Milan Martic,

IT9541-R61, Mar.

8,

1996,

1111

Review of Indictment Pursuant

is

largely

to Rule 61, I.C.T.Y.

No.

10-18.

42. For the position that the invocation of the Martens clause can hardly justify the conclusion

that the

combined

effect of the clause

and

opinio juris

can transform the prohibition on

against civilian objects into customary law binding on States that have not

reprisals

ratified Protocol

I

or

have dissented from the prohibition of reprisals, see Theodor Meron, The Humanization of
Humanitarian Law, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 (2000).
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discernible in international practice

ber of State ratifications

is

and

legal doctrine. 43

The

increasing

corroborative of this growing trend, together with

the emerging case law of international judicial bodies, which tends to

quently underline

num-

more

fre-

human values in assessing the content of customary interna-

tional law.

Except perhaps in some cases where
ists,

the areas in which Protocol

I

it is

clear that

no customary

rule ex-

has encountered the most difficulty in de-

veloping into customary law appear to be the areas where the Protocol

itself,

provisions and the definitions contained therein are not

suffi-

because

its

ciently clear

and well shaped,

is

subject to different interpretations. In other

words, the diverging approach to such provisions
In this regard,
also

lie

it

lies

in their interpretation.

has to be noted that the resistance to

in the different rules of interpretation that

ratify

would apply

Protocol

I

may

in establishing

the scope of the principles enshrined in the Protocol, should the latter be

regarded as treaty provisions instead of principles of customary international law.

drawn twenty-five years after Protocol I was
adopted, one can doubt whether it was drafted in a way intended to help the
development of customary law. Unclear treaty rules can hardly develop into
customary law and may frequently be opposed by States which may fear being
bound by interpretations they would not be in the position to accept. By way
of example, a list of military objectives would have helped the formation of
customary law, at least as far as the list is concerned, even though it would
have been necessary to recognize that the list was not exhaustive. The lack of
such a list, due to only partially different views of States as to its scope, does
not provide any help in this regard. 44 Although it cannot be denied that Protocol I has had an impact on pre-existing customary law, 45 it may be submitted
In light of these conclusions

that Protocol

I

could have

made

a far greater contribution to

43. In this connection, the potential impact of Protocol

I

on the

its

development.

state of customary

law has been

stressed by Gasser, supra note 27, at 87.

44.

For a different view, see FRITS

the Waging of
45.

War

101 (2001).

For a discussion of this

or Backwards?, 33

KALSHOVEN AND LlESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON

issue, see

Yoram Dinstein, The New Geneva Protocols: A Step Forward

YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 269

against civilians, Commentaires au sujet du

Croix Rouge 553

Protocole

(1997).
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Commentary
Rudolf Dolzer

As

made by Professor Stein and Judge Pocar, I
shall limit my comments to two points. The first one concerns the
methodology and sources of international humanitarian law in general. The
I

agree with most points

second one relates more specifically to the evolving diversity of goals and functions of humanitarian law

and the necessity

to understand

and apply the

exist-

ing rules in the current policy context.

The

first

point

on the sources of humanitarian law

premise that no special rules

would

in principle depart in

exist, or

starts

out from the basic

should be recognized, in

any way from those recognized

this area

which

for public interna-

canon of principles laid down in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice will apply to
humanitarian law as well. The jurisprudence of the ICJ has been consistent
with this postulate. As to the relationship between treaty law and customary
tional law in general. In other words, the

law in particular, the rulings in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, the Nica1

ragua case 2 and the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion 3 do not point to any di-

vergence in the Court's approach between humanitarian law and other areas
of public international law.

always identical.

It

1.

2.

of these three decisions

may not be

has been noticed rightly that the North Sea Continental

Shelf decision, for instance,
tailed

The nuances

seems to require a more comprehensive and de-

examination of State practice than the Nicaragua decision. All three

North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (J une 27) [hereinafter

Nicaragua case].
3.

Legality of the

Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons

in

Armed Conflict, 1996

I.C.J.

78

(July 8).

Commentary
inasmuch as they are based on the same view that "it
should not lightly be assumed that treaty law evolves into customary law." 4
Widespread practice and corresponding opinio iuris will be required for the formation of customary law, with or without parallel treaty law. This maxim has
decisions converge

to be adapted to the circumstances of the context in regard to the
characteristics of relevant States,

number and

and the practice of the major States

will

have to be given considerable weight.

At

the same time,

it is

appropriate to assume that the rules

on the

persistent

objector will also be operative in the context of humanitarian law. While
all

we

agree that the strengthening and expansion of the rules protecting the vic-

tims and the innocents deserve our support,
rules lie carefully

it is

also clear that

behind these

balanced compromises which take into account the nature

of warfare. Against this background,

it

should not be generally presumed that

States are inclined to interpret those rules in favoram humanitatem at the cost

of their freedom in the
Special issues

may

means and methods of warfare.
arise in those areas of

customary law and treaty law

which are frequently disregarded in State practice. In such a setting it will be
necessary to examine carefully to the extent possible whether States assume
that the relevant rule is valid in principle, and point to special justifications
for their departure from the rule, or clarify whether it must be concluded that
States

do not consider themselves

to be

bound

in general.

Of course,

the

first

alternative describes the setting of considerable State practice regarding the

prohibition of the use of force.

Many governments

act contrary to a rule, but

way of pointing to one of the justifications that allow them, or would allow them if the relevant facts existed, to
act contrary to the rule. The issue will become more complex if no attempt
to justify the conduct is made. In case a considerable number of States fall

nonetheless accept

it

in principle by

have to be assumed that the rule has been eroded.
Such a process of derogation may take different forms, depending on the
into this category,

it

will

precise circumstances.

can no longer be
considered to be valid and that States are no longer bound by any norm in the
relevant context. Another version of a process of this kind will exist where
In the extreme setting,

it is

possible that the rule as such

do not flatly disregard the rule but apply it frequently in a generally restricting manner; under such circumstances, the understanding of the rule
will have to be adapted to the practice. This will also be the case if State pracStates

tice disregards

4.

the rule in a specific area of application. Evidence of such

North Sea Continental

Shelf, supra note

1,

at 41,
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can be found in various areas of humanitarian
law. The common denominator of all such developments lies in the requirement to take into account State practice in identifying and interpreting the
different types of derogation

rules of

humanitarian law. In the context of treaty law, Article 3 1 of the Vi-

enna Convention on the Law of Treaties 5 points

The second

part of

my

in the

same

direction.

remarks concerns the diversity of goals, functions

The

which I wish to make is
that the various branches of humanitarian law resulting from this diversity
need to be viewed in an integrated context so that the development of the law
as a whole will be kept and tied together.
The diversity and the branches to which I refer essentially consists of the
and faces of humanitarian

law.

essential point

following three parts:

(1)

The

protection of potential victims, being the primary goal of

humanitarian law as

it

has evolved historically, remains the key

concern.

(2)

The

necessity to leave

room

to fight a

war

for a

good cause

in

an

manner must be preserved. This concerns Professor
Dinstein's point that we do not want a war to last forever, and John
Norton Moore's emphasis on the need to fight effective wars in our
efficient

contemporary world.

(3)

Following the developments in the past decade,

we need

to view

humanitarian law increasingly through the lenses of international
criminal law, as the two areas are increasingly linked together.

Why

is it

necessary to point to the distinctness of these diverse goals and

The concern here is a fragmentation in the outlook on humanitarian law that may occur when the three segments noted above are seen in isola-

branches?

tion without regard to the necessity to fashion

and design the

rules so as to

and the special needs of all three branches. In practice,
the three perspectives have their own "constituencies" which may or may not
be prepared in practice to accept that their own concerns need to be merged
with the policies and considerations underlying the two other concerns. As to
the protective dimension of humanitarian law, it is widely known that its
causes are championed especially in scholarly circles, but also by a number of
reflect the existence

5.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May

355

23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

Commentary
governments. Perhaps

it is

fair

to say that the favorite clause of this part of the

international humanitarian law

1899

for the first

community

is

time and phrased in Article

1

the Martens Clause drafted in
(2)

of Protocol

I

6

as follows: "In

and combatants enjoy the protection of the principles of international law derived from the established custom,
from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience." 7
This emphasis on humanity and the public conscience as the overarching goal
of humanitarian law echoes the fundamental purpose of humanitarian law,
and from an abstract point of view no one will disagree with the noble cause
expressed by the Martens Clause.
Nevertheless, it will not be denied that another part of the community concerned with humanitarian law may have priorities in practice which highlight
factors additional to those reflected in the Martens Clause. I refer to the military sector and to the actors on the ground. Any realistic consideration will
have to conclude that it is not surprising that this community is often less concerned with the principles of the Martens Clause than with the interpretation
of the law in a manner which allows flexibility, military advantage and ultimately the operation and conclusion of a successful military operation ended
within an appropriate timeframe.
The third branch of the contemporary humanitarian law relates, of course,
to the enforcement community, charged with the application of the modern
rules of international criminal law. It appears that the application and interpretation of this dimension of international humanitarian law may present the
most difficult challenge for the entire body of rules in the coming years. The
universe of criminal law as generally accepted in most parts of the world is
cases not covered by this Protocol, civilians

characterized by distinct principles such as the prohibition of ex post facto laws,
the presumption of innocence, the prohibition of vagueness of criminal rules

and an emphasis on the subjective perception of the individual concerned.
Should the rules of international criminal law based on the laws of war be

6.

Protocol Additional

(I)

to the

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating

Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.

ON THE LAWS OF WAR 422
7.

The Martens

clause

first

(A. Roberts

&R. Guelff eds., 3d ed.

3,

to the

DOCUMENTS

2000) [hereinafter Protocol

appeared in the preamble to the Hague Convention

(II)

states:

High Contracting

Until a

more complete code of the laws of war

think

right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations

it

is

issued, the

Parties

adopted by them,

populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles
of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilised
nations, from the law of humanity,

and the requirements of the public conscience.
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fashioned so as to be as transparent and predictable as possible? Should these
rules

be construed so as to allow a wide margin of appreciation and an empha-

ex ante for the actor

sis

on the ground? 8 Should the main emphasis

in the inter-

pretation concern the broad protection of the victim, even though this would

be at the expense of the special guarantees characteristic of criminal law and
also at the
just

expense of chilling the enthusiasm of those States willing to wage a

war?

These three modes of interpreting international criminal law are emphasized here only for the sake of separating and isolating the potential perspectives. In reality, these approaches will be blended in one way or another in the
application of the law.

What is remarkable,

however,

is

that the International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has

come

fairly close to

emphasising the third, the "humanitarian approach" in the context of apply-

and 58 of Protocol

ing Articles 57

I

dealing with the necessity of feasible pre-

cautions for the civilian population. Generally speaking, the Tribunal was
faced in this context with an unusually generally worded, imprecise rule, uncharacteristic for language typical of criminal law.

the opportunity to narrow

narrow construction.

down

the rule of the margin of appreciation would also

and an approach respecting
have been conceivable.

In the Kupreskic case referred to by Judge Pocar, the

and 58

Article 2 of Protocol

I.

in the specific light of the
9

way of a

possible to interpret the rules taking

into account the necessity of military efficiency,

pret Articles 57

court would have had

the meaning of the two articles by

would have been

It

The

ICTY

chose to inter-

Martens Clause

laid

down in

In effect, this reading of the rules led to a very broad

understanding and to an emphasis on the protective dimension of Protocol
with no special regard for the

I,

and second branch of international humanithe sense mentioned above. The ICTY found that these rules

tarian law in

first

must be interpreted "so as to construe as narrowly as possible the discretionary
power to attack belligerents and, by the same token, so as to expand the protection accorded to civilians." 10 Clearly, for purposes of enforcement, the

ICTY

thus has underlined a distinctly humanitarian approach to the interpre-

tation of the Protocol

8.

The concept

The

ruling

shows no apparent regard

for the classical

of the margin of appreciation has been widely used by the European Court of

Human Rights in
court,

I.

the context of the application of human rights norms which, in the view of the

must be interpreted

to take into

account the special situation of the member States as they

apply the law.
9.

See Prosecutor

v.

Kupreskic et

al.,

Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-16-T, Jan.

525.
10. Id.
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2000,

11
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requirements of criminal law, nor was any attention paid,

proach favoring a margin of appreciation

As

for those

it

appears, to any ap-

who have

to render deci-

to the wording of the

Martens Clause in the
modern sense, as reflected in Protocol I, the literal reading leaves no doubt
that the clause will only be applied in cases "not covered by this Protocol." 11
Thus it has to be assumed that the Martens Clause must be applied only in arsions during times of war.

eas not addressed by the written rules. This

the

ICTY

for the written rules which are written in a

pretation.

is

quite different from assuming, as

did, that the Martens Clause must serve as a rule of interpretation

The

manner

so as to be in need of inter-

implication of the ICTY's approach

is

indeed then to broaden

the protective dimension of the humanitarian rules in a general manner, with-

out attention to the other branches of this body of rules.

It is

more than doubt-

whether such an approach is consistent with the original intention of the
Martens Clause and with the contemporary need to integrate all concerns emful

bodied in humanitarian law.

When we

speak about the lessons of the Kosovo, the humanitarian ap-

proach adopted by

this decision of the

ICTY reflects our general hope

that this

decision has taught former President Milosevic and his disciples a lesson

which future warmongers and warlords and dictators will eventually remember. The urgent question, however, remains whether this approach satisfies all
goals and functions present in humanitarian law. What about the chilling effect for those who are willing to fight a war with a just cause? What are the
consequences of such a chilling effect? Does such an approach in an unintended way protect a dictator from those who may be called upon to fight him?
And, more generally, what is the effect of such an approach to humanitarian
law doctrine on the acceptance by governments of an international criminal
system?

There are no clear-cut answers to these questions, but they need to be addressed because they concern serious questions. We are living through a period of fundamental changes in the laws of armed conflict,

that the implication of

all

and

it is

important

these changes are thought through in a broad de-

bate where the requirements of criminal law guarantees are discussed, where
the realities of military conduct are taken into account and where not only the

noble humanitarian aspirations in an isolated sense are highlighted. Possibly,

community will decide to adopt the humanitarian approach
favored by the ICTY, but we must do so in a manner which is responsive to all
the international

elements and dimensions of the laws of war as they

11. Protocol

I,

supra note 6,

art. 1(2).
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submit that our reflections on the choices to be made in the future are

an

early stage.

Whoever wishes

ment of humanitarian law is
tions in

all

particular,

to take the moral high

ground

at

for the develop-

under moral pressure to consider the implicatheir various facets on international relations. This requires, in
also

both a focus on the impact of any change of law on those national

leaders

who are most likely to start an illegal war and to cause

fering,

and

likely to

still

also

on the conduct of those

leaders

defend potential victims against an

essary suffering.
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illegal

unnecessary

suf-

and nations who are most
war and thus to end unnec-

Commentary
Leslie C,

A

Green

had been forewarned, the immediate effect of Operation Allied
Force, which was in fact directed against targets in Serbia as well as
Kosovo province, was an increase in the terror directed against the Muslim Albanian population. While NATO claimed that only military targets were being
attacked, it soon became clear that civilians and civilian objects were suffering
damage sometimes because of "clever" bombs going astray but also, it seems,
from NATO's desire to avoid casualties among its own personnel, which led to
aircraft flying beyond anti-aircraft range resulting in mistakes in targeting.
Cluster bombs, the range of which is difficult or impossible to control, were
among the ordinance dropped rendering civilian casualties virtually inevitable.
While it was claimed that bridges over the Danube, television studios and elecs

—

tricity-generating establishments were legitimate military objectives, questions

regarding the rule of proportionality in relation to collateral damage, both un-

der customary law and Protocols

and II, have to be examined.
The Economist Intelligence Unit reported, perhaps in the light of more
recent developments with some exaggeration, that the NATO bombing
"inflicted enormous damage on Yugoslavia's economy and infrastructure.
Yugoslavia will sink below Albania and become the poorest country
in Europe." The Secretary General of the United Nations stated in a press re.

.

I

.

1

lease of April 28, 1999:

The

number of displaced. There is increasing
devastation to the country's infrastructure, and huge damage to [its] economy.
For example, Mr. Sommarugua [President of the International Committee of

1.

civilian

death

toll is rising, as is

the

Globe and Mail (Toronto), 23 August 1999.

Commentary
the

Red Cross after visiting Yugoslavia] told me that the destruction of the
Novi Sad also cut off the fresh water supply to half of that

three

bridges in

population of 90,000 people.

No fewer than 350 cluster bomb
(it

was

later discovered that

city's

2

attacks were launched against Serb forces

NATO claims of destruction of Serb

tanks and

other military installations were unrealistic) and:
[Officially

would

it is

have

acknowledged that between

failed

although

detonate,

to

five

and ten per cent of the bombs
unofficial

estimates

put

it

Although the civilian casualty toll from incidents involving
unexploded munitions has dropped from five a day in the first month after the
air campaign ended to the present one or two a day Lt. Col. Flanagan
[Australian program manager of the United Nations mine action coordinate
center in Pristina] said he needed NATO's help to meet the challenge of
making Kosovo safe for the population, especially in rural areas, Any help we
could get from NATO would be appreciated, but at the moment KFOR
[Kosovo Protection Force] is not addressing the problem unless there is an
emergency humanitarian or operational reason'. He said 'children were being
maimed because the cluster bombs looked like toys and were extremely
sensitive. If you pick up a cluster bomb it will explode, it is even more dangerous
than a mine. Anything can detonate a cluster bomb'. Colonel Flanagan said
NATO had supplied the coordinates for the cluster bomb attacks which had
helped his teams to trace some of the unexploded bomblets. However, not all
the coordinates had proved accurate. 3
higher.

.

.

.

Given the nature of this statement, one
not embarrass those participants in the
to Protocol

2.

II

as

amended

4

is

inclined to enquire whether

did

NATO campaign which were parties

of the 1990 Conventional

Statement by Secretary-General Kofi

it

Annan on Kosovo

Weapons Convention. 5

Crisis, Press

Release SG/SM/6972,

Apr. 28, 1999, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/Kosovo334.htm. For a

breakdown of the damage done

NATO's Armed

economy, see Ved Nanda, Legal Implications of
INTERNATIONAL LAW ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF
OF PROFESSOR L.C. GREEN ON THE OCCASION OF HIS

to Yugoslavia's

Intervention in Kosovo, in

CONFLICT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 313, 319 (M. Schmitt
International

Law

3.

Michael Evans,

4.

Protocol

on

ed.,

2000) (Vol. 75,

US Naval War

College

Studies).

NATO Bombs

Still

THE TIMES (London), Aug. 16, 1999.
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other

Killing Kosovars,

Prohibitions or Restrictions

May 3, 1996, 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1206, 1209 (1996).
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons

Devices, adopted
5.

Which May

be

Deemed

to be Excesively Injurious or to

Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted
Schindler and

J.

Toman eds., 3d

ed. 1988).

in

Have

The unamended
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THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT
Protocol

II is

at 185.

179 (D.

.

.

Leslie C.

While

Green

NATO certainly did not use booby-traps, Colonel Flanagan's descrip-

and attractive to children" brings them very
close to the definition of such weapons: "any device or material which is designed, constructed, or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object
or performs an apparently safe act." 6
tion of cluster

bombs

as "toy-like

Colonel Flanagan also expressed some criticism of NATO's unwillingness

weapons which again draws attention to the Protoobligation to give notice of a minefield and arrange for its

to assist in clearing these

and

col

its

clearance:
1

Without delay

after the cessation of active hostilities, all minefields,

areas, mines, booby-traps

destroyed.
2.

.

and other devices

shall

mined

be cleared, removed,

.

High Contracting

Parties

and

parties to a conflict bear

such responsibility

with respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other
devices in areas under their control.
3.

With

respect to minefields,

mined

areas, mines, booby-traps

devices laid by a party in areas over which

such party

it

no longer

and other

exercises control,

shall provide to the party in control of the area ... to the extent

permitted by such party, technical and material assistance necessary to
fulfill

such responsibility. 7

For the main part,

KFOR and those members of NATO contributing thereto

remained in control of most of Kosovo and would appear,

at least at the time of

Colonel Flanagan's remarks, as not being as cooperative as some of them are
gated to be. Finally,

it

may be asked whether by using weapons coated

obli-

in depleted

uranium there has not been a breach of the basic principle of customary law that

weapons

8

cause unnecessary suffering

may not be

used, while for parties to

would appear to have been also a breach of Article 35, which
"methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected, to

Protocol
forbids

likely to
I

there

cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment" (emphasis

added) as such usage must have envisaged.

As has been pointed

out, the

bombing campaign was not

as successful as

NATO might have hoped. It extended over seventy-eight days and at no time
6. Id., art. 2(4).
7. Id., art. 10.

8.

Protocol Additional

(I)

to the

Geneva Conventions of

12 August 1949, and Relating to the

Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, Dec.

International Legal Materials 1391

12,

1977,

1125 U.N.T.S.

(1977) [hereinafter Protocol

363

I].

3,

16

Commentary
was there any contact between ground troops and no fatalities were suffered
by NATO air personnel. Since the aerial campaign was affected by weather
conditions as well as the accuracy of the crews, observation of targets was
sometimes difficult. 9 While the United States was not a party to Protocol I,
both Canada and the United Kingdom were. It is therefore necessary as regards these participants to refer to the relevant Articles of that instrument.

should also be noted that in so far as the United States was concerned

under the customary law obligation to confine
tary

and not

Article

48

-

civilian targets. In

its

it

It

was

offensive activities to mili-

accordance with Protocol

I:

Basic rule

[T] he Parties to the conflict shall at

all

times distinguish between the civilian

population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives

and accordingly
Article 51

1.

The

-

shall direct their operations only against military objectives.

Protection of the civilian population

civilian

population and individual civilians shall enjoy general

protection against dangers arising from military operations.

3.

The

civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall

not be

the object of attack. Acts or threat of violence the primary purpose of which
is

to spread terror

among

the civilian population

There has never been any suggestion that
directed at causing terror, but

is

prohibited.

NATO operations were in any way

NATO never concealed that there was inherent

which the Yugoslav population
would be so discomforted as to rise up and overthrow the government seated in
Belgrade. This eventually occurred but not as a direct consequence of the
bombing campaign.
in

its

policy an intention to create a situation in

Article 51 continues:
4.

Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a)

those which are not directed at a specific military objective;

(b)

those which employ a

method

or

means of combat which cannot be

directed at a specific military objective; or

9. See, e.g.,

Nanda, supra note

2, at

319.
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those which are employ a method or means of combat the
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;

(c)

and consequently,

in

each

effects of

case, are of a nature to strike military objectives

and civilian objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.

Among

5.

others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as

indiscriminate:
(a)

an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a
number of clearly separated and distinct

single military objective a

military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area

containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and

an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive 10 in relation to the concrete and

(b)

direct military advantage anticipated.

Article

2.

52

-

General protection of civilian objects

Attacks shall be limited

strictly to military objectives.

In so far as objects are

concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use

make an

effective contribution to military

action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
3.

In case of doubt whether an object which

purposes ...
action,

it

is

shall

In the case of the

being used to

make an

is

normally dedicated to civilian

effective contribution to military

be presumed not to be so used.

bombing campaign undertaken by NATO,

pear, prima facie, that the question

demanded by Protocol

I

may

also be asked

it

would often ap-

whether the distinction

of those States which were parties to

it

was always

respected.

Perhaps one of the clearest instances of acceptance of ethical principles in

modern

international law

is

that

which governs the punishment of those

war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. To the extent
that Serbian or Kosovar Albanians committed any of these offenses, they must

guilty of

answer

at a trial before the International

10. See, e.g.,

Criminal Tribunal for the former

William Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol

98 Military

Law Review 91

(1982).
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Yugoslavia (ICTY) established by the United Nations.

ad quern and so enjoys jurisdiction until

it is

The ICTY

declared functus

has no

dies

or there

officio

is

a

clear statement that conflict in the territories of the former Yugoslavia has

an end. Prima facie, members of the NATO forces who may have
committed offenses against the law of armed conflict are as amenable to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal as are any other offenders. In fact, the ICTY established a committee to investigate this issue, which, concluded that no further
investigation was necessary and no attempt has been made to indict any

come

to

NATO personnel.

11

Since the operation was essentially

armed

conflict

grave breaches

was somewhat
is

limited.

3.

The

the ambit subject to the law of
provision of Protocol

I

defining

almost certainly an expression of the customary law with

gard to protection of civilians and so
Protocol.

aerial,

is

not confined solely to parties to the

However, that instrument's language

is

specific:

[T]he following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of

when committed willfully

.

.

.

re-

and causing death or serious

this Protocol,

injury to

body or

health:

making the

(a)

civilian population or individual civilians the object of

attack;

launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or

(b)

civilian objects in the
loss

One

knowledge that such attack

will

cause excessive

of life, injury to civilians or danger to civilian objects.

12
.

.

.

English newspaper report lends support to the argument that such

breaches did occur: "So wild was the bombing that ministers found themselves

having to

call journalists,

make-up

'legitimate targets of war', blithely

hospital staff and

even whole villages
rewriting the Geneva Convention to suit

girls,

themselves." 13

There can be no doubt that
prevail in the future,

it is

the rule of law or ethical standards are to

if

essential that the law concerning

war crimes, geno-

and crimes against humanity be attached to all individuals, military, political or civilian, and not merely to those against whom "we" are taking
action. As has been mentioned a committee established by the ICTY Office of
cide

11. Final

Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the

Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1257 (2000), and reprinted herein

Bombing

reprinted
as

[hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor].
12. Protocol
13.

I,

supra note 8,

Simon Jenkins,

art.

85

and

(3) (a)

(b).

A Victory for Cowards THE TIMES
,
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(London), June

1 1,

1999.
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the Prosecutor

(OTP)

lodged against

tigate allegations

duction.

As

in accordance with Article 18 of its Statute 14 did inves-

NATO. Some

regards the legality of the

United Nations sanction, the Report
[T] he jus ad bellum regulates

enshrined in the

UN

of

the

NATO

its

comments bear

repro-

recourse to force without

states

when states may use force and is, for the most part,
may use force in self defence

Charter. In general, states

and
presumed

(individual or collective)

legitimacy

of

for very

basis

few other purposes. In particular, the

for

NATO

the

bombing campaign,

humanitarian intervention, without prior Security Council authorization,
hotly debated.

use force

is

That being

said

.

.

.

the crime against peace or aggression. While a person convicted of a

crime against peace may, potentially, be held criminally responsible for
activities

is

the crime related to an unlawful decision to

causing death, injury or destruction during a conflict, the

not have jurisdiction over crimes against peace.

all

of the

ICTY

does

15

Consequently, the Report was confined to examining only allegations that

NATO might have committed acts contrary to the jus in hello.
was alleged that the use of depleted uranium (DU) constituted
a breach of the law of armed conflict, the Report stated:
In so far as

There

is

it

no

specific treaty

ban on the use of

DU

projectiles.

There

a

is

developing scientific debate and concern expressed regarding the impact of the
use of such projectiles

and

it is

view in international legal

possible that, in future, there will be a consensus

circles that use of

such projectiles violate general

weapons in armed conflict. No such
acknowledged
consensus exists at present
It is
that the underlying principles
of the law of armed conflict such as proportionality are applicable in this
context; however it is the committee's view
based on information available
at present, that the OTP should not commence an investigation into use of
depleted uranium projectiles by NATO. 16
principles of the law applicable to use of

.

A similar hesitancy to condemn the

.

.

use of cluster

bombs

is

to be

found in

the Report.

14.

"The Prosecutor shall

initiate investigations ex officio or

on the

basis of information obtained

from any source, particularly from Governments, United Nations organs, intergovernmental and

non-governmental organizations. The Prosecutor
obtained and decide whether there

U.N. Doc. S/25704,

at

is

36-40 (1993), reprinted

in

Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A,

11

827 (May 25, 1993),

32 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS

1192(1993).
15.

shall assess the information received or

sufficient basis to proceed." S.C. Res.

30.

16. Id., U 26.
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There is no specific treaty provision which prohibits or restricts the use of cluster
bombs, although, of course, cluster bombs must be in compliance with the
general principles applicable to the use of

all

weapons.

Human

Rights

[which had submitted documentary evidence concerning alleged
offences] has

condemned the use of cluster bombs

Watch

NATO

alleging that the high 'dud' or

submunitions (bomblets) contained inside cluster bombs
converts these submunitions into antipersonnel landmines which it asserts, are
failure rate of the

now

prohibited under customary international law.

Whether antipersonnel

landmines are prohibited under current customary international law
debatable, although there

no general

legal

is

a strong trend in that direction.

consensus that cluster bombs

antipersonnel landmines

....

It is

are, in legal terms,

is,

bombs

as

OTP

such by

should not

is

however,

equivalent to

the opinion of the committee, based

information presently available, that the
investigation into use of cluster

There

on

commence an

NATO. 17

was hesitant to condemn the use of particular weaponry, the committee did make some general comments concerning legal issues relating to
target selection. Here we may detect some hints of a commander's responsibil-

While

ity to

it

have concern

[I]n

for ethical principles.

combat, military commanders are required

against military objectives,

and

b)

when

a) to direct their

operations

directing their operations against

and the
the concrete and direct

military objectives, to ensure that the losses to the civilian population

damage

to civilian property are not disproportionate to

military advantage anticipated. Attacks

which

are not directed against military

objectives (particularly attacks directed against the civilian population)

which cause disproportionate

attacks

and

civilian casualties or civilian property

damage may constitute the actus reus for the offence under Article 3 of the ICTY
Statute. 18

The mens

rea for the offence

is

intention or recklessness, not simple

negligence. In determining whether or not the mens rea requirement has been

met,

it

should be borne in mind that commanders deciding on an attack have

duties:

(a)

to

do everything practicable

to verify that the objectives to be attacked

are military objectives,
(b)

to take

all

practicable precautions in the choice of methods

and means

of warfare with a view to avoiding or, in any event to minimizing
incidental civilian casualties or civilian property damage,

17. Id.,
18.

11

27.

Concerning violations of the laws or customs of war.
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from launching attacks which may be expected to cause
disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property damage.
to refrain

(c)

One

C. Green

of the principles underlying international humanitarian law, constituting

an expression of high ethical standards,
obligates military
civilian

commanders

persons or objects.

is

the principle of distinction, which

to distinguish

The

between

and

practical application of this principle

effectively encapsulated in Article 57 of Protocol

those

military objectives

who plan or decide upon an attack to 'do everything feasible

the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians
obligation to do everything feasible

is

is

which, in part, obligates

I

nor civilian

to verify that
objects.'

A

high but not absolute.

The

military

commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and
The commander must also
direct his forces to use available technical means to properly identify targets
during operations. Both the commander and the aircrew actually engaged in
evaluate information concerning potential targets.

operations must have some range of discretion to determine which available
resources shall be used and

how

they shall be used. Further, a determination

made

that inadequate efforts have been

and
on a

objectives

civilians

exclusively

or

civilian

to distinguish

objects

between military

should not necessarily focus

measures have worked

specific incident. If precautionary

adequately in a very high percentage of cases then the fact they have not worked
well in a small

inadequate.

Once

number of

mean

cases does not necessarily

they are generally

19

would seem that the committee was unwilling to find that
NATO might in fact have breached the law, even though it might be argued
that the decision not to suffer casualties and to fly beyond the range of
again,

it

anti-aircraft artillery militated towards ineffective

cloudy weather. Moreover, the number of incidents
prosecutor

20

involving civilian casualties,

targeting, especially in

listed in the

Report to the

some of which were

quite heavy,

might suggest that the accuracy of targeting was inadequate in quite a large

number of cases. 21

19.

Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, UH 28-9.

20. See
21.

id.,

n 9 and 53.

See for example,

id. y

UU 58-70, dealing with attacks on a

Albanian refugees.
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civilian train

and

a

convoy of

Commentary

The Report

went into some detail as to what might be defined as a military objective, but once again fails to be dogmatic as to the policy adopted by NATO. Perhaps more important in so far as the future is
concerned is its comments on proportionality, a concept that owes its origins
to the Prosecutor
22

to ethical standards:

48.
it

The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not
what it means and how it is to be applied. It is relatively simple to

exists but

state

that there

destructive effect

refugee

camp

is

must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate
and undesirable collateral effect. For example, bombing a

obviously prohibited

if its

only military significance

is

that

camp are knitting socks for soldiers. [Is the same true if they are
collecting aluminum pots to be converted into aircraft or munitions?]
Conversely, an air strike on an ammunition dump should not be prohibited
people in the

merely because a farmer

is

ploughing a

field in

the area. Unfortunately, most of

the applications of the principle of proportionality are not quite so clear cut.

It is

much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms than it
is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because the comparison is often
between unlike quantities and values. One cannot easily assess the value of
innocent human lives as opposed to capturing a particular military objective.

49.

The

questions which remains unsolved once one decides to apply the

principle of proportionality include the following:

(a)

What

are the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage

gained and the injury to non-combatants and or the damage to civilian
objects?
(b)

What do you

(c)

What

(d)

To what

is

include or exclude in totaling your sums?

the standard of measurement in time or space? and

extent

is

a military

commander

obligated to expose his

forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or
civilian objects?

[Once

again,

own

damage

to

an ethical question for said commander]

The answers to these questions are not simple. It may be necessary to resolve
them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ depending on the
background and values of the decision maker. It is unlikely that a human rights
lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign the same relative
50.

values to military advantage and to injury to noncombatants. Further,
unlikely that military

22. See

id., 1111

commanders with

35-47.
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it is

backgrounds and
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differing degrees of

combat experience or national

always agree in close cases.

It is

would

military histories

suggested that the determination of relative

values must be that of the 'reasonable military commander'. 13 Although there will

be

room

argument in close

for

cases, there will be

commanders will agree

military

to civilian objects

was

many cases where

reasonable

that the injury to noncombatants or the

damage

advantage

clearly disproportionate to the military

gained.

24

Despite the somewhat confident expression to be found in this

last sen-

tence, the entire approach adopted in the Report to the Prosecutor

how

sizes

difficult

it

will

always be

to

reach an acceptable

empha-

common

understanding of what constitutes ethical standards of behavior.
City planners rarely pay heed to the possibility of future warfare. Military
objectives

are

often

located

in

intensely

populated

and fighting

areas

occasionally occurs in such areas, Civilians present within or near military
objectives must, however, be taken into account in the proportionality equation

even

if

a party to the conflict has failed to exercise

its

obligation to

remove

them. 25

In the Kupreskic case the

526.

As an example

ICTY addressed the issue of proportionality as follows:

of the

way in which the Martens

clause 26

may be

utilised,

regard might be had to considerations such as the cumulative effect of attacks

on

military objectives causing incidental

damage

to civilians. In other words,

may happen that single attacks on military objectives causing incidental
damage to civilians, although they may raise doubts as to their lawfulness,
nevertheless do not appear on their face to fall foul per se of the loose
prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 27 (or of the corresponding customary
rules). However, in case of repeated attacks, all or most of them falling within
it

the grey area between indisputable legality and unlawfulness,

it

might be

warranted to conclude that they may not be in keeping with international

conduct may turn out to jeopardise

law. Indeed, this pattern of military

23.

Emphasis added.

24.

Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A.

25.

Id.,

H 51

26. "[I]n cases not included in the Regulation

.

.

.

the inhabitants and the belligerents remain

under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as

among
Convention

usages established

civilized peoples,

conscience."

(IV) Respecting the

in

THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT,

27. Protocol

I,

from

the laws of

humanity and the

they result

Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.

supra note

5, at

70 (emphasis added).

supra note 8, regarding "Precautionary Measures."
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from

the

dictates of the public

18, 1907,

Commentary
excessively the lives

humanity.'

and

assets of civilians, contrary to the

demands of

28

This formulation

.

.

.

can be regarded

as a progressive

law with regard to the obligation to protect

statement of the applicable

civilians. Its practical import,

is

somewhat ambiguous and its application far from clear. It is the committee's
view where individual (and legitimate) attacks on military objectives are
concerned, the mere cumulation of such instances, all of which are deemed to
have been lawful, cannot ipso facto be said to amount to a crime. The committee
understands the above formulation, instead, to refer to an overall assessment of
the totality of civilian victims as against the goals of the military campaign
During the bombing campaign,

54.

NATO

aircraft

flew 38,400 sorties,

including 10,484 strike sorties. During these sorties 23,614 munitions were
released

....

[and]

it

appears that approximately 500 civilians were killed

during the campaign. These figures do not indicate that

conducted a campaign aimed

NATO

may have

at causing substantial civilian casualties either

directly or incidentally.

The

NATO

some loosely defined categories
such as military-industrial infrastructure and government ministries and some
potential problem categories such as media and refineries. All targets must meet
the criteria for military objectives. If they do not do so, they are unlawful. A
general label is insufficient. The targeted components of the military-industrial
infrastructure and of government ministries must make an effective
contribution to military action and their total or partial destruction must offer a
55.

choice of targets by

definite military

includes

advantage in the circumstances ruling

at the time. Refineries

is not enough and due
damage if they are attacked. The media as
category. ... As a bottom line, civilians, civilian

are certainly traditional military objectives but tradition

regard must be paid to environmental

such

is

not a traditional target

and civilian morale as such are not legitimate military objectives. The
media does have an effect on civilian morale. If that effect is merely to foster
support for the war effort, the media is not a legitimate military objective. If the
media is sued to incite crimes ... it can become a legitimate military objective. If
the media is the nerve system that keeps a war-monger in power and thus
perpetuates the war effort, it may fall within the definition of a legitimate
objects

military objective.

As

a general statement, in the particular incidents reviewed

by the committee,

it is

the view of the committee that

attack objects

it

NATO was attempting to

perceived to be legitimate military objectives.

28. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et

al.,

Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-16-T, Jan.
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14, 2000, H 542.
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The committee

agrees there

is

Green

nothing inherently unlawful about flying

above the height which can be reached by enemy

defences. However,

air

NATO air commanders have a duty to take practicable measures to distinguish
military objectives

minimum

from

civilians

or civilian objectives.

altitude adopted for part of the

The 15,000

feet

campaign may have meant the target

could not be verified with the naked eye. However,

it

appears that with the use

of modern technology, the obligation to distinguish was effectively carried out
in the vast majority of cases during the

57. In the course of its review, the

which, in

its

bombing campaign.

committee did not come across any incident

opinion, required investigation by the

The committee examined

OTP.

.

.

five specific incidents of attacks the legality of

which might have been doubtful, but in each case came to the conclusion that
there was no reason to refer the matter to the Prosecutor. One is left with a
somewhat uncomfortable feeling with the committee's statement in its penultimate paragraph:
[T]he committee has not assessed any particular incidents as justifying the

commencement

of an investigation by the

OTP.

NATO

has admitted that

mistakes did occur during the bombing campaign; errors of judgment

have occurred. Selection of certain objectives
debate.

for attack

may be

On the basis of the information received, however,

may

also

subject to legal

the committee

is

of

the opinion that neither an in-depth investigation related to the bombing

campaign
In

all

as a

whole nor investigations related to specific incidents are justified.

cases, either the

law

is

not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely

to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against

high level accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous offences. 29

It

may well be

that, noting all the efforts to define proportionality

and to

assess

comes to the conclusion that the findings
of the committee might be correct. However, it is submitted that one cannot but
feel that the report might have contributed more to vindicating the rule of law
and recognizing the significance of ethical standards as equally operative for all
parties, had it recommended to the Prosecutor the possibility of referring to the
ICTY some of the issues it examined. The Tribunal might not in all cases have
the role of ethical considerations, one

agreed with individual recommendations, particularly in view of the fact in

some instances the Report
29. Report to the Prosecutor,

to

the

Appendix A, H

Prosecutor

90.
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itself

refers

to

a

"trend
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developing," or to particular cases being controversial or
judicial

determination

—

—

clearly

some instances "the law

that in

is

an

issue for

not sufficiently

clear."

The Serbs,
and

particularly as a result of pressure

in face of the threat by

from Russia,

its

traditional ally,

NATO that a land offensive would be launched,

fi-

nally accepted terms almost identical with those rejected at Rambouillet prior
to the

commencement

Among

the terms accepted

Kosovo to be temporarily administered by an internabody supported by some military and police personnel brought in from

was an arrangement
tional

of the bombing campaign.

for

Yugoslavia, thus preserving that State's concern with

Kosovo was divided into

its

national sovereignty.

some exKosovo (UNMIK). Since it

areas of administration with civil affairs to

tent controlled by the United Nations Mission in

was recognized that returning Kosovar Albanians, supported by the KLA,
might pursue a policy of revenge against the remaining Serb population, it was
agreed that the KLA would be disarmed and that KFOR would ensure the
safety of the Serbs. It was not long before it became clear that the KLA was not
going to be overly cooperative regarding the surrender of arms and KFOR not
excessively effective in preventing attacks

KLA leaders made

Further,

it

on the

Serbs.

clear that they intended to regard themselves

an interim government determined on secession, whatever the view of
NATO or KFOR. The French defense minister commented on this state of
as

affairs:

[T] here's

an unseemly scramble

for

power, influence and wealth within the

The Kosovars don't understand that we're here not to support them
but to support human rights for all and ensure political power is held to account.
On the other hand, to expect the KLA to willingly disband when they see a
KLA.

.

.

.

continued threat from paramilitaries under effective protection by French and
Russian troops

[in their respective administrative areas],

recognize provisional mayors
administrator,

is

just farcical.

This seems to overlook that,
icy to assist the
via's

when

and

to refuse to

UNMIK hasn't assigned a single municipal

30

officially at least, it was

never part of NATO's pol-

Kosovars in doing anything to question or endanger Yugosla-

sovereignty over the area.

As

the occupation by

KFOR

continued,

it

on paper at least, the KLA and its soi disant political leadership were proving a little more cooperative, although KFOR's protective activities became more and more essential for the Serb population.

became

30.

clear that,

THE TIMES

(London), Aug.

14, 1999.
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The growing willingness
of terrorists

—

to

push

to allow the

political

its

Green

KLA—originally denounced as a gang

aims and failure to prevent attacks upon the

which NATO was sustaining

local Serbs raise questions as to the extent to

contention that

intervention was ethical based

its

manitarian principles. In

NATO's

fact,

on the needs

its

to protect hu-

the ethical and humanitarian character of

became even more questionable when it reneged somewhat
on its promises to assist in the rehabilitation and rebuilding of Yugoslavia, unless the then government was replaced by one that was more "democratic." It

is

policy

true that this has

now ensued,

but

this fact

does not lend support to the ide-

NATO claims to have acted originally.
In assessing the validity of the NATO bombing campaign from both legal

alistic

grounds on which

becomes necessary to ask whether the campaign
purpose. That is to say, whatever its legality might have been, was

and ethical standpoints,
achieved

its

it

the action justified because of what was ultimately achieved?

It is

clear

from

the above comments, and in the light of the continuing trouble in Kosovo and
the threats of conflict spreading in the area, that the writer
either the legal or ethical grounds

Since similar situations denying

might recur,

it is

NATO

on which

human

rights in the

is

not happy with

claimed to be acting.

most obscene manner

clearly necessary to consider what, if any, process

can be

in-

troduced to prevent similar unilateral and questionable punitive or enforce-

ment action in the
somewhat like the

future.

human

this

unwilling or unable to protect, or persistently infringes

rights of large

segments of

until
is

virtually ceased to exist,

it

well be time for the United Nations to take over the administration

such time

as

normal conditions have been restored

already happening in Bosnia and Kosovo.

more

population, or the government

its

and order have

structure has so disintegrated that law

may then

might be achieved by adopting a policy

following:

When a government is
the

Perhaps

.

.

.

However

—

To some extent this
it

would perhaps be

done not on an ad hoc basis nor by a group of states
itself
but on the basis of a permanent United
Nations body made up of trained personnel from a variety of countries.
The
members of such administrative or governing commissions should not be drawn
from nationals of the great powers among whom, despite the end of the cold
war, political rivalries and maneuvering is still likely to take place. 31
desirable that this be

assuming such authority unto

—

.

31. See Leslie Green, 23

rd

.

.

Annual Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law,

Canadian Council on International Law Proceedings 6, 26; 26 th Annual
Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law, 1997 CANADIAN COUNCIL ON
1994

International

Law Proceedings 31,37.
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If

such a policy were adopted, there might be

it is

in

doubt as to the

legal or

and a more substantial foundation for conaccordance with the rule of law and the maintenance of

ethical basis for the intervention

tending that

less

ethical principles.
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Professor Stein and Judge Pocar have done well in addressing the issue of
coalition warfare

and the

effect that Protocol

has had on the ability of

I

coalition partners to engage in effective operations. Central to this discussion,

of course, has been the fact that the United States
essentially every

is

a principal participant in

major coalition enterprise undertaken since the coming into

force of Protocol

there

—

I

—

is

no indication

not a party to the Protocol.

I

would hasten to add that

instrument at any time in the foreseeable future. Given
offer

a

number of the observations

I

would

like to

I,

this signify in

terms of the interoperability of coalition forces

first

question. Since certain

tracting parties to Protocol

what does

that have been made.

members of NATO are conwhereas the United States and some others are

Let us turn to the

like

this fact,

a party to this

my own thoughts concerning three specific questions and in so doing also

comment on

not,

become

that the United States intends to

NATO's? Upon

the coming into force of Protocol

decision of the United States not to

become

a party,

I

and the concomitant

I

can well remember the

substantial hand-wringing that occurred. This action

United States sounded the death knell of the

US

NATO

on the

Alliance,

part of the
it

was

said.

and purposes, served to negate its Article V collective defense commitment under the North Atlantic
Treaty. Why? Because, how would it be possible for the United States to engage in combat operations with its NATO allies absent an obligation to comOthers believed

this

decision, for

all

would be impossible to mount
coalition operations when the participating States were

ply fully with the provisions of Protocol
effective

NATO

intents

I? It

bound by different law of armed conflict standards. The means and methods
by which warfare could be conducted would vary too substantially. It would be

Commentary
impossible to achieve consensus even

ment (ROE).
the

US

a set of command rules of engage-

In brief, the coalition sky was falling and

decision to reject Protocol

What

upon

it

was

all

the result of

I.

Time and experience have
the category of "much ado about

has become of these dire predictions?

shown these concerns to have fallen into
nothing." The fact that the United States is not a party to Protocol I has had
no adverse effect on the ability of the United States and its coalition partners
to engage in numerous effective military operations. There are three principal
reasons for this. First, shortly after the United States announced its decision
not to become a party to Protocol I and prior to the time that a number of
other NATO States did so law of armed conflict experts from the United

—

—

States

and several

NATO countries conducted a series of meetings to discuss

various provisions of the Protocol.

As

a result of these meetings, a

common

understanding was reached regarding the manner in which certain of the

more vague, subjective, and ill-defined articles would be interpreted and applied. (A number of these agreed interpretations were later reflected in several
of the statements of understanding and reservations made by NATO members when they eventually became parties to Protocol I.) These common understandings have assisted the United States and its NATO partners in
achieving a broad consensus regarding the law of armed conflict requirements
applicable to coalition operations.

Coupled with these
conflict experts

is

earlier

meetings between

US

and

NATO law of armed

the fact that there has been extensive cooperation between

the United States, key

NATO allies, and several other countries in the updat-

These countries have included, at
New Zealand, Denmark, and Israel. Again, numerous provisions of Protocol I have been discussed, in detail, and common approaches toward the manner in which these
provisions would be applied during military operations have been developed.
ing of their respective law of war manuals.

various times, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom,

This process has served to foster a growing consensus

among

the States con-

cerned that no substantive differences regarding the law of armed conflict applicable to coalition operations currently exist.

The third and perhaps most basic reason why the US
come a party to Protocol I has not adversely affected its
effective coalition operations revolves
alition

ROE are drafted, disseminated,

decision not to beability to

engage in

around the process through which co-

and

trained.

Of primary importance

is

the fact that coalition military activities are conducted in accordance with

mutually agreed

ROE, which

are largely unaffected by academic/diplomatic
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disagreements over nuanced interpretations of various provisions of Protocol
I.

This

is

not to say that the drafting of coalition

ROE is not often a time con-

suming, frustrating process. This was certainly true in the cases of SFOR (the
Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina)
tional Secutity Force),

note, however,

is

and was true

as well

the fact that the major

of these operations

—such
ROE

KFOR

(the

Kosovo Interna-

during Operation Allied Force.

Of

ROE issues that arose in the context

as those related to targeting

differing interpretations regarding the

delay in achieving

and

—

did not result from

law of armed conflict. Invariably, any

consensus resulted largely from a highly politicized

making process driven by a desire on the part of the participating governments to minimize casualties both military and civilian. This was not a
desire mandated by law of armed conflict considerations, but by the perceived
need to retain the very thin veneer of public and political support for the operation itself. In a similar vein, Professor Stein has noted that, though KFOR
decision

—

ROE were unquestionably restrictive in nature, these restrictions were the result of

domestic law, rather than law of armed conflict concerns. In

alition

ROE are the product of a negotiated consensus that reflects a common

brief,

understanding of coalition law of armed conflict requirements, and then

co-

dis-

seminated to and trained on by coalition forces.
It

is

for these reasons that the

Protocol

I

US

decision not to

become

a party to

has had no adverse effect on the interoperability capabilities of co-

alition forces.

Again, experience has shown that

when concerns

that might af-

do surface, these are driven by political or domestic law
considerations, rather than disagreements over the meaning or requirements
of specific international law requirements. In such cases, the coalition ROE
are drafted and the forces of the participating countries deployed in such a
way that such concerns are resolved and the operational capabilities of the cofect interoperability

alition are

Can

not diminished.

there be differing legal standards for various

tion? This

is

members of a given

coali-

a question that Professor Stein and Judge Pocar appeared to

good reason, in order to arrive at a workable answer. A textbook treaty law response would most likely render effective coalition warfare
struggle with, for

me

what I mean by this statement. The question posed immediately begs another. To what does the term
"legal standards" refer in this context? That is, does there exist an internaexceptionally difficult to wage. Allow

to explain

tional consensus as to the nature of the "legal standards" applicable to a coali-

tion as a whole, or to individual

member

States are engaged in military operations?

379

States of a coalition,

when

those

Commentary
This question might be answered in one of two ways.
proach: within a coalition, the actions of each

Under

these conventions.
tion as a whole,

when

this

its

it is

dictated

a party, as well as by the

made by

this State to

each of

would seem to follow that a coalioperations plan, must take into account

approach

developing

the textbook ap-

member State must be

by the various international conventions to which
statements of understanding and reservations

First,

it

each convention to which any of its members are parties, as well as the statements of understanding and reservations made by these individual members.
There is little doubt that such an approach would prove to be exceptionally
difficult

to apply in a real-world environment. Rather than establishing

would subject the coalition to a potentially vast array of varying interpretations of what these standards should be. Individual coalition members would be forced to function
under diverse standards, a fact that would be certain to adversely affect the
clear-cut "legal standards" for a coalition as a whole,

it

operational capabilities of the coalition.
In view of these inherent difficulties, might this issue be approached in a

more

would submit that if there are to be uniform legal standards to which a coalition as a whole is to be held, these must be customary
law of armed conflict standards. This is a workable approach a 90% solution,
if you will. Adherence to the customary law of armed conflict, of which the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions are an integral part, would ensure a disciplined, effective, and lawful coalition operation. Coalition ROE could be
drafted accordingly. If within a coalition there arise those situations in which
individual members feel as if they are restrained from employing certain means
or methods of warfare, these could be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. However, experience has shown that these situations would be few in number, and
practical

way?

I

—

"work-arounds" could be effected. This

community,

fully

a

common sense,

legally sustainable

members, as well as the internaunderstand the law of armed conflict applicable to co-

approach toward ensuring that
tional

is

all

coalition

alition operations.

There are

also other elements of this issue that merit

comment. Professor

Stein has suggested in seeking to formulate a workable response to this question that perhaps the law of

operations

may be

armed

conflict standards applicable to coalition

found, in part, in the

UN

Secretary-General's 6 August

1999 guidance on the "Observance by United Nations forces of international
humanitarian law."
proach, but

fails

1

He

notes a

number of problems

to speak to the principal shortcomings of this

poorly drafted and incomplete, and in a
inaccurate.

It

associated with this ap-

document.

It is

number of instances misleading and

does nothing to advance the development and effective
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implementation of the law of armed

conflict. If

one

is

searching for coalition

standards, they will not be found in this guidance.

On another matter raised by Professor Stein in connection with his discussion of coalition standards,

I

find myself in complete agreement.

He points out

the potential for confusion that has resulted from what he refers to as "the

re-naming" of the law of war, which has generally been referred to in the
post-Charter era as the law of armed conflict. By referring to the law of armed
conflict as international

humanitarian law, he notes that the distinction be-

tween "humanitarian" and "human
further.

The apparent attempt

to

law has been blurred.

rights"

make

would go

the law of armed conflict a kinder,

more gentle form of jurisprudence has generated
sion in the minds of many.

What does

I

a significant degree of confu-

mean? Even
the term means dif-

the term "international humanitarian law" actually

a cursory review of this issue clearly reflects the fact that

ferent things to different people. In discussions with articulate, well-informed

individuals

who

insist

upon using

this term,

I

have listened to sometimes pas-

and the necessity for its use. Disturbingly,
however, these explanations often differ and there appears to be no consensus
as to the norms and principles embraced under this terminological umbrella.
To some, it is just another "updated" name for the law of armed conflict, insionate explanations of the term

dicative of the "humanitarian" emphasis

now

placed on the regulation of

To others it reflects the fact that the body of law applicable to
conflict now contains many, but not all, of the elements of human
rights law. There are also those who view international humanitarian law as
the single embodiment of all of the law of armed conflict and human rights
armed
armed

conflict.

law.

How did we reach this point? When was the vote
a

name change should

occur?

I

taken as to whether such

cannot think of a single individual charged

with the responsibility of giving real-world advice to military commanders on

law of armed conflict issues that would have cast an affirmative vote for embracing a term that would result in blurring the legal obligations for which a

commander and his staff would be held accountable in an operational environment. The use of a term that confuses and carries with it such imprecision
in an area of the law that imposes so many responsibilities and often calls for
and death decisions, does a disservice to those who constantly strive to
comply with this law. I'll continue to provide advice on the law of armed conlife

flict.

I

know what

To what

extent

it is

is

and, even more importantly, what

Protocol

I

it is

not.

customary international law, such that

it

may

be binding on non-parties? Perhaps this question might be more accurately
381
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articulated: "can't

we simply

declare Protocol

be reflective

I,

in

its

of customary international law and thus declare

its

provisions to be binding

entirety, to

on

the United States, despite the fact that the United States has chosen not to

become

a party to the Protocol?"

vided an answer.

He

this question, Professor Stein

has expressed substantial doubt as to whether

provisions of Protocol
ary international law.

I

has proall

of the

have become "intransgressible" principles of custom-

He

many of the undefined
nature, specifically

To

notes specifically that

it is

"very doubtful" whether

can be declared to be of such a
those that were of principal concern during the conduct of
provisions of Protocol

I

Operation Allied Force.
In illustrating this point, Professor Stein refers to terms such as "military
significance," "definite military advantage," "effective contribution to military

and "indiscriminate attacks" and notes that they are not defined even
by way of non-exhaustive examples. Moreover, he observes, even among
those States that have become parties to Protocol I, a number have issued
action,"

varying statements of understanding regarding their individual interpretations
of the meaning of these terms. Given these facts, he concludes that
correct to state that the fundamental principles of the law of

it

armed

may be
conflict

and repeatedly referenced by the International
Court of Justice that is, the basic distinction between civilians and combatants, the prohibition against directly attacking civilians, and the rule of proportionality
are customary law of armed conflict concepts. However, he
notes, "[i]t is very doubtful whether the same can be said about all of the other
provisions of Protocol I. ..." I am in complete agreement with Professor Stein
on that point.
Judge Pocar, on the other hand, would appear to be much more supportive
of the view that Protocol I, as a whole, is making steady progress toward becoming customary international law. He observes that in looking at the factors to be considered in making customary law determinations, "customary
international humanitarian law should not be determined on the sole basis of
the practice of the States that have not ratified the Protocol." 2 In making this
contained within Protocol

I

—

—

statement, Judge Pocar acknowledges, in essence, the primary role played by
State practice in the formulation of customary international law.
there can be

no doubt. Every

Of

this,

criterion set forth for the purpose of making cus-

tomary law determinations has, at its core, the concept of State practice. The
primacy of this concept has been reaffirmed repeatedly by various international tribunals.

2.

To

this

See Judge Pocar's paper in

Judge Pocar would seem to say that he agrees that

this

volume (emphasis added).
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State practice

is

component of any customary law determination, but
principle one must not look exclusively at the practice of

the key

that in applying this

those States that have chosen to challenge the customary law nature of nu-

merous provisions of Protocol
that are parties to Protocol

I.

Fair enough. Let us take a look at those States

I.

have never been impressed by the number of States that have, over the

I

become parties to Protocol I. It is my view that the long list of signatories of this document has very little to do with State practice in the area of the
law of armed conflict. The vast majority of the signatories of Protocol I are at
bystanders, if you will
best interested observers
when it comes to the actual application of the law of armed conflict in combat situations. These
States have not applied the provisions of Protocol I on the battlefield or, for
years,

—

—

the most part, during any form of military operation. In sum, they have not
"practiced" the various provisions of Protocol

national

I.

(The same

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and

mental organizations (NGOs).) As a
parties to Protocol

means very

I

little

is

true of the Inter-

a host of other non-govern-

result, the fact that these States are

when one examines

the practice of such

States in the context of determining whether the Protocol constitutes customary international law.

In terms of tangible State practice that substantively affects the evolution

of Protocol
ers."

Not

I

as

customary law,

I

have but one thing to

the signatories; not the observers; not the

rather "show

me

the players."

Which

ICRC

States

is

one.

environment? The answer

And

or

States in the international

actually practice or apply law of armed conflict principles
in a real- world

me the playthe NGOs; but

"show

say:

is

—

community

on an ongoing

basis

of which the United

very few

the United States as a consistent law of

armed

conflict

practitioner has just as consistently expressed the view that Protocol

I,

as a

whole, does not reflect customary international law.

One

might ask "what about those States, though

that have signed Protocol

I

relatively

few in number,

and have practiced or applied the law of armed

conflict in a series of military operations since the times of their signatures?

Surely their status as parties to Protocol
its

evidences a growing acceptance of

provisions as customary law?" Again, another

such a premise

fails

in issue. Essentially

col

I

I

with a

to hold

up under

scrutiny.

fair

Examine,

each of these States has qualified

series of

observation. However,

its

if

you

will,

the States

ratification of Proto-

both reservations and statements of understanding deal-

ing with various articles of the Protocol. Search as you may, you will find

no

concordant and continuous State practice regarding the application of
383
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numerous provisions of Protocol I
that are both parties and players.

—even among

that limited

number of States

Judge Pocar also notes that special importance should be attached to the
case law of international tribunals, in terms of evaluating the assessment of

whether certain treaty provisions have become customary international law. Leaving aside the fact, however, that customary law is not the
primary source of international law upon which international tribunals base
their decisions, what have such courts looked for when they turn to an examination of whether a particular concept has become a binding principle of cussuch courts

as to

tomary international law? Once again, these courts have sought to find the
existence of concordant and continuous State practice associated with the

and the acceptance of or acquiescence

concept in

issue,

State (s) to

which the court

is

in the concept by the

being asked to apply this principle.

As I have

in-

no concordant and continuous State practice
the applicability of Protocol I
and the United States has nei-

dicated previously, there exists

with respect to

—

ther accepted or acquiesced in the view that the Protocol, as a whole, reflects

do not believe that any international tribunal
would find the more controversial and ill-defined articles of Protocol I to be
binding customary law.
Let me speak, very briefly, as well, to Judge Pocar's summary of an opinion
of a Trial Chamber of the ICTY that was dealing with law of armed conflict
obligations under Articles 57 and 58 of Protocol I. The Court found that
"when a rule of international humanitarian law is somewhat imprecise, it must
be defined with reference to the laws of humanity and dictates of public conscience espoused in the celebrated 'Martens Clause', which is, itself, customary law." Here, I would simply call your attention to the fact that the "laws of
humanity" and "the dictates of public conscience" are but the second and
third components of the Martens Clause. The first, omitted component refers
customary international law.

I

among civilized peoples", that is, customary law as
established by State practice. The omission of any reference to this aspect of
the Martens Clause, even if inadvertent, is certainly a significant one when
to the "usages established

the Martens Clause has been invoked to "define" the "imprecision" of certain

Protocol
I'll

I

provisions.

conclude

my comments

by leaving you with a quote from Judge Pocar's

excellent paper, a quote that very cogently summarizes the issue of whether

Protocol

I,

as a whole,

Judge Pocar

might

rightly

be viewed as customary international law.

states:
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David Graham
While most of Protocol

can undoubtedly be regarded as essentially reflecting
customary international lav/, there are areas where this conclusion is subject to
debate for two reasons. First, Protocol I clearly sets forth new rules. Second, the
I

add new elements to principles that, while
they are well established in customary law, leave margins of discretion to
belligerent States. Belligerent States are then free to argue that such provisions
specificity of Protocol Ps provisions

will limit

or

may

limit discretion if they are given certain interpretations.

scope and impact of these additions
basis of the hesitations of

To

3.

this,

I

some

therefore controversial and

States to ratify Protocol

can add only, "Well

See Judge Pocar's paper, supra,

is

said."

at 347.
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may be

The
the

Discussion

Can a

Coalition

Member Be Held

Responsible for the Actions of

Other Members?

Ruth Wedgwood:
have a question for Professor Stein on your approach to the problem of the

I

potential responsibility of one coalition
tion members. This

sure this

a

is

good

is

member for

the actions of other coali-

probably a statement against interest because I'm not

line of argument for the

which the idea of command

United

responsibility has

States.

now been

Given the manner

in

liberalized to include

not only direct commanders in a wiring diagram but also responsibility for ac-

who may

tors

here the Blaskic case where the fact that
1

paramilitary was not

command
there

is

enough

responsibility to

some potential

Court of

commander (I have in mind
actions may have been taken by a

be under the effective control of a

Justice)

and indeed the extension of
a broad range of civilian officials), don't you think
to exculpate Blaskic

liability (I

suppose we shall see in the International

by individual coalition members for the actions of others

which they might indeed have been able to stop

politically?

Torsten Stein:
Well, there might be.

I

take a three-stage approach.

Where you have an in-

ternational organization, States cannot hide behind the organization and say

"we

will

The

not be responsible because

organization has

no penny

it's

to pay.

the organization that's acting, not us."

You cannot

thing where the organization as such acted ultra
ble."

But

if

you have a situation

NATO

is

and say

NATO

agree to

1.

like

say "well, this was some-

vires,

so

we

are not responsi-

Operation Allied Force where you say

not the "international tin council," then you can't use

all

those rules

You have a group of individual nations. They
do something together, and now they are responsible. It would make

Prosecutor

v.

is

responsible.

Blaskic,

Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95T4-T, Mar.

3,

2000.

Discussion

one who did it stand alone in the
rain because the others were not in a position to do it. I don't see a clear rule in
international law that says because you are all acting together, we can just
choose one out of the coalition. There are little examples for that I think.
sense. Also, for political reasons, let not the

That would not be

a bad rule.

Ruth Wedgwood:
I

would simply

made

that

UN

issue a

note of caution. There are even arguments being

peacekeepers should be responsible for not having prevented

the Serbs from acting out. So the

command

may be going

responsibility

hori-

zontal as well as vertical and therefore one should be careful.

Wolff H. von Heinegg:
When it comes to NATO operations there are a variety of different instruments in force for the member States of the coalition, but it's never NATO to

whom it

can be attributed. It's always the national States to whom a possible
violation can be attributed. Politically there may be a problem. So what the

NATO countries should do,
ment (even though they

common

denominator

rather than having a variety of rules of engage-

are standardized), they should at least try to find a

as regards their different legal obligations.

Torsten Stein:

We agree that in any given coalition there can be different legal standards,
and if there was no pre-existing legal obligation then one will not be held liable even for the actions of coalition partners. But it would be an awkward case
indeed if one asked a State to be in the coalition primarily because that State
had not ratified certain conventions, such as the one on blinding laser
weapons.

The United
Yves Sandoz:
Has the United

States

and Protocol

States de facto recognized Protocol

I

I? If

not, are there con-

cerns remaining that prevent the United States from ratifying Protocol

I?

David Graham:
I'll

that

answer your second question

we have with

first.

Yes,

I

think there are

specific provisions to Protocol

those specific concerns.

I

I,

and

I

still

concerns

won't go through

think those have appeared in the public domain on a
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number of

Those concerns

different occasions.

are essentially of an opera-

tional nature.
I

col

think there are inartfully drafted and very subjective provisions of ProtoI.

Provisions that lend themselves to subjective judgments and would place

commanders

in a very tenuous position

on the

battlefield

ond-guessing. Just as various parties of Protocol

and subject

to sec-

have expressed various

I

in-

what those provisions mean in the form of statements of
understanding and reservations, we have reservations with respect to whether
they could ever be applied in an objective manner. I think that includes much
of Protocol I given the fact that it was based on compromise and was very
inartfully drafted. Those are the types of provisions that we still have reservations about because we think that it places commanders in situations that subject those commanders to subjective judgments. We can't give them clear
guidance with respect to what those provisions mean.
terpretations of

As

I

said,

we would

we have met with

We

coalition partners.

have agreed

as to

how

interpret those provisions (in terms of developing consensus rules of

engagement),

how we would

ply the use of force.

ervations about

apply the use of force, and

But that doesn't mean that we

still

some of the provisions of Protocol

Now with respect

how we would

do not have

not ap-

serious res-

I.

do not think that we are going to
be the position of violating Protocol I because the rules of engagement that we
come up with in a coalition environment will essentially reflect the interpretations that our coalition partners have with respect to the law of armed conflict. I don't see any commander that would knowingly force a coalition
partner into a violation of Protocol I; knowing what governmental limitations
might have been placed on that coalition partner by their capitals. I don't see
to your

first

question,

I

that situation as occurring.

The Status

of Protocol

1

As Customary

International

Law

Fausto Pocar:

would like to clarify my remarks regarding the status of Protocol I as customary international law. I didn't say that as a whole the Protocol is becoming
I

or

is

customary law.

said that there

I

eral value of Protocol

I

as

is still

a trend towards recognition of the gen-

evidenced by the increasing number of ratifications

and some case law in international
State practice

is

tribunals.

showing areas in which

major actors in international relations.

I

However,

this

is

also said that the

not true, and

I

referred to

maintain one should take into ac-

count also the State practice of the States that have
389

I

ratified the Protocol

and

Discussion

not only the non-ratifying States. Neither did

ICTY

I

say that the practice of the

made by many scholars
including scholars in this room like Professor Greenwood
that referred
to international case law as having been seen later on as determinative in deis

determinative.

I

only referred to arguments

—

—

bates, but this

crease in

is

not necessarily always the case.

number of State

one of the States that has
Kingdom.

parties,

I

had

in

ratified Protocol

When

mind major
I

I

referred to the in-

actors as well because

as recently as

1998

is

the United

Leslie Green:
I

only want to touch on the point of the number of ratifications. True, from

the point of view of classical doctrine, there would have been a general

atti-

tude that perhaps 159 ratifications amounts to at least general international

But when I look at those 159 ratifications, I'm not very concerned as to
what Nepal thinks about the law of armed conflict nor what Iceland thinks.
(I'm fascinated by the thought that Iceland recently signed a treaty of non-aglaw.

and peace with Nepal. Somehow or another it doesn't sound very
much more concerned with the fact, not that the United Kingdom has ratified, but that the United States, China, and Israel have not ratified. What we have to count are those who are the contributors. If I'm looking
at the law this evening, I don't care whether Switzerland has ratified a law of
the sea convention. The same thing applies here. Who are the actors? If a
gression

practical.) I'm

number of senior actors don't play, then we can't call it general or universal international law.

Reprisals

Adam Roberts:
and Colonel Graham.
It touches on whether there may be a difference of emphasis between them regarding the issue of reprisals. In his paper, Judge Pocar referred to the problem
of reprisals very briefly. Colonel Graham was quite right to suggest that the
reservations that a number of States
and not only NATO member States
but at least one other State have made to Protocol I suggest that there is unease on this issue of reprisal and a desire to leave some room open for reprisals
as a means of enforcing observance of the laws of armed conflict. This is an issue which can certainly arise in coalition warfare as evidenced in the 1991
Gulf operations where the senior partner in the operation was the United
States. The United States felt an obligation to make clear that it would do
This

is

a question particularly directed at Judge Pocar

—

—
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something

the other side violated fundamental norms, as Secretary of State

if

James Baker communicated to Tariq Aziz on 9 January in Geneva with respect
to the use of

My

weapons of mass destruction.

scope do you think

is left

question

is

very simply, what

within the law of armed conflict for reprisals and

is

problem in coalition operations?

that a

David Graham:

The concept
sals

—

is

of reprisals

an extremely

—even

difficult

confidential information that

if

concept.

you
I

restricted

think

I

we have debated

can

it

tell

to belligerent repri-

you without divulging

the issue of belligerent reprisals

within the Department of Defense and between Defense and the Department
of State extensively.

what the position

is

I

wish

on

I

could give you an easy answer with respect to

belligerent reprisals.

I

will tell

you that

I

do not think

the United States has renounced the right to engage in belligerent reprisals

from those categories of persons and property protected in the 1949

(apart

Geneva Conventions) given certain circumstances, but
pared to go.

It's

that's as far as I'm pre-

a difficult issue.

Fausto Pocar:
Unfortunately
in

my

I

am not able

to fully answer this question.

paper only to show that this

When

I

is

Chamber in Kupreskic,

Chamber

2

1

is

it

open.

was quite

may
I won't say more because this question is now

prudent to say that whatever consideration

before the Appeals

touched upon

an area in which the debate

referred to the decision of the Trial

play a role in developing the law.

I

of which

The Martens Clause and

I

am

the

a

is

given to this judgment

it

member.

Margin

of Appreciation

Rudolf Dolzer:
Allow

me

to

make

to interpret Protocol
this

is

a very

a brief point regarding the Kupreskic case.
I,

The ICTY had

Article 57's "feasible precautions" provision.

broad statute with a very broad wording).

interpret "feasible precautions" in the light of the

(I

think

What the ICTY did was

Martens Clause. In other

words, you interpret a very broadly worded statute in the light of a very, very

broad general clause.
2.

Prosecutor

v.

Kupreskic et

al.,

Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-16-T, Jan.
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The Martens Clause
covered."

is

reworded in the Protocol

I.

It

says

u

[i]n cases

not

Now I'm not quite sure what it means, "in cases not covered," but I

3

Martens Clause in areas that are more or
less specifically addressed in the Protocol. Otherwise I would probably not apply the Martens Clause. But even if I would in principle think it might be ap-

would be very

careful to apply the

plicable in terms of applying Article 57 in the context of criminal justice,

add the Martens Clause, you would

come

if you

into a sphere of vagueness that in

most domestic constitutional systems would probably be quite near to the borders that probably constitutional lawyers would find acceptable.

My

remark

margin of appreciation was meant

as to

have to apply Protocol
cumstances

I

—sometimes

as follows: those

or customary law have to apply

it

under

who

specific cir-

very short-term, sometimes without very specific

ICTY

would be happier if the ICTY
had not supplemented Article 57 with the Martens Clause, but with a sense
and spirit of the margin of appreciation approach. In other words giving some
benefit of doubt to those who act under the circumstances in which they have
knowledge.

to act.

I

think the

Now why

thetic to those

but

I

do

who

I

should do more.

say so again?

are before the

I

say so mainly not because

I

ICTY

at the

moment

as very

I

am

sympa-

few of us

are,

we have to keep in mind that those rules will have to be accepted. I
ICTY very seriously. I think there is a very good chance that the juris-

think

take the

prudence of the Tribunal in the long-term

depending upon

its

persuasiveness.

What

will

have a considerable influence

I'm concerned about

is if

the Tribu-

comes down with an interpretation of
next time for those who are on the different

nal for very good or excellent reasons

the law that will

make

it

difficult

and in similar circumstances, then
would make very bad law.
side

The Relationship Between

I

think indeed those very hard cases

Human Rights Law and the

Law of Armed Conflict
Natalino Ronzitti:

The

International Court of Justice in

has said that humanitarian law

is

its

Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion

lex specialis vis-a-vis

human

rights law, so in

some cases you have to apply human rights law. This is a problem for European countries; it's not a problem for the United States. For European countries it's a real problem because we have a European Convention on Human
Rights. There is a case before the European Court of Human Rights for
3.

Protocol

I,

Article 1(2).
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Convention on Human Rights during Operation Allied Force.
This is important also for an occupying army or also for peacekeeping operations. We cannot say that we will not apply the European Convention because in this case individuals are under the jurisdiction of the State that is
occupying its territory or having its troops on their territory. So for the European States it's a very important issue. How is it possible to address this issue
violation of the

in a coalition?

David Graham:
appreciate that

I

comment

the European Convention

pean Court

is

now making

on

Professor.

Human

understand that you're subject to

Rights and

human rights

law? Does

a combination of the two?

make

going to

Is,

it

will

assume

NATO countries for Operation Allied Force.

the European Court assumes jurisdiction,

apply

understand that the Euro-

I

a determination as to whether or not

jurisdiction of the case against
If

I

it

my

question becomes does

apply the law of armed conflict? Does

it

it

apply

European Court on Human Rights
the law of armed conflict and interpret

in fact, the

rulings with respect to

To me that's a fairly scary proposition.
My concern also is that when you combine elements of human rights law
and the law of armed conflict, it makes my job of advising military commanders a very difficult job. I know what the law of armed conflict is. When I ask
very, very bright people to tell me what international humanitarian law is, I
get some very good answers. The problem is that they're all diffe?ent. Everybody has his or her own idea with respect to what international humanitarian
the law of armed conflict?

law

is.

Professor Stein has said that

armed

we have seen the

transformation of the law

an element of humanitarian law. Well, that's an
uncomfortable proposition for me as well because it makes my job in advising
commanders a very difficult job in terms of understanding what their obligaof

conflict into simply

tions are. That's

thing that

something that continues to trouble me.

we need

to take a long hard careful look

I

think

it's

some-

at.

Torsten Stein:
I

just

want

to

comment on one

point of Colonel Graham's statement.

absolutely clear that the Strasbourg Court will apply the European
tion

4.

and nothing

else

if

they take up the case. 4

See Professor Greenwood's paper in

this

volume.
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Fausto Pocar:

The European Court has managed

European Convention on
Human Rights and nothing more than that. But of course the problem the
arises in any case because the Convention
relationship with the law of war
says that the state of war does not exclude the application of the Convention.
So the problem of combining the Geneva conventions and the European Conto apply the

—

—

vention on

Human

Rights does exist for States that are parties to both.

Leslie Green:
I

my

much

agreement with Colonel Graham, because from
point of view international humanitarian law is the Geneva conventions.
find myself very

This

treaty

is

Armed
armed

conflict law

conflict law.
is

We also have customary armed conflict law.

lex specialis. It

conflicts. If I look at the

lates to a

own

armed

in

peace situation.

It

has been created to deal specifically with

European Convention on

Human Rights, it re-

relates to a situation of a country dealing

who

with

its

That was
the basic view that the Convention originally took. The fact that the Court
has perhaps extended it, in the same way that the Canadian Supreme Court
has extended our own Charter of Rights, does not change the law. It is not the
role of the European Court of Human Rights to deal with issues that are outside the field of human rights. The issue of the law of armed conflict is lex
specialis, which applies even if the Convention on Human Rights is lex
generalis, which I don't think it is.
subjects or perhaps those

are present within

its territory.

Michael Bothe:

comes as a surprise to me that we are back to this old issue of humanitarian law and human rights. Professor Green, you know what you said was
wrong. We made every effort from 1974 to 1977 to have a good mix of human
rights and humanitarian law. Article 75 of Protocol I and the human rights
It

provisions of Protocol

II

are

human rights provisions. They are drafted accord-

ing to the international covenants. Their purpose

clude the suspension of the guarantee which

European Convention on
to

make them

Human Rights;

in a certain sense

immune

is

is

to a certain extent to ex-

possible according to the

to reintroduce those guarantees

and

against this type of suspension. This

double guarantee or double protection of victims by humanitarian law and by

human

rights law

There

is

nothing

ternational law.

you

was always with

us.

This

like a lex specialis.

Now when you

is

These

not new.
are

two overlapping areas of in-

have overlapping areas of international law,

will get into difficult situations at

some

394

point.

I

think the case which

is

Discussion

pending before the European Court of Human Rights

is

one of those

difficult

where you have also as a matter of fact a very old question. The relationship between the right to life and the right to kill in warfare. It's a very fundamental issue. It pops up from time to time at places where you might not
have expected, but there is nothing shocking and nothing new about it. Perhaps it's an opportunity to rethink the issue. This is the fundamental side of it.
situations

The Court has

on a technical level because the Court
will have to apply the European Convention. There the problem is whether
actual fighting is something that is meant to be "subject to the jurisdiction" of
a party to the Convention, or whether the scope of protection of the Convention as

it is

to decide the issue

formulated really covers actual fighting.

It

covers action in the con-

an occupation, but actual fighting is different. This would be my
problem if I were a judge there. Is this really something which is within the
scope of protection of the European Convention?
text of

Leslie

Green:

Professor Bothe,

I

know you were

on
Committee

Rapporteur of that Committee.

I

sat in

would remind you that what we did in that
was to take certain human rights and make them part of armed conflict law.
They were taken out of the generality of human rights law from the point of
view of military operations and made part of Geneva law because they appear
not in a human rights document but in a Protocol attached to the Geneva
conventions. They are now part of armed conflict law. They are to be considered from the point of view of the operation of the law of armed conflict, not
that

Committee. But

I

in the light of human rights law.

tional

in Pictet's definition of interna-

humanitarian law, which he said was the Geneva conventions, but from

that point of view

when

They may be

it

I

think you go too far in retaining

has become part of the

lex specialis

it

as a separate

concept

of the law of armed conflict.

Rudolf Dolzer:

To me

the issue of the law of armed conflict or humanitarian law

case before

it

in terms of

its

law, not

pean Convention was meant in the

some

a matter of strict

The European Court

will interpret the

more and not

Professor Bothe indicated that there

to

It is

extent a semantic issue in terms of interpreting the law.
interpretation of the relevant treaties.

is

is

first

less.

a serious question

whether the Euro-

place to address war or war-like situa-

would think that is not the case. The universal human rights
conventions will have to interpret human rights laws in their own light. I
think that we will come to the general issue of which is the more specific law.
tions.

I

395

Discussion

The law of armed conflict is probably more specific, but there may be instances
where the two bodies of law have to be interpreted in the light of each other.
That would be a very specific issue to be determined in the light of the very
specific case, but in principle one would have to assume that the law of armed
conflict

is

much more

specific

than

human

rights law.

Fausto Pocar:

would like to make a simple point on the relationship between human
rights law and humanitarian law. We are discussing the question of the EuroI

pean

States, but the question

many

countries in the world

is

We should not forget that
now— are parties to the UN Cove-

not only European.

—about 150

nant on Civil and Political Rights. The Covenant's provisions on these matters are

more or

less

going in the same direction as the European Convention.

So the problem of combining the treaty obligation that was mentioned by Professor Bothe still exists and exists also for the United States because the
United States is a party to the Covenant. So it's a point that should be
stressed.
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PART VI
THE ROAD AHEAD

Introduction

Joel Rosenthal

o

"The Road Ahead." Now I suppose if Yogi Berra
were in my place he would just say, when you get to the fork in the
road, take it. Say what you will about Yogi, but he's right to imagine that the
road ahead is one with many forks. Legal and ethical dilemmas necessarily imply that choices must be made. I hope that this colloquium and this particular
panel can help us to see these choices clearly and help us articulate the principles upon which we make our decisions.

The

ur topic

is

entitled

Kosovo campaign
and ethical issues stemming

organizers of this colloquium sensed that the

brought to the surface several inconclusive legal
primarily from rapid geopolitical

and technological changes. This point has
been made throughout proceedings. For example Professor Dinstein points
out in his paper that the jus in hello cannot afford to lag behind the changing
conditions of combat. Colonel Graham asked us when did we change our perspective from the law of armed conflict to international human rights law?
We have seen some new language and new concepts, and we've seen some old
concepts put under new strain. We are all here because we know that these
changes

The

affect

organizers also understand that in order to investigate the world be-

tween law and

why

our thinking about the road ahead.

in this

ethics,

we would need

to call

upon an

eclectic group.

colloquium are included judges, philosophers, military

So

that

is

officers, his-

We

torians

and even

riously,

but we're also confident that

hope we've created a stimulating and fruitful
discussion that has been interdisciplinary, inter-professional and international. Yesterday historian Barry Strauss cautioned whether we can or should
even try to learn lessons from history. The organizers take that admonition selawyers.

experience in ways that
nevertheless shed

some

we can profitably reflect on the Kosovo
might not amount strictly to lessons learned but might
light

on the road ahead.

The Laws

of War After Kosovo

Adam Roberts

T

he 1999 Kosovo

War between

NATO members and the Federal Re-

public of Yugoslavia confirmed the importance of issues relating to

the laws of war in contemporary conflicts, especially in coalition operations.

It

A central issue in the war was
the minimizing of civilian casualties. The NATO leadership recognized from
also

exposed some problems in that body of law.

the start that this was of major importance, for two

main

reasons: because the

war was being fought with a stated purpose of protecting the inhabitants of
Kosovo and also because international opinion would not have tolerated a

war on
to

civilians. 1

An

underlying question raised by the war

which international

legal considerations

and

institutions

is

thus the extent

can

assist in pro-

tecting the civilian.

The

title

of this paper calls for explanation.

The terms

"the laws of war"

(jus

and "international humanitarian law" are for most purposes interchangeable. They refer to the same body of law. Both terms are used in this paper. For most purposes I prefer the first of these terms, "laws of war" being
older and simpler, and recognizing as it does that war is the central area of
concern. However, the second term, "international humanitarian law," somein hello)

times with the suffix "applicable in
ternational diplomacy. In

some

armed

conflicts,"

usages, this term

parts of the international law of

human

rights.

is

can

increasingly used in in-

also

encompass relevant

The term may be

particularly

appropriate in reference to a situation (such as applied in Kosovo before

March

24, 1999) in

which there

is

no international armed

conflict

and only a

The importance of minimizing civilian casualties is stressed in the memoirs of the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe during the period of the Kosovo War. See WESLEY CLARK, WAGING
1.
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(2001).
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small-scale civil war, but there
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is

of
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systematic government repression of part of

own population. Whichever term one

uses, the fact

remains that the scope

of this body of law has significantly expanded in the past sixty years to encom-

on crimes

humanity and on genocide as well as the laws
and customs of international armed conflict; and that in the past decade this
body of law has been increasingly viewed as at least partially applicable in conpass the law

flicts

which are

against

partly or completely non-international in character.

Eight questions

This survey concentrates on the following eight questions which
in

connection with the Kosovo War, and

likely to affect the

way

in

which the law

(b) also

is

(a)

arose

touch on matters which are

viewed, influences events, and de-

velops further in the future:
1.

How did developments in the written laws of war which occurred in the
and the increasing international concern with implementation of the
affect the framework within which international responses to civil wars,

1990s,
law,

including in Kosovo, took place?
there

2. Is

now

a stronger link than before

helium 1 In particular,
.

what

between jus

in hello

and

jus

ad

are the implications of the fact that sometimes, as

in Kosovo, violations of international

humanitarian norms by a belligerent in

an internal conflict provide part of the rationale

external military

for

intervention?
3. If military

action

is

embarked upon

poses by a large alliance or coalition,
low-risk,

is

remote control methods? In

for

proclaimed humanitarian pur-

there a logic whereby
particular,

is

it is

the oxymoron, humanitar-

ian war, particularly likely to take the form of bombing; and

problems

arise

from reliance on

air

what jus

NATO/US

strategic doctrine

aims at putting pressure on the adversary's government, and not just

its

which
armed

the implicit assumption of the laws of war that the adversary's

forces,

and

armed

forces are the

(b)

in hello

power?

there tension between (a) the

4. Is

carried out by

main

legitimate object of attack? If so,

how can

this ten-

sion be addressed?
5.

What

lessons are to be learned from the fact that the

NATO operations

were subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal
former Yugoslavia (ICTY)?

for the

In particular, does the consideration of the

NATO

bombing campaign that was conducted under the auspices of the
ICTY Prosecutor suggest that the NATO campaign was conducted largely in
accord with

member

States' obligations

under the laws of war?
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Did the war confirm that there can be many forms of non-belligerence
which differ significantly from neutrality as traditionally conceived in the laws
6.

of war?

Did the war expose deficiencies or omissions

7.

of the laws of war? In particular,

what

there a need for further codification?

main subject-areas that might require such

are the

What,

8.

is

in the existing codifications

if

United States

And

codification?

anything, might need to be done about the paradox that the

is

simultaneously a principal upholder of the obligation of States

to observe the laws of war

and a non-party to several important agreements on

the subject?

These questions are certainly not the only important
arise.

jus in hello

ones to

A number of specific issues and controversies, such as the naval opera-

tions in the Adriatic

and the bombing of the

TV station in Belgrade,

cannot

be covered here in the detail they deserve.

These eight questions have to be seen against a
changes in the conduct of international

larger

politics in the 1990s,

international preoccupation with the problem of civil wars

background of

and increasing

and with the im-

plementation of the laws of war. These changes had a significant effect on the
fact,

and the form, of NATO involvement

Changes in the conduct of international

in Kosovo.

politics

none of them entirely new, reinforced the tendency of international bodies and foreign powers to get involved in wars, including particularly civil wars, and also to apply pressure for implementation
of the laws of war by belligerents.
In the 1990s four factors,

end of the Cold War has had the character of
civil wars, though often with international involvements on one or more sides.
Since such wars cause appalling and often highly visible suffering, as well as
threatening international stability in the regions in which they occur, there has
been an evident need to ensure the application of certain rules of restraint in
Firstly,

most

conflict since the

such wars.
Secondly,

many contemporary wars have

a particular tendency to engage

the interests of outside powers because they threaten to create huge refugee
flows with
it is

which our not-very-liberal

northern

Iraq, Bosnia,

societies are unwilling to cope.

Kosovo or East Timor, an unholy

Whether

alliance of hu-

manitarianism and illiberalism makes intervention within the State undergoing conflict a possible,

even imperiously necessary, option.
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there has been a growing awareness that crimes committed by

y

been among the most serious of the twentieth century. The international preoccupation with restitution for a wide range of State misdeeds is
States have

evidence of this.
Fourthly

,

it is

widely accepted that the post-Cold

Human rights

such system of values.

It is

international order

mutual respect among
and humanitarian norms are core parts of any

has to be based on values other than, or additional
sovereign States.

War

to,

thus very difficult for States to ignore massive viola-

tions of fundamental norms.

The

challenge of implementation

The main
rules

challenge facing the laws of war today

— though some

are needed.

It is

in the

who have worked in

the field of the laws of war;

is

it

exist,

Unwidely shared among

conduct of armed

questionably, the preoccupation with implementation

new

not devising

implementation of the rules that

and of the underlying idea of moderation
those

is

conflict.

has had a profound

ef-

on policy and on treaty-making in this field; and it has been reflected in a
number of UN reports and in certain actions of the UN Security Council.
"Implementation" is taken to encompass (]) the normal measures taken by
States, and by international bodies including the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations, to ensure that populations
and armed forces are aware of the laws of war and carry out their terms; (2)
the actions taken by outside bodies, including States and international organifect

zations, in response to systematic violations of the laws of war.

mainly on

this

second and more

forcement of the laws of war, but

difficult category,
is

My

focus

which encompasses the

is

en-

not limited to coercive measures.

The concern with implementation should not be taken to imply support for
the commonly expressed view that existing implementation is lamentable or
even non-existent. In the 1999 Kosovo
mentation. This was not only on the

War

there was

much

effective imple-

NATO side, but also in some instances

on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
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For example, in the talks at
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FRY

and accurate
information about the location of minefields. The central challenge is both to
improve patterns of implementation, and to further develop means of coping
the conclusion of the war the

military provided extensive
2

with gross violations.

Changes

in the

Laws

of

War in the

1990s

on Kosovo, there had been two striking develtendency to make more explicit and detailed the

In the decade before the war

opments

in the laws of war: a

application of the laws of war to conflicts with a partly or wholly non-interna-

and a range of specific measures to improve mechanisms of
implementation. Both of these developments affected the United States and
NATO response to the events in Kosovo. Up to March 24, 1999 the Kosovo
tional character;

problem had
ties

and

civil

largely the character of State repression

war.

It

might thus have been perceived

by the Yugoslav authori-

as a largely internal prob-

lem, about which the rest of the world should not worry.

The

fact that

Kosovo

did not escape the attention of outside powers and bodies owes something to

the development of the law.

Changes in the written law
In the laws of war, as they developed from the mid-nineteenth century to

World War, implementation was traditionally not treated as a major topic in its own right. The general assumption, reflected in certain early
agreements on the laws of war (e.g., the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions)
was that civilized States could be relied on to ensure that their own armed
forces would act in a disciplined, restrained and professional manner. That
the Second

idea was called into question by the events of the twentieth century.

When

the State that was supposed to take action was the very one whose

armed

had committed the alleged offenses, the idea of purely national jurisdiction seemed optimistic; and when the State itself was committed to a criminal

forces

2.

Information from General Rupert Smith, Deputy Supreme Allied

Commander

Europe, June

25-27, 1999. See also the UN Mine Action Programme website, www.mineaction.org. Its report
on Kosovo of September 2001 (available at the Mine Action website) showed that the Yugoslav
Army handed over 620 records of minefields in Kosovo, principally but not exclusively on the
Albanian and Macedonian borders. According to the final annual report on the UN Interim
Administration in Kosovo Mine Action Programme, covering the period to December 15, 2001,
the 620 records did not include mines laid by Ministry of Interior Police Units, or paramilitary
groups. UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report - 2001 (December 2001) H 10 (available
at the Mine Action website).
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policy,

it

was absurd. That

is

of

why
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since 1945 there has

been a

definite

ment towards a system of international criminal law affecting the
States

As

and armed

move-

activities of

forces.

far as treaties are

concerned, the old pattern of treating implementation

began to change significantly after the Second World War. The 1948
Genocide Convention authorized and indeed exhorted parties to take action
against offenders, including rulers and public officials; and it authorized action
through the UN. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions called for: (1) universal
jurisdiction as regards grave breaches, and (2) "Protecting Powers" to ensure
implementation of certain parts of the agreements in wartime. However, the
implementation systems specified in these treaties concluded in 1948 and
1949 have not been used much in the intervening years.
casually

The 1977 Geneva

Protocol

I

3

included some provisions attempting to break

the impasse. In particular, in accordance with the terms of

Article 90, the

its

Commission" was set up in 1991.
one of the numerous problems in the

"International Humanitarian Fact-Finding

Yet

this

too has not worked.

Not

a single

decade of its existence has been referred to

it.

In this, as in

many

other ways,

the actual forms of implementation that have been developed have been
ferent

from what was envisaged

dif-

in treaties.

In short, the law developed before the 1990s

had

relatively

few provisions

regarding implementation, and those that existed were not effective. This

does not

mean

that there was

no implementation

—many

States did a capable

job of developing a culture of law observance within their

own armed

forces.

However, the war crimes and crimes against humanity of the 1990s exposed
the weakness of the implementation "system."
Similarly, laws of war
little

about

civil

war.

agreements concluded before the 1990s said relatively

The

treaty provisions explicitly applicable in civil wars

were notoriously modest (being essentially

Common

Geneva Conventions and 1977 Geneva Protocol
on matters of implementation.
In the 1990s, States and international bodies

II),

Article 3 of the 1949

and were

made

especially

weak

further attempts to ad-

and enforcement. Eight new legally binding
international documents in the area of the laws of war broadly defined were
adopted by the UN Security Council or by States at international conferences.
Only one of these new agreements (the 1995 Protocol on Blinding Laser
dress questions of implementation

3.

Protocol Additional

(I)

Victims of International

to the

Armed

Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating
Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,

LAW OF WAR 422 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000)
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DOCUMENTS ON THE

[hereinafter Protocol

I]
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Weapons) does not deal extensively with implementation and enforcement,
or with the problem of civil war. 4

ments,

1.

2.

all

other seven

new

international instru-

of which do address these issues, are:

The 1993

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former

UN Security Council in

Yugoslavia.

Adopted by the

The 1994

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for

Adopted by the
3.

The

UN Security Council in

The 1994 Convention on
This

is

the Safety of

1993.

Rwanda.

1994.

UN and

Associated Personnel.

not part of the laws of war as such, but closely related.

contains

extensive

provision for prosecution

or

extradition

It

of

offenders.

4.

The 1996 Amended

Protocol

11

on Landmines

to

the

1980

UN

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. This requires each party

and other measures against violations "by persons
under its jurisdiction or control."

to take legislative

or

on

territory

5.

The 1997 Ottawa Landmines Convention. This contains extensive
provisions on transparency, compliance and dispute settlement.

6.

The

1

998 Rome

into force July

7.

1,

Statute of the International Criminal Court (entered

2002).

The 1 999 Second Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property
in Armed Conflict (not yet in force) This was concluded and opened
.

for signature

during the Kosovo War, but had been negotiated and

numerous provisions regarding
implementation and enforcement not just of the Second Protocol
itself, but also of the Convention and the first Protocol (both of which
had been concluded in 1954).
agreed

4.

I

well

before.

It

contains

exclude from this total documents of an essentially advisory character, such as the 1994

ICRC/UNGA Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the
Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, included in the UN Secretary-General's report of 19
August 1994 to the UN General Assembly. See U.N. Doc. A/49/323 (1994).
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All seven documents have two critically important features in
First,

common.

they contain some provisions that go beyond the old idea of essentially

national implementation by the authorities of individual States. Second, they

have formal application in wholly or partly non-international armed

An unresolved problem:

internationalized civil

conflicts.

war

Most wars are much more confused in character than the simple dichotomous definition of war, as being either international or non-international,
would suggest. Frequently, as in past eras, the civil wars of our time have had
international dimensions: troops and command structures from outside powers have often played major roles on one or more sides. In many cases a more
accurate short description of the conflict would be "internationalized civil
war", although this

is

not a recognized category in the laws of war.

As far as the laws of war are concerned, one unhappy result of having largely
separate bodies of law applying to different aspects of the conflict
especially

is

that courts,

ICTY have had to devote enormous efforts to determining the char,

acter of the conflict in Bosnia as

it

arose in particular times, places and events.

and Croatia were among many which have had partly international and partly internal aspects. There must in principle be a case for
applying the whole of the body of the laws of war even to armed conflicts that
are substantially non-international in character, and some recent developments in the law do point in that direction. However, as far as Kosovo is con-

The wars

in Bosnia

cerned, the question of the character of the conflict

Before

March

24,

1999

it

is

After that date there was, superimposed

The

conflict

difficult.

was mainly or entirely a non-international armed

conflict, occurring within the territory of the Federal

armed

not especially

between the

on

Republic of Yugoslavia.

that conflict, an international

NATO powers and the FRY.

UN Security Council's involvement

In the 1990s the

UN Security Council assumed a major role in attempting

to ensure implementation of the laws of war, including investigation

and pun-

ishment of certain violations. This role was not entirely new. For example,
ready during the
authorized the main

Iran- Iraq

War

official investigation into

In the conflicts of the 1990s the
lating to the
cases:

(1980-88)

UN

the

Security Council

had

the use of chemical weapons.

Security Council addressed issues re-

implementation of international humanitarian law in

Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-5); Somalia (1992);

Leone (1997-2000); and Kosovo
civilians and other similar violations, a major

at least five

Rwanda

(1994);

(1998-9). In addition to attacks

Sierra
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al-

issue at stake in

on

some of these
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cases was the refusal of parties to permit delivery of humanitarian aid
is

certainly a

problem relating to the laws of war, but could also be considered

a violation of other

In

all

—which

norms and agreements.

these cases in the 1990s the Security Council

went beyond appeals

to

observe norms, and called for action. There were always several different
stated purposes for UN-authorized action or the threat thereof, but obser-

vance of humanitarian law was one of them. The actions taken by the Council
included not only the establishment of the international criminal tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but also action of a more direct kind.

Some

of the

and some cases of UN-imposed ecobased on claims that the target State had vio-

cases of UN-authorized military action,

nomic

sanctions, were partly

lated fundamental

norms of humanitarian

law.

These forms of action under UN Security Council auspices posed problems.
As regards military action, in most of these five crises a principal problem for
the UN was the difficulty of finding outside forces willing to act in situations
perceived to be dangerous. The failures of the UN, and of States, to act in time
in respect of the crises in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995 are clear examples. The enthusiasm for implementing humanitarian norms ran into the
rock of national interests. In respect of Kosovo the problem was different: the
main difficulty was in getting agreement in principle in the Security Council
that force should be used at all in response to the unfolding crisis. This was because, more than in any of the other five cases, any military action to stop ongoing atrocities in Kosovo involved violating the sovereignty of a functioning
sovereign State, Yugoslavia.

Links Between Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum

One consequence

of the developments of the 1990s has been the strength-

ening of the idea that a systematic pattern of violations of the basic humani-

norms of international humanitarian law may justify acts of military
intervention. Although there were many pre-echoes of this in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, the apparent strengthening of this link between jus
ad bellum and jus in bello represents a momentous and controversial change in
tarian

the terms of international debate.

The

long-standing and important principle that the law relating to resort to

war (jus ad bellum)
conduct in war (jus

is

a separate

in bello)

and

distinct subject

from the law relating to

remains valid and important. However, there have

always been causal links between these distinct bodies of law.

One such

link

is

that aspect of the idea of proportionality that deals with the proportionality of
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a military response to the original grievance.

The developing

tary action as a response to violations of the law of

war

is

practice of mili-

another important

Quite simply, massive violations of jus in hello by a belligerent can help to
legitimize certain threats and uses of force by outside powers intervening to
link.

stop the violations.
In an effort to get an offending State to observe rules of restraint, the

response of outside powers
force.

The

may be

first

the threat, rather than the actuality, of

use of pressure against States, for example in order to

make them

accept an intervention force, as was attempted in Kosovo and done in East

Timor

and international lawyers have been suspicious of agreements negotiated under duress. If
the host government has only given consent under extreme pressure, is its
consent valid? The experience of the post- 1990 period shows how necessary
pressure can be to achieve international objectives, and how hard it is to eliminate certain aspects of power politics.
in 1999, raises a problem. Traditionally, international law

The change

whereby humanitarian outrages serve in
practice as a basis for threatening or using force, has not been universally recognized. This is not surprising, particularly as the whole issue poses difficult dilemmas for humanitarian workers and organizations. In some cases in the
in the landscape,

1990s, the violations of jus in hello that contributed to decisions to intervene

included assaults on aid workers and convoys.

Any

suggestion that humani-

and organizations may play some part in triggering military actions challenges their deep (and in some cases legally based) commitment to
impartiality and neutrality. Almost all humanitarian workers and organizations are in a state of denial about the extent to which they, and the principles
and laws for which they stand, have played a part in initiating military action.
tarian workers

Where, following a pattern of violations,
authorization of the

military action has

been with the

UN Security Council, and/or has had the consent

(how-

ever reluctant) of the host State, there has not generally been a strong objec-

These conditions were present, for example, in Bosnia in
1995 and in East Timor in September 1999. However, where these conditions
were not present, as in Kosovo in March-June 1999, military intervention has
been strongly contested by major and minor powers.
In respect of Kosovo, before the NATO military action there had been sevtion to

eral

it

in principle.

UN resolutions which, in addition to many other elements, noted the vio-

lations

of international humanitarian law

resolution
icized the

there.

For example,

a

on Kosovo passed by the General Assembly in December 1998
Yugoslav authorities

for a variety of

crit-

unacceptable practices, includ-

ing violations of Common Article 3 of the 1949
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1977 Protocol

II;

deplored the killing of humanitarian aid workers; and re-

quired the Yugoslav authorities to allow investigators from the International

Criminal Tribunal access to examine alleged atrocities against

civilians. 5

The

on Kosovo also addressed these issues. A resolution in March 1998 condemned "the use of excessive force by Serbian police
forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators." 6 In September 1998 the
Council expressed concern at "the excessive and indiscriminate use of force
by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army," and at "reports of increasing violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law," going
on to call for a cessation of such acts. 7 This resolution, notably tough in tone,
followed a first-hand presentation made to the UN Security Council by a senior representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) on September 11, 1998. The next resolution, passed in October
Security Council resolutions

1998, also referred repeatedly to humanitarian issues. 8

The

failure of the

Yu-

goslav authorities to comply with these resolutions was a key consideration in

the decisions of

NATO countries to resort to the use of military force, as they

24, 1999.

When President Clinton addressed the nation on that

day, in a key link in his

argument he asked Americans: "Imagine what would

did

on March

happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the other way,
people were massacred on NATO's doorstep." 9

To draw attention to the connection between issues related

to violations of

the laws of war, and the decisions of outside countries to intervene,
say that there

nor

is

is

a simple

and

clear doctrinal or legal link.

as these

There

is

is

not to

not now,

there likely to be, a generally recognized "right" of humanitarian inter-

vention.

Such interventions may

occasionally be necessary, but to suggest

that they are a general "right" implies that

it is

possible to adjudicate in a gen-

way between the undoubted and still important non-intervention rule on
the one hand, and the demands of humanitarian considerations on the other.
Any decision on forcible intervention must involve a balancing of considerations in the face of unique and urgent circumstances, not the assertion of a
eral

general right.

To suggest that there is no general right of humanitarian intervention is not
to say that certain uses of force for

humanitarian ends are necessarily

6.

G.A. Res. 53/164 (Dec. 8, 1998), U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/164 (1998).
S.C. Res. 1160 (Mar. 31, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998).

7.

S.C. Res. 1199 (Sep. 23, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998).

8.

S.C. Res. 1203 (Oct. 24, 1998), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998).

5.

The Kosovo Conflict and International Law:
DOCUMENTATION 1974-1999, at 416 (Heike Krieger ed., 2001).

9.
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under international law; nor

is it

to assert that certain uses of force are simply

beyond the scope of international law. Rather, it is to suggest that in respect
of each intervention there are important, relevant but alas competing legal
principles which have to be balanced against each other; and a great deal depends on the particular facts and legal considerations that relate to that particular case.

Since the Kosovo

War

there have been attempts to develop a "right" of

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair
1999; UN Secretary-General Kofi

humanitarian intervention by such figures

as

Chicago on April 22,
Annan in his UN report of September 8, 1999; a number of speakers in the
UN General Assembly in 1999; the then Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy in a lecture in New York on February 10, 2000; and the then UK
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in a speech in London on July 19, 2000. Yet
in his speech in

there

is

absolutely

Moreover, the

might

tie its

US

no sign of international agreement on their propositions.
government has never wanted a doctrine in this area that

hands.

The attempt

to develop a general doctrine could actually

do harm

to the

cause of humanitarian intervention: such an attempt can imply that the

macy of each case of intervention
right.
if

Since that right does not

is

dependent on the existence of a general

exist,

the legitimacy of individual actions may,

anything, be reduced. Because pursuit of a defined legal right

fail,

and the conditions giving

appear, the situation

The

is

legiti-

rise to

likely to

is

humanitarian intervention

remain untidy.

recognition of a link between jus

in hello

It

doomed

will

not

probably ought to do

and jus ad bellum

of any general recognition of a right of humanitarian intervention.

dis-

so.

falls far
10

to

short

What has

emerged from the experiences of the 1990s is a pattern of acquiescence by significant numbers of States in respect of some interventions with stated humanitarian purposes. However, there has also been strong opposition by
States to particular interventions, and even stronger opposition to the granting of a general right. The distinctly uneven pattern of acquiescence is not the

same thing

as the recognition of a right.

an intervention may be motivated by humanitarian considerations, including a concern to stop violations of human rights and humanitarian norms, does not in any way affect the equal application of the laws of war
in any resulting hostilities. During the Kosovo war there was no suggestion

The

fact that

from any party that the United States and
10. See

Adam

Roberts, The So-Called "Right"

International Humanitarian

Law 3-51

its allies

were entitled to ignore any

Of Humanitarian
(2002).
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aspects of jus in hello because they were engaged in
11

as a high

anything, the logic was rather that the humanitarian ele-

moral cause.
ments in the stated reasons
If

what they saw

for resort to

war

particularly obliged the

NATO

members to observe the rules of war.
The Kosovo War confirmed another connection between jus in hello and jus
ad helium. In the Kosovo War, as in a number of other recent conflicts, the
whole appeared to
depend in significant measure on a public understanding that the war was being fought in a disciplined and restrained manner, and in accordance with inpublic's perception of the legitimacy of the operation as a

Some of the worst moments for NATO
campaign were when NATO appeared to be falling short of
ternational norms.

Support for the war could

easily

have evaporated

if

in the entire
this standard.

there had been

more

inci-

dents such as the bombing of refugee convoys.

Bombing as a Default Form
Bombing from the

Humanitarian

of

War

formed a key part of the Western response to at least
three humanitarian crises of the 1990s: (I) in northern and southern Iraq
since 1991, as a

air

means of maintaining

"no-fly-zones," enabling refugees to re-

turn home, and limiting the activities of the Iraqi armed forces; (2) in Bosnia
in 1995, especially in the

form of

NATO's

Operation Deliberate Force,

fol-

lowing the Bosnian Serbs' brutal massacre at Srebrenica and their renewed assault

on Sarajevo; and

One

(3) in

1999, in the war over Kosovo.

underlying reason for reliance on

power in such cases is the reluctance of the populations and governments of Western democracies to take
substantial risks, for example by using ground forces in a combat role, in what
air

were perceived to be distant humanitarian causes. This reluctance
standable but

may

is

under-

at times jeopardize the effectiveness of operations. In the

was disadvantageous to NATO, and to the inhabitants of Kosovo,
that Milosevic was not confronted with a more convincing threat of land op1999 war

it

erations in the province.

Bombing

as

such has never been, and

war, but in practice

1 1.

it

is

not now, violative of the laws of

has frequently risked violating norms requiring force to

This was confirmed in the discussion of the committee established by the Prosecutor of the

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to review

NATO

actions in

Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1111 30-4, 39
International Legal Materials 1257, 1265-6 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A
Yugoslavia. See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the

{hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor].
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be directed at military targets and to be used discriminately.

The increased ac-

curacy of certain air-delivered weapons in several recent conflicts, including
the 1991 Gulf War, has indicated that certain uses of

air

have the capacity to become, compatible with the existing

power may

ing and discrimination. This was one conclusion of the detailed

Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on Kosovo.

It

be, or

rules about target-

UK House of

noted that

this

was

which the United Kingdom had engaged since it ratified Protocol I in 1998; and after considering the main areas of controversy
surrounding the bombing it concluded: "On the evidence available to us, we
believe that NATO showed considerable care to comply with the 1977 Protocol and avoid civilian casualties." 12
However, the use of air power in this war posed certain problems. Some of
these were more political than legal: the controlled use of air power is an option available to very few States, and it naturally causes both fear and resentment. Some of the problems were technical, but have a major impact on
evaluations of the lawfulness of particular uses of air power. As the Kosovo war
demonstrated, even in the electronic age air power suffers from certain striking
limitations, and it has a natural tendency to lead to unintended damage.
The 1999 Kosovo War began in an atmosphere of arrogant and ignorant illusions among Western decision-makers about the capacity of bombing to
protect the inhabitants of Kosovo and/or to bring about a change in Serbian
policy in a matter of days. In the end, the bombing could only succeed as a
campaign of long-drawn-out coercive pressure, in which other elements were
the

first

armed

conflict in

also involved.

The Kosovo War exposed
achieve

results.

Most

certain limitations in the capacity of bombing to

notably,

bombing was not

at all effective in providing

protection or relief from Serb attacks, for the hard-pressed Kosovars.

The

ini-

bombing campaign was followed by an intensification of those
attacks, leading to huge numbers of people fleeing from their homes. In his address on March 24 President Clinton did warn that Yugoslavia "could decide
to intensify its assault on Kosovo." 13 However, the apparent belief of many
Western policy-makers that NATO military action would deter Milosevic
from further atrocities against the Kosovars was one of the most shocking
tiation of the

12.

House of Commons Foreign

Proceedings of the Committee,

HC

Affairs
28-1,

Committee, Fourth Report, Kosovo,

May

2000,

1IH

vol.

I,

Report and

145, 157.

Address to the Nation, March 24, 1999. Text in THE KOSOVO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 415-6 (Heike Krieger, ed.) (Cambridge International

13. President Clinton,

CONFLICT AND
Documents Series, Volume

11).

•
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lapses of the crisis. 14

cleansing
pressed

is

that

USAF

it

One

reason

investigation

sonnel carriers, and twenty
if

the bombing failed to stop the ethnic

on movable military targets. A supreported to have showed that NATO forces

had very limited
is

veriftably destroyed just fourteen

mented: "Even

why

effects

Serb tanks in Kosovo, eighteen armored per-

artillery pieces.

As Tim Garton Ash has com-

the real figures are higher than that,

that ethnic cleansing increased under the bombing."

bombing did

ment

it is

15

It is

inhibit the mobility of Serb armor, but that

especially in a context in

an indisputable

is

fact

probably true that
a

modest achieve-

which heavy armor was not necessary

for the

effective pursuit of ethnic cleansing.

Partly because of its stated humanitarian purpose, the

involved

many elements of restraint,

Kosovo

air

campaign

including in target selection, in efforts to

ensure the accuracy of bombing, and in the evident willingness to abandon
sorties

because of concerns about potential civilian casualties. Yet the case

confirms that such bombing can cause direct damage to civilians and to
non-military installations and activities in several distinct ways.
•

Unintended damage caused by bombing from high

altitude.

It

has been

frequently asserted that the problems of damage to civilians and civilian

property were
altitude.

The

made worse by

aircraft generally flying at a safe

potentially disastrous consequences of flying at altitude are

obvious: in attacks

weapon

NATO

on railway

bridges, the time

takes to get to the target

may

an air-to-ground guided

also be the time a passenger train

takes to get onto the bridge; and in attacks

on road convoys,

it

may be

impossible at 15,000 feet to be sure that the convoy does not contain, or

even consist largely of, the very civilians who are supposedly being
protected. Both of these things happened in the Kosovo War, and many
died as a result. Yet there may also be certain advantages in attack
aircraft operating from relative safety: not just that the aircrew are safer,
but also that they have more time in which to acquire targets and make
decisions, can afford to make a second pass over a target if they are in
doubt, and may feel less urgency about getting rid of whatever explosives
they are carrying so that they can rush back to safety.
14.

At

a press conference

flood of

new

on March

25, 1999, despite her recognition that there could be "a

refugees," Secretary of State

Madeleine Albright was notably optimistic on the
on the Kosovar

capacity of air strikes to deter or prevent Milosevic from inflicting further horrors

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, id., at 416 and 418.
Worth It?, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Sept. 21,
58-9. The US Air Force report he cites was publicized in NEWSWEEK, May 15, 2000.

people. See
15.

Timothy Garton Ash, Kosovo: Was

2000, at

it
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Pressure to attack fixed targets.

A

major problem in Kosovo was

that,

it proved
and movable
equipment from attacks from the air, and to fabricate dummies, there was
especially strong pressure on the NATO alliance to attack large fixed
targets. In many cases (bridges, power stations, buildings of various types,
the broadcasting station in Belgrade) these were dual-use targets which
had major civilian as well as military functions.

relatively easy to conceal military units

because

Changing functions of

•

buildings.

Even

if

targets are believed to be purely

and are hit accurately, as with the Amariya bunker in Baghdad in
1991 or the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, their function proved
in the event to be different from what the targeteers had believed.
military

Long-term, effects of certain weapons on the civilian population. Trying to

•

inhibit the adversary's military

movements by the

use of cluster

bombs

weapons can have a long- term adverse effect on the civilian
population and on international military personnel who may be present
in the territory following the end of hostilities. (The question of cluster
and

similar

bombs is considered further below.)
In some cases the damage to civilians or civilian

objects

may be completely

unintended. However, in other cases (especially against certain dual-use
gets) the
all

damage may be seen by

goal of wearing

down

tar-

military planners as contributing to the over-

the adversary's will to carry

on with the

struggle.

Behind these problems lay a deeper and more intractable one. If the prime
function of a bombing campaign is to bring about a capitulation by the government of the country, what happens when the bombing starts to run out of mili-

and seems unable to force a change of policy on the part of the
target government? In such circumstances, there is bound to be heavy pressure to continue with the bombing and to direct it at targets which are doubtful or plainly illegal under the laws of war.
tary targets,

A particular challenge posed by the development of precision-guided munitions

is

that

it is

harder than in earlier eras to deny that there was a specific

tention to hit whatever object was
individuals

may be more

acts of destruction. This

destruction

could

is

likely

hit.

As

a result,

armed

than before to be held responsible

development could have a considerable

viewed by the public in

allied,

forces

in-

and

for specific

effect

on how

neutral or adversary States.

also, at least potentially, create additional

It

grounds for conducting inqui-

and prosecutions, whether by the internal disciplinary
mechanisms of States and armed forces, or by international criminal tribunals.
The exact combination of factors that led Milosevic to back down on June
3, 1999 is not yet known with any certainty. There are three obvious factors:
ries,

investigations
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the bombing; the prospect of invasion of Kosovo by
the isolation of Yugoslavia, especially with the
his last significant potential ally, Russia.

NATO land forces;

and

abandonment of Milosevic by

General Clark considers that

it

was

the combination of these three factors that led to the Milosevic surrender. 16

The indictment of Milosevic by ICTY announced on May 27,
further below, may also have contributed to the ending of the

1999, discussed
war.

How these

and other factors are evaluated will heavily influence any overall verdict on
the lessons to be drawn from the Kosovo War, and on the importance, or the
limitations, of the laws of war. As to the effect of bombing, my own provisional
evaluation is that even though certain initial assumptions about how quickly a
bombing campaign might achieve results were mistaken, that does not prove
that the actual bombing, and the threat of more, were not important. They
were. The most difficult question this raises so far as the laws of war are concerned

is

on dual-use targets, and/or a perceived
civilians and civilian objects, play a major

the following: did attacks

threat of further attacks directed at

part in the Yugoslav decision of June 3? 17

In conclusion, a lesson of the

power undoubtedly achieved

bombing

in the

significant results,

Kosovo War
its

is

that, while air

use involved serious prob-

what might have been considered a relatively straightforward target, namely an army which was reliant
on heavy armor and operated on at least partly conventional lines. 18 It was
slow to achieve results even against a State debilitated by years of war and
poor economic performance. It would be hazardous to assume that a similar
air campaign would necessarily be the appropriate course in the context of another urgent humanitarian or other crisis. It appears that a systematic campaign of bombing was not a serious option when the East Timor crisis was at its
gravest in September 1999.
lems.

It

did not perform particularly well against

NATO Strategic Doctrine
NATO's

conduct

in the

1999 Kosovo

War confirms

that there

is

continu-

ing tension between certain contemporary strategic doctrines and the implicit
vision of

war contained

in the laws of war.

16.

CLARK, supra note

17.

For a challenging argument that the

1,

at

410-1

Over recent decades the United

1.

NATO

bombing was

a key factor in leading to the

bombing would become less
discriminate if Milosevic did not settle, see Stephen Hosmer, The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why
Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did, RAND Report MR-1351-AF, at 91-107 (2001).
18. See Clark's lugubrious comment on this in CLARK, supra note 1, at 412.
decision to back down, and that one element was a belief that the
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NATO have developed a conception of how force can be applied

which involves putting military pressure not just on the armed forces of the
adversary State, but on its government. Such an approach was evident in
some official thinking about nuclear deterrence and strategic doctrine generally vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It has also been evident in the conduct of certain operations in which NATO members have been involved, including
aspects of the bombing campaign against Iraq in early 1991 as well as the
Kosovo War eight years later.

The

NATO

approach

one underlying principle of the
laws of war, as famously expressed in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration,
"that the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish
during war

war

is

as they

to

is

weaken the

in tension with

military forces of the

enemy." Actually the laws of

have developed in the intervening years are not so

restrictive as

the words of the St. Petersburg Declaration might imply. In particular, they by

no means exclude the application of military force against aspects of the adversary's war-making capacity and system of government. In the Kosovo campaign, the targets of operations clearly had to encompass all those taking an
active part in ethnic cleansing, even if they were only police.
There is much to be said in favor of attacks against government targets.
Such attacks may reach the individuals most directly responsible for the situation which has led to war. They may save lives among the adversary's armed
forces,

many

of

the front line.

who

will

be essentially innocent individuals conscripted into

They may shorten

the duration of hostilities. However, there

aimed at government targets. The very government whose actions caused a war may also be the only body that can end it, in
which case its continued existence is vital. Attacks against government targets may have severe effects on the civilian population, and may indeed involve attacks on people or objects that are non-military in character. There is
much scope for debate as to whether, for example, the homes and families of
are also problems with attacks

government ministers are legitimate military

targets.

The key question of what is a military objective, addressed most extensively
in certain provisions of Protocol I, may merit re-examination. Numerous
States, including many NATO members, had already long before the Kosovo
War made declarations or reservations regarding some of these provisions.

NATO
States,

members, including non-parties to Protocol

may now need

relate to the limits

on

I

such

as the

United

to address the question of how their conceptions of war

targeting that are specified in the laws of war.

It

may be

doubted whether such an exercise would lead to

specific revisions to the writ-

ten laws of war, or to the reservations to Protocol

I

418

made by NATO States, but

Adam Roberts
it

might suggest some

handling the tensions between

criteria for

NATO doo

and the laws of war.

trine

International Tribunals:

The conduct

NATO in the Kosovo War became

of hostilities by

ject of consideration

by no

less

ICTY
the sub-

than three international courts and tribunals:

the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Interna-

Court of Justice

tional

(ECHR). Although the ICJ

case,

around matters of jus ad bellum,

it

did also involve claims concerning breaches

The

states

by

killed

at a

pace

far

slower than

NATO

Yugoslav citizens complaining about the bombing of the

TV sta-

case was brought against

tion in Belgrade by

were

demon-

ongoing, and

seventeen European

ECHR
six

is

sometimes proceed

strates, sadly, that legal processes

Rights

brought by Yugoslavia, revolved mainly

of international humanitarian law. This ICJ case

war.

Human

and the European Court of

(ICJ),

all

NATO forces on April 23,

and another sixteen

ECHR ruled

1999, in which sixteen people

seriously injured. In

its

decision of December

no jurisdictional link between the
persons who were victims of the bombing and the seventeen NATO states,
and therefore the application was inadmissible.
12,

2001 the

that there was

ECHR, ICTY had

In contrast to the limited part played by ICJ and

ber of important roles in connection with the Kosovo War.

cant part during the build-up of the

It

played a

principally through

crisis,

a

its

num-

signifi-

entirely

proper and widely supported insistence on recording details of atrocities in

Kosovo. In March 1998 the Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, affirmed that ICTY's
jurisdiction "is ongoing

ing

moment

and covers the recent violence

occurred on January 18, 1999,

when

in Kosovo." 19

A defin-

the Prosecutor applied for

entry to Kosovo in order to "investigate the reported atrocities at Racak," but

was refused. This hardened views
settlement would work unless

NATO-led
outside

force.

Kosovo

province.

it

in

NATO member States that no political

allowed for the deployment of a substantial

Even during the

hostilities,

ICTY

investigators

were active

in collecting evidence of crimes by the Yugoslav forces in the

20

19. Text of ICTY Prosecutor's statement of March
International Law, supra note 13, at 515.

10,

1998

is

in

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND

David Gowan (formerly UK War Crimes Coordinator
London) Kosovo: The British Government and ICTY,
13 Leiden Journal of International Law 913-29 (2000).

20. For a useful account, see particularly
at the Foreign

and Commonwealth

Office,

,
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The announcement on May

of

War After Kosovo
1999 of the indictment of Slobodan

24,

Milosevic, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and four col-

way

leagues further illustrated the

caught up in

political

in

which ICTY's

and military events.

21

was unavoidably

role

Milosevic was indicted in respect

of the conduct of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo during the war there in 1998-9. In
this particular case, despite speculation to the contrary, the

indictment

may

have contributed to the willingness of Milosevic to make the concessions necessary for a settlement, as he did early in June 1999.

The ICTY

indictment, as

General Clark has argued, may have hardened European resolve to continue
with the struggle. 22

It is

also possible that

reaching a settlement while he

still

could protect him from arrest and

it

compelled Milosevic to focus on

had a functioning State around him which

trial;

and

it

may also have shocked him into

an erroneous belief that he could escape from the threat of

by cutting a

NATO. If he did entertain any such hope, he was to be disapOn June 28, 2001 Milosevic, by this time the former President, was

deal with
pointed.

trial

23

extradited to

The Hague to face

trial,

which began on February

first-ever extradition of a

former head of State to face

tional criminal tribunal

an important precedent.

is

The ICTY's most unusual

role, its

particularly controversial in the

trial

consideration of

12,

2002. This

before an interna-

NATO

actions,

was

United States. In 1999 the United States,

having been campaigning diplomatically against the projected International

months on the grounds that the actions of
US forces should not be subject to a foreign prosecutor and tribunal, chose to
wage war in the one part of the world where ongoing war was subject to such a
tribunal. The ICTY, the establishment of which the United States had actively promoted in 1993, has much stronger powers of independent investigation and prosecution than are provided for the projected International
Criminal Court for the previous

six

Criminal Court under the terms of the 1998
21. For texts of the key

documents

Rome

Statute. 24

relating to the indictment of Milosevic, see

THE KOSOVO

Conflict and International Law, supra note 13, at 516-29.
22. CLARK, supra note 1, at 327-8, where it is confirmed that the Pentagon and White House
were not happy with the ICTY Prosecutor's decision to issue the indictment.
23. This is argued by James Gow of King's College, London in THE SERBIAN PROJECT AND ITS
ADVERSARIES: A STRATEGY OF WAR CRIMES (2002).
24. Compare the uncomplicated provisions on jurisdiction, investigation and prosecution in
Articles 1 and 18 of the 1993 ICTY Statute, U.N. Doc. S/25704, May 3, 1993, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000_con.htm, with the much more heavily qualified
provisions on the same subjects in the 1998 Rome Statute, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/183/9, July 17,
1998 available

at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
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On May

14, 1999, while hostilities in the

Kosovo

War

were ongoing, the

ICTY Prosecutor established a committee to assess the numerous allegations
made against the NATO bombing campaign and the material accompanying
them.

It

prepared an interim report which was presented to the Prosecutor on

December 6, 1999. On February 1, 2000 the Prosecutor stated that there was
no evidence that NATO's bombing campaign had violated international treaties on the conduct of war. The committee investigating the NATO campaign
then prepared a detailed

numerous

facts

and

that as a result of the

final report,

published in June 2000, discussing the

issues involved. It provided

evidence for the conclusion

NATO bombing approximately 495 civilians were killed

and 820 wounded in documented instances.

It

recommended

that "neither an

in-depth investigation related to the bombing campaign as a whole nor investigations related to specific incidents are justified. In all cases, either the law

is

not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition
of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against high level accused or

The Report's
be commenced by the OTP

against lower accused for particularly heinous offences."

final

recommendation was that "no investigation

[Of-

fice

of the Prosecutor] in relation to the

dents

occurring during the

NATO bombing campaign or inci-

campaign." 25

On

June

Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, stated in her address to the

2,

2000 the ICTY

UN Security Council

would not open a criminal investigation into any aspect of NATO's
bombing campaign, and this was confirmed eleven days later in a statement isthat she

sued by the Office of the Prosecutor. 26

The Report to the Prosecutor had many limitations, and the reactions to it
showed how difficult it is to get justice done, and seen to be done, when controversial issues of war,

peace and national pride are at stake. ICTY's consider-

bombing campaign ran into two depressingly predictable lines of
political criticism. First, some initial US reactions suggested a sense of outrage
that any prosecutor anywhere would even contemplate the possibility of ination of the

vestigating a US-led military action. Because of this outrage, there was
sign that

little

ICTY's decision not to launch any criminal investigation caused any

easing of US concerns about the proposed International Criminal Court. Sec-

NATO campaign suggested that the ICTY was hardly impartial, not least because NATO
ondly,

some reactions by countries and

member
25.
26.

individuals critical of the

States had played a significant part in creating

Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, 1111 53, 90, 91.
ICTY Press Release PR/PIS/510e of June 13, 2000.
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arresting indicted individuals. In this view,

ICTY

could not

realistically

have

embarked on prosecutions of NATO personnel.
In addition to such political criticisms, the Report to the Prosecutor was

vulnerable

on other grounds.

It

being insufficiently rigorous in

was
its

criticized

by some international lawyers as

consideration of

NATO actions and deci-

sion-making, especially as regards the balancing of military advantage and

damage. 27 Even to those, like myself, who do not quarrel with its
overall recommendation, some parts of its analysis call for comment. On the
question of damage to the environment it makes the common mistake of ascivilian

suming that the only relevant provisions in treaty law are those provisions of
Protocol I, namely Articles 35(3) and 55, which specifically mention the
word "environment." 28 On the question of what is a military objective, it
states (probably correctly) that Protocol

I,

Article 52,

is

"generally accepted as

nowhere mentions the declarations made in reStates, including NATO members. 29 On the
and gravity of offence that brings an action within

part of customary law," but

spect of that article by

question of the scale

many

ICTY's remit, the Report says remarkably

little.

Indeed, the Report implies, in

the concluding passage quoted above, that the reasons for not pursuing any
investigation were a lack of clarity of the law, or a lack of sufficient evidence.

The fundamental reason why ICTY could not

act in this matter, not fully ex-

pressed in the conclusions, was that the alleged

NATO offenses,

because of

considerations of scale, gravity and absence of criminal intent, did not pass

the threshold that would have brought

them

into the court's remit. Despite

such flaws, the committee performed a service by openly addressing a number
of difficult issues raised by the
that,

although

NATO bombing campaign, and demonstrating

NATO decisions and actions were within ICTY's jurisdiction,

there were serious grounds for doubt as to whether any of them was such as to

merit further investigation and possible prosecution.

Ultimately ICTY's most important role in relation to Kosovo, as well as to

may be by

other parts of the former Yugoslavia,
27. See particularly

Michael Bothe, The Protection of the

holding particular individuals

Civilian Population

and NATO Bombing

on Yugoslavia: Comments on a Report to the Prosecutor of the ICTY, 12 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 1-5 (2001) and Natalino Ronzitti, Is the Non Liquet of the Final Report
by the Committee Established to Review the
Yugoslavia Acceptable?,
28.

NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of

82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1017-28 (2000).

Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A,

laws of war that bear

on damage

environment mentioned in note 34 infra.
29. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A,
42, see

1111

14-25. For discussion of the other parts of the

to the environment, see

1iH

Documents on the Laws of War,

35-47.

chapters in the two works on the

On the declarations re Protocol

supra note

422

my

3, at

500-1 1.

I,

Article
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guilty of some of the terrible crimes associated

with ethnic cleansing. Only by

way can the

idea of collective guilt be effec-

establishing individual guilt in this
tively challenged.

30

Variety of Forms of Non-belligerence and Neutrality

The campaign confirmed

the lesson of numerous wars of the twentieth cen-

war can assume many forms much more subtle
and complex than the impartial neutrality spelled out in certain laws of war
agreements. Two developments of the Kosovo crisis and war stand out one
typical, the other exceptional. First, in this war various non-belligerent States
took part in the ongoing UN economic sanctions against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, and some offered some other elements of support for the
NATO operations. These events thus confirmed the lesson of many other
tury that non-participation in

—

conflicts in the twentieth century, that the traditional

emphasis on impartiality,

its

is

far

from covering

all

law of neutrality, with

circumstances and cases.

one part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, namely
Montenegro, pursued a policy close to neutrality during the NATO bombing
Secondly,

campaign. From the outset of hostilities

NATO policy-makers recognized this

remarkable, perhaps even unprecedented, state of
ingly.

31

This

belligerents

reasons for

is

affairs,

and acted accord-

further evidence that the law's neat classification of States into

and neutrals can be confounded by messy realities; and that the
moderation in war extend far beyond jus in hello.

These developments show that
richer than art (in the

life (in

the form of conduct during war)

is

form of legal agreements) However, they do not show
.

an urgent need to modify art to reflect the complexities of life.
Neither of these developments threw up serious practical problems certainly
that there

is

—

not those of the kind that could attract a general legal answer. In particular,

would be a brave person who dared to
the

component

ity,

especially in a

outside.

30.

assert, as a

right, that

parts of a federal State should be free to declare their neutral-

war in which the parent State is under direct assault from
What these developments do show is that law can only provide a

A point made forcefully by Chris Patten, European Commissioner for External Affairs, in a

speech to the International Crisis Group, Brussels, July
President Stipe Mesic of Croatia.
31.

matter of general

it

10,

2001.

He

credited the idea to

See the passages praising Montenegro's independent stance and warning Serbia not to

change

it,

which were made

in

US

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's press conference on

Kosovo, Washington DC, March 25, 1999

LAW,

in

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL

supra note 13, at 417, 419.
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framework for the conduct of States and individuals during war:
unique situations which defy tidy legal categorization frequently occur.

partial

New

Codifications

Certain issues raised in recent wars, including the Kosovo War, have been
perceived by some as pointing to lacunae in the existing law. Three major con-

from the Kosovo War, and which might point to the need for
new codification, concerned the environmental effects of war generally, and
troversies arising

two related

issues,

depleted uranium and cluster bombs. 32

Environmental effects of war
This is a complex area, on which existing

treaty law offers general principles

number of relevant rules. The best available short summary of the
legal framework on this subject is the 1994 ICRC/UN General Assembly document "Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of
the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict." 33 In studies of the subject
as well as a

there has been a broad consensus against the idea of trying to negotiate a

new

on the protection of the environment in war. 34
Many NATO actions in the Kosovo War led to expressions of concern on

treaty

environmental grounds. The actions that were most questioned included the
destruction of bridges causing blockage of major rivers; attacks
tions having serious

knock-on

effects

on water

on power

sta-

supplies, etc.; other attacks

on

the infrastructure of Serbia; and the use of depleted uranium and cluster

bombs, discussed separately below.
There were prompt and careful investigations of certain key

conducted

Programme

under
in

the

auspices

of

the

United

Nations

1999 concluded a key part of its study: "There

is

issues.

A study

Environment
no evidence of

an ecological catastrophe for the Danube as a result of the air strikes during
the Kosovo conflict." It went on to say, however, that there were "some
32. All three issues were discussed in the Report to the Prosecutor,
33.

U.N. Doc. A/49/323 of 19 August 1994,

WAR,

supra note

3, at

at

49-53. Text

in

Appendix A, UH 14-27.

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF

609-14.

especially the two main general works on the subject: PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT (Richard Grunawalt, John King and Ronald
McClain eds., 1996) (Vol. 69, US Naval War College, International Law Studies) and THE
Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic and Scientific

34. See

PERSPECTIVES (Jay Austin and Carl Bruch eds., 2000). In the latter, see especially Carl Bruch
and Jay Austin, Epilogue: The Kosovo Conflict: A Case Study of Unresolved Issues, at 647-64. This
lays

out certain general issues usefully.
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serious hot spots

where contamination by hazardous substances released dur-

ing the air strikes poses risks for
It

also stressed that there

to factors other

human health and

the aquatic environment."

was long-term chronic pollution of the Danube due

than the war. 35 The report was overwhelmingly concerned

with describing the situation and proposing remedial action:

it

did not discuss

existing or possible future international legal regimes governing

destruction in war.

tal

The Chairman

of the Task Force that prepared the re-

port stated that the exercise "marked the

first

time that an environmental

impact assessment had been made of any war, though the

Gulf War with Iraq."

effects of oil well fires after the

environmen-

UN did look at the

36

For the future, while no grand general treaty on the environmental effects
of war

is

remotely probable,

tual cases, coupled with

it

seems

demands

likely that the practice of evaluating ac-

for remedial action, will continue.

Depleted uranium

The military value of depleted uranium (DU) shells in piercing heavy armor is proven. At the same time the very mention of the word "uranium"
arouses considerable public anxiety. The use of DU in the Kosovo War, and
the various issues that

it

was not well handled by NATO spokespersons

raised,

either during or after the war. 37

The

greatest controversy in

exposure to
their

own

wards

NATO

member

States concerned fears that

DU might have been a cause of subsequent cases of cancer among

troops. In this connection there

were criticisms of official policy

to-

NATO/KFOR troops involved in operations in Kosovo after the end of

bombing campaign. This is not strictly speaking a laws of war issue, as it involves relations between governments and their own troops. Some member
the

States, including the

UK, were

inconsistent in the briefings given to their

own

35. UNEP/UNCHS Balkans Task Force, The Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for
the Environment and Human Settlements 60-1 (1999), available at http://www.grid.

unep.ch/btf/final/index.html.

Pekka Haavisto, former Finnish Environment and Development Cooperation Minister and
UNEP/UNCHS Balkans Task Force, presenting the report at a press conference in
Stockholm on October 14, 1999. Frances Williams, Christopher Brown-Humes and Neil
36.

Chair of the

NATO "hindered" Kosovo inquiry, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Oct. 15, 1999, at 30.
After the war, NATO spokesmen were reluctant to say anything about DU, and even cast

Buckley,
37.

it had been used at all. The UNEP/UNCHS Balkans Task Force, in its 1999
commented on the lack of information from NATO. See THE KOSOVO CONFLICT, supra
note 35, at 61-2. The task force chairman, in his presentation on October 14, 1999, elaborated

doubt on whether
report,

on these complaints. See

NATO "hindered" Kosovo inquiry, supra note 36, at 30.
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possible hazards,

and

also about subsequent

38

far as jus in hello

fects of

of

is

concerned, the main issues raised are the possible

on adversary troops and

third parties,

conflict. In particular, the use of

both during and

after

ef-

an

DU involves a matter with which the
may have,
The scientific

laws of war have long dealt: the adverse effect that remnants of war

including

on innocent

civilians,

long after hostilities are over.

evidence about possible health effects of

ICRC

has been notably cautious in

its

DU

is still

inconclusive, and the

statements on the matter. In view of

DU's exceptionally slow rate of radioactive decay it is far from certain whether
any worry should focus on its radioactivity. Grounds for concern which seem
more likely to have a strong scientific basis are (a) evidence of impurities ineluding much more highly radioactive isotopes of uranium; and (b) the possible toxicity of DU, though this is far from established. Such concerns will be
increased by reports of pollution of groundwater in Kosovo. Careful scientific

DU

must be the first priority. Since there is at
present no international consensus on its effects or on the desirability of putting legal controls on it, DU will not be a promising subject for negotiation until there has been a fuller scientific investigation.
investigation of the effects of

Cluster

bombs

The explosive remnants

of war, a problem of long standing which has tradi-

been a subject of concern in the laws of war, proved to be a serious
problem in the aftermath of the Kosovo War. Cluster bombs formed one part
of that problem. These weapons, which are meant to explode on impact
and/or to deactivate themselves after a specific period, can cause particularly
severe problems when they fail to do so. In the year after the NATO bombing
campaign ended in June 1999, at least 50 people in Kosovo were killed and
101 injured by unexploded bomblets. Over 15,000 unexploded bomblets were
tionally

and
mation on where
left

in Kosovo,

NATO was criticized for failing to provide sufficient inforcluster

bombs were dropped. Cluster bombs

killed or

maimed five times more Kosovar children than landmines. Peter Herby, head
of the Red Cross anti-mines unit, said: "Anti-personnel landmines were doing
what they were meant to do, but were not being used properly. Cluster bombs
are causing this

38.

problem because they're not doing what they were designed to

Michael Smith and Nigel Bunyan, Soldiers will be screened for uranium exposure, THE DAILY
9, 2001; Nicholas Watt and Richard Norton-Taylor, Troops not told

TELEGRAPH (London), Jan.
of shells' toxic

risk,

THE GUARDIAN

(London), Feb.
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do, so

a bit

it's

more

difficult to

of cluster

this difficulty, the use

laws of war framework: the

argue on humanitarian grounds." 39 Despite

bombs could

harm they can do

usefully be addressed within a

to innocents

and although complete prohibition is unlikely, means
they pose to civilians and others should be investigated.

The United

US

States

is

hardly in dispute,

to reduce the threat

and Certain Laws of War Agreements

non-participation in key treaties

Despite

conspicuous role in certain acts of enforcement of the laws of

its

war, the United States

of war.

Its

is

not a party to several important treaties on the laws

notorious difficulties in accepting international treaties produced

the strange result that

it

took the United States forty years to

Genocide Convention. The United States

is still

ratify

the 1948

not formally a party to the

following agreements.
•

•

•
•
•

•

The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention. Parties: 103. (The United
States signed in 1954, but it has not been ratified.)
The 1 977 Geneva Protocols 1 & 11 on International and Non-international
Armed Conflicts. Parties: 159 and 152 respectively. (The United States
signed both on December 12, 1977, but has not ratified either one.)
The 1980 Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons. Parties: 81.
The 1995 Protocol TV on Blinding Laser Weapons. Parties: 63.
The 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Land-mines. Parties: 124.
The 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court. Parties: 75. (The
United States signed on December 31, 2000, but has not ratified it. In
May 2002 the United States informed the Depositary that it did not

Nato bombs "still killing" in Kosovo, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 6, 2000,
commenting on a Red Cross report first issued in September 2000. A revised version of this
report is INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CLUSTER BOMBS AND
Landmines in Kosovo: Explosive Remnants of War (2001). I have also relied here on
the annual reports of the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) in Pristina, available at
www.mineaction.org. The final annual report on the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo
Mine Action Programme, covering the period to December 15, 2001, stated that it "has
successfully completed its objectives, and the problems associated with land mines, cluster
munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance in Kosovo have virtually been eliminated."
(11 4.) Over 47,000 devices were cleared. (11 9.) Nonetheless, there continued to be concerns
39. Peter Capella,
at 14,

about a remaining threat from unexploded cluster bomblets in Kosovo, with further finds being
reported,

e.g.,

by Richard Lloyd, Director of Landmine Action, London.
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intend to become a party to the treaty and accordingly has no legal
obligations arising from

its

signature.) 40

would be wrong to view the US's or any other State's non-participation in
a treaty as in itself a failure. There are some questionable provisions in some
treaties in this area. Although a non-party, the United States takes at least
It

some of these accords more

some States that are parties. The
reasons for US non-participation go far beyond the obduracy of one single elderly Senator, and call for careful analysis rather than uncomprehending condemnation. In some cases they are based on serious arguments.

may be

Indeed, there
tiation

seriously than

a price for like-minded States taking the lead in nego-

of particular treaties,

The

as

happened

the

in

case

of the Ottawa

which are partially or wholly
outside the consensus, and have particular problems which need to be addressed, feel sidelined. This also happened at the Rome conference in 1998.
Add a prohibition on reservations as was done with the Ottawa and Rome
treaties
and there is a recipe for non-participation even by States, such as
the United States, which have a serious record of supporting the general
land-mines convention.

price

that States

is

—

—

thrust of these projects.

Of the above
erations in the

War,

all

agreements, the one most directly relevant to the

Kosovo

NATO

War

was the Protocol

I.

At

NATO op-

the time of the Kosovo

Turkey and
force between many NATO members

States were parties except the United States,

41

Although the Protocol was in
and the FRY (which, too, was a party to Protocol I) in formal legal terms the
United States was not so bound. This unevenness in the formal participation
in a key treaty could in principle have posed many problems in the conduct of
the Kosovo operations. In practice the fact that three NATO members were
not at that time parties to Protocol I does not appear to have been a problem.
This was mainly because the United States had long accepted that it would
France.

,

observe a high proportion of the Protocol's provisions, either because they

40.

Information as of July

1,

2002 from ICRC,

UN

and

www.icrc.org, www.un.org, and www.unesco.org, respectively.
41. France acceded to Protocol

I

on April

1 1,

2001.
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represented customary law, or because

it

had been decided

to apply

them

as a

matter of policy, especially in view of the reality of coalition warfare. 42

Of the

treaties to

politically neuralgic

be) but the 1998

which the United States
is

not the Protocol

Rome

is

not a party, probably the most

(sensitive as that issue continues to

I

Statute of the International Criminal Court.

position of the United States to this treaty, marking a reversal of

The

op-

earlier

its

support for the general idea of such a court, reflects the fundamental Ameri-

can concern that

US

wide range of situations globally

forces deployed in a

might face unfounded or

politically

motivated prosecutions, over which the

United States would have no control. The detailed terms of the
contain certain safeguards against such an eventuality.
visions,

I

am

tempted to say that the United States

"prosecution mania." However, in Washington
tions

was and

is

One of many US

real.

prosecutor

it

Statute.

In the future,

US

and demands

by the

US

this

The US

voice

on

ICC

A

may

flow from

US

certain key issues

to any

consequence of US non-participation

42.

conduct of
tar-

non-participation

may well be

US participation,
sufficient

succinct exposition of

there are

power

US

war

criminals,

muffled.

its

adver-

may be weakened

even the potential application of international

refusal to accept

ICC will have

its

Kosovo War, and then face an enthusiastic
as an illegal attack on civilian objects.

for the arrest of certain

procedures under the

Without

that in

complaints about violations of the laws of war by

saries,

dicial

is

did in the

who might view

Rome

from a case of

DC the fear of such prosecu-

areas of concern

Certain political and military hazards
in the

Statute

Because of these pro-

suffering

is

Rome

United States might decide to attack "dual-use"

military operations the
gets in a country, as

43

US forces.

will

However, the most serious

be for the power of the court

bound

ju-

to be questions about

itself.

whether the

to operate effectively.

policy

on the

application of Protocols

I

and

II is

in the

US

Army's Judge Advocate General's School's OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 2002, at ch. 2, pp.
4-5, and ch. 11, pp. 13-15 (Jeanne Meyer and Brian Bill eds., 2002), available at the Judge
Advocate General's School's website at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/
Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf.
43. Among the provisions of the Rome Statute offering safeguards: Article 8 on war crimes,

which requires that they be "committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes." Certain safeguards in the case of "second track jurisdiction" (i.e.,
where the matter has not come to the ICC from the UN Security Council): Article 16, enabling
the Security Council to require the

providing that a case
prosecution

such State

itself;

is

is

ICC

to defer

an investigation or prosecution; Article

inadmissible where a State

and Article

18,

is

enabling a State party to request the

pursuing the same matter, although such deferral
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17,

genuinely carrying out investigation or

is left

ICC to defer an investigation if
to the ICC's decision.
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This pattern of US non-participation in existing treaties

is,

at least for this

Other States which have a record of foreign military activity, including the United Kingdom, manage to be parties to many more of
these agreements, and have been less nervous about the possibility, remote as
observer, worrying.

it

may be,

of seeing the actions of their forces being actually or potentially sub-

mitted to the not always tender mercies of foreign prosecutors and courts. 44

When

a State such as the United States that

tion,

invites criticism.

on occasion acts as a principal
guarantor of implementation of humanitarian norms itself avoids being subject to many of those norms through the regular mechanism of treaty ratificait

Impact of legal norms in US-led combat operations

Whatever the

US

US

fears,

the actual impact of international legal norms

conduct of operations has often been

positive.

Commitment

on

to the laws of

war has contributed to the post- Vietnam rehabilitation of the US armed forces.
In both the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 war over Kosovo, the United States,
though not a party to Protocol

I,

observed

many of its

provisions

—whether

be-

was policy to support them anyway, or because of a need to harmonize targeting and other matters with allies.
The experience of these wars suggested that most of these provisions reprecause of their customary law status, because

it

sented a useful set of guidelines for professional conduct.

Conclusions

need to evaluate how well belligerents observe the
rules of war; and there is also a need to evaluate how appropriate or otherwise
the law is to the ever-changing circumstances and forms of armed conflict.
After a war, there

The NATO role

is

a

in the

1999 Kosovo

War was in some

respects remarkably

and did enable the overwhelming majority of people who had fled
from their homes to return. However, before too many lessons are drawn from
this success, it must be emphasized that it had many exceptional features, as
well as some that are more typical of the new types of conflict. There is probably a danger, as Mark Twain would have put it, of seeing more wisdom in it
than is there. A war in which one side had no casualties is exceptional, and
successful,

hardly likely to be repeated. Equally,
44.
10,

the

it is

hardly typical of modern conflict for

The United Kingdom completed a key pan: of the Rome Statute ratification process on May
2001, when the House of Commons passed the ICC Bill. Its ratification was registered with
depositary on October 4, 2001.
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Western armed forces to find themselves in combat against a disciplined
armed force under an organized State. With these caveats, the following conclusions are offered.

To

1

a large extent

civilians,

NATO did succeed in the aim of avoiding damage to

and the events of the war

the soldier/civilian distinction that

largely confirm the value

is

and

viability of

so central in the laws of war.

However, the war caused the death of about 495 civilians, had a huge impact on civilians in both Kosovo and Serbia, and involved extensive destruc2.

tion of "dual-use" targets.

It is

destruction in Serbia played
this is correct,

then

it

possible that the threat of further societal

some

part in the Serbian decision to capitulate:

NATO strategic doctrine, in so far as

adversary's governmental structure,

laws of war.

The

pally in Article

and the need to
considerable tension with each

follows that the requirement of victory,

observe the laws of war, could have been in
other.

if

question of what

is

it

concentrates on attacking the

can involve problems in relation to the
a legitimate objective, addressed princi-

52 of 1977 Geneva Protocol

I,

remains a

difficult

one, and a

subject of contestation.

Reliance on

3.

air

power

as a

means of implementing an action

mentally humanitarian purposes raised

difficult

proved to be something of a gamble, both because

it

for funda-

moral questions.

It

also

could not protect the vic-

many other factors were required to bring
The sense that the campaign had been a

tims in the short term, and because

about the Milosevic capitulation.

close-run thing, and the product of a unique set of circumstances, contributed
to a feeling in

in

countries that

had

its

was unlikely to be repeated.

a particularly high profile not only in the course of this war, but also

beginnings and

its

ending.

ternational humanitarian
initiation of the

May

it

Implementation of the laws of war, and humanitarian norms more gener-

4.
ally,

many

27,

NATO

The importance

norms contributed

military campaign.

of ensuring observance of in-

to the factors leading

The indictment

up to the

of Milosevic on

1999 may have played some part in the Yugoslav leader's decision to

accept the eventual settlement.
5.

Whether

this

war

will

prove to have some deterrent function in respect

of potential future violations of fundamental humanitarian

be seen.
East
forts
6.

It

norms remains

did not stop Indonesian forces from engaging in mass killings in

September 1999; though it may have given credibility
subsequently made under UN auspices to stop the killings.

Timor

to

in

Among

the

the most urgent

many
is

difficult laws

to the ef-

of war issues raised by the war, perhaps

the explosive remnants of war, and in particular cluster
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depleted uranium, more knowledge of

its

impact on health

is

needed before that issue can be usefully addressed in the laws of war.
7. It remains an odd although not completely inexplicable paradox that the
United States, which has played the key part in developing a use of air warfare
that

is

reasonably consistent with key principles and provisions of the laws of

war,

is

outside so

many parts of the

treaty regime of the laws of war. This situa-

tion calls for careful analysis, not shrill condemnation. After the experience of

Kosovo, the
is

US government could usefully re-examine the treaties to which it

not party, to see

which

it

if it

can bring

itself

more into

line

with a treaty regime

has, in large measure, not merely observed but also

found

useful,

not

1999 Kosovo War. Unfortunately there has been a tendency in the
United States to react negatively and defensively to the reasonably judicious
ICTY review of the NATO bombing campaign; and this tendency has reinforced the US government's resistance to becoming a party to certain laws of
least in the

war

treaties,

including the

ICC

The Kosovo War, and

Statute.

the role of the laws of war in

evoked different
perceptions in different parts of the world. Some perceived the war favorably
as a case of NATO coming to the aid of an oppressed population which happened to be predominantly Muslim, and maintaining certain limits in its conduct of military operations. However others viewed these events much more
critically, as one further proof that the armed forces of northern countries, especially of course the United States, have established such a monopoly on the
battlefield that the only effective response to their presumed dominance becomes an asymmetric one, including terrorist attacks. In this view, to the extent that the laws of war are considered at all, they are deemed to suit the
north more than the south. Such a perception may be rooted in a naive and
probably incorrect view of the results that are presumed to flow from terrorist
attacks and other unlawful acts, but it appears to be held by many. Partly because of such perceptions, the effective US/NATO conduct of operations in
the Kosovo War, in a manner deeply influenced by laws of war considerations,
may paradoxically fail to discourage certain groups from conduct in which
8.

such considerations are

alien.
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Propositions
after

Ruth Wedgwood
Jus

A,

fter

Ad Bellum and

the Personal Factor in History

Kosovo, any purely proceduralist account of the international

j\. community's use of force must be found wanting.

JL.

Belgrade's sovereign

claim to Kosovo, even including the right to police the activities of the Kosovo

Army (KLA), did not plausibly include the right to deport the
of its own ethnic Albanian citizens. After the failed negotiations at

Liberation
majority

Rambouillet and the beginning of the bombing campaign, Belgrade's troops

and police deliberately forced 740,000 Albanian Kosovars to

and cross the borders into Albania and Macedonia
continued
ted

its

allied

campaign even

if

—providing

a casus

belli

for a

any was disputed before. Belgrade commit-

clumsy acts of violence and coercion in the

CNN

flee their villages

The

full sight

of international

officials

and

political

madness and ethical hedonism. Yet many public international lawyers

have

felt

television cameras.

tactics bore witness to Milosevic's

great difficulty in admitting any legal justification for the

tervention in the absence of formal endorsement by the

This pure proceduralism
cil's

is

odd

endorsement could not have

post-Cold

War

resolve

issues of international

all

in the extreme, for
stilled

NATO in-

UN Security Council.

even the Security Coun-

questions about the outer limits of the

Charter of the United Nations. Council decisions
law and ultra vires action,

if

one

is

may not

to believe

the International Court of Justice in the Lockerbie jurisdictional decision.

Thus, even with Council endorsement, one would have to resort to the
ogy of the Charter, including
indulge the

new

limits of

its

strengthened embrace of

Chapter VII.

human

teleol-

rights, to

Propositions on the

Law

of

War after the Kosovo Campaign

Rather than resting upon a mechanistic decision

rule, legitimacy for

the use

—

may also be strengthened by a resort to history in the appropriate inferences about intention, shown by an adversary's past behavior. The allied
of force

response in Kosovo has to be taken in the context of a decade's disorder.

Milosevic was the excessive personality

who

lit

the tinder for the wars in

West with a false promise of cooperation
power on the back of Serbian nationalism, he

Croatia and Bosnia, and beguiled the
at

Dayton. Though he rose to

and

Napoleon was ultimately
found to be a threat to the peace of Europe, and Hitler was irrepressibly aggressive, so in this smaller neighborhood, Milosevic showed himself to be the
indefatigable author of conflict. To understand the interpretive context of
a legal principle, such as an emerging right of humanitarian intervention,
requires some attention to history and its actors. Milosevic violated the "onebite" rule, showing no inhibition against repeating his bouleversement of delicate ethnic balances, savaging local populations, and ignoring NATO's ultimate commitment to the area evidenced in the Bosnian air campaign in 1995.
sharpened

One may

its

talons

started three wars. Just as

not wish to endorse a principle of humanitarian intervention or

gional stabilization for the ordinary case, and yet

the antagonist has

shown

a hearty

may admit

and unsated appetite

frustration of the "dual key" use of force in Bosnia,

it is

its

validity

re-

where

for trouble. After the

hardly surprising that

the Security Council was not given the controlling key in yet another war.

The Consanguinity
It is

commonly

of Jus

ad Bellum and Jus

in Bello

believed that the tactics of war must be judged independ-

ently of the purpose of a war.

The

divorce of purpose and tactics

is

designed to

even where there is no consensus on
the merits of the underlying dispute. But this asserted independence of the
two regimes may be no more than a fiction. Defeating Nazism, for example,
required measures that are now seen as harsh and even punitive. Even where
allow agreement

their legality

is

on humanitarian

limits

conceded under the

earlier standards of air war,

it is

taught in American military curricula that their repetition would
gal. It

may be

commonly

now be

that our real judgment of their contemporaneous legality

fected by the radical evil represented by

Nazism

—an ideology posing an

ille-

is af-

ulti-

mate threat to human welfare. Kosovo, in its smaller venue, may be another
illustration of that same quiet linkage. This was not a war to settle a commercial dispute, or remap the location of a boundary valued because of mineral
deposits, but rather a war to prevent ethnic expulsions. As such, its speedy
conclusion was necessary. A gradual war of attrition that might defeat
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Belgrade in slow motion was unacceptable in light of the
stake in the conflict
principle,

it is

itself.

Whether

one's framework

is

human

survival at

utilitarian or

pure

war make a difference in
methods of warfighting. This teleological view can be incor-

possible to admit that the merits of a

our tolerance for

porated, albeit awkwardly, in the metric for "military advantage" in judging
proportionality, for surely
sake.

But

homilies.

we do not value

may be better to be
The latitude allowed to
it

as self-indulgence

might making

—supposing

right.

An

forthright,

military objectives for their

even

that the law of war

—

The Contentious Role

The enforcement

is

commonly

dismissed

mere victor's justice,
explanation is possible. Democratic leadan important link between the legitimate

and publics may believe there is
purpose of a war and its allowable tactics at
humanity and the protection of civilian lives.
ers

at the cost of questioning

a victor in a conflict

alternative

own

is

least within the limits of basic

of Civilian Tribunals

of the law of war has traditionally been

left

to military

was so in the proposed trial of the Kaiser after World War One.
The Nuremberg and Far East trials after World War Two were conducted before military tribunals, designated as such. (Indeed, Nuremberg's limitation of
judges. This

humanity to the period of the world war reflected the extent to which the proceeding was conceived as a military trial.)
The latter-day invention of the field of "international humanitarian law" has
obscured the extent to which implementation of many aspects of the law of
war depend on battlefield judgments and knowledge of campaign strategy, and

jurisdiction over crimes against

may be suitable to military tribunals. For example, the destruction of
bridges over the Danube in the Kosovo campaign may be understood as a

therefore

the

stratagem to force Milosevic to gamble between theatres for the placement of

(He could head north to meet a possible NATO invasion from
Hungary, or south to meet a NATO invasion from Albania while continuing
his ethnic cleansing operations. With the severance of bridges across the Danube, he had one vulnerable flank). The dependence of the prosecutor at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on a committee of
experts in evaluating allegations against NATO and in attempting to judge
the legitimacy of Kosovo targeting choices shows the extent to which the law
of war depends on judgments that may lie outside the experience of lay judges
or prosecutors. We have overlooked that the law of war contains both brightline rules and open-textured principles, and that only the former are so easily
his armor.

applied. This

is

a serious potential defect in the
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where judges are to be chosen on the basis of experience in
criminal law or international humanitarian law, but not for familiarity with
Court

as well,

military operations.

The dangers

battlefield events should

ments of the military

weigh

of professional back-scratching in evaluating
in,

of course, but

is

limited by the commit-

in a democratic society.

One-Trick Ponies and Specialized Armies

To

equipment is designed for specialized war
fighting tasks and this, too, was shown in Kosovo. We learned the same lesson
in the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue mission. NATO's weaponry was planned
for a very different conflict, in which allied forces would face off against
massed enemy troops on the plains of Central Europe.
a surprising extent, military

Much

of the academic critique of

NATO's

operational plans and deci-

sion-making in Kosovo ignores the unique and unexpected nature of the

Kosovo

was pick-up ball, redeploying weapons systems in a context far different from their original planned use. If the West is serious about
humanitarian intervention as a vocation, it will need to rethink decisions
about force structure and equipment. For example, to optimize target discrimtasking. This

ination, especially for delicate distinctions

between army vehicles and

civilian

convoys, one would like to have more JSTARS Qoint Surveillance Target Attack

Radar Systems). So,

too, the ability to react against mobile targets in a

moun-

tainous and frequently cloudy terrain would be enhanced by fully integrated

among services and allies. The real intention of the international
community to implement a new ethic of humanitarian intervention may be
data systems

judged

(as

wanting) by the extent to which most traditional powers are cut-

back on military spending and force structure. The recent decisions of
European countries such as France, Italy, and Germany to reduce military
budgets, cut manpower, and shorten conscription periods, do not give much
credence to any claimed doctrine of humanitarian police. A lightly-armed
European rapid reaction corps will not, by itself, win humanitarian wars.
ting

Surrogate Ground Forces and Conflict Containment

unhappy reminiscence of Afghanistan during the Russian occupation, the Kosovo experience shows the difficulties of controlling surrogate
ground forces. In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, for example, the KLA extended its "defense" of Albanian communities to northern Macedonia as well
In an

as the

Presevo valley in Serbia, threatening to regionalize the war. Evaluation
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of the efficacy of NATO's

Kosovo

air strategy in

any "lessons learned" must be

tempered by the realization that building-up local insurgents

when

their long-term political

agenda

is

will

be costly

from our own.

vastly differ

Picking Winners

The dilemma

of a post-conflict breakdown in law and order (politely

termed a mid-level security gap)

is

familiar to veterans of

most peacekeeping

Ambassador Bob Oakley has written a troubling survey of the problem for the National Defense University, and Timor- veteran Graham Day
has named "policekeeping" as the major problem in post-conflict transitions. Wherever a long-standing government has been displaced, whether
in Panama, Haiti, East Timor, or Kosovo, there is a raw edge in the aftermath because basic gendarme functions are lacking. In the absence of an effective international police presence, with language skills and the capacity to
build a network of local cooperation, it is unlikely that one can control the
violent "to-and-fro" between ethnic communities except by measures such as
missions.

1

Dayton's de facto segregation.

Acknowledging

this incapacity to fine-tune factional disputes

ternational peacekeeping force, one

outcomes to the
winner"

—while

nity will share

conflict.

The

must be

realistic

many

of the

about the available

only real choice, regrettably,

realizing that the side favored
illiberal qualities

with an

may be

in-

set of

to "pick a

by the international commuof

its

antagonist. In Kosovo,

NATO succeeded in stopping Belgrade's ethnic cleansing of Muslims, but the
U.N. follow-on force has predictably been unable to control violent attacks
against Kosovar Serbs by the KLA.
The ideal of a multi-ethnic democracy, which was so attractively packaged
for media export by the Sarajevo government in the Bosnian war, is hardly
characteristic of the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention. One can see something of the same problem in East Timor, where violence against the returning
West Timorese and ethnic Chinese continues to be a problem, and, of course,
in Rwanda. A decision to intervene must depend not on the pretense of a
future multi-ethnic democracy, for that end state will often not be available. It
must be on some rougher calculus of which outcome minimizes overall abuse.

1.

Policing the New

World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security

Oakley, E.M. Goldberg, M.

J.

Dziedzic, eds. 2002).
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Precision-Guided Munitions and the Transparency of Intention
In the past, technological limits have often obscured the
sues of target discrimination. In the air campaigns of World

Korean

conflict, the radius of uncertainty for

more

difficult is-

War Two and

the

ordnance delivery against indus-

and transportation nodes often mooted the question whether
other objects would qualify as military or civilian assets. Gravity bombs and a
limited ability to see through weather left a five-mile radius for probable point
of impact, and finer gradations would have seemed an intellectual construct.
trial targets

But the extraordinary precision of guided munitions used in the Yugoslav
campaign brings front and center the most contentious questions of targeting.

Aim points are made

utterly clear to potential critics,

and the

tion of cigarette factories, television stations, urban bridges,
will

legal categoriza-

and

train depots

be mooted by skeptical observers. With a targeteer's intention made plain

for the

world to

see, the

indeterminate language of humanitarian law becomes

a potential hazard for warfighters. If munitions are precise, the law

The hazard

is

is

vague.

increased by the active campaign to juridicalize the law of war

in international fora

—including the International Criminal Court and the

International Court of Justice, not to mention national courts exercising universal jurisdiction.

The

loose- jointed language of treaty texts provides

comfort against roving legal patrols. Additional Geneva Protocol

I

little

of 1977

making "an effective contribuknow what a civilian judgment of the

describes permissible military targets as those
tion to military action," but

matter

The

it is

hard to

will bring.
difficulty

with attempting clarification of treaty language, or venturing

a clearer restatement of customary law,

is

two-fold. First, the right to restate

been claimed by non-governmental organizations
and a subset of States proposing a "human security" agenda that may pay little
heed to active military security problems. One saw the evidence of this at Ottawa and Rome, in the debates over land mines and the international criminal
court. Second, the United States' unique capabilities in air warfare and other
advanced methods of war-fighting may lessen the number of supporting allies
in law formation. For example, we may have few interlocuters who understand
the practical problems of using air power in limited wars. In the Kosovo and
Iraq campaigns, the United States flew the majority of air sorties due to the requirements of targeting and the capabilities of advanced avionics. In a world
humanitarian law has

lately

skeptical of hyperpuissance, few other countries

may admit

a shared interest in

American warfighting, including how to secure a safe air space. Only
Washington and a few other capitals will be called upon to think through the
effective
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problems of linkage between an adversary's anti-aircraft capability and dual-

To

use electrical grids.
States

retain a necessary operational flexibility, the

may be cast in the role of the legal Luddite,

United

seeking to avoid the usurpa-

and by States unfamiliar with strate-

tion of military law by non-military actors
gic security challenges.

A

second concern

is

the general collapse of State consent as a basis for

we have seen a "vanguard" theory of law
a low number of ratifications needed for treaties to come into force,
creation
a prohibition on reservations so that a package must be taken on an allnorm-setting. In recent negotiations,

—

or-nothing basis, the bald assertion of third party jurisdiction, and the view

become hard law on

that soft law can

persistent objector

human

rights,

norms binding

is itself

a quick timetable.

under challenge

if

The

the subject matter concerns

and the once narrow category of jus cogens
regardless of State consent)

doctrine of the

may become

(the

peremptory

a cornucopia.

At

the

Ottawa landmines negotiation and the Rome international criminal court
conference, the chairmen abandoned the view that treatymaking should proceed by consensus, or even that treaty texts should have the support of major
effective actors.

United States

An

as a

attempt to restate customary law

is

likely to leave

the

prime target of rhetorical bombardment.

Timing is another problem. It is dangerous to codify the law before one
knows what the practical problems will be. International armed force has
lately been asked to achieve some difficult ends in limited wars
including
coercing local governments to end the mistreatment of ethnic minorities and

—

persuading host States to withdraw support from terrorist groups. In these
conflicts, the likely end-state will

term occupation.
partial

It's

not be unconditional surrender and long-

not clear that we

know how

to gain this

new

type of

compliance, through a "tariff theory of warfare. In traditional warfare

as well,

an adversary's threatened misuse of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD)

will present

ties

new problems

in strategy. In

have been lamentably misused to shield

some

WMD

states, civilian facili-

manufacture. Pesticide

weapons manufacture, and biological labocan turn from diagnostics and vaccines to preparing biological patho-

plants convert quickly to chemical
ratories

gens for weaponization. This dual-use imperils the traditional attempt to
separate civilian and military objects.
flict

termination strategies.

world wars gives us

little

The

We

also

have

little

knowledge of con-

radius of clear-cutting destruction in prior

basis for judging

whether narrow targeting against a

limited set of assets will dissuade an adversary from acting badly.

One devoutly

wishes to protect civilian populations on both sides from the hardships of war.
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Yet leadership morale and regime

stability are also linked to the general condi-

tion of a country's infrastructure.

on accepted State practice, we should be honest
about the possible mismatch between the humanitarian purposes of wellintended States in using armed force and the facts of the battlefield. Strategists
of air power argue that the pinprick bombing of purely military materiel may
not suffice to cause regime collapse. Targeting tanks on the battlefield may be
effective in a desert war or on the plains of Europe, but it can be wholly ineffecif law is

Indeed,

to be based

where the adversary's illicit behavior is carried out by unconventional means or even where the adversary happens to enjoy mountainous
terrain and cloudy weather. The prudential view of choosing a fight in the
most advantageous circumstances whether against an ideological antagonist
or an aggressor bent on regional or global domination
is not available if one
tive as a strategy

—

is

—

undertaking intervention for humanitarian ends within a

Lacking a choice of the

field

civil conflict.

of engagement, humanitarian intervention

may

be forced to resort to bluntly coercive methods.

and Repair

Proportionality

In humanitarian intervention, the "incidental"

damage

include both wartime casualties and

damage

to civilians will

to the infrastructure. (Indeed,

it

was anticipation of the latter that persuaded Milosevic to surrender, if we
credit Belgrade's new ambassador to the United Nations and former Finnish
president Martti Ahtisaari.) The hardship to civilians from infrastructure

damage
colder,

is

and

likely to

deepen over time,

civilians

become exhausted

as supplies

run short, weather gets

in jerry-rigging alternatives.

Unspent

munitions also can pose a continuing danger, as we see in the case of cluster

bombs.

We
time

may wish

— and

as a

to think of proportionality as possessing the element of

dynamic requirement.

assist in rapid repair

If

the victorious country and

its allies

of the infrastructure and economy, the effective penalty

of "incidental damage" will be far less harsh.

The post-war

clearance of un-

exploded munitions, though not a legal requirement as such, can also
direct civilian

do

damage (though continued

this safely or expeditiously)

.

local fighting

may make

it

limit

hard to

Proportionality in warfighting should be seen

as a joint responsibility of the civilian

and

into the post-conflict period.
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Conclusion
In a post-Kosovo world, the international

community must be prepared

when

it is

in thinking through the applicable standards.

We

look at humanitarian intervention with clear eyes, in determining
legitimate to intervene

and

to

must also recognize the complexity of the tasks we give our military forces in
hazardous and remote environments. Any post-conflict evaluations must
appreciate the difficulties inherent in the application of the rules of conventional warfare in the intricate tasks of limited war, coercive diplomacy,

humanitarian protection.
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I

find the presentations of Professor Roberts

and Professor Wedgwood very

stimulating indeed. There are observations with which

agreement and

only remains to

it

same time, there

are also

me

I

am

in

complete

to emphasize their significance.

some points in both papers

that, in

At

the

my opinion, call for

clarification or dispute.
First,

about the relationship, discussed here by various speakers, between

These branches of international law are separate
in the sense that notwithstanding the status of parties of an armed conflict in
the light of jus ad bellum (i.e., notwithstanding whether one is an aggressor or a

jus

ad bellum and jus

in hello.

victim of aggression) they are equal in the light of jus in
,

hello.

In that respect,

the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the advisory opinion

Weapons created

on Nuclear

between "an extreme circumstance
which the very survival of a State would be at stake" and

a novelty distinguishing

of self-defense, in

1

other circumstances. Only in the former circumstances, as the Court said,

it

"cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons

would be lawful or unlawful." 2 Paragraph 105 (2) E of the advisory opinion
seems to indicate, on the one hand, that in all other circumstances the use of
(or threat to use) nuclear

humanitarian law.

On

weapons

is

unlawful,

1.

contrary to international

the other hand, such a formula seems to

would otherwise be unlawful under jus
ily

i.e.,

in hello lawful (or at least

make what

not necessar-

unlawful) because of different status of parties in the light oijus ad helium.

Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996

105 (2) E (July 8) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons].
2. Id.

I.C.J. 78,

11

.
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In jus ad bellum the concept of survival of a State

may be

expressed through

the right to self-defense. Obviously, only a victim of an armed attack, and not
its

perpetrator, has such a right.

A State that has committed an armed attack

does not have the right to self-defense even
of measures taken in self-defense.

may be

3

if its

survival

at stake as a result

is

In jus in hello the victim's right to survival

expressed through the concept of military necessity.

As Judge

Higgins,

dealing with possible use of nuclear weapons, wrote in her Dissenting

Opinion:

It

must be

that, in order to

not be attacked

if

meet the

legal

may

requirement that a military target

collateral civilian casualties

military advantage, the 'military advantage'

would be excessive

in relation to

must indeed be one related

to the

very survival of a State or the avoidance of infliction (whether by nuclear or

other weapons of mass destruction) of vast and severe suffering on
population: and that

no other method of eliminating

own

its

this military target

be

available. 4

why only a State
resort when its sur-

This carefully formulated passage does not, however, explain
acting in self-defense
vival

is

at stake.

may

use nuclear weapons as a

Assuming that even

serve requirements of jus in

hello,

a victim of

last

an armed attack has to ob-

the only explanation seems to be that by

committing an armed attack the aggressor has

forfeited

its

right to survival ex-

pressed through the concept of self-defense. In that way, a wrong done in the
light of jus

ad helium has an impact on jus

in hello since

crosses both branches of international law.

the concept of survival

The victim's right

to survival raises

the bar against which military advantage resulting, for example, from the use

of nuclear weapons has to be measured. In such circumstances even

cant civilian casualties

may not be

signifi-

excessive in relation to the military advan-

tage achieved.

3.

The requirements of necessity and proportionality may nevertheless protect the survival even

of an aggressor State.

A small-scale armed attack does not give the victim the right to respond by

destroying the attacker. Although Professor Dinstein writes that "once the war
exercise of self-defence

may

is

raging, the

bring about 'the destruction of the enemy's army,' regardless of the

condition of proportionality," he correctly points out that

permit an all-out war whenever a State absorbs an isolated

would be utterly incongruous to
armed attack, however marginal.
"it

.

.

Proportionality has to be a major consideration in pondering the legitimacy of a defensive war."

(Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 208-209
4.

Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note

21.
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(3d ed. 2001)).

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins,
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Be that as
tain that

all

it

may with extreme circumstances of self-defense, it remains cerhave to equally abide by the requirements of jus

parties

in hello.

5

In

that sense these branches of international law are separate. However, this

mean

no points of contact between jus ad bellum and
jus in hello. For example, I find the link between jus ad helium and jus in hello
discussed in Professor Roberts's paper quite new and interesting. Indeed, exdoes not

that there are

treme cases of violation of jus
as

he

writes,

Adam

massive violations of human

rights,

"can help to legitimize certain uses of force."

Roberts's conclusion

even though he

is

the

Oxford University.

at

in hello, like

is

rather cautious;

Montegue Burton

He

I

would say a lawyerly one

Professor of International Relations

says that massive violations of jus in hello can help

(emphasis added) to legitimize certain uses of force. This seems to suppose
that other conditions (say, threats to international peace
be,

if

and

security)

have to

not overwhelming, then at least playing a significant role in triggering

However, even more importantly, Roberts uses the word
"legitimize" instead of, for example, "making it lawful." This seems to indicate
that his views on this issue are, if not identical, then and least close to those of
Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley who wrote in the aftermath of the Indian
such uses of

force.

intervention in Eastern Pakistan:
[U]ndeniably, there are circumstances in which the unilateral use of force to

overthrow injustice begins to seem less wrong than to turn aside. Like civil
disobedience, however, this sense of superior 'necessity' belongs in the realm of
not law but of moral choice, which nations,

make weighing

must sometimes
cause, to social fabric, and to

like individuals,

the costs and benefits of to their

themselves. 6

Professor Franck

made

later observing that

a similar

comment more than

a quarter of a century

"NATO's action in Kosovo is not the first time illegal steps

have been taken to prevent something palpably worse." 7 Bruno Simma, analyzing the

Kosovo

conflict, believes in the

same vein that sometimes "imperative

Here I have to express my reservations to Professor Wedgwood's comment that "most leaders
and publics may in fact believe there is an important link between the legitimate purpose of a war
and its allowable tactics." It may be true that many people believe indeed in the existence of such
a link. Osama bin Laden and his ilk seem to be convinced of the existence of such a link.
However, the acceptance of such an approach would lead to the erosion of the very foundations
5.

of jus

in bello.

Thomas Franck & Nigel Rodley, After Bangladesh: the Law of Humanitarian
Military Force, 67 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 304 (1973).
7. Thomas Franck, Break It, Do Not Fake It, 78 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 18 (1999).
6.
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political

and moral considerations may appear

to leave

Kosovo

outside law" since "legal issues presented by the

impressive proof that hard cases

My comment
make law

for

on the

hard cases.

last

If

make bad

point

is

short.

bellum or jus in

hello, for

I

that matter, at

all.

crisis are particularly

am

sure, only

hello.

Only

hard cases can
all

hard

then there would be no jus ad
Maritime delimitation cases or preat all

cedents on diplomatic privileges and immunities do not
bellum or jus in

to act

8

hard cases (and uses of military force are

were to make only bad law or no law

cases)

law."

no choice but

practice involving use of force

make law for jus ad
may make or change

law governing use of force.

would like to argue with Adam Roberts when he writes that "it is doubtful whether there is, or is likely to be a 'right' of humanitarian intervention"
and that "the recognition of a link between jus in hello and jus ad helium falls far
short of any general recognition of a right of humanitarian intervention."
Taking into account what Professors Franck, Rodley and Simma have said on
the issue and Roberts's point that "massive violations of jus in hello can help to
legitimize (emphasis added) certain uses of force," one may conclude either
I

that (1) certain uses of force are not suitable (amenable) for legal regulation,
i.e.,

they have to be considered as being beyond the realm of international law

though such uses of force are contrary to international law

or (2)

(i.e.,

they are

unlawful), they are nevertheless legitimate since they are morally justifiable or

some instances even necessary from the moral point of view. Such an approach also presumes that some international practice is so unique, so excepin

tional, that
I

it

does not, cannot, or should not contribute to changes in law.

cannot agree with that kind of reasoning both

for practical

and doctrinal

do not think that
there can be or there should be such a gap between legitimacy and legalbetween international law and morality. In most sensitive areas (use of
ity
reasons. First, speaking from the doctrinal point of view,

I

—

force,

human rights,

etc.) international

law

is

heavily value-loaded.

erally true that in international relations practice

If it is

gen-

has a tendency to become

and unique,
should be accepted sooner rather that later. In practical terms, if there were
such a gap between law and morality it would be damaging for both of them.
law (ex facto jus

It

seems

Northern

oritur),

difficult

Iraq,

morally justifiable practice, even

if

rare

indeed to conclude that Operation Provide Comfort in

ECOWAS

(Economic Community of West African States)

in-

terventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and Operation Allied Force in the

8.

Bruno Simma, Nato,

International

the

Law 3

UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,

(1999).
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, together with some earlier cases of use of force

where humanitarian considerations played at least some role, have led to the
crystallization of a right of humanitarian intervention in international law. At
the same time, these cases (and

show

that there

is

some even more ambiguous

earlier

when human-

considerable tolerance towards interventions

itarian catastrophes are

genuine and interventions can and do

leviate the sufferings of

thousands

if

examples)

realistically al-

not millions of people. Such tolerance

called in the language of international law "acquiescence"

and

it

is

may contrib-

ute to changes in customary international law (or even treaty law)
If this

practice

and the reaction

conclusively that there
poses,

is

it

by the majority of States do not

testify

a right to intervene militarily for humanitarian pur-

means not only that

it

to

some humanitarian interventions

at least

are le-

gitimate (or as Roberts says, "massive violations of jus in hello can help to
legitimize certain uses of force") but also that

questionably contrary to international law.

such interventions are not un-

A customary norm prohibiting any

humanitarian intervention could not have crystallized in such circumstances.
Therefore,

I

find that the purpose of Operation Allied Force,

if not all

the

mo-

was not only morally justifiable, it was also not unlawful in the light of international law. Using the wording of Nguen Quoc Dinh,
Patrick Dailler and Alan Pellet, "V intervention d'humanite ne beneficie pas d'une
dalities of its execution,

habilitation expresse,

sus suffisant
rUliceite

mais sa condamnation ne fait pas non plus Vobjet d'un consen-

pour que ce

degagee une opinio juris qui permaitrait d!affirmer

soit

de cette forme d'intervention" 9

Today even

this cautious

formula seems too

practice, especially in the 1990s, has

shown

restrictive.

human

rights

—

it is

believe that State

that in the case of a clash

two fundamental principles of international law
spect for basic

I

—non-use of

may

all

re-

not always the non-use of force principle

humani-

proportionate and adequate measures involving use of

Here one has

two conflicting principles by considerconcrete circumstances that necessarily are unique and urgent.

military force.

ing

justify

and

force

that has necessarily to prevail. Massive violations of human rights or
tarian law

between

My

to balance

next comment, and related to the previous one, concerns Professor

Roberts's point that "any decision of forcible intervention

must involve

a bal-

ancing of considerations in the face of unique and urgent circumstances, not
9.

"Though there

is

no express permission of humanitarian intervention neither

is

there

consensus concerning the condemnation of such interventions that would amount to the opinio
juris

on the

and Alan

illegality

Pellet,

of this form of intervention."

NGUEN QUOC DlNH, PATRICK DAILLER

Droit international publique 892
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(5th ed. 1994).
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the assertion of a general right."

I

believe that there

is

not necessarily a contra-

diction between the existence of a right and the need to balance various considerations "in the face of unique

domains of international law and

and urgent circumstances." In

politics

(and practically

all

sensitive

issues involving

use of force belong to this category) the need to balance not only various policy considerations but also different principles of international law, often indi-

cating in opposite directions,

no

right to intervene for

is

rather a rule than an exception. If there were

humanitarian purposes, then however

much one bal-

anced various considerations in the face of unique and urgent circumstances,
any intervention would be unlawful.

The

NATO

intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over

Kosovo was the

first

collective intervention

ations were overwhelming.

As

where humanitarian consider-

was not authorized by the Security Council,
concerns for peace and stability in Europe (though they certainly played an
important role) alone would not have justified this use of force. Therefore, the
justifiable

it

cause of the intervention was humanitarian. However, as humani-

tarian intervention has

been and

a highly contested concept, doctrinal

still is

been concentrated only on the issue of the legitimacy or legality (illegality) of the use of force for humanitarian purposes (jus ad bellum
aspect). No attention has been paid to the legitimacy or legality of modalities

works have so

far

of use of force for these purposes (which includes both jus ad bellum and jus in
hello aspect).

As Roberts has remarked,

"in the long history of legal debates

about humanitarian intervention, there has been a consistent

failure to ad-

dress directly the question of methods used in such interventions." 10
It

goes without saying that the laws of armed conflict must apply in the case

of humanitarian intervention.

What

interests us here

is

whether (and

then to what extent) the objective of such intervention

man
If

rights

—has any impact on the

we compare

if yes,

—protection of hu-

modalities of the use of force?

the modalities of the use of force as a collective security mea-

sure authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the

UN Charter

with the modalities of the use of force in self-defense, we see that there
substantial differences depending

on the purpose of the use of

may be

force. Let us

take as an example the response of the Coalition to the Iraqi aggression
against Kuwait. In this response, there were elements of both collective

10.

Adam

Roberts, Nato's "Humanitarian

War"

over Kosovo, 41

110.
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at
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self-defense

and

collective security. 11

The

right to self-defense gave the Coali-

tion the right (even without the Security Council authorization) to use force

an end to the armed aggression and to restore the
status quo ante. But only Security Council resolutions, as a measure of collective security under Chapter VII, created an adequate legal basis for the actions
to liberate Kuwait, to put

(including military) aimed at forcing the regime of Saddam Hussein to destroy
its

programs of production of weapons of mass destruction and

missiles.

These

measures went beyond what a State (or States) can do in self-defense, but Security Council resolutions provided the basis for measures necessary for the

restoration

and maintenance of peace and security

In the area of self-defense,

it is

in the region.

the Caroline formula that reflects customary

international law. Secretary of State Daniel

Webster wrote

to

Mr

Fox, the

had to be demonstrated that there was
the necessity to use force in self-defense that was "instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation" and that the act
"justified by the necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity, and
kept clearly within it." 12 There is no reason to believe that these requirements
apply only in the case of self-defense or that this formula has in mind only
so-called anticipatory self-defense. It seems to be possible to generalize all
these criteria by the term of adequacy which, depending on the circumstances, includes necessity, proportionality and even immediacy. Every use of
British Minister to

force, in order to

the use of force.

Washington, that

it

be lawful, has to be adequate to the situation that

Or

to put

it

slightly differently: the modalities of the use of

force have to correspond to the purposes of

both to jus ad helium and jus

calls for

its

use.

This requirement belongs

in hello.

Analyzing self-defense, Yoram Dinstein distinguishes between "on the
spot reaction," "defensive

armed

reprisals," responses to

an "accumulation

of events" and "war of self-defence" as different modalities of the use of force

on the character of the armed attack that
has triggered the right to use force in self-defense. 13 The legality of these modalities of self-defense is dependent on the character of the armed attack. Judith Gardam writes that "in the Gulf conflict the massive aerial bombardment
that can be resorted to depending

11. See

Rein Miillerson

& David Scheffer, The Legal Regulation of the

Use of Force,

CONFRONTATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE POST-COLD

&

in

BEYOND

WAR WORLD

(Lori

Damrosch, Gennady Danilenko
Rein Mullerson eds., 1995).
12. John Basset Moore, The Caroline, in 2 Digest of International Law 412 (1906). See
also,
R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (J 938).
13. See DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 192-221.
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of the infrastructure of Iraq had to be balanced against

removal of Iraq from Kuwait."

its

contribution to the

14

A good

example of the adequacy of measures undertaken may be operations to rescue one's nationals abroad, which is often considered to be a special case of self-defense. Whether one regards it as a separate ground for the
lawful use of force or as being within the parameters of the right to self-defense, practically all authors agree that the purpose of the use of force (rescu-

ing nationals)

Waldock

conditions the modalities that

may be

used.

As C.H.M.

wrote, measures of protection must be "strictly confined to the ob-

ject of protecting

them

[nationals] against injury." 15

between modalities of self-defense depending on the character of an armed attack, it seems natural that the modalities of
the use of force for humanitarian purposes must also correspond to the objectives of the use of force. They have to be adequate to these objectives.
Fernando Teson writing of humanitarian intervention observes that "the general rule is that the coercion in the operation and the consequent harm done
by it have to be proportionate to the importance of the interest that is being
served, both in terms of the intrinsic moral weight of the goal and in terms of
the extent to which that goal is served." 16
In the light of these distinctions

The

NATO

and the
G-8 and confirmed by the Security Council, where: (1) immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; (2) withdrawal from Kosovo of
military and paramilitary forces; (3) deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United
objectives of Operation Allied Force, as declared by

Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives; (4)
establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the
Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful

and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; (5) the safe and free return of all
refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian organizations; (6) a political process towards the establishment of an interim
political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
14. Judith

Gardam,

Necessity

and Proportionality

in

Jus

ad Bellum and Jus

in

Bello,

in

International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons
281 (Lawrence Boisson de Chazournes &. Philipe Sands
15.

C.H.M. Waldock, The

eds., 1999).

Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law,

DES COURS 455, 467 (1952).
Fernando Teson, A Philosophy of International

81 RECUEIL
16.
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Law 64

(1998).
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KLA; and

the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the
(7) a

comprehensive approach to the economic development and

of the

crisis region.

The

question

stabilization

17

do these objectives that are

is:

other types of use of force

(e.g.,

different

from objectives of

measure of collective

in self-defense or as a

se-

curity) determine also what kind of force can be used? Although neither the

Hague

or

Geneva Conventions

or Additional Protocols to the latter nor cus-

tomary international law contain any references to wars of self-defense, collective security operations or humanitarian interventions, distinguishing only

between international armed

conflicts

mean
even immediacy may not

and armed

conflicts of non-interna-

tional character, that does not

that requirements of necessity, propor-

tionality or

lead to distinctions between applicable

law depending on the purpose of the use of force.
It

seems that the

NATO response was not, using the Naulilaa formula, "ex-

cessively disproportionate" 18 to the

achievement of the objectives of this humanitarian intervention. There was not simply a potential and imminent

human

Kosovo leaving little time for deliberation; human
lives were actually being lost and crimes against humanity were actually being
committed before NATO intervened. The world community, represented
inter alia by the UN Security Council, had already given peaceful diplomacy a
chance but the ethnic cleansing continued unabated.
threat to

lives in

The primary or general objective of any humanitarian intervention is to
stop massive human rights violations. In the case of Kosovo it was to stop ethnic cleansing and, foremost, the

murder and torture through which the ethnic

cleansing was being carried out. All other objectives are to be subordinated to
this

primary objective. They are aimed at reversing,

if

possible, the results of

human rights violations, at ensuring that violations will not recur in the future
and at punishing those who have committed acts of genocide, war crimes or
crimes against humanity. But the primary objective

is

to stop violations

(i.e.,

to protect victims) that have engendered the intervention.

The
tions.

NATO

But the

intervention, in the end, stopped such

fact that

it

achieved

this objective

Roberts

when he

17. See general principles

on the

believes

that

political solution to the

rights viola-

only in the end seems to be

the major shortcoming of Operation Allied Force.
Professor

human

"in

I

completely agree with

the

Kosovo

1999

crisis in

war

Annex

1

it

was

of Security

Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
18. The Naulilaa Case (Port. V. Germ. 1928), 2 REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL

AWARDS

1028 (1928).
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disadvantageous to

NATO,

and to the inhabitants of Kosovo, that Milosevic

was not confronted with a more convincing threat of land operations in the
province." The openly declared refusal to use ground troops and the exclusive
use of air power allowed the ethnic cleansing not only to continue unabated,

but also even to intensify for a while. Earlier Roberts had emphasized that "the
initial

exclusion of the option of a land invasion was the most extraordinary

aspect of NATO's resort to force." 19

One

has to bear in

mind

that the

Hutu

extremists in their genocidal attack

an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 people
within approximately one month. Ethnic cleansing, even without massive
against the Tutsis in 1994 killed

20

killing

of the

Rwandan

scale,

can also be carried out with extreme speed. The

more than 200 000 Serbs from Krajina within
Thus, Milosevic could have expelled or killed most of the Aljust three days.
banian population of Kosovo while NATO was bombing targets in Serbia
Croats, for example, drove out

y

21

proper to protect the Kosovars. In humanitarian interventions, the exclusive

bombardment without even

use of aerial

troops

may be

quate to

a plausible threat to use

ground

an intervention seems to be inadethe objectives of the use of force when it is carried out by means of
a terrible gamble. Therefore,

and dual-purpose objectives outside the area where human
rights violations are being committed in order to persuade the authorities to
stop violations, without at least being ready to use force to protect immediately and directly the victims of massive human rights violations. Here the remark of Professor Wedgwood that "a gradual war of attrition that might defeat
Belgrade in slow motion was unacceptable in light of human values at stake in

bombing

military

the conflict"

is

rather pertinent.

What may be
(also a specific

adequate in a war of self-defense or in a war against terrorism

form of self-defense) may be inadequate in the case of humani-

tarian intervention.

We see that just as modalities of use of force as a counter-

measure depend on the characteristics of the
hello (the

initial

wrong, so too does

jus in

law of armed conflict) depend on jus ad helium (the law on lawful

causes of use of force) Here the bridge between the two branches of interna.

tional law

is

the requirement of adequacy (including, as

cessity, proportionality

to

and even immediacy)

was

said earlier, ne-

—the requirement

that

is

central

both of them. Daniel Webster, speaking of self-defense in the Caroline case

wrote that "the act

justified

note

10, at 112.

19. Roberts, supra

by that necessity of self-defense, must be limited

20. Report of the Secretary-General,
21.

it

Tim Judah,

U.N. Doc. S/1994/640 (May 31, 1994).

Kosovo's Road to War, 41 SURVIVAL,
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Summer

1999, at 12.
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by that necessity and kept clearly within

it."

22

We may paraphrase

it

that an act justified by the necessity of humanitarian intervention

by saying

must be

and kept clearly within it.
It seems that the bridge of adequacy between purposes of the use of force
and its modalities is especially important today when threats to peace and security stem not so much from the clash of interests of superpowers or
cross-border attacks by one State against another, but from internal conflicts, massive human rights violations and terrorism. Here Roberts's remark
about the restrictive character of the oft-quoted expression in the 1868 St.
Petersburg Declaration that "the only legitimate object which States should
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy" is rather pertinent. As he writes, the laws of war "by no means exclude
the application of military force against the adversary's war-making capacity
and system of government." I support Roberts's call to NATO members "to
address the question of how their conception of war relates to the laws of
war, and whether any modifications of either are indicated by this experience. The question of what is a military objective, addressed most extenlimited by that necessity

sively in Protocol

I, is

central." 23

The Kosovo experience shows

what is and what is not a military objective is, to an extent at least, dependent on the purpose of war. In that respect Roberts rightly draws our attention to the East Timor crisis writing
that "it appears that a systematic campaign of bombing was not a serious option" in that crisis. Depending on the purposes of the use of force (e.g., to
rescue one's nationals abroad) the adversary's armed forces (even the concept of adversary or enemy becomes uncertain in the case of many new
threats) may not be the main target at all.

Adam Roberts wrote

that

earlier that:

[T]he main problem in Kosovo was that, because it proved relatively easy to
conceal military units and movable equipment from attacks from the air, there

was especially strong pressure on the Nato alliance to attack fixed

which

in

many

power stations, buildings of various types, the
Belgrade) had civilian as well as military functions. 24

cases (bridges,

broadcasting station in

targets,

22.

MOORE,

23.

See Professor Roberts's paper in

supra note 12, at 919.
this

volume, supra,

24. Id.

453

at 418.
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In the light of what

I

have said above,

I

believe that targets such as bridges,

power stations and other similar dual-purpose objects, which may be legitimate targets in the case of more conventional military operations (e.g., when
force is used in self-defense), should not be military objectives (save maybe
exceptional circumstances) in humanitarian operations.
All interventions that have so far been analyzed as humanitarian (not-

withstanding whether accepted or rejected as such) have been carried out by

ground troops and not by

human

rights violations

air strikes only. 25

may be stopped

point

is

that though massive

end of the day by

at the

and dual-purpose objects

pressive regimes' military

them

The

hitting op-

in order to persuade

to stop violations, the effects of such violations (which well

tinue or even exacerbate while such military force

is

may con-

used) can be reversed

who are killed remain dead. Those who are raped
remain raped. Even those who are "only" expelled remain traumatized for
the rest of their life and many of them, as historical experience shows, never
only to an extent. Those

return.

Ruth Wedgwood

raises a delicate issue of "the difficulties controlling sur-

rogate ground forces" or local insurgents

who

"share

Kosovo such

many

of the illiberal

was the so-called
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) whom President Clinton had earlier
branded (and not without serious ground) terrorists. It is a dilemma of
whether or not to support bad guys against the worst guys. Cooperation with
such groups may be dictated by considerations of military necessity, but one
qualities" of their opponents. In

should not forget that very often those
only for their

One can

own freedom

who

a force

fight against oppressors fight

to oppress others.

only hope that after the Kosovo experience and other develop-

same direction 26 at least some would-be human rights
violators will not rely on State sovereignty and will think twice before embarking on their murderous paths. At the same time, this experience teaches us
ments pointing

that

it is

in the

difficult to protect

other peoples' lives without being ready to sacrifice

own soldiers. In our so imperfect world those who care about huand want to make the world safer vis-a-vis terrorist attacks cannot

lives of one's

man rights
afford to

become

soft.

Unfortunately, dictators and terrorists (often these no-

tions overlap since dictators use terror to stay in power, while terrorists are

25. See,

e.g.,

ANTHONY AREND

FORCE 112-137

& ROBERT BECK,

LAW AND THE USE OF

(1993).

26. For example, the functioning of the

Hague, the

INTERNATIONAL

arrest of General

two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals in The

Pinochet in London, the adoption of the Statute of the permanent

International Criminal Court.
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aspiring dictators

who want to impose

stand and respect only force.
Hitler

and aims on others) underMutual hatred and respect between Stalin and
their beliefs

was not accidental.
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Horace B. Robertson,

my comments

to the papers presented by Professors Roberts

I

shall confine

laid

out eight issues that arose during the Kosovo

and Wedgwood.

Jr.

Adam

First, as to

serts are likely to affect the

way

and develops further in the

future.

in

Roberts's paper. Professor Roberts has

which the law
I

will single

air

is

campaign, which he

as-

viewed, influences events,

out three of these for

my com-

ments.
there

First, is

now

a stronger link between jus in hello and jus ad belluml

Roberts asserts that the 1990s saw a strengthening of the idea that a systematic pattern of basic

tion.

humanitarian norms may

"Quite simply," he

states,

"massive violations oijus

legitimize certain uses of force."

clusion,

it

seems to

me

justify acts

1

While

I

of military intervenin hello

do not quarrel with Roberts's con-

that while justification for intervention by another

State or international entity

may

rest in part

tions of jus in hello in a civil war, that

is

on

solely

a systematic pattern of viola-

an

issue of jus

ad helium. The

conduct of the intervening party once involved in the conflict
independent of whether or not the intervention meets the
helium.

The

intervening party

is

obligated, both by treaty

the obligations of the almost universally

is

completely

test

of jus ad

and customary

inter-

With respect to
binding 1949 Geneva Conventions,

national law, to abide by the principles and rules of/us in

Common Article

can help to

hello.

Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war

1.

2 provides unequivocally: "the present

See Professor Roberts's paper in

this

volume, supra, at 410.
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is

not recognized by one of them." 2

This principle

is

reiterated in Articles 1(1)

state that the Protocol shall apply

and 3(a) of Protocol

I,

which

"from the beginning" of any armed conflict

referred to in Article 2 of the 1949 Conventions. 3

Although not

the Kosovo intervention were parties to Protocol

seems to have been generally accepted

I,

as a part of the

ail

parties to

the principle

it

states

customary law of war.

The United States CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement provide, for example:
"US forces will comply with the Law of War during military operations involving armed conflict, no matter how the conflict may be characterized under inand

comply with its principles and spirit during all other
operations." The US Navy's Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, likewise provides as follows: "Regardless of whether the use of armed
force in a particular circumstance is prohibited by the United Nations Charter
(and therefore unlawful) the manner in which the resulting armed conflict is conducted continues to be regulated by the law of armed conflict" 5 This principle is
valid today and should be applied in any future conflict.
Now to the second question that Professor Roberts asks that I would like to
address. Is there tension between the NATO/US strategic doctrine which
aims at putting pressure on the adversary's government and the implicit assumption of the laws of war that the adversary's armed forces are the main legitimate object of attack? If so, how can this tension be addressed?
My answer is that I do not believe there is a tension between the strategic
objective of putting pressure on the enemy's leadership and the tactical conduct of the military campaign. After all, the ultimate object of any military
campaign is some political objective; the campaign itself can be fully
ternational law,

will

4

,

2.

Convention

(I)

for the

Amelioration of the Condition of the

Wounded and

Sick in

Armed

Forces in the Field, signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, authentic text in Final Record of the
Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, vol.

1,

Federal Political Department, Berne, 205-224,

THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS,
RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman eds., 1988). The

reprinted

in

provisions of Convention II (Wounded, sick and shipwrecked), Convention III (Prisoners of
War) and Convention IV (Civilians) are identical.
3. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the

Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,

ON THE LAWS OF WAR 422 (Adam

Roberts

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
Engagement for US Forces, Enclosure A, 11 lg (Jan. 15, 2000).
4.

5.

DOCUMENTS-

& Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000).
3 12 1.01 A, Standing Rules of

The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,

M4M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.1, at 1 5.1
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(1997) (emphasis added).

NWP

Horace B. Robertson,

compliant with law of war in reaching
wrote in his much-quoted statement,

Jr.

this strategic objective.

"War

is

not merely a

As Clausewitz

political act,

but

also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out

the same by other means." 6 This statement

is

neutral with respect to the

legiti-

means and methods of carrying out the campaigns. The
legitimacy of the resort to armed force does not excuse the violation of the

macy of the
laws of war

It

(jus in hello)

airman or

soldier,

tion

military

may be

sailor

regarded as

nor does

it

render unlawful the compliant actions of a

engaged in a conflict, the entry into which by
unlawful under the principles of jus ad bellum.

his na-

should be noted in this connection that the Committee established by

the Prosecutor of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

(ICTY) was asked to address the linkage between the jus
helium.

The Committee was

1

since the resort to force by

specifically

in hello

and the jus ad

asked to address the allegations that

NATO had not been authorized by the Security

and consequently "all forceful measures
taken by NATO were unlawful." The Committee declined to address this issue as a matter of practice, "which we consider to be in accord with the most
widely accepted and reputable legal opinion." 9
Council, the resort to force was

illegal
8

The

is

would like to address
what, if anything, might need to be done about the paradox that the United

States

third question raised by Professor Roberts that

is

I

simultaneously a principal upholder of the obligation of States to ob-

serve the laws of war, and a non-party to several important agreements.

number of agreements

which the United States
is not a party, the most significant being Protocol I. While the other agreements listed are important, Protocol I is the most significant because it gives
concrete definition to a number of principles that traditionally formed a part
of the customary laws of war governing the methods and means of warfare but
which have not been codified in a single document. As Professor Roberts acknowledges, although it is not a party, "the United States takes at least some
of these accords more seriously than some States that are parties." 10 As Colonel Graham has stated, the fact that the United States was not a party to
Professor Roberts

6.

lists

a

Karl von Clausewitz, On

War

to

(1832).

Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1111 30-4, 39 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1257, 1265-6 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A [hereinafter Report to
7.

See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the

Committee Established

the Prosecutor].
8. Id.,

U 30.

9. Id.,

U 34.

10.

See Professor Roberts's paper in

this

volume, supra,
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at 428.
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Protocol

I

had no

United States

loses

effect

on the conduct of the war

by not being a party, in

my view,

authority, in taking to task non-complying States

in Kosovo. 11

What

the

the legal (and moral)

is

which are

parties, of reliance

on the implementation and enforcement provisions of these agreements. As
Roberts points out, a principal feature of these latter-day agreements

is

their

provision for implementation and enforcement measures. Adherence would

enable the United States to rely on and cite specific binding agreements instead of relying

on the sometimes vague and ambiguous

principles of the cus-

tomary international law of war.

A greater paradox in this field,
action,

is

pointed out by Professor

submitted to this colloquium.

To

and perhaps a more

this observer,

it is

He

Murphy

fruitful field for future

in the final paragraph of his paper

states:

ironic that so

much

attention has been devoted to the

NATO complied with the jus in bello in its Kosovo campaign.
one looks at practices in other conflicts around the
world Chechnya, Afghanistan, the Sudan, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, to
name just a few one sees not only no effort to comply with the jus in bello but
barbaric practices that flout even the most elementary dictates of humanity.
Accordingly, the most strenuous efforts should be made to induce States and
other combatants to adhere to at least the ethical and moral dimensions of
issue of

For

whether

when

—

—

international humanitarian law, regardless of the presence or absence of a

formal legal obligation to do

Now let me
because what

I

so.

12

Wedgwood's paper. I can be brief here
applies to some extent to the issues she raises.

turn briefly to Professor

have said

earlier

She states that the "asserted independence of the two regimes [jus ad bellum
and jus in bello] may be no more than a fiction." 13 She argues that the Kosovo
campaign was not a war to settle a commercial or boundary dispute but one to
protect basic human rights and therefore that, "[w]hether one's framework is
utilitarian or pure principle, it is possible to admit that the merits of a war
make a difference in our tolerance for methods of warfighting." 14
I submit such a principle places one on a very slippery slope. Any linkage
between the two principles has been universally rejected by the relevant international agreements and (in the words of the Report to the Prosecutor) "the

11.

See Colonel Graham's comments in

this

12.

See Professor Murphy's paper in

volume, supra,

13.

See Professor Wedgwood's paper in

this

this

volume, supra, at 378.
at 255.

volume, supra,

14. Id.

460

at

434-5.

Horace B. Robertson,

most widely accepted and reputable
fessor Roberts's paper

made

I

Jr.

legal opinion." 15 In

my comments on Pro-

the point that both international agreements

and customary international law have firmly settled that the rules of war apply
to the conduct of hostilities regardless of whether we are assessing the conduct
of those
side.

on the "good"

repeat

I

it

side of the conflict or those

here because

I

firmly believe

it is

on the "bad"

well established in

international agreements that deal with the subject
tional law.

I

also believe

it is

(or aggressor)

and

in

all

of the

customary interna-

morally justified and the only workable

way of

judging compliance with the law of war by subordinate participants in the conflict.

Judging which

subjective.

I

is

the "good" or the "bad" side of any conflict

have never heard of a national leader

cause was "just." Are

we

on the ground that they

to judge the

I

essentially

did not assert that his

conduct of subordinate military

find themselves fighting

submit that the question answers

who

is

on the wrong

officers

side of a war?

I

itself.

Wedgwood

agree, however, with Professor

in her expressions of

about the contentious role of civilian tribunals in the post-war
accused of violations of the law of war. This problem

is

trial

concern
of those

aggravated by the de-

velopment of precision-guided munitions and the increasing transparency of
targeting decisions made by military authorities resulting from almost instantaneous on-scene television reporting and analysis as well as cockpit-monitor-

weapons from launch to detonation. What may appear to be a
reasonable and lawful targeting decision to a commander enveloped in the fog
of war may take on an entirely different appearance with the advantage of
hindsight. Judging whether that decision is lawful or not is certainly difficult
for any tribunal but particularly so for one which may not have a full appreciaing of strike

tion that, as Professor

Wedgwood

states,

"implementation of many aspects of

on battlefield judgments and knowledge of campaign
strategy." While it would be desirable in my view (and apparently also in Professor Wedgwood's) that such judgments should be made by a military tribunal with membership familiar with these factors, I am afraid that we have gone
the law of war depends
16

down the road toward civilian tribunals to make possible a reversal of
that policy. The tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Statute of the Inter-

too far

Geneva Conventions for
universal jurisdiction of "grave breaches" have set us off on a course that may
be irreversible. We can, I think, however, take some temporary comfort at
national Criminal Court and the provisions of the

least

from the

Report to the

Prosecutor,

15.

Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, H 34.

16.

See Professor Wedgwood's paper in

this

volume, supra,
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which appeared

at 435.

to

take

a

Commentary
knowledgeable and sophisticated approach to
crimes by

NATO

forces in the air campaign.
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its

analysis of allegations of war

Commentary
Harvey Dalton

I

think there are three verities that

we need

to be aware of throughout our

mentioned

discussions in this area. Professor Robertson has already

—

one that the use of force is a continuation of political relations by other
means. I think another verity is embodied in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which provides that domestic matters are the sole responsibility of sovereign States.
that

is

I

think another verity

is

the inviolability of the territorial

embodied in the UN Charter,
integrity and political independence
also

of sovereign States.

We've heard from time to time that Operation Allied Force was a humanitarian intervention and that there might be a right of humanitarian intervention. I agree with Professors Roberts and Walker that, at least in my view,
there is no right of humanitarian intervention and that the situation in
Kosovo was an extraordinary situation dominated by necessity. It was necessary for the NATO alliance to use force. There were no alternative means. All
alternative means had been exhausted.
But assuming that Kosovo was a humanitarian intervention, there have been

some comments that maybe the

rules should be different

this so different

should be different?
instances of

armed

If we're

My

talk about
is

why?

from an ordinary armed conflict that the

rules

the use of force as a part of humanitarian intervention.

What makes

when we

going to apply the jus

hostilities.

in hello,

it

question

should apply on

In this case, the weapons were

no

all

less deadly,

the systems were just as effective and just as destructive, the clash of the

armed

forces

was

just as deadly,

and the

effects

on civilians were no different.

There seems to be some implicit criticism of NATO's decision to keep its
planes above fifteen thousand feet as if NATO was not being quite correct in

Commentary
would like to simply point out that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) had one of the most sophisticated integrated air defense systems in Europe. FRY forces did put our pilots and aircraft in harm's
way. They shot down two of our aircraft. There's no evidence that I'm aware
of that NATO's decision to stay above fifteen thousand feet affected the accuracy of our weapons. We did have outliers (missiles or bombs that drop outside
the area they were targeted at). We did have mistakes. But there's no evidence that the fifteen thousand foot restriction or ceiling affected the accuracy. The fifteen thousand foot altitude protected our aircraft against the FRY
playing by these rules.

I

anti-aircraft artillery, but

it

did not protect those aircraft against surface-to-air

missiles. You might contemplate that fact on your way home from this colloquium when you're flying at thirty-seven thousand feet, because an SA-2 can

reach out and touch you at thirty-seven thousand

feet.

As Colonel Sorenson mentioned yesterday, fifteen thousand feet is not very
high. Mistakes have been made at far less than fifteen thousand feet. I would
you to the US/UK blue-on-blue clash that occurred during Operation
Desert Storm. That incident occurred at much less than fifteen thousand feet.
refer

Finally,

wood

I

would

like to

turn very briefly to the reference by Professor

Wedg-

and international tribunals. I would
agree with Professor Roberts that there has not been a critical review of the
to the international institutions

Committee's Report to the Prosecutor on the Kosovo operation.
give you two examples from this report.

The Committee

I'd like to

uncritically accepted

the definition of environmental crime contained in the International Criminal

Court

statute:

Operational reality

is

recognized in the Statute of the International Criminal

Court, an authoritative indicator of evolving customary international law on

where Article 8(b)(iv) makes the infliction of incidental
environmental damage an offence only if the attack is launched intentionally in
the knowledge that it will cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
this

point,

1

Now that was an uncritical acceptance of a crime that was defined in the ICC
Statute,

and there

particular

—

that

are a few people here that
this

was

a

definition

can

that

tell

you

—Charles Garaway

in

was cobbled together as a

1.
See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 11 21, 39 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1257, 1263 (2000), reprinted herein as Appendix A.
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Harvey Dalton

compromise by various lawyers from likeminded States in a restaurant at the
top of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn in October 1995 or 1996. It's a
compromise. Yet here's an uncritical acceptance of this definition in a statute
that is not in force. We need a critical review of this Committee's Report.

Another example is the Committee's rather tight control on the attacks on
propaganda and a rather critical statement concerning the attack on the RTS
(Serbian TV and radio station) transmission facility. It must be known that
the RTS system was critical to sustaining the war effort and the ethnic cleansing effort by the FRY. It also directed virulent propaganda against NATO
with the view to breaking up the alliance or shattering our unanimity. It was
part of a determined effort to conceal what was actually happening in Kosovo.
I think it's very important to recognize that in an authoritative regime such as
in Yugoslavia, propaganda is essential. Control of the populous is essential and
propaganda is the means by doing it. Let me give you a quote from Julius
Stone:
Quite apart from the dependence of totalitarian governments on unquestioning
and undeviating acceptance of their respective ideologies, preparation for

modern war and
and

effort

the waging of it

demand

a high degree of solidarity of outlook

throughout the community. In these circumstances, the undermining

of the internal social and political order of the

enemy and

his psychological

assurance become a Military target as important as his physical industrial plant

and second

in

So propaganda
tor's

importance only to

is

his

armed

forces. 2

a legitimate military objective

—

at least in this

commenta-

view.

One

final point

with respect to the International Criminal Court. Professor

Dinstein in his book notes that there are certain principles that are jus cogens.

These are fundamental principles that trump other aspects of international
law. His example of a jus cogens principle is the territorial inviolability and the
political independence of sovereign States. A final comment. I would suggest
to you that there may be another principle of jus cogens and that is a principle
that no obligation can be conferred on a sovereign State without their express
written consent. That is also contained in the Vienna Convention on
Treaties. It is also a fundamental principle of international law. If you take
that as a principle of jus cogens, then those aspects of the

ICC statute

that pur-

port to extend the ICC's jurisdiction over a non-party State and nationals of a

non-party State are a legal
2.

Julius Stone, Legal

nullity.

Controls of International Conflict 322
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(1954).

Discussion

Does

US Have a

the

Unilateralist

Approach

to International

Law?

John Norton Moore:
This question
task.
eral.

do

I
I

so,

is

addressed to

Adam Roberts who

I

intend to gently take to

however, after saying that I'm an admirer of your paper in gen-

say gently because actually

I

suspect that in terms of the purpose of your

would have exactly the same underlying purpose to be
served. We would both agree on the great importance of the United States
and our European allies working together. I particularly enjoyed the entire
intellectual sweep of what you were dealing with. I thought it was quite
statement, you and

I

extraordinary.

My comment

relates to the specifics of

your statement that somehow we

need to be concerned that the United States currently

is

set

out on a course to

ensure that laws apply to others, but they do not apply to the United States.

I

making these generalizations. I'm just back
from the country of some of my good European colleagues and I know that
one is hearing quite a few generalizations about American isolationism and

believe

it's

quite dangerous to be

nonparticipation in various treaties.

I

treaty-by-treaty in looking at these.

There

think that

we have

to actually proceed

are very different reasons for

US

number of these treaties and the kinds of generalizations
that we're hearing are not helping us move forward.
With respect to the Law of the Sea Convention, US leadership actually resulted in an effective renegotiation of Part XI. Our President then submitted
the treaty to the Senate. There is no opposition of any significant kind in the
nonparticipation in a

United States to

it.

There

is

a peculiarity in the

US Constitution over require-

ments in relation to how it goes through the US Senate, and I fully expect that
the United States will be a party to that treaty at some point.

The landmines convention

is

eminently reasonable in seeking to bring

under control the reckless scattering of landmines by aggressive leaders.

(Saddam Hussein,

for

example, threw landmines around Kuwait with no

Discussion

records kept.) That

an entirely understandable and reasonable thing to do.
On
we need to differentiate between the uses of a variety of weapons systems. For example, our
forces in South Korea maintain a well-marked mined area between North and
is

the other hand, the United States believes strongly that

South Korea. The laws of war and arms control ought to differentiate appropriately between those two examples. The United States did not reject the
landmine convention because we want to have different laws for everyone,

we

but because

don't think the right thing

is

being done.

Adam Roberts:
For the sake of brevity,
less.

I

many
tial

I

made my remarks

in a

way

that was perhaps tact-

agree with you that there are different reasons for nonparticipation in

of these treaty regimes and sometimes there

is

sound, sensible, pruden-

reasoning on the part of the United States in thinking seriously about the

consequences of becoming party to a particular agreement.
any of that

one second.

for

And

I

of course, the United States

wouldn't deny
is

not alone on

the landmines treaty. Finland has similar concerns to those of the United
there's

no sugges-

itself as

above the

a perception of that because of the range

and num-

States about the possible defensive value of landmines.
tion that

My

So

not a serious position.

it is

concern

is

not that the United States in fact views

law, but that there

may be

ber of treaties that we're talking about and because the United States has such
a peculiar

—

you yourself have indicated

as

—and slow system of

ratification of

which has been a nightmare for successive presidents of the United
States. In respect of some of the treaties in this area, a good deal can be
achieved by reservation. Not of course with the landmines treaty and not of
treaties,

course with the

ICC

statute, because, in

have been excluded from those
there.

It is

treaties.

my

opinion unwisely, reservations

There

really

is

a structural

problem

not clever of the majority of the like-minded States to exclude the

possibility of reservations,

name among some

because reservations, although they have had a bad

progressive international lawyers, are actually a very

important means of bringing treaties into a relationship with the needs, interests,

you

plans and intentions of States.
say.

But

I

other treaties

think, for
I

listed,

example

So

I

agree with you in a large part of what

in relation to Protocol

I

or a

number of the

a good deal could be achieved by participating with res-

ervations rather than staying formally outside the regime.

I

hasten to add I'm

well aware that the United States, even while formally outside certain re-

gimes, in fact has contributed very powerfully to them.
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Discussion

Is

There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?

Adam Roberts:
While

it is

impossible to establish a general right of humanitarian interven-

one can argue that there are powerful factors supporting intervention. I'm not sure whether they are all containable within the
tion, in individual cases

category of necessity.

I

don't think they are. But there are very powerful fac-

including legal factors, which

tors,

force in a particular case.
ular

It is

may

point to a justification for the use of

the concentration on the specificities of a partic-

and urgent situation that seems to me

to be the right legal as well as politi-

cal approach.

The German Bundestag,

for

example,

in October, 1998, essentially said that
right of

when

whereas

it

it

debated the issue of Kosovo

was not asserting any general

humanitarian intervention, in the extraordinary circumstances of

would support an operation and would permit the use of German
forces to take part in that operation. I personally think that is a more powerful
and a clearer position than the very fragile one of asserting a general right of
Kosovo,

it

states to

engage in humanitarian intervention.

One can

of course buttress such an approach by making certain general

propositions about particular cases, be
in 1991,

when

it

Bangladesh in 1971 or northern Iraq

a use of force without the consent of the receiving sovereign

community even though it didn't
Security Council blessing. There is also the relevant legal

State was tolerated by the international

have

explicit

UN

consideration that an intervention
objectives

even

if it is

may be

in support of

UN Security Council

not with the specific consent of the Security Council.

There's also the relevant legal consideration that some of these actions have

not been condemned. All of that

short of a general right. But

falls

it's

a consid-

you have attributed to me, which is not
the position I hold
that one simply has to throw up one's hands in despair
and say these questions cannot be answered. On the contrary, in specific
cases, they can be answered, and they need to be answered.
erable advance over the position that

—

Humanitarian Intervention: Ethically Right, Although Legally Wrong?
Christopher Greenwood:

There is one lesson offered to us that seems to be a pit of vipers that we
need to avoid like the plague. That is the suggestion that it may be better to
proceed on the basis that something is ethically right and not worry too much
if it's legally wrong. Now I can see that there are times when you have a
469

Discussion

_____

where something is ethically justified, and the law has not yet caught
up with that. But when that's the case, surely as lawyers we ought to be trying
to ensure the law is changed in order to accommodate what we recognize as
the ethical need. The suggestion that we can simply fall back on an ethical justification and think that is the end of the matter is frankly wet. It's no good at
all if you've got to defend what we have done in Kosovo in front of an international court. It doesn't give the kind of steer that we ought to be giving to
the people who go out and do the fighting and it's frankly an abdication of our
responsibility as lawyers. It comes pretty much to saying this: "It's too difficult
to formulate a rule that isn't capable of abuse, therefore it would be better if
we don't formulate a rule at all." That's something which I as a lawyer simply
cannot accept. We're paid to deal with difficult situations and we should face
up to our responsibility in that regard.
situation

Adam Roberts:
It's

not

my position that one can summarize

tion for the

Kosovo operation

the state of affairs and justifica-

as ethically right

but legally dubious or legally

wrong. That's a position that was advanced in a number of articles by lawyers,
including the articles by Bruno

Simma and Antonio

Journal of International Law, and
1

take.

It's

perhaps a

I

comment on the

think

Cassese in the European

a very extraordinary position to

it's

puzzling state of the law to say that some-

may be legally dubious, even legally wrong, but ethically right.
The position I would take is different. It is impossible to establish a

thing

right of humanitarian intervention.

significant

tion

There

is

virtually

general

no chance of getting any

group of states to assert a general right of humanitarian interven-

and no serious

mittedly, the

effort

has been

made

since the

Kosovo war

to

do

that.

Ad-

NATO Parliamentary Assembly passed a resolution urging there

should be such a

but they got absolutely nowhere. 2

right,

The reason

they're

nowhere is: first, States that fear they might be the subject of intervention, have recent memories of colonialism, or are governed by seedy dictators
are never going to agree; secondly, the States that might do the intervening
and especially the United States to be not very interested in
turn out

getting

—

1.

Bruno Simma,

—

NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1

(1999); Antonio Cassese,

Ex

10

EUROPEAN JOURNAL

iniuria ius oritur:

Are

We

Moving

towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World

Community?, 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1999).
2. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is completely independent of NATO but constitutes a
link between national parliaments and the Alliance. It encourages governments to take Alliance
concerns into account when framing national legislation. For more information, see the NATO

Handbook

at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hbl601.htm.
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propounding a general doctrine that might obligate them to act in situations

one reason or another they may be unable or unwilling

where

for

simply

no chance of getting an

So there

is

international agreement of the kind that lawyers

might recognize as law asserting a general

However, one can say

to.

—and here

I

right.

we

think

agree

—

may be a tol-

that there

erated occasional practice of intervention. Here the fact that there has been

no General Assembly resolution condemning the Kosovo action and the

March

that the Security Council draft resolution of

fact

1999 put forward by

26,

Russia and others condemning the Kosovo action failed,

evidence that

is

no established general right, certain cases of humanitarian intervention may be tolerated. Another example is the Indian intervention over
East Bengal in 197 1, which was defended partly on grounds similar to those on
which the NATQ action over Kosovo was defended. I think that is as far as
while there

one can

go.

is

It is riot

saying that there

but rather that there

is

an odd

is

a distinction

where a practice

legal situation

One

tolerated that cannot be asserted as a general right.

argument

for

humanitarian intervention

ticular intervention
right.

think

I

it is

seem

to be

if

between ethics and

law,

is

occasionally

actually

weakens the

one makes the legitimacy of a par-

dependent upon the existence of the general

a very occasional practice.

Rein Mullerson:
During
wood.

I

my comments

I

supported the view

also think that there

between what

is

about toleration of certain interventions.

tion

at least

on the use of force.

I

expressed by Chris Green-

cannot be and there shouldn't be such difference

and

ethically or morally right

change in the law or

now

it

undermines,

legally

The
it

toleration of

is

Adam

them

spoke

leads to

destabilizes the existing prohibi-

think that perhaps the least

the use of force for humanitarian purposes

wrong.

that

it is

we can

say today about

not unquestionably un-

—you

lawful in a certain set of circumstances. Every right

is

non-general or otherwise. In international law, and

am not going into theory,

there are treaties that create legal obligations.
obligations, but

I

general

These are not general

customary international law certainly

is

can't say

rights or

general. Therefore,

every right under customary international law has to be general. There was
considerable toleration of Operation Allied Force
for very different reasons.

gence of a
such a

new

rule,

I

think that

this, if it

on the

part of

471

States

hasn't led towards the emer-

has undermined the existence of the rule

rule) prohibiting the use of force for

many
(if

humanitarian purposes.

there was

Discussion

___^___

Green:

Leslie

There probably
vention, but

not at present a general or a non-general right of inter-

is

when

I

look back,

I

often feel that in the humanitarian

field,

our

more advanced than we are. I'm thinking now of the
writings of Grotius, Vattel, Hall, Westlake, and the greatest of them all on the
subject of intervention, Stowell. They would argue that if the situation is so
unique and so outrageous, then while there may not be a right, perhaps we are
moving into a stage where there is a duty to intervene. If we develop the law
classical writers

were

far

with regard to humanitarian principles

we may

find that in the light of

gladesh, in the light of Kosovo, perhaps in the light of

we are now
become so outrageous that we go back
there is a duty upon those who believe in

Rwanda where we

should have taken stronger action,

in a position

tion has

to

that

being and those

who

there are written

Ban-

where the situaHall and Westlake and say

the personality of the

believe in the rule of law; there

is

a

human

duty upon us even

if

documents that suggest we may be going outside the ambit

of the law.

Michael Bothe:
If

law and ethics seem to clash, then something must be wrong either with

The problem we are facing here is that most of us are
lawyers. We know how to make nice arguments of what the law is. My impression is that many people who speak about ethics just feel in their hearts what
the law or with ethics.

it

is.

I

sometimes question whether

this

is

the correct source for ethical

principles.

Ruth Wedgwood:
Actually

it's

a great pity that international law doesn't really have a vocab-

which to recapture the brilliant British distinction between law and
equity that is also found in American nineteenth century jurisprudence. It is
the skeptical doubt that any rule could ever capture all of the necessary
the role of equity contra legem and intra legem. Instead
instances of exception
ulary with

—

we seem

to lapse into almost a sociological or psychological vocabulary of

acquiescence or tolerance or diplomatic signal.
flat rule

piece.

against humanitarian intervention

It's

is

in

My own

suspicion

some ways a

that the

is

historical period

part of anti-colonialism.

One of the curious books in my library is a 1940 monograph by the "German Library of Information" on so-called "Polish Acts of Atrocity Against the
German Minority

in Poland," published in

New

York

in 1940.

The

fact that

humanitarian intervention was proffered by Germany as an excuse
472

for the

^===========_

Discussion

invasion of Czechoslovakia and Poland in

name

for a very long time.

So even

in

World War

The

reflex against

gave

it

a very

bad

Europe the feeling of Turkey or other

States was that mistreatment of coreligionists

intervention.

II

would be used

humanitarian intervention

as

an excuse

may become

for
less

automatic as the majority of members of the United Nations system become

more democratic and mature.
vene because

I

wouldn't go so

far as to

coin a duty to inter-

going to be breached so often.

it's

Adam Roberts:
I

was pleased that

Green put

Leslie

this in its

Maybe

proper context along centu-

we can

blame
Grotius for the way in which the debate has been phrased because he was the
one who actually used the term "right" in respect of intervention for what we
now regard as humanitarian causes. He raised the issue in terms of whether
States had a right to do it. For reasons I've indicated that may be a problematic
way of looking at a very difficult issue. I do think that there is bound to be
skepticism in the post-colonial era about any general assertion of such a right
and for pretty good reasons. One of the most notorious episodes of European
colonialism
the Belgian role in the Congo
began as a humanitarian enterprise with a congress held in Brussels on Central Africa during which the
word humanitarian was uttered countless times. It can very easily happen
that a cause embarked upon for humanitarian or mercy purposes can end up
very nasty as we have seen in Somalia. So the nervousness about a general
right seems to me to be justifiable and not just to be a fad of the present
ries

of historical debate about the issue.

in a sense

all

—

—

post-colonial era.

Where

I

think there

may be

scope for developing a

new

principle

is

in the

direction of thinking about a duty, not to intervene, but a duty to take appropriate action (whatever that

tarian norms. In

many

may be)

in case of extreme violations of humani-

cases, the appropriate action will

not be intervention.

There may be numerous other forms of action that are better for whatever
reasons
prudential reasons, tactical reasons and so on. I think it would be
very unwise to promote the idea of a duty to intervene as such, but a duty to
take action may make more sense.

—

Michael Glennon: 3
I

am

a bit surprised

by both

Adam

Roberts's and Chris Greenwood's dis-

comfort with the notion that ethical or moral considerations may, or could
3.

Professor of Law, University of California at Davis
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under certain circumstances, provide a
tradition of civil disobedience

is

justification for law violation.

of course one with a long-standing and rather

time-honored pedigree and not simply in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
should international law not be subject to the same considerations?
possible that the law has

come over in

to correspond to? Isn't that perhaps precisely

Article 2(4)

needs of

when

NATO

it is

I

myself

Is it

not

that the law seeks

what occurred with respect

confronted the moral justifications or the

leaders?

Why

the fullness of time and the course of re-

cent events to reflect evolving social mores or whatever

it

That

initially

felt

to

ethical

conceptualized this as kind of a

must say on further reflection, I've come to think that the real issue is not whether there is an exception
for humanitarian intervention, but whether there is a rule for which an exception could or should exist. My current conclusion I suppose would be that international law simply provides no satisfactory answer to the question of
problem of civil disobedience in international law.

lawfulness of the

I

NATO intervention in Yugoslavia.

Wolff H. von Heinegg:
If you read Wilhelm Grewe's book Epochs of International Law, which has
now been translated into English by Michael Byers, you will find a chapter on
humanitarian intervention. The discussion that was held in the nineteenth
century and

much

of what has been discussed since Kosovo

is

identical.

Even

though I'm a professor of international law, I have to admit that it's not us
lawyers that make international law. I have always understood international
law to be made by States
law. Necessity

—

I

just

shortened because

who

want

it is

to

main

are the

subjects of public international

remind you that the Latin phrase

opinio juris sive necessitates-

the subject of international law, which

means by

opinio juris

—has to be articulated by

States.

So when

it

humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, there were a couple of States
ously

felt

the necessity to do something.

Whether

is

this will

comes

to

who obvi-

develop into a rule

of international law, customary or whatever, depends on the States and not

on

us.

Is

There a Link Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello?

Wolff H. von Heinegg:

We are not only stepping on a slippery slope

(as

Admiral Robertson put

it)

comes to the question of whether those who are fighting for the just
cause are less bound by jus in bello than the one who is fighting for the unjust

when

it

cause. Let

me

remind you once again that
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consensus of States

is

erate, so everything

son
is

I

which goes beyond these

have learned from

that

on

the utmost the international

we should

belligerents

this

tol-

The

les-

limits

is

clearly illegal.

colloquium, maybe not from the Kosovo conflict,

leave jus in hello as

have problems putting stronger

it is. I

limits

do have severe problems
or by brushing them away and thus jeopardizing the

by referring to jus ad bellum.

with lightening the limits

community is willing to

achievements of the law of armed

certainly

I

conflict.

Henry Shue:
admire Professor Wedgwood's courage in saying the unconventional dur-

I

ing her presentation.

think

I

it's

very helpful, but I'm sure she'll agree that

we're going to speak the unspeakable,

want

to emphasize

how narrow

a point

more

take her suggestion to be that the

we should do
I

very precisely.

I

just

That is, I didn't
one's cause, the more discretion

think there

just

it

if

is

here.

one has about the in bello rules. I took it to be that there are exceptional cases
in which one's moral responsibility is to win because one's adversary is so evil
that

one

is

justified in

doing what one would otherwise not be justified in

doing. I'm willing to concede that there

me

is

such a category in the

abstract,

away from Professor Greenwood. I
also suggest that so far there's only been one case
the Nazi's. The
danger here of course is that since all nations tend to demonize their enemies
anyway (it's sort of notorious that George Bush first referred to Saddam
which
would

I

think puts

a couple of inches

—

Hussein as another Hitler; while Saddam Hussein
he's not a Hitler)

we

really

have to be very

able defeat without atrocity

these very rare cases.

is still

is

careful. It

a nasty piece of work,

seems to

me

that honor-

preferable to victory with atrocity except in

So although

think you're right in principle, I'm not

I

sure that the point shouldn't stay unspoken.

Ruth Wedgwood:
I

take and agree with the point. Indeed one of the problems with codifica-

tion always

is

that (a)

it is

looking for simplicity and (b) both lawyers and

courts take litigating positions.

They choose

to enunciate bright line rules that

they think will lead to the best result in the majority of cases. But most States
also take the relationship

than we ordinarily admit

between jus

in bello

and jus ad bellum

—because very few States

war) would choose to be conquered honorably and

(at least in the

age of total

many States would

use any

means if, in the last analysis, they thought there was a magic bullet
would preserve them from brutal occupation. This is grounded on

justifiable

that

to be broader

475

Discussion

strategic anticipation of

an adversary's expected breach of the laws of honor-

able occupation.

One of the purposes of the
ing occupied

quered

territories)

isn't all

is

law of war

Geneva

IV's provisions protect-

to say to States that the alternative of being con-

that bad because civil

change, but your private

(e.g.,

life

will

go on. There

and private property

life

will

will

be a regime

be preserved and your

can conduct themselves as always. This is simply a quarrel among
princes. But in the age of total war, if one is skeptical about the efficacy of enforcement of Geneva IV or its first-cousin principles, then I think you would
see lots of deviation from jus in hello for the sake of avoiding a devastating occupation and social destruction. In a way, jus in hello is a very, very stringent
families

war (not limited war), most
least in detail, and within the

rule of exhaustion, but in the last analysis, for total

countries would ultimately deviate from

it,

at

bounds of humane standards.

Yves Sandoz:
It is

a fact that the law of

helium and in

hello. I

war

is

fundamentally separated between the ad

share your view that humanitarian law cannot force a

why it's so important to examine the rules for the
That's also why I cannot share your suggestion that in

country to lose a war. That's

conduct of hostilities.

some cases you could violate humanitarian law because if you accept that, it's
the end of humanitarian law. Every State that goes to war believes it is defending a good cause.

Ruth Wedgwood:
We've been talking about
ad helium could be linked.

lots

of different senses in which jus in

hello

and jus

One was Professor Roberts' point that if there are so

many systematic in hello violations,

that itself is the casus

intervention. There's the other argument offered at

helli

for

humanitarian

Nuremberg by the

prose-

an illegal war all acts of force are illeHarvard Professor Sheldon Glueck makes this point in his little volume on

cution, but rejected by the judges, that in
gal.

war crimes, introduced by Justice Robert Jackson. 4 My third type of linkage
was to argue that there may be cases in which the urgency of concluding the
war should influence the interpretation of military necessity or the unclear
borderline between civilian objects and military objects. If indeed Milosevic
had continued killing people at a rapid pace and we knew or could infer that,
then a rapid conclusion of the war would have been all the more urgent.
4.

See

SHELDON GLUECK, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND AGGRESSIVE WAR
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That

in turn

would have arguably

___

_____

of military targets

justified designations

that were realistic in light of the problems of persuading Milosevic to cease

and desist. It's a sliding scale. It's at the edges, but it doesn't mean to reject
what is crucial. I agree with Yves Sandoz and the others that from the point of
view of educating ground-level military operators and ordinary politicians,
one wants to preserve the formal distinction of in hello and ad helium.
Critiquing the Report to the Prosecutor

Natalino Ronzitti:

Adam
ICTY

Roberts said that the Report of the Committee established by the

Prosecutor has not been properly critiqued.

I

heavily criticized the Report to the Prosecutor in

am one of those who have

an

article

published in the

European Journal of International Law. My main critique is that it said the
facts were not well established, that is, that it is the Committee's assertion that
it is

very difficult to establish the facts. This

cutor has the

full

power of the ICTY

to

that the Report has said that the law

court that the law

is

not very

clear.

is

is

very strange because the prose-

summon people. The second critique is
not very

You cannot say within a

clear.

That, together with the anonymity of the

Committee because we don't know officially who they

are,

is

not, I'm afraid, in

keeping with the prestige of this Tribunal.

Adam Roberts:
What

I

intended to say about the

ICTY Report

is

that there hasn't

full-blooded criticism of its conclusion that there were

reference to the
crimes.

ICTY by

On the whole,

those

who

asserted that

no

been

a

violations justifying

NATO

did

commit war

the Report has remained inviolate against that kind of

and it remains a valuable comment on Operation Allied Force. I am
aware of the article that you have contributed on the subject, which

criticism
in fact

does not set out to be the kind of full-blooded critique that
certainly be referring to

I

had

in mind.

I

will

it.

Applying the

Law of Armed

Conflict in the Future

Ruth Wedgwood:

A few responses
The

to

what

I

thought were some very thoughtful comments.

distinction that academics face

exterior view

is

between the

interior

view of law and the

always there. There's a language you speak as a citizen, advo-

cate or judge that has a crisp vocabulary, rejects alternative readings,
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stabilizes the legal text for

the sake of clear communication and workable

guidelines for behavior. But

when you

step back

and ask how

satisfactory that

framework is or what meta-principles will influence interpretation, then you
can dare to be a little more dangerous. Most of my scruples about not losing
wars and avoiding utterly catastrophic humanitarian harm can be accommodated by interpretation within the existing rules of jus
pose

is

judge

the milieu of the decision maker. If you have

who is

in hello.

The worry I sup-

someone

as a

war crimes

deeply skeptical about the right to use force in any circumstance,

who fundamentally

then you're going to get a

at heart is a type of a pacifist,

who survived
Korean War or any number of other conflicts. So my con-

very different reading of these rules than you will from somebody

World War
cern

is

II

or the

how you

explain the appropriate balancing to somebody who's ap-

proaching these rules as an ingenue, which

I

hasten to say the war crimes

tribunal judges are not. Europe has lived through

wars. Don't mistake

its

my

exceptional chancellor's foot for an antinomianism wanting to overthrow the
rules as such.

would be helpful to make some clear distinctions for participants who apply the law of armed conflict. Number one, some textual statements are rules
and others are principles. Some norms are bright-line rules, sharp-edged and
self-executing, and others are circumstance and fact specific and will garner
lots of variation in lawyers' interpretation of what they mean in a particular
circumstance. Professor Dolzer's invocation of margin of appreciation indeed
might be one very good way of putting it into accepted vernacular. But we
have too easily given the impression that all laws of war are created equal, that
they all are equally easily applied, and that all are amenable to application
without experience. In general, I have to agree, we're very far down the road
the cow is out of the barn and
indeed. ICTY, ICTR, ICC, European Court
the only cure for the movement to "juridicalize" war may be the attempt by
the military community and by extraordinary judges like Judge Pocar of really
coming to learn each other's trade craft.
It

—

My advice

to friends in

Washington has been

smother the ICC with seminars. Have

lots

of

that of forced familiarity

—

to

NATO gatherings in which you

begin to educate the judges and persuade them that they do need military law
clerks.

They do need

ever the European equivalent

some of the

They do need to go to whatof CINC conferences to come to understand

a roster of expert witnesses.
is

practical operations of the law of war.

difficult field

because

it

requires people

who

see this as an incredibly

I

are versed in history, versed in

criminal law, versed in international law, versed in humanitarian law, versed
in military operations

and versed

in military law.
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omnicompetent

been cast. But the purpose of
to invoke a sense of modesty in civilian judges and

synthesis. Perhaps the die has

my observation was to try
NGO's (as well as in myself)

in approaching the application of rules to battle-

field operations.
If I

may give

a parallel

New Haven anecdote: Yale used to pride itself on besome of the
of Columbia Circuit,

ing the vanguard for law and psychiatry. Judge David Bazelon, and

other judges

on the US Court of Appeals

thought that

if

for the District

only they could get the right kind of psychiatrists testifying

about the nature of legal insanity and moral choice, they could reform the law

much gnashing
do so would be an abdication from their own responsibility
decide about the nature of moral choice. You couldn't call a

of criminal responsibility. Ultimately the judges decided, after
of teeth, that to

under the law to

randomly-selected expert witness. This wasn't an objective question of fact. In
the context of battlefield law,

my

worry

is

that

if

there

is

a great distance

—

between the two communities of judges and military operators if all you
have is an amateur criminal lawyer, acting as prosecutor, calling random
experts to say what they think should happen on the Kosovo battlefield
then

—

that's

going to inhibit necessary military planning.
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Background and Mandate

I

1.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted

a

bombing

campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from 24 March
1999 to 9 June 1999. During and since that period, the Prosecutor has received numerous requests that she investigate allegations that senior political
and military figures from NATO countries committed serious violations of international humanitarian law during the campaign, and that she prepares indictments pursuant to Article 18(1)

2.

Criticism of the

NATO

varying weight: a) that, as

were

illegal,

and

& (4) of the Statute.

bombing campaign has included allegations of
the resort to force was illegal, all NATO actions

b) that the

NATO forces deliberately attacked civilian infra-

structure targets (and that such attacks were unlawful), deliberately or recklessly

attacked the civilian population, and deliberately or recklessly caused

excessive civilian casualties in disregard of the rule of proportionality by trying
to fight a "zero casualty"

war

for their

own

side. Allegations

concerning the

war involve suggestions that, for example, NATO aircraft opheights which enabled them to avoid attack by Yugoslav defences

"zero casualty"

erated at

and, consequently,

tween military or
far as to

3.

accuse

made

it

impossible for

them

to properly distinguish be-

on the ground. Certain allegations went so
of crimes against humanity and genocide.

civilian objects

NATO

Article 18 of the Tribunal's Statute provides:

"The Prosecutor

shall initiate investigations ex officio or

on the

basis of

information obtained from any source, particularly from Governments,

United Nations organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations.

The

Prosecutor shall assess the information received or

obtained and decide whether there

On

is

sufficient basis to proceed".

May 99 the then Prosecutor established a committee to assess the allegaand material accompanying them, and advise the Prosecutor and Deputy
Prosecutor whether or not there is a sufficient basis to proceed with an investigation into some or all the allegations or into other incidents related to the
NATO bombing.
14

tions

4.

In the course of its work, the

committee has not addressed

sue of the fundamental legality of the use of force by

485

in detail the

is-

NATO members against

Final Report to the Prosecutor

FRY

the

peace and the

activity

ICTY

has no jurisdiction over this offence. (See, however, paras

30 - 34 below).

NATO
by the

is

was unlawful,

such

as, if

could constitute a crime against

noted that the legitimacy of the recourse to force by
a subject before the International Court of Justice in a case brought

FRY

It is

against various

NATO countries.
Review

II

5.

it

Criteria

In the course of its review, the committee has applied the same criteria to

NATO activities that the Office of the Prosecutor
activities of

(OTP) has

applied to the

other actors in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

The com-

mittee paid particular heed to the following questions:
a.

Are the

prohibitions alleged sufficiently well-established as viola-

tions of international humanitarian law to

cution,

form the

and does the application of the law

basis of a prose-

to the particular facts

reasonably suggest that a violation of these prohibitions

may have

occurred?

and
b.

This

upon the reasoned evaluation of the information by the committee,
is the information credible and does it tend to show that crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal may have been committed by
individuals during the NATO bombing campaign?

latter question reflects the earlier

approach in relation to Article 18(1) of

the Statute taken by the Prosecutor when asserting her right to investigate
gations of crimes committed by Serb forces in

Pursuant

to

Rule 7

bis)

I

the Prosecutor,

(B) that the President Notify the Security Council

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Article 29, dated

Kosovo (Request by

Has

February 1999).

Failed to

The

Comply With

Its

alle-

That

Obligations

the

Under

threshold test expressed therein by the

Prosecutor was that of "credible evidence tending to show that crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal

may have been committed

in Kosovo".

That

what situation the Prosecutor would consider,
for jurisdiction purposes, that she had a legal entitlement to investigate. (As a
corollary, any investigation failing to meet that test could be said to be arbitrary
and capricious, and to fall outside the Prosecutor's mandate). Thus formulated,
test

was advanced

to explain in

the test represents a negative cut-off point for investigations.

The

Prosecutor

may, in her discretion require that a higher threshold be met before making a
positive decision that there

is

sufficient basis to

(In fact, in relation to the situation

proceed under Article 18(1).

on the ground
486

in Kosovo, the Prosecutor
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was in possession of a considerable body of evidence pointing to the commission of widespread atrocities by Serb forces.) In practice, before deciding to

open an investigation

in

any case, the Prosecutor

number of other factors concerning the prospects

will also take into

for obtaining

account a

evidence

suffi-

been committed by an individual who merits

cient to prove that the crime has

prosecution in the international forum.

Work Program

Ill

6.

The committee has
a.

documents sent
to

commence

reviewed:

to the

OTP by persons or groups wishing the OTP

investigations of leading persons

from

NATO coun-

tries,

b.

c.

documents made available by NATO, the US Department of
Defense and the British Ministry of Defence,

public

documents hied by the FRY before the ICJ, a large number of other
FRY documents, and also the two volume compilation of the FRY
Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled

NATO

Crimes

in Yugoslavia

(White Book),

d.

various documents submitted by
letter sent to the Secretary

Human Rights Watch including a

General of

NATO during the bombing

campaign, a paper on NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions, and a report

on
e.

a

Civilian Deaths in the

UNEP study: The Kosovo Conflict: Consequence for the Environment

and

f.

g.

h.

NATO Air Campaign,

Human

Settlements,

documents submitted by

a Russian Parliamentary

Commission,

two studies by a German national, Mr. Ekkehard Wenz, one concerning the bombing of a train at the Grdelica Gorge and the other
concerning the bombing of the Djakovica Refugee Convoy,
various newspaper reports and legal articles as they have
the attention of committee members,
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the response to a letter containing a

i.

number of questions

sent to

NATO by the OTP, and
an Amnesty International Report entitled "Collateral Damage* or
Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Op-

j.

eration Allied Force.

should be noted that the committee did not travel to the

7.

It

not

solicit

information from the

FRY

channels existed during the period

through

when

channels as no such

official

Most of
the public domain. The com-

the review was conducted.

the material reviewed by the committee was in
mittee has relied exclusively

FRY and it did

on documents. The FRY submitted

to the Prose-

amount of material concerning particular incidents. In
what happened on the ground, the committee relied

cutor a substantial

attempting to assess

upon the Human Rights Watch Report entitled Civilian Deaths in the NATO
Air Campaign and upon the documented accounts in the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs volumes entitled NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia. The committee
also relied heavily on NATO press statements and on the studies done by Mr.
Ekkehard Wenz. The information available was adequate for making a preliminary assessment of incidents in which civilians were killed or injured. Information related to attacks on objects where civilians were not killed or injured
was difficult to obtain and very little usable information was obtained.
8.

To

Analysis
all

the preparation of an Interim Report, a

assist in

Team reviewed

the documents available in the

the

OTP

to

pared: a) a

NATO,

list

f)

a

of key incidents, b) a

list

list

g) a list

on

list

of civilian residential targets, c) a

of communications targets. Very

The committee reviewed
file

response to the letter sent by

of cultural property targets, e) a

available concerning the targets in

a

NATO's

list

list

of power

pre-

of ci-

facility

of targets the destruction of which might significantly affect the

environment, and

9.

entitled

and the Amnesty International Report. The analyst

vilian facility targets, d) a
targets,

FRY volumes

is,

HRW report on Civilian Deaths in the NATO

Air Campaign, the studies by Mr. Wenz,
the

of the Military

OTP at the time, that

those referred to in paragraph 6 above except the

NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia,

member

containing

all

lists (b)

through

little

information was

(g).

and requested the preparation of
available information on certain particular incidents, and

certain target categories.

the above

(It

lists

should be noted that the use of the terms

"target" or "attack" in this report does not
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mean

that in every case the site in

.
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question was deliberately struck by

NATO. The

which it is alleged that
aged in the course of the bombing campaign)

hand

for incidents in

The key
a.

on

the attack

- 10

a civilian passenger train at the Grdelica

or

more

civilians killed, 15 or

more

dam-

on the Djakovica Convoy - 14/4/99 - 70-75
100 or more injured,
on Surdulica,

the attack

-

27/4/99 -

1 1

Gorge -

injured,

the attack
killed,

c.

particular locations were

incidents and target categories were:

12/4/99

b.

terms are convenient short-

civilians killed,

civilians

100 or more

injured,

d.

the attack

on Cuprija - 8/4/99 -

e.

the attack

on the Cigota Medical

civilian killed, 5 injured,

1

Institute

- 8/4/99 - 3

civilians

killed,

f.

g.

h.

the attack

on Hotels Baciste and Putnik - 13/4/99 -

1

civilian killed,

on the Pancevo Petrochemical Complex and Fertilizer
Company - 15/4/99 and 18/4/99 - no reported civilian casualties,
the attacks

the attack

on the Nis Tobbaco Factory - 18/4/99 - no reported

ci-

vilian casualties,

i.

the attack
killed,

j.

on the Djakovica Refugee Camp - 21/4/99 - 5

civilians

16-19 injured,

-the attack

on

a bus at

v
Lu ane -

1/5/99 39 civilians killed,

on a bus at Pec - 3/5/99 -

k.

the attack

1.

the attack at Korisa village

m. the attack on the Belgrade

1

7 civilians killed,

- 13/5/99 - 48-87

44 injured,

civilians killed,

TV and Radio Station - 23/4/99 - 16 ci-

vilians killed,
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the attack

n.

o.

on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade - 7/5/99 - 3

killed,

15 injured,

attack

on Nis City Centre and Hospital - 7/5/99 - 13

killed,

60

injured,

p.

attack

on

Istok Prison

q.

attack

on Belgrade Hospital - 20/5/99 - 3

- 21/5/99 -

civilians

civilians

at least 19 civilians killed,

civilians killed, several in-

jured,

r.

attack on Surdulica Sanatorium - 30/5/99 - 23 killed,

s.

attack

on

journalists

civilian killed

10.

attack

u.

attacks

cluding

all

convoy Prizren-Brezovica Road - 31/5/99 -

1

3 injured

on Belgrade Heating Plant -

t.

On 23 July

-

many injured,

4/4/99,

-

1

killed,

on Trade and Industry Targets.

member was provided with

a binder in-

The committee members reviewed

material in

1999, each committee

available material.

the binders.

1 1

In addition to reviewing factual information, the committee has also gath-

ered legal materials and reviewed relevant legal issues, including the legality of
the use of depleted uranium projectiles, the legality of the use of cluster munitions,

pact

12.

whether or not the bombing campaign had an unlawfully adverse im-

on the environment, and

legal issues related to target selection.

The committee prepared an

interim report

on the

basis of

its

analysis of

the legal and factual material available and this was presented to the Prosecu-

on 6 December 1999. At the direction of the Prosecutor, the committee
then further updated the incident list and prepared a list of general questions
tor

and questions related to specific incidents. A letter enclosing the questionnaire and incident list was sent to NATO on 8 February 2000. A general reply
was received on 10 May 2000.
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13. It

has not been possible for the committee to look at the

campaign on a bomb by bomb

basis

and that was not

its

NATO bombing

task.

The committee

has, however, reviewed public information concerning several incidents, in-

cluding

all

the

more

well

known

incidents, with considerable care.

It

has also

endeavored to examine, and has posed questions to NATO, concerning
other incidents in which it appears three or more civilians were killed.
In conducting

which

its

review, the committee has focused primarily

civilian deaths

in

were alleged and/or confirmed. The committee reviewed

certain key incidents in depth for

its

interim report. These key incidents in-

cluded 10 incidents in which 10 or more civilians were

Human Rights Watch revealed
killed, all

on incidents

all

killed.

The review by

12 incidents in which 10 or more civilians were

of the incidents identified by the committee plus two additional inci-

on the Aleksinak "Deligrad" military barracks on 5/5/99 in
which 10 civilians were killed and 30 wounded (a bomb aimed at the barracks
fell short) and b) the attack on a military barracks in Novi Pazar on 3 1/5/99 in
which 1 1 civilians were killed and 23 wounded (5 out of 6 munitions hit the
target but one went astray). The committee's review of incidents in which it is
alleged fewer than three civilians were killed has been hampered by a lack of redents: a) the attack

,

liable information.

IV

Assessment

A. General Issues

i.

14.

Damage

The

to the

Environment

NATO bombing campaign did

ment. For instance, attacks on industrial
oil installations

cause some damage to the environfacilities

such as chemical plants and

were reported to have caused the release of pollutants,

al-

unknown. The basic legal provisions applicable to protection of the environment in armed conflict are Article
35(3) of Additional Protocol I, which states that '[i]t is prohibited to employ
methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment'
and Article 55 which states:
though the exact extent of

1.

Care

shall

this

is

presently

be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment

against widespread, long- term

and severe damage. This protection
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means of warfare
which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the
natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival
includes a prohibition of the use of methods or

of the population.

Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are pro-

2.

hibited

USA nor France has ratified Additional Protocol

Neither the

15.

may, nevertheless,

I.

Article 55

however the 1996 Adviof Nuclear Weapons, where the International

reflect current

customary law

(see

Opinion on the Legality
Court of Justice appeared to suggest that it does not (ICJ Rep. (1996), 242,
para. 31)). In any case, Articles 35(3) and 55 have a very high threshold of application. Their conditions for application are extremely stringent and their
scope and contents imprecise. For instance, it is generally assumed that Articles 35(3) and 55 only cover very significant damage. The adjectives 'widespread, long-term, and severe' used in Additional Protocol I are joined by the
word 'and', meaning that it is a triple, cumulative standard that needs to be
sory

fulfilled.

Consequently,

upon the
stance,
col

I

basis

it is

would appear extremely difficult to develop a prima facie case
of these provisions, even assuming they were applicable. For init

thought that the notion of 'long-term' damage in Additional Proto-

would need

measured in years rather than months, and that as such,
damage of the kind caused to France in World War I would

to be

ordinary battlefield

not be covered.

The

great difficulty of assessing whether environmental

threshold of Additional Protocol

I

damage exceeded the

has also led to criticism by ecologists. This

may partly explain the disagreement as to whether any of the damage caused by
the

oil spills

and

fires in

the 1990/91 Gulf War technically crossed the thresh-

old of Additional Protocol

It is

I.

the committee's view that similar difficulties would exist in applying Addi-

even if reliable environmental assessments were to give rise to legitimate concern concerning the impact of the
NATO bombing campaign. Accordingly, these effects are best considered from
tional Protocol

I

to the present facts,

the underlying principles of the law of armed conflict such as necessity and
proportionality.
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The

16.

conclusions of the Balkan Task Force (BTF) established by

UNEP to

look into the Kosovo situation are:

"Our

findings indicate that the

Kosovo

conflict has not caused

an

environmental catastrophe affecting the Balkans region as a whole.
Nevertheless, pollution detected at
threat to

some

sites is serious

and poses a

human health.

BTF was able

namely in Pancevo,
Kragujevac, Novi Sad and Bor, where immediate action and also further
monitoring and analyses will be necessary. At all of these sites,
environmental contamination due to the consequences of the Kosovo
conflict

was

to identify environmental 'hot spots',

identified.

Part of the contamination identified at

Kosovo

conflict,

and there

is

some

sites clearly

pre-dates the

evidence of long- term deficiencies in the

treatment and storage of hazardous waste.

The problems

immediate attention, irrespective of

identified require

their cause, if further

damage

to

human

health and the environment

is

to be avoided."

The

17.

OTP

has been hampered in

its

assessment of the extent of environ-

mental damage in Kosovo by a lack of alternative and corroborated sources
garding the extent of environmental contamination caused by the

bombing campaign. Moreover,
curred only a year ago, the

it is

quite possible that, as this

UNEP study may not be

re-

NATO

campaign oc-

a reliable indicator of the

NATO bombing,

as accurate

assessments regarding the long-term effects of this contamination

may not yet

long term environmental consequences of the

be practicable.

It is

possession, that

its

on the basis of information currently in
the environmental damage caused during the NATO

the opinion of the committee,

bombing campaign does not reach the Additional Protocol
dition, the

UNEP

tamination which

Report also suggests that
is

much

I

threshold. In ad-

of the environmental con-

discernible cannot unambiguously be attributed to the

NATO bombing.
The alleged environmental effects of the NATO bombing campaign flow
many cases from NATO's striking of legitimate military targets compatible

18.

in
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with Article 52 of Additional Protocol

fundamental importance

for the

I

such as stores of

conduct of war and

fuel, industries

of

manufacture of

for the

and material of a military character, factories or plant and manufacturing centres of fundamental importance for the conduct of war. Even when

supplies

need to avoid excessive long-term damage to the economic infrastructure and natural environment with a consequential adverse effect on the civilian population. Indeed,
targeting admittedly legitimate military objectives, there

is

military objectives should not be targeted

likely to

eral

if

the attack

is

a

cause collat-

environmental damage which would be excessive in relation to the direct

which the attack is expected to produce (A.P.V. Rogers,
"Zero Casualty Warfare," IRRC, March 2000, Vol. 82, pp. 177-8).

military advantage

19. It

is

difficult to assess

the relative values to be assigned to the military ad-

vantage gained and harm to the natural environment, and the application of
the principle of proportionality
In applying this principle,

it is

in relation to the incidental

is

more

easily stated

necessary to assess the importance of the target

damage expected:

if

the target

portant, a greater degree of risk to the environment

20.

The

than applied in practice.

adverse effect of the coalition

air

campaign

may be
in the

is

sufficiently im-

justified.

Gulf war upon the

prompted concern on the part of some experts regarding the notion of "military objective." This has prompted some experts to argue that where the presumptive effect of hostilities upon the civilian
civilian infrastructure

infrastructure (and consequently the civilian population)

is

grave, the military

advantage conferred by the destruction of the military objective would need
to be decisive (see below, paras. 40-41). Similar considerations would, in the

committee's view, be warranted where the grave threat to the civilian infra-

emanated instead from excessive environmental harm resulting
from the hostilities. The critical question is what kind of environmental damage can be considered to be excessive. Unfortunately, the customary rule of
structure

proportionality does not include any concrete guidelines to this effect.

The

worth of the target would need to be considered in relation
to the circumstances prevailing at the time. If there is a choice of weapons or
methods of attack available, a commander should select those which are
21.

military

most

likely to avoid, or at least

ever,

he

ons and

is

minimize, incidental damage. In doing so, how-

entitled to take account of factors such as stocks of different

likely future

demands, the timeliness of attack and

forces (A.P.V. Rogers,

ibid,

at p. 178). Operational reality
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risks to his

own

recognized in the

Appendix A
Statute of the International Criminal Court, an authoritative indicator of

on

where Article 8(b)(iv)
makes the infliction of incidental environmental damage an offence only if the
attack is launched intentionally in the knowledge that it will cause widespread, long- term and severe damage to the natural environment which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. The use of the word "clearly' ensures that criminal
responsibility would be entailed only in cases where the excessiveness of the
incidental damage was obvious.
evolving customary international law

Taken

22.

this point,

together, this suggests that in order to satisfy the requirement of

known or can reasonably be assumed to cause grave environmental harm may need to confer a
very substantial military advantage in order to be considered legitimate. At a
proportionality, attacks against military targets

minimum,

which

are

actions resulting in massive environmental destruction, especially

where they do not serve a clear and important military purpose, would be
questionable. The targeting by NATO of Serbian petro-chemical industries
may well have served a clear and important military purpose.

The above considerations also suggest that the requisite mens rea on
part of a commander would be actual or constructive knowledge as to
23.

the
the

grave environmental effects of a military attack; a standard which would be
difficult to establish for

the purposes of prosecution and which

insufficient basis to prosecute military

harm in the (mistaken)

belief that

commanders
Nuremberg

the Hostages case before the

stance, the

German General Rendulic was
on the grounds

environmental

such conduct was warranted by military ne-

cessity. (In

devastation

inflicting

may provide an

Military Tribunals, for in-

acquitted of the charge of

that although Rendulic

may have

wanton

erred in believ-

ing that there was military necessity for the widespread environmental destruction entailed by his use of a Scorched earth' policy in the

Norwegian

province of Finnmark, he was not guilty of a criminal act (11 Trials of
Criminals, (1950), 1296)). In addition, the notion of 'excessive'
tal

destruction

is

difficult to

environmen-

imprecise and the actual environmental impact, both pres-

ent and long term, of the

and

War

NATO bombing campaign

is

at present

unknown

measure.

24. In order to fully evaluate

such matters,

extent of the knowledge possessed by

it

would be necessary to know the

NATO as to the nature of Serbian mili-

tary-industrial targets (and thus, the likelihood of
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NATO could reasonably
(for instance, could NATO

flowing from their destruction) the extent to which
,

have anticipated such environmental damage

have reasonably expected that toxic chemicals of the sort allegedly released
into the environment by the
that military target?)

other (and

bombing campaign would be stored alongside

and whether

NATO could reasonably have resorted to

environmentally damaging) methods for achieving

less

its

military

objective of disabling the Serbian military-industrial infrastructure.

25.

It is

therefore the opinion of the committee, based

rently available to

it,

OTP

that the

into the collateral environmental

should not

on information

commence an

investigation

NATO

damage caused by the

cur-

bombing

campaign.

ii.

Use of Depleted Uranium

26.

There

aircraft

use of

is

Projectiles

evidence of use of depleted uranium (DU) projectiles by

during the bombing campaign. There

DU projectiles. There

is

is

no

specific treaty

a developing scientific debate

pressed regarding the impact of the use of such projectiles
that, in future, there will

NATO

ban on the

and concern exand it is possible

be a consensus view in international legal

circles that

use of such projectiles violate general principles of the law applicable to use of

weapons

in

armed

conflict.

in the case of nuclear

No such consensus exists at present.

Indeed, even

warheads and other weapons of mass-destruction -

those which are universally acknowledged to have the most deleterious envi-

ronmental consequences -

it is

difficult to

argue that the prohibition of their

Weapons, IC] Rep. (1996), 242).
In view of the uncertain state of development of the legal standards governing
use

is

in all cases absolute. (Legality of Nuclear

this area,

it

should be emphasised that the use of depleted uranium or other

potentially hazardous substance by any adversary to conflicts within the for-

mer Yugoslavia
Prosecutor.

armed
ever,

It is

conflict

it is

since 1991 has not formed the basis of any charge laid by the

acknowledged that the underlying principles of the law of

such as proportionality are applicable also in

this context;

how-

the committee's view that analysis undertaken above (paras. 14-25)

with regard to environmental damage would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the
use of depleted uranium projectiles by

NATO.

on information
should not commence an investigation
the committee, based

tiles

by

NATO.
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into use of depleted

OTP

uranium projec-
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Use of Cluster Bombs

Hi.

27. Cluster

bombs were used by NATO

forces during the

bombing campaign.

no specific treaty provision which prohibits or restricts the use of cluster bombs although, of course, cluster bombs must be used in compliance with

There

is

weapons.

Human

the general principles applicable to the use of

all

Watch

alleging that the high "dud"

has

condemned the use of cluster bombs

Rights

bombs

or failure rate of the submunitions (bomblets) contained inside cluster

converts these submunitions into antipersonnel landmines which,

now

are

under

prohibited

customary

international

it

Whether

law.

antipersonnel landmines are prohibited under current customary law
able,

although there

is

a strong trend in that direction.

general legal consensus that cluster

antipersonnel landmines.

an

It

bombs

There

is,

are, in legal terms,

asserts,

is

debat-

however, no

equivalent to

should be noted that the use of cluster bombs was

issue of sorts in the Martic

Rule 61 Hearing Decision of Trial Chamber

I

on

Chamber stated there was no formal provision forbidding the use of cluster bombs as such (para. 18 of judgment) but it
regarded the use of the Orkan rocket with a cluster bomb warhead in that par8

March

1996. In that decision the

evidence of the intent of the accused to deliberately attack the

ticular case as

civilian population

because the rocket was inaccurate,

with no military objectives nearby,

was used

as

landed in an area

an antipersonnel weapon

Zagreb and the accused indicated he intended to
as such (paras. 23-31 of judgment). The Chamber concluded

launched against the
attack the city

it

it

that "the use of the

city of

Orkan rocket

in this case

was not designed to

hit military

targets but to terrorise the civilians of Zagreb" (para. 31 of judgment).

There

is

bombs were used in such a fashion by NATO. It is the
opinion of the committee, based on information presently available, that the
OTP should not commence an investigation into use of cluster bombs as such
no indication

by

cluster

NATO.

iv.

Legal Issues Related to Target Selection

a.

Overview of Applicable Law

28. In brief, in

combat

military

commanders

operations against military objectives, and b)

are required: a) to direct their

when

directing their operations

against military objectives, to ensure that the losses to the civilian population

and the damage to civilian property are not disproportionate to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated. Attacks which are not directed
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against military objectives (particularly attacks directed against the civilian

population) and attacks which cause disproportionate civilian casualties or
vilian property
ful

damage may

ci-

constitute the actus reus for the offence of unlaw-

attack under Article 3 of the

ICTY Statute. The mens

rea for the offence

is

intention or recklessness, not simple negligence. In determining whether or

not the mens rea requirement has been met,

commanders deciding on an attack have
to

a)

do everything practicable

it

should be borne in mind that

duties:

to verify that the objectives to be at-

tacked are military objectives,

to take

b)

all

practicable precautions in the choice of

means of warfare with

methods and

a view to avoiding or, in any event to mini-

mizing incidental civilian casualties or civilian property damage,

and
to refrain from launching attacks

c)

which may be expected

to cause

disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property damage.

29.

One

of the principles underlying international humanitarian law

principle of distinction,

which

is

the

commanders to distinguish
persons or objects. The practical ap-

obligates military

between military objectives and
plication of this principle

is

civilian

effectively encapsulated in Article

tional Protocol which, in part, obligates those

who

57 of Addi-

plan or decide upon an

attack to "do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked
are neither civilians nor civilian objects".
sible

is

high but not absolute.

A military

intelligence gathering system to collect

potential targets.

The obligation to do everything feacommander must set up an effective

and evaluate information concerning

The commander must

also direct his forces to use available

means to properly identify targets during operations. Both the commander and the aircrew actually engaged in operations must have some range
technical

of discretion to determine which available resources shall be used and

how

they shall be used. Further, a determination that inadequate efforts have been

made
jects

to distinguish

between military objectives and

civilians or civilian ob-

should not necessarily focus exclusively on a specific incident.

tionary measures have

worked adequately

If

precau-

in a very high percentage of cases

then the fact they have not worked well in a small number of cases does not
necessarily

mean

they are generally inadequate.
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Law Concerning Recourse

b.

Linkage Between

ing

How Force May Be Used
have been made

to Force

NATO's

and Law Concern-

was not authorized by the Security Council or in self-defence, that the resort to force was
illegal and, consequently, all forceful measures taken by NATO were unlaw30. Allegations

These

ful.

jus

that, as

resort to force

allegations justify a brief discussion of the jus ad bellum. In brief, the

ad bellum regulates

shrined in the

when

states

may

use force and

is,

for the

most

part, en-

UN Charter. In general, states may use force in self defence

(in-

and for very few other purposes. In particular, the
legitimacy of the presumed basis for the NATO bombing campaign, humanidividual or collective)

tarian intervention without prior Security Council authorization,

bated.

That being

said, as

is

hotly de-

noted in paragraph 4 above, the crime related to an

unlawful decision to use force

is

the crime against peace or aggression. While a

person convicted of a crime against peace may, potentially, be held criminally
responsible for
conflict, the

31.

The jus

all

of the activities causing death, injury or destruction during a

ICTY

does not have jurisdiction over crimes against peace.

in hello regulates

how states may use

force.

The ICTY

has jurisdic-

tion over serious violations of international humanitarian law as specified in

Articles 2-5 of the Statute.

32.

The

precise linkage

These are jus

in hello offences.

between jus ad helium and jus

in hello is

not completely

re-

There were suggestions by the prosecution before the International MiliTribunal at Nuremberg and in some other post World War II war crimes

solved.
tary

cases that

all

of the killing and destruction caused by

crimes because the

Germans were conducting an

German

aggressive war.

forces

The

were war

courts were

unreceptive to these arguments. Similarly, in the 1950's there was a debate concerning whether
hello as

UN

authorized forces were required to comply with the jus in

they represented the good side in a battle between good an

evil.

This de-

bate died out as the participants realized that a certain crude reciprocity was essential

if

the law was to have any positive impact.

An

argument that the "bad"

had to comply with the law while the "good" side could
would be most unlikely to reduce human suffering in conflict.
side

33.

More

recently, a refined

violate

it

at will

approach to the linkage issue has been advocated

by certain law of war scholars. Using their approach, assuming that the only
lawful basis for recourse to force
flict

is

self defence,

must be measured by whether or not
499
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complies with the jus

in hello

and
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by whether or not

it

complies with the necessity and proportionality require-

ments of self defence. The difficulty with this approach is that it does not adequately address what should be done when it is unclear who is acting in self
defence and it does not clarify the obligations of the "bad" side.

34.

As

a matter of practice,

which we consider

widely accepted and reputable legal opinion,

to be in accord with the

we

in the

most

OTP have deliberately

work and focused excluon whether or not individuals have committed serious violations of in-

refrained from assessing jus ad bellum issues in our
sively

ternational humanitarian law as assessed within the confines of the jus in

c.

The

35.

The most widely accepted

cle

hello.

military objective

52 of Additional Protocol

definition of "military objective"
I

which

is

that in Arti-

states in part:

In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those
objects

which by

their nature, location, purpose or use

make an effective

contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,

capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers
a definite military advantage.

36.

Where

objects are concerned, the definition has

nature, location, purpose or use

(a) their

effective contribution to mili-

(b) their total

or partial destruction, capture or neutralization

offer a definite military

advantage in the circumstances ruling at the

tary action,

must

and

must make an

two elements:

Although this definition does not refer to persons, in general, members
of the armed forces are considered combatants, who have the right to participate directly in hostilities, and as a corollary, may also be attacked.
time.

37.

The definition is supposed

to provide a

means whereby informed

objective

observers (and decision makers in a conflict) can determine whether or not a
particular object constitutes a military objective.
in simple cases.

Everyone

will agree that a

It

accomplishes this purpose

munitions factory

is

a military ob-

and an unoccupied church is a civilian object. When the definition is
applied to dual- use objects which have some civilian uses and some actual or
potential military use (communications systems, transportation systems, petrochemical complexes, manufacturing plants of some types), opinions may dif-

jective

fer.

The

application of the definition to particular objects
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depending on the scope and objectives of the
objectives of the conflict

38.

Using the Protocol

I

may change during

advanced a tentative

list

military personnel

being

scope and

the conflict.

own review of state practice, Major
Director of British Army Legal Services has

definition

General A.P.V. Rogers, a former

conflict. Further, the

and

his

of military objectives:

and persons who take part in the

members of the armed

forces,

military

fighting without

facilities,

military

equipment, including military vehicles, weapons, munitions and stores
of fuel, military works, including defensive works and fortifications,

depots

military

Ministries,

and

War and

including

establishments,

Supply

works producing or developing military supplies and other

supplies of military value, including metallurgical, engineering

chemical industries supporting the war

effort; areas

and

of land of military

and bridgeheads; railways, ports,
airfields, bridges, main roads as well as tunnels and canals; oil and other
installations;
communications
installations,
including
power
broadcasting and television stations and telephone and telegraph
stations used for military communications. (Rogers, Law on the
significance such as

Battlefield

The

hills,

defiles

(1996) 37)

was not intended to be exhaustive. It remains a requirement that both
elements of the definition must be met before a target can be properly considlist

ered an appropriate military objective.

39. In 1956, the International

the following proposed

I.

The

list

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) drew up

of categories of military objectives:

objectives belonging to the following categories are those con-

sidered to be of generally recognized military importance:

(1)

Armed

forces,

including

auxiliary

or

complementary

and persons who, though not belonging
above -mentioned formations, nevertheless take part

organisations,

to the
in the

fighting.

(2) Positions, installations or

indicated

in

constructions occupied by the forces

sub-paragraph
501

1

above,

as

well

as

combat
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objectives (that

is

to say, those objectives

which are

directly

contested in battle between land or sea forces including
airborne forces).

constructions and other works of a military

(3) Installations,

nature, such as barracks, fortifications,
Ministries

of

War

Ministries

(e.g.

Army, Navy, Air Force, National Defence,

Supply) and other organs for the direction and administration
of military operations.

(4) Stores

of army or military supplies, such as munition dumps,

stores of equipment or fuel, vehicles parks.

(5) Airfields,

(6)

rocket launching ramps and naval base installations.

Those of the

and means of communications (railway lines,
tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental

lines

roads, bridges,

military importance.

(7)

The

and television stations;
telephone and telegraph exchanges of fundamental military
installations

of broadcasting

importance.

(8) Industries

of fundamental importance for the conduct of the

war:

(a)

industries for the manufacture of armaments such as

ons, munitions, rockets,
craft,

fighting

accessories

and

(b) industries for

ships,
all

(c)

including

vehicles, military air-

the

manufacture

of

other war material;

the manufacture of supplies and material of a

military character,

material,

armoured

weap-

such as transport and communications

equipment of the armed

forces;

factories or plant constituting other production

and manu-

facturing centres of fundamental importance for the con-

duct of war, such as the metallurgical, engineering and
502
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chemical industries, whose nature or purpose

essentially

is

military;

(d) storage

and transport installations whose basic function it is

to serve the industries referred to in (a) -(c);

(e)

installations providing energy
e.g. coal,

other

fuels, or

mainly for national defence,

atomic energy, and plants produc-

ing gas or electricity mainly for military consumption.

experimental, research centres for

(9) Installations constituting

experiments on and the development of weapons and war
material.

The

II.

following however, are excepted from the foregoing

(1) Persons, constructions, installations or transports

protected under the Geneva Conventions

I,

II, III,

list:

which are
of August

12, 1949;

(2)

Non-combatants

armed

in the

forces

who

obviously take

no

active or direct part in hostilities.

The above

III.

list

will

be reviewed at intervals of not more than ten

years by a group of Experts

composed of persons with

a

sound grasp

of military strategy and of others concerned with the protection of
the civilian population.

(Y.

Sandoz, C. Swiniarski, B. Zimmerman,

tional Protocols of 8 June

1977

to the

eds.,

Commentary on

the

Addi-

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949

(1987) at 632-633.

40.

The

Protocol

I

definition of military objective has

Hays Parks, the Special Assistant

for

Law

of

War

been

criticized

Matters to the U.S.

W.
Army

by

Judge Advocate General as being focused too narrowly on definite military advantage and paying too

nomic

Law
ics

targets

such

of War," 32

little

heed to war sustaining

as export industries.

A.RL.

Rev.

1,

capability, including eco-

(W. Hays Parks, "Air

135-45 (1990)).

War and

the

On the other hand, some crit-

of Coalition conduct in the Gulf War have suggested that the Coalition air
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campaign, directed admittedly against legitimate military objectives within

damage to
the Iraqi economic infrastructure with a consequential adverse effect on the
civilian population. (Middle East Watch, Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian Casualties during the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War
(1991); Judith G. Gardam, "Proportionality and Force in International Law,"
87 Am. J. MIL. 391,404-10 (1993)).
the scope of the Protocol

definition, caused excessive long-term

I

gone unexplored. Franchise Hampson, a

41. This criticism has not

British

scholar, has suggested a possible refinement of the definition:

In order to determine whether there

a real subject of concern here,

is

would be necessary to establish exactly what the

damage

been of the

effect has

to the civilian infrastructure brought about by the hostilities. If

that points to a

needed

it

is

need further

to refine the law,

it is

submitted that what is

a qualification to the definition of military objectives. Either

it

should require the likely cumulative effect on the civilian population of
attacks against such targets to be taken into account, or the

same

might be achieved by requiring that the destruction of the object
definite military

result
offer a

advantage in the context of the war aim. Frangoise

Hampson, "Means and Methods of Warfare in the Conflict in the Gulf,"
in P. Rowe, ed., The Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law
89 (1983) 100.

42.

Although the Protocol

cism,

it

I

definition of military objective

provides the contemporary standard which must be used

ing to determine the lawfulness of particular attacks.

noted once again neither the

The
43.

not beyond

is

definition

is,

That being

when
said,

it

criti-

attempt-

must be

USA nor France is a party to Additional Protocol

I.

however, generally accepted as part of customary law.

To put the NATO campaign in context,

it is

instructive to look briefly at the

approach to the military objective concept in history of air warfare. The Protocol
standard was not applicable during

World War

II.

The bomber

I

offensives con-

ducted during that war were conducted with technological means which rendered attacks on targets occupying small areas almost impossible. In general,

depending upon the period in the

conflict,

at best, to strike within 5 miles, 2 miles or

mission for the

bomber
1

attacks could be relied upon,

mile of the designated target.

US/UK Combined Bomber Offensive
504

from the

UK was:

The
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"To conduct a

United States-British

joint

air offensive to

the progressive destruction and dislocation of the

accomplish

German

military,

and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of
the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance
is fatally weakened. This is construed as meaning so weakened as to
industrial

permit initiation of final combined operations on the Continent."
(A. Verrier,

The

The Bomber Offensive (1968) 330).

principal specific objectives of the offensive were designated as:

"Submarine construction yards and bases.

German

aircraft industry.

Ball bearings.
Oil.

Synthetic rubber and

tires.

Military transport vehicles."

(A. Verrier,

ibid, at

330).

Notwithstanding the designation of specific targets and the attempt,

at least

by

US Army Air Force commanders on occasion, to conduct a precision bombing
campaign, for the most part World War II bombing campaigns were aimed at
area targets and intended, directly or indirectly, to affect the morale of the en-

emy civilian population. It is difficult to describe the fire bombing of Hamburg,
Dresden and Tokyo as anything other than attacks intended to kill, terrorize or
demoralize civilians. Whether or not these attacks could be justified legally in
the total war context of the time, they
to

comply with Protocol

would be unlawful

if

they were required

I.

and the public consensus of what was acceptable, at
least in demonstrably limited conflicts, had evolved by the time of the 1990-91
Gulf Conflict. Technological developments, such as precision guided munitions, and the rapid acquisition of control of the aerospace by coalition air
forces significantly enhanced the precision with which targets could be

44. Technology, law,

attacked.

Target sets used during the Gulf Conflict were:
"Leadership;

Command,

Control, and Communications; Strategic Air

Defenses; Airfields; Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Research and
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Production; Naval Forces and Port Facilities; Military Storage and
Production; Railroads and Bridges, Electrical Power; and Oil Refining

and Distribution Facilities. Schwarzkopf added the Republican Guard
as a category and Scuds soon emerged as a separate target set. After the
beginning of Desert Storm, two more categories appeared: fixed
surface-to-air missile sites in the KTO and breaching sites for the
ground offensive."

(W. Murray, Air War
45. In the words of the

the

US

in the Persian

Cohen, Shelton Joint Statement on Kosovo given

to

Senate:

"At the outset of the
objectives for
its

Gulf (1995) 32)

its

air

campaign,

use of force in

NATO

Kosovo that

set specific strategic

later served as the basis for

stated conditions to Milosevic for stopping the bombing.

These

objectives were to:

— Demonstrate
of NATO's
— Deter Milosevic from continuing and
the seriousness

opposition to Belgrade's

aggression in the Balkans;

escalating his attacks

helpless civilians

cleansing;

and create conditions to reverse

his

ethnic

and

— Damage

Serbia's capacity to

wage war against Kosovo

in the

future or spread the war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading
ability to

on

wage

its

military operations...

Phases of the Campaign. Operation Allied Force was originally planned to be
prosecuted in five phases under

NATO's operational plan,

the development of

which began in the summer of 1998. Phase was the deployment of air assets
into the European theater. Phase 1 would establish air superiority over Kosovo
and degrade command and control over the whole of the FRY. Phase 2 would
attack military targets in Kosovo and those FRY forces south of 44 degrees
north latitude, which were providing reinforcement to Serbian forces into
Kosovo. This was to allow targeting of forces not only in Kosovo, but also in the
FRY south of Belgrade. Phase 3 would expand air operations against a wide
range of high-value military and security force targets throughout the FRY.
Phase 4 would redeploy forces as required. A limited air response relying predominantly on cruise missiles to strike selected targets throughout the Phase 1.
Within a few days of the start of NATO's campaign, alliance aircraft were
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striking

both strategic and

ing to suppress

At the

tactical targets

and disrupt the FRY's integrated

air

NATO Summit in Washington on April 23,

clude military-industrial

The

NATO

1999, alliance leaders de-

air

Internet Report Kosovo

kosovo/repo 2000, 21

defence system.

campaign by expanding the target set to ininfrastructure, media, and other strategic targets ...."

cided to further intensify the

46.

throughout Serbia, as well as work-

Mar

One Year On

00) described the targets

(http://www.nato.int/

as:

campaign set out to weaken Serb military capabilities, both
strategically and tactically. Strikes on tactical targets, such as artillery
and field headquarters, had a more immediate effect in disrupting the
ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. Strikes against strategic targets, such as
government ministries and refineries, had long term and broader impact

"The

air

on the Serb

military machine.

The bulk of NATO's effort against tactical targets was aimed
facilities,

fielded forces,

at military

heavy weapons, and military vehicles and

formations in Kosovo and southern Serbia...

command and control
(MUP) forces headquarters,

Strategic targets included Serb air defences,
facilities,

Yugoslav military (VJ) and police

and supply
47.

Most of the

objectives.

The

routes".

targets referred to in the quotations

above are clearly military

media and
statement and "government

precise scope of "military-industrial infrastructure,

other strategic targets" as referred to in the

US

and refineries" as referred to in the NATO statement is unclear.
Whether the media constitutes a legitimate target group is a debatable issue. If
the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a legitimate target.
If it is merely disseminating propaganda to generate support for the war effort,
ministries

it is

not a legitimate target.

d.

The

48.

The main problem with

Principle of Proportionality

the principle of proportionality

is

not whether or

means and how it is to be applied. It is relatively simple
to state that there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects. For example, bombing a
not

it

exists

but what

it
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refugee

camp

people in the

camp

field in

if its

only military significance

are knitting socks for soldiers. Conversely,

dump

an ammunition
plowing a

obviously prohibited

is

It is

circumstances because the comparison

and values.

air strike

on
is

the area. Unfortunately, most applications of the principle of

much

principle of proportionality in general terms than

ties

that

should not be prohibited merely because a farmer

proportionality are not quite so clear cut.

set of

an

is

is

it is

easier to formulate the

to apply

it

to a particular

often between unlike quanti-

One cannot easily assess the value

of innocent

human

lives as

opposed to capturing a particular military objective.

49.

The

questions which remain unresolved once one decides to apply the

principle of proportionality include the following:

a)

What

are the relative values to be assigned to the military advan-

tage gained

and the

injury to

non-combatants and or the damage to

civilian objects?

b)

What do you

c)

What

d)

To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his own

is

include or exclude in totaling your sums?

the standard of measurement in time or space? and

forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or

damage

to ci-

vilian objects?

may be necessary to resolve them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ depending on
the background and values of the decision maker. It is unlikely that a human
rights lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign the same
50.

The answers

to these questions are not simple.

relative values to military
it is

and

It

advantage and to injury to noncombatants. Further,

commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds
degrees of combat experience or national military histories

unlikely that military
differing

would always agree in close

cases. It

is

suggested that the determination of rel-

must be that of the "reasonable military commander". Although
there will be room for argument in close cases, there will be many cases where
reasonable military commanders will agree that the injury to noncombatants
or the damage to civilian objects was clearly disproportionate to the military
ative values

advantage gained.
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51.

Much of the material submitted to the OTP consisted of reports that civil-

had been killed, often inviting the conclusion to be drawn that crimes had
therefore been committed. Collateral casualties to civilians and collateral
damage to civilian objects can occur for a variety of reasons. Despite an obliians

gation to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated
areas, to

remove

civilians

tect their civilians

tion
rise

from the vicinity of military objectives, and to pro-

from the dangers of military operations, very

may be feasible in many cases. Today's
to many dual use facilities and resources.

little

preven-

technological society has given

City planners rarely pay heed to

the possibility of future warfare. Military objectives are often located in

densely populated areas and fighting occasionally occurs in such areas. Civilians present within or near military objectives must, however, be taken into

account in the proportionality equation even
failed to exercise its obligation to

if

a party to the conflict has

remove them.

52. In the Kupreskic

Judgment (Case No: IT-95-16-T 14 Jan 2000) the

Chamber addressed

the issue of proportionality as follows:

"526.

As an example of

utilised,

the

way

which the Martens clause may be

regard might be had to considerations such as the cumulative

effect of attacks
civilians. In

on

military objectives causing incidental

other words,

it

may happen

objectives causing incidental
raise

in

Trial

damage

that single attacks

damage to
on military

to civilians, although they

may

doubts as to their lawfulness, nevertheless do not appear on their

face to

fall

foul per se of the loose prescriptions of Articles

57 and 58

(or

of the corresponding customary rules). However, in case of repeated
attacks, all or

indisputable

most of them

legality

falling

within the grey area between

and unlawfulness,

it

might be warranted to

conclude that the cumulative effect of such acts entails that they
not be in keeping with international law. Indeed,

this pattern

conduct may turn out to jeopardise excessively the
civilians,

contrary to the

lives

may

of military

and

assets of

demands of humanity."

This formulation in Kupreskic can be regarded as a progressive statement of the
applicable law with regard to the obligation to protect civilians.

Its

practical im-

somewhat ambiguous and its application far from clear. It is
the committee's view that where individual (and legitimate) attacks on military objectives are concerned, the mere cumulation of such instances, all of
which are deemed to have been lawful, cannot ipso facto be said to amount to a
port,

however,

is
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crime.

The committee understands

an overall assessment of the
military campaign.

the above formulation, instead, to refer to

totality of civilian victims as against the goals of the

Casualty Figures

v.

53. In

its

report, Civilian Deaths in the

NATO Air Campaign, Human Rights

Watch documented some 500

civilian deaths in

eluded: "on

on these ninety incidents

as

many

the basis available

90 separate

incidents.

that as few as

as 527 Yugoslav civilians were killed as a result of

It

con-

488 and

NATO bombing.

Between 62 and 66 percent of the total registered civilian deaths occurred in
just twelve incidents. These twelve incidents accounted for 303 to 352 civilian deaths. These were the only incidents among the ninety documented in
which ten or more civilian deaths were confirmed." Ten of these twelve incidents were included among the incidents which were reviewed with considerable care by the committee (see para. 9 above) and our estimate was that
between 273 and 317 civilians were killed in these ten incidents. Human
Rights

Watch

also

found the

FRY

Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication

NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia to be largely credible on the basis of own filed
research and correlation with other sources. A review of this publication indiits

cates

820

it

provides an estimated total of approximately 495 civilians killed and

this report,

wounded

documented instances. For the purposes of
the committee operates on the basis of the number of persons al-

civilians

in specific

legedly killed as found in both publications.

It

appears that a figure similar to

both publications would be in the range of 500

vi.

civilians killed.

General Assesment of the Bombing Campaign

During the bombing campaign, NATO aircraft flew 38,400 sorties, including 10,484 strike sorties. During these sorties, 23,614 air munitions were
54.

released (figures from

NATO). As indicated in the preceding paragraph, it ap-

pears that approximately 500 civilians were killed during the campaign. These
figures

do not indicate that

NATO may have conducted a campaign aimed at

causing substantial civilian casualties either directly or incidentally.

55.

The

choice of targets by

NATO

38 and 39 above) includes
military-industrial infrastructure and

(see paras.

some loosely defined categories such as
government ministries and some potential problem categories such as media
and refineries. All targets must meet the criteria for military objectives (see
510
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do not do so, they are unlawful. A general label is
insufficient. The targeted components of the military-industrial infrastructure
and of government ministries must make an effective contribution to military
action and their total or partial destruction must offer a definite military adpara. 28-30 above). If they

vantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. Refineries are certainly traditional military objectives but tradition

paid to environmental

damage

if

is

not enough and due regard must be

they are attacked (see paras. 14-25 above).

The media as such is not a traditional target category. To the extent particular
media components are part of the C3 (command, control and communicamedia components are not part
of the C3 network then they may become military objectives depending upon
their use. As a bottom line, civilians, civilian objects and civilian morale as
such are not legitimate military objectives. The media does have an effect on
civilian morale. If that effect is merely to foster support for the war effort, the
media is not a legitimate military objective. If the media is used to incite
crimes, as in Rwanda, it can become a legitimate military objective. If the media is the nerve system that keeps a war-monger in power and thus perpetuates
the war effort, it may fall within the definition of a legitimate military objective. As a general statement, in the particular incidents reviewed by the committee, it is the view of the committee that NATO was attempting to attack
tions)

network they are military objectives.

objects

56.

it

If

perceived to be legitimate military objectives.

The committee

agrees there

is

nothing inherently unlawful about flying

above the height which can be reached by enemy

NATO

air

commanders have

air

defences. However,

a duty to take practicable measures to distin-

guish military objectives from civilians or civilian objectives.

The 15,000

feet

campaign may have meant the target could not be verified with the naked eye. However, it appears that with the
use of modern technology, the obligation to distinguish was effectively carried
out in the vast majority of cases during the bombing campaign.

minimum

B.

altitude adopted for part of the

Specific Incidents

57. In the course of

dent which, in
cific

its

its

opinion, required investigation

incidents discussed below are those which, in the opinion of the

committee, were the most problematic.

each

come across any inciby the OTP. The five spe-

review, the committee did not

The

facts cited in the discussion of

specific incident are those indicated in the information within the pos-

session of the

OTP

at the

time of

its

review.

511

Final Report to the Prosecutor

i.

The Attack on a

58.

On

Civilian Passenger Train at the Grdelica

12 April 1999, a

Gorge on 12/4/99

NATO aircraft launched two laser guided bombs at

the Leskovac railway bridge over the Grdelica gorge and Juzna
in eastern Serbia.

A

Morava

river,

5 -carriage passenger train, travelling from Belgrade to

Ristovac on the Macedonian border, was crossing the bridge at the time, and

The

made of this incident concur
that the incident occurred at about 1 1.40 a.m. At least ten people were killed
in this incident and at least 15 individuals were injured. The designated target
was struck by both

missiles.

various reports

was the railway bridge, which was claimed to be part of a re-supply route being
used for Serb forces in Kosovo. After launching the first bomb, the person
controlling the weapon, at the last instant before impact, sighted

on the
it

bridge.

The

hit the train, the

coaches in

controller was unable to

impact of the

half. Realising

bomb

the

bomb

at that stage

and

cutting the second of the passenger

the bridge was

second aim point on the bridge

dump

movement

still

intact, the controller picked a

end from where the train had
come and launched the second bomb. In the meantime the train had slid forward as a result of the original impact and parts of the train were also hit by the
second bomb.
59.

It

at the opposite

does not appear that the train was targeted deliberately.

US Deputy De-

John Hamre stated that "one of our electro-optically guided
bombs homed in on a railroad bridge just when a passenger train raced to the
aim point. We never wanted to destroy that train or kill its occupants. We did
want to destroy the bridge and we regret this accident." The substantive part
of the explanation, both for the failure to detect the approach of the passenger
train and for firing a second missile once it had been hit by the first, was given
by General Wesley Clark, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe
and is here reprinted in full:
fense Secretary

" [T] his

that

is

was a case where

a pilot

was assigned to

strike a railroad bridge

part of the integrated communications supply network in Serbia.

He launched

his missile

from

his aircraft that

on the

was many miles away, he

was a remotely directed
attack. And as he stared intently at the desired target point on the
bridge, and I talked to the team at Aviano who was directly engaged in
this operation, as the pilot stared intently at the desired aim point on
was not able to put

his eyes

the bridge and worked

sudden

it,

bridge,

and worked

at the very last instant

with

512
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it

and worked it, and all of a
than a second to go he caught

it
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movement

a flash of

coming

that

came

into the screen

and

it

was the

train

in.

Unfortunately he couldn't

dump the bomb at that point, it was locked, it

was going into the target and it was an unfortunate incident which he,
and the crew, and all of us very much regret. We certainly don't want to

do

collateral

damage.

The mission was

to take out the bridge.

He

realised

when

it

had

happened that he had not hit the bridge, but what he had hit was the
train. He had another aim point on the bridge, it was a relatively long
bridge and he believed he still had to accomplish his mission, the pilot
circled back around. He put his aim point on the other end of the bridge
from where the train had come, by the time the
bridge

it

bomb

was covered with smoke and clouds and

got close to the

at the last

minute

again in an uncanny accident, the train had slid forward from the
original

impact and parts of the train had moved across the bridge, and

so that by striking the other

additional

damage

end of the bridge he actually caused

to the train."

(Press Conference,

NATO

HQ,

Brussels, 13 April).

General Clark then showed the cockpit video of the plane which fired on the
bridge:

"The
about
is

a

pilot in the aircraft
this

much

running

is

looking at about a 5 -inch screen, he

is

seeing

much and in here you can see this is the railroad bridge which
better view than he actually had,

this

you can see the tracks

way.

Look very intently at the aim point, concentrate right there and you can
see how, if you were focused right on your job as a pilot, suddenly that
train appeared. It was really unfortunate.
Here, he came back around to try to strike a different point on the

Look at
smoke and other obscuration there - he

bridge because he was trying to do a job to take the bridge down.

aim point - you can see
couldn't tell what this was exactly.
this

Focus intently right at the centre of the
crosses together

cross.

and suddenly he recognises

the train that was struck here has

He

bringing these two

at the very last instant that

moved on across
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engine apparently was struck by the second bomb." (Press Conference,

NATO HQ, Brussels,
60.

Some doubt

13 April).

has since been cast on this version of events by a comprehen-

sive technical report

German

submitted by a

which queries the actual speed

at

national,

Mr Ekkehard Wenz,

which the events took place

that suggested by the video footage of the incident released by
fect of this report

NATO.
gle

Wenz

Mr.

in fact considerably greater than that alleged by

also suggests the aircraft involved

was an F15E Strike Ea-

with a crew of two and with the weapons being controlled by a Weapons

Systems Officer

61.

NATO. The ef-

to suggest that the reaction time available to the person

is

bombs was

controlling the

in relation to

(WSO)

not the

pilot.

The committee has reviewed both

the report of Mr.

Wenz

mittee that

it is

pilot or the

WSO.

and

aircraft

the material provided by

with considerable care.

It is

NATO and

the opinion of the com-

whether the person controlling the bomb was the
Either person would have been travelling in a high speed

irrelevant

performing

likely

endeavouring to keep the

several

aircraft in the air

in a combat environment.

If

tasks

and

simultaneously,

safe

including

from surrounding threats

the committee accepts Mr. Wenz's estimate of

the reaction time available, the person controlling the
short period of time, less than 7 or 8 seconds in

all

bombs

still

had a very

probability, to react. Al-

Mr Wenz is of the view that the WSO intentionally targeted the train,

though

the committee's review of the frames used in the report indicates another interpretation

is

equally available.

throughout, and

it is

clear

from

toward the bridge only as the

The

this footage that the

bomb

is

on the bridge
train can be seen moving

cross hairs remain fixed

in flight:

it is

only in the course of the

bomb's trajectory that the image of the train becomes visible. At a point where
the

bomb

is

within a few seconds of impact, a very slight change to the

aiming point can be observed, in that
regarding the

bomb

it

bomb

drops a couple of feet. This sequence

sights indicates that

it is

unlikely that the

geting the train, but instead suggests that the target was a point

WSO was taron the span of

the bridge before the train appeared.

62.

It is

the opinion of the committee that the bridge was a legitimate military

objective.

The passenger

trolling the

bombs,

train

pilot or

was not deliberately targeted. The person con-

WSO,

targeted the bridge and, over a very short

period of time, failed to recognize the arrival of the train while the

was in

flight.

The

train

first

bomb

was on the bridge when the bridge was targeted a
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second time and the bridge length has been estimated at 50 meters (Wenz
study para 6 g above at p. 25). It is the opinion of the committee that the infor-

mation in relation to the attack with the first bomb does not provide a sufficient basis to initiate an investigation. The committee has divided views
concerning the attack with the second

bomb

in relation to

whether there was

an element of recklessness in the conduct of the pilot or WSO. Despite this,
the committee is in agreement that, based on the criteria for initiating an investigation (see para. 5 above) this incident should not be investigated. In re,

whether there

lation to

is

information warranting consideration of command

committee is of the view that there is no information from
which to conclude that an investigation is necessary into the criminal responsibility of persons higher in the chain of command. Based on the information
available to it, it is the opinion of the committee that the attack on the train at
responsibility, the

Grdelica Gorge should not be investigated by the

ii.

The Attack on

63.

The

the Djakovica

OTP.

Convoy on 14/4/99

precise facts concerning this incident are difficult to determine. In

some confusion about the number of aircraft involved, the
number of bombs dropped, and whether one or two convoys were attacked.
particular, there

The FRY

is

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report (White Book) describes the inci-

dent as follows:

"On

April 14, 1999

[...]

on the Djakovica-Prizren

road, near the

Madanaj and Meja, a convoy of Albanian refugees was
targeted three times. Mostly women, children and old people were in
the convoy, returning to their homes in cars, on tractors and carts. The
first assault on the column of over 1000 people took place while they
were moving through Meja village. Twelve persons were killed on that
occasion. The people from the convoy scattered around and tried to
villages of

find shelter in the nearby houses.
missiles

on those houses

process.

The

But

NATO

as well, killing

warplanes launched

another 7 persons in the

attack continued along the road

beween

[the] villages

Meja and Bistrazin. One tractor with trailer was completely
destroyed. Twenty people out of several of them on the tractor were
killed. In the repeated attack on the refugee vehicles, one more person
[of]

was

killed."

(Vol

1, p. 1)
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Total casualty figures seem to converge around 70-75 killed with approxi-

mately 100 injured.
states 73

were

killed

The FRY

publication

NATO War Crimes

in Yugoslavia

and 36 were wounded.

NATO initially denied, but later acknowledged, responsibility for this attack. Assuming the facts most appropriate to a successful prosecution, NATO

64.

aircraft flying at

15000

feet or higher to avoid

Yugoslav

air

defences attacked

two vehicle convoys, both of which contained civilian vehicles. On 15 April,
NATO confirmed that the aircraft had been flying at an altitude of 15,000
feet (approximately 5 km) and that, in this attack, the pilots had viewed the
target with the naked eye rather than remotely. The aim of the attack was to
destroy Serb military forces, in the area of Djakovica, who had been seen by
NATO aircraft setting fire to civilian houses. At a Press Conference of 15
April 1999, NATO claimed that this was an area where the Yugoslav Special
Police Forces, the MUP, were conducting ethnic cleansing operations over
the preceding days. The road between Prizren and Djakovica served as an important resupply and reinforcement route for the Yugoslav Army and the Special Police.

65.

A reconstruction of what

is

known about

the attack reveals that in the

hours immediately prior to the attack, at around 1030,

NATO forces claimed

and that a series of fires could
be seen progressing to the south east. They formed the view that MUP and VJ
forces were thus methodically working from the north to the south through
villages, setting them ablaze and forcing all the Kosovar Albanians out of
those villages. At around 1030, the pilot spotted a three-vehicle convoy near
to the freshest burning house, and saw uniformly shaped dark green vehicles
which appeared to be troop carrying vehicles. He thus formed the view that
the convoy comprised VJ and MUP forces working their way down towards
Djakovica and that they were preparing to set the next house on fire. In response, an F-16 bombed the convoy's lead vehicle at approximately 1110; the
pilot relayed a threat update and the coordinates of the attack and departed
the area to refuel. A second F-16 aircraft appears to have arrived on the scene
around 1 135, and visually assessed the target area as containing large vehicles
which were located near a complex of buildings. A single GBU-12 bomb was
dropped at 1 148. Contemporaneously, a third aircraft identified a large convoy on a major road south east out of Djakovica and sought to identify the target. The target was verified as a VJ convoy at 1216 and an unspecified number
of bombs were dropped at 1219. In the next 15 or so minutes (exact time
to

have seen a progression of burning

villages,
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unspecified)

,

the same aircraft appears to have destroyed one further vehicle

two Jaguar aircraft each dropped 1 GBU-12
bomb each, but both missed their targets. Between 1235 and 1245, the first
F-16 aircraft appears to have dropped three further bombs, at least one of
in the convoy. Simultaneously,

which appears to have missed

its

target.

claimed by one source (report on

with the

OTP)

that the Yugoslav

66.

It is

TV

broadcast of the attack on the Djakovica convoy on 15 April 1999 re-

file

corded a conversation between one F-16 pilot involved in the attack and the

AWACs. This conversation is

alleged to establish both that the attack

on the

convoy was deliberate and that a UK Harrier pilot had advised the F-16 pilot
that the convoy was comprised solely of tractors and civilians. The F-16 pilot
was then allegedly told that the convoy was nevertheless a legitimate military
target and was instructed to fire on it. This same report also suggests that the
convoy was attacked with cluster bombs, indicated by bomb remnants and

However, these claims - both with regard to the foreknowledge of the pilot as to the civilian nature of the convoy and of the weapons used - are not confirmed by any other source.
craters left at the site.

67.

NATO itself claimed that although the cockpit video showed the vehicles

to look like tractors,

when viewed with

the naked eye from the attack altitude

They alleged that several characteristics
convoy including movement, size, shape, colour,

they appeared to be military vehicles.
indicated

it

to be a military

spacing and high speed prior to the attack. There had also been reports of Serb
forces using civilian vehicles.

An analysis of the Serb TV footage of the attack

on Djakovica by the OTP indicates that at approximately 1240, some point
during the attack, doubt was conveyed that Serb convoys do not usually travel
in convoys of that size. However, the on-scene analysis of the convoy appeared to convey the impression that the convoy comprised a mix of military
and civilian vehicles. At around 1300, an order appears to have been issued,
suspending attacks until the target could be verified.

68.

NATO has consistently claimed that

it

believed the Djakovica convoy to

be escorted by Serb military vehicles at the time of the attack.

Watch

has

commented on

Human

Rights

the incident as follows:

"General Clark stated in September that

NATO consistently observed

Yugoslav military vehicles moving on roads 'intermixed with civilian
convoys.' After the Djakovica-Decane incident, General Clark says, 'we
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got to be very, very cautious about striking objects

Another

NATO

officer, Col.

Ed

Boyle, says: 'Because

concerned with collateral damage, the

Component Commander]
the guidance that
vehicles, they

if

at the time,

CFAC

we were

so

[Combined Forces Air

General [Michael] Short, put out

military vehicles were intermingled with civilian

were not to be attacked, due to the collateral damage.'

When this directive was

actually issued remains

Nevertheless, the change in

attack,

this

an important question.

NATO rules of engagement indicates that

the alliance recognized that

mounting

moving on the roads.'

it

had taken

insufficient precautions in

in not identifying civilians present,

and in

assuming that the intended targets were legitimate military objectives
rather than in positively identifying them."

69.

the opinion of the committee that civilians were not deliberately at-

It is

tacked in this incident. While there
height above Yugoslav air defences,

is

nothing unlawful about operating at a

it is

difficult for

any aircrew operating an

hundred miles an hour and at a substantial height to
between military and civilian vehicles in a convoy. In this case,
most of the attacking aircraft were F16s with a crew of one person to fly the
aircraft and identify the target. As soon as the crews of the attacking aircraft
became aware of the presence of civilians, the attack ceased.
aircraft flying at several

distinguish

70.

While

this incident

is

one where

it

appears the aircrews could have bene-

fitted

from lower altitude scrutiny of the target

tee

of the opinion that neither the aircrew nor their

is

at

an

early stage, the

commit-

commanders

displayed

the degree of recklessness in failing to take precautionary measures which

would sustain criminal charges. The committee also notes that the attack was
suspended as soon as the presence of civilians in the convoy was suspected.
Based on the information assessed, the committee recommends that the OTP
not

commence an

Hi.

The Bombing of

investigation related to the Djakovica

the

RTS

(Serbian

TV

and Radio

Convoy bombing.

Station) in Belgrade

on

23/4/99

71.

On

23 April 1999, at 0220,

dio of the

RTS

(state -owned)

NATO intentionally bombed the central stubroadcasting corporation at

at

Aberdareva

which
the place where the Aberdareva Street building was connected to

Street in the centre of Belgrade.

caved in

The

1

missiles hit the entrance area,
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some doubt over exact casualty
estimated to have been killed.

the Takovska Street building. While there
figures,

72.

between 10 and 17 people

The bombing of the

are

__

is

TV studio was part of a planned attack aimed at dis-

rupting and degrading the

C3 (Command, Control and Communications)

network. In co-ordinated attacks, on the same night, radio relay buildings and
towers were hit along with electrical power transformer stations.

conference on 27 April 1999,

FRY communication

system

put, describing this as a

"very hardened and redundant

system [which
fibre

a press

NATO officials justified this attack in terms of

the dual military and civilian use to which the

was routinely

At

...]

optic cable,

command and

uses commercial telephone,
[...]

control communications
[...]

military cable,

high frequency radio communication,

[...]
[...]

microwave communication and everything can be interconnected.
There are literally dozens, more than 100 radio relay sites around the
country, and

[...]

everything

is

wired in through dual use. Most of the

commercial system serves the military and the military system can be
put to use for the commercial system

[...]."

NATO stressed the dual-use to which such communications sys-

Accordingly,

tems were put, describing civilian television as "heavily dependent on the
tary

command and control system and military traffic is also routed through the

civilian system" (press

73.

mili-

conference of 27 April,

At an earlier press conference on 23 April

that the

ibid).

1999,

NATO officials reported

TV building also housed a large multi-purpose communications satel-

and that "radio relay control buildings and towers were targeted in the ongoing campaign to degrade the FRY's command, control and
communications network". In a communication of 17 April 1999 to Amnesty
lite

antenna

dish,

International,

NATO claimed that the RTS facilities were being used "as ra-

dio relay stations and transmitters to support the activities of the

and

special police forces,

FRY military

and therefore they represent legitimate military

tar-

(Amnesty International Report, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force, June

gets"

2000,

74.

p.

42).

Of the

electrical

tion supplied

power transformer

power to the

air

one transformer stadefence co-ordination network while the other
stations targeted,
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supplied power to the northern-sector operations centre. Both these facilities

were key control elements in the
regard,

FRY

integrated air-defence system. In this

NATO indicated that

"we are not targeting the Serb people

do we

as

we

repeatedly have stated nor

target President Milosevic personally,

control system that

is

we

are attacking the

used to manipulate the military and security

forces."

More

bombing was also
which it was employed:

controversially, however, the

the propaganda purpose to

"[We need

to]

justified

on the

basis of

directly strike at the very central nerve system of

which are used to
plan and direct and to create the political environment of tolerance in
Yugoslavia in which these brutalities can not only be accepted but even
condoned. [....] Strikes against TV transmitters and broadcast facilities
are part of our campaign to dismantle the FRY propaganda machinery
which is a vital part of President Milosevic's control mechanism."
Milosovic's regime. This of course are those assets

In a similar statement, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was reported as saying

The Times that the media "is the apparatus that keeps him [Milosevic] in
power and we are entirely justified as NATO allies in damaging and taking on
in

those targets" (24 April, 1999). In a statement of 8 April 1999,

TV studios would be

dicated that the

NATO also in-

targeted unless they broadcast 6 hours

per day of Western media reports: "If President Milosevic would provide equal

time for Western news broadcasts in

programmes without censorship 3
hours a day between noon and 1800 and 3 hours a day between 1800 and midnight, then his TV could be an acceptable instrument of public information."
75.

its

NATO intentionally bombed the Radio and TV station and

killed or injured

were

civilians.

military objective and;

if it

The

questions are: was the station a legitimate

was, were the civilian casualties disproportionate

to the military advantage gained

by the attack? For the station to be a military

objective within the definition in Article 52 of Protocol

pose or use must

make an

total or partial destruction

before

the

I:

a) its nature, pur-

effective contribution to military action

must

offer a definite military

cumstances ruling at the time. The 1956
drafted

the persons

Additional

Protocols,
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ICRC

list

included

and

b) its

advantage in the

cir-

of military objectives,
the

installations

of

Appendix A
broadcasting and television stations of fundamental military importance as

39 above). The list prepared by Major General Rogers included broadcasting and television stations if they meet the military objective criteria (para. 38 above). As indicated in paras. 72 and 73 above, the
military objectives (para.

attack appears to have been justified by

tack aimed at disrupting the

NATO as part of a more general at-

FRY Command,

Control and Communications

network, the nerve centre and apparatus that keeps Miloseviae in power, and

an attempt to dismantle the FRY propaganda machinery. Insofar as the
attack actually was aimed at disrupting the communications network, it was
also as

legally acceptable.

76.

If,

however, the attack was made because equal time was not provided for

Western news broadcasts, that is, because the station was part of the propaganda machinery, the legal basis was more debatable. Disrupting government
propaganda may help to undermine the morale of the population and the
armed forces, but justifying an attack on a civilian facility on such grounds
alone may not meet the "effective contribution to military action" and "definite military advantage" criteria required
paras. 35-36, above).

by the Additional Protocols (see

The ICRC Commentary on

the Additional Protocols in-

terprets the expression "definite military

advantage anticipated" to exclude

"an attack which only

indeterminate advantages" and in-

offers potential or

and direct" as intended to show that the advantage concerned should be substantial and relatively close rather than
hardly perceptible and likely to appear only in the long term (ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977, para. 2209). While stopping
such propaganda may serve to demoralize the Yugoslav population and undermine the government's political support, it is unlikely that either of these purposes would offer the "concrete and direct" military advantage necessary to
terprets the expression "concrete

make them
broadcast

a legitimate military objective.

facilities

NATO

believed that Yugoslav

were "used entirely to incite hatred and propaganda" and

government had put

TV

and radio stations in Serbia under military control (NATO press conferences of 28 and 30
April 1999). However, it was not claimed that they were being used to incite
violence akin to Radio Milks Collines during the Rwandan genocide, which
alleged that the Yugoslav

might have

justified their destruction (see para.

all

private

47 above). At worst, the Yu-

goslav government was using the broadcasting networks to issue propaganda

supportive of

amount

to a

its

war

effort: a

war crime

Military Tribunal in

circumstance which does not, in and of

(see in this regard the

Nuremberg

in

itself,

judgment of the International

1946 in the case of Hans Fritzsche, who
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served as a senior official in the Propaganda ministry alleged to have incited

and encouraged the commission of crimes. The
Fritzsche clearly

made

IMT

held that although

strong statements of a propagandistic nature,

nevertheless not prepared to find that they were intended to incite

was
the comit

mission of atrocities, but rather, were aimed at arousing popular sentiment in

German war effort (American journal of International
328)). The committee finds that if the attack on the RTS

support of Hitler and the

Law,

was

vol.

41 (1947)

justified

by reference to

well be questioned by
law.

It

propaganda purpose alone,

its

some experts

appears, however, that

in the field of international

NATO's

paganda purposes was an incidental

its

targeting of the

legality

might

humanitarian

RTS building for pro-

complementary) aim of its primary
goal of disabling the Serbian military command and control system and to destroy the nerve system and apparatus that keeps Milosevic in power. In a press
conference of 9 April 1999,

(albeit

NATO declared

that

TV

transmitters were not

targeted directly but that "in Yugoslavia military radio relay stations are often

combined with TV transmitters [so] we attack the military target. If there is
damage to the TV transmitters, it is a secondary effect but it is not [our] primary intention to do that." A NATO spokesperson, Jamie Shea, also wrote to
the Brussels-based International Federation of Journalists

on 12

April claim-

ing that Operation Allied Force "target [ed] military targets only

sion and radio towers are only struck
facilities ...

no
Amnesty

There

such" (cited in

Assuming the

is

if

and

televi-

they [were] integrated into military

policy to strike television

and radio transmitters

International Report,

June 2000).

ibid,

as

was a legitimate objective, the civilian casualties
were unfortunately high but do not appear to be clearly disproportionate.
77.

Although

station

NATO alleged

that

it

made

"every possible effort to avoid civilian

damage" (Amnesty International Report, ibid, June
2000, p. 42), some doubts have been expressed as to the specificity of the warning given to civilians by NATO of its intended strike, and whether the notice
would have constituted "effective warning ... of attacks which may affect the
civililan population, unless circumstances do not permit" as required by Article
casualties

and

collateral

57(2) of Additional Protocol

Evidence on
officials in

this point

is

I.

somewhat

contradictory.

Brussels are alleged to have told

did not give a specific warning as

nesty International Report,

ibid,

it

On the

Amnesty

one hand,

International that they

would have endangered the

June 2000,
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at p. 47; see also para.

pilots

(Am-

49 above

re:

.

Appendix A

and the extent

proportionality

to

which

^===

=

a military

commander

obligated to

is

own forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage)
On this view, it is possible that casualties among civilians working at the RTS
may have been heightened because of NATO's apparent failure to provide
expose his

clear

advance warning of the attack, as required by Article 57(2).

On the other hand, foreign media representatives were apparently forewarned
of the attack (Amnesty International Report,

ibid).

As Western

journalists

were reportedly warned by their employers to stay away from the television staofficials

may

have expected that the building was about to be struck. Consequently,

UK

tion before the attack,

it

would

also appear that

Prime Minister Tony Blair blamed Yugoslav
building, claiming that "[t]hey could

They knew

some Yugoslav

officials for

not evacuating the

have moved those people out of the build-

and they didn't ... [I]t was probably for
very
clear propaganda reasons." (ibid, citing Moral combat - NATO at war, broadcast on BBC2 on 12 March 2000). Although knowledge on the part of Yugoslav officials of the impending attack would not divest NATO of its obligation
to forewarn civilians under Article 57(2), it may nevertheless imply that the
ing.

it

was a

Yugoslav authorities
sulting

target

may be

. . .

partially responsible for the civilian casualties re-

from the attack and may suggest that the advance notice given by

NATO may have in fact been sufficient under the circumstances.
78.

that

Assuming the

NATO

RTS

building to be a legitimate military target,

realised that attacking the

RTS

it

appeared

building would only interrupt

broadcasting for a brief period. Indeed, broadcasting allegedly

recommenced

within hours of the strike, thus raising the issue of the importance of the military

advantage gained by the attack

vis-a-vis

the civilian casualties incurred.

The FRY command and control network was alleged by NATO to comprise a
complex web and that could thus not be disabled in one strike. As noted by
General Wesley Clark, NATO "knew when we struck that there would be almeans of getting the Serb Television. There's no single switch to turn
off everything but we thought it was a good move to strike it and the political
leadership agreed with us" (ibid, citing "Moral combat, NATO at War,"
broadcast on BBC2 on 12 March 2000). At a press conference on 27 April
ternate

1999, another

NATO spokesperson similarly described the dual-use Yugoslav

command and

control network as "incapable of being dealt with in "a single

knock-out blow (ibid)" The proportionality or otherwise of an attack should
not necessarily focus exclusively on a specific incident. (See in
para. 52, above, referring to the

need

for
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an overall assessment of the

totality
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of civilian victims as against the goals of the military campaign).

With

regard

was the Yugoslav command
and control network. The attack on the RTS building must therefore be seen
as forming part of an integrated attack against numerous objects, including
to these goals, the strategic target of these attacks

transmission towers and control buildings of the Yugoslav radio relay network

and control the repressive
activities of his army and special police forces in Kosovo" (NATO press release, 1 May 1999) and which comprised "a key element in theYugoslav
air-defence network" (ibid, 1 May 1999). Attacks were also aimed at electricity grids that fed the command and control structures of the Yugoslav Army
(ibid, 3 May 1999). Other strategic targets included additional command and
control assets such as the radio and TV relay sites at Novi Pazar, Kosovaka
and Krusevac (ibid) and command posts (ibid, 30 April). Oi the electrical
power transformer stations targeted, one transformer station supplied power
to the air-defence coordination network while the other supplied power to the
northern sector operations centre. Both these facilities were key control elements in the FRY integrated air-defence system (ibid, 23 April 1999). The radio relay and TV transmitting station near Novi Sad was also an important
link in the air defence command and control communications network. Not
only were these targets central to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's governing apparatus, but formed, from a military point of view, an integral part of the
strategic communications network which enabled both the military and national command authorities to direct the repression and atrocities taking
place in Kosovo (ibid, 21 April 1999).
which were

"essential to Milosevic's ability to direct

79.

On the basis of the above

analysis

iv.

The Attack on

Embassy on 7/5/99

and on the information currently available to it, the committee recommends that the OTP not commence an investigation related to the bombing of the Serbian TV and Radio Station.

On

the Chinese

NATO

which hit the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing 3 Chinese citizens, injuring an estimated
15 others, and causing extensive damage to the embassy building and other
buildings in the immediate surrounds. At the moment of the attack, fifty people were reported to have been in the embassy buildings. By the admission of
US Government sources, the Chinese Embassy compound was mistakenly hit.
The bombing occurred because at no stage in the process was it realised that
the bombs were aimed at the Chinese Embassy. The Embassy had been
80.

7/5/99, at 2350,

aircraft fired several missiles
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wrongly identified as the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement (Yugoimport FDSP) at 2 Umetnosti Boulevard in New Belgrade.

The FDSP was deemed by
military procurement:

it

CIA

the

to be a legitimate target

was selected

due to

for its role in support of the

its

role in

Yugoslav

military effort.

81.

Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering offered the

tion for

following explana-

what occurred:

"The bombing

resulted from three basic failures. First, the technique

used to locate the intended target - the headquarters of the Yugoslav
Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement (FDSP)
flawed. Second,

none of the

verify target information

- was

severely

military or intelligence databases used to

contained the correct location of the Chinese

Embassy. Third, nowhere in the target review process was either of the
first

two mistakes detected.

No

targeted building was not the

one who might have known that the

FDSP

headquarters

- but was

in fact the

Chinese Embassy - was ever consulted."

US Government sources, the street address of the intended tarFDSP headquarters was known as Bulevar Umetnosti 2 in New Bel-

According to
get, the

grade. During a mid-April "work-up" of the target to prepare a mission folder
for the

B-2 bomber crew, three maps were used in an attempt to physically

cate this address within the neighborhood:

two

local

lo-

commercial maps from

US

government (National Imagery and Mapping
Agency or NIMA) map produced in 1997. None of these maps had any reference to the FDSP building and none accurately identified the current location
1989 and 1996, and one

of the Chinese Embassy.

82.

The

root of the failures in target location appears to stem from the land

navigation techniques employed by an intelligence officer in an effort to pinpoint the location of the

used techniques

known

FDSP

building at Bulevar Umetnosti

as "intersection"

2.

The

officer

and "resection" which, while appro-

priate to locate distant or inaccessible points or objects, are inappropriate for

use in aerial targeting as they provide only an approximate location. Using
this process, the individual

now know

to be the

mistakenly determined that the building which

Chinese Embassy was the

FDSP

we

headquarters. This

method of identification was not questioned or reviewed and hence this flaw
in the address location process went undetected by all the others who
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evaluated the

FDSP

headquarters as a military target.

It

also appears that

very late in the process, an intelligence officer serendipitously

came

to sus-

pect that the target had been wrongly identified and sought to raise the con-

cern that the building had been mislocated. However, throughout a series of

missed opportunities, the problem of identification was not brought to the
tention of the senior managers

who may have been

at-

able to intervene in time

to prevent the strike.

83. Finally, reviewing elements in, inter alia, the Joint Staff did not

ther the inaccurate location of the

of the Chinese Embassy.

The

FDSP headquarters or the

correct location

data base reviews were limited to validating the

target data sheet geographic coordinates

data base by the

uncover ei-

NIMA analyst.

Such

and the information put into the

a circular process did not serve to un-

cover the original error and highlighted the system's susceptibility to a single
point of data base failure.
tion of the building

The

and the

critical

linchpin for both the error in identifica-

failure of the

review mechanisms was thus the in-

adequacy of the supporting data bases and the mistaken assumption the
information they contained would necessarily be accurate.

84.

The

building hit was clearly a civilian object and not a legitimate military

objective.

NATO,

and subsequently various organs of the

including the CIA, issued a formal apology, accepted

US

Government,

full responsibility for

the

incident and asserted that the intended target, the Federal Directorate for

Supply and Procurement, would have been a legitimate military objective.

The

USA has formally apologized

to the

Chinese Government and agreed to

pay $28 million in compensation to the Chinese Government and $4.5 million

The CIA has also dismissed one intelsenior managers. The US Government

to the families of those killed or injured.

ligence officer
also claims to
sponsibility

85.

It is

and reprimanded

six

have taken corrective actions in order to assign individual

and

to prevent mistakes such as this

from occurring in the

re-

future.

the opinion of the committee that the aircrew involved in the attack

should not be assigned any responsibility for the fact they were given the

wrong

target

sibility for

and that

it is

inappropriate to attempt to assign criminal respon-

the incident to senior leaders because they were provided with

wrong information by officials of another agency. Based on the information
available to it, the committee is of the opinion that the OTP should not undertake an investigation concerning the bombing of the Chinese Embassy.
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v.

The Attack on Korisa

86.

On

14

May

1999,

Village

NATO

on

J

3/5/99

dropped 10 bombs on the

aircraft

village of

on the highway between Prizren and Pristina. Much confusion seems
exist about this incident, and factual accounts do not seem to easily tally

Korisa,
to

As many

with each other.

as

87

civilians,

mainly refugees, were killed in

this

wounded. The primary

tar-

attack and approximately 60 appear to have been

was asserted by NATO to be a Serbian military camp and
Command Post which were located near the village of Korisa. It appears that
the refugees were near the attacked object. However, unlike previous cases
where NATO subsequently claimed that an error had occurred in its targeting
get in this attack

or

its

military intelligence sources,

NATO spokespersons continued to affirm

the legitimacy of this particular attack.

They maintained

mate military target and that NATO intelligence had
camp and Command Post near to the village of Korisa.
87.

According to

was identified

that this was a

legiti-

identified a military

NATO officials, immediately prior to the attack, the target

having military revetments. The

was able to see silhouettes of vehicles on the ground as the attack took place at 2330, when two laser guided bombs were dropped. Ten minutes later, another two laser guided
bombs and six gravity bombs were dropped. In a press conference on 15 May,
NATO stated that the attack went ahead because the target was confirmed by
prior intelligence as being valid and the pilot identified vehicles present.
There were never any doubts, from NATO spokespersons, as to the validity of
as

pilot

this target.

released at the press

NATO's

on the bombardment of Korisa was
conference on the following day, 15 May. At this confer-

88. Information about

position

ence, General Jertz twice affirmed that the target was, in
gitimate since military facilities were present at the

"As already has been mentioned,

NATO

it

NATO's opinion,

site:

was a legitimate military

target.

reconnaissance and intelligence orders identified just outside

Korisa a military

camp and command

personnel carrier and 10 pieces of

confirmed

this

post, including

artillery.

an armoured

Follow-up intelligence

information as being a valid military target. Immediately

prior to the attack at 23.30-11.30

pm -

local time

Thursday night an

airborne forward air controller identified the target, so the identification

and attack system of his

aircraft,

having positively identified the target
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what looked like dug-in military reveted positions, he dropped two
laser guided bombs. Approximately 10 minutes later, the third aircraft
as

engaged the target with gravity bombs, with six gravity bombs.
10

bombs were dropped on the

A total of

target."

When questioned about the presence of civilians on the ground,

General Jertz

indicated:

"What

I

can say so

visually identify

it

far

when

is

the pilot attacked the target he had to

through the attack systems which are in the

aircraft,

and you know it was by night, so he did see silhouettes of vehicles on the
ground and as it was by prior intelligence a valid target, he did do the
attack

[...] it

was a legitimate

command

were

make

is

sure that

attack.

And

in the target area for attacking,
all

and they have been
it was a legitimate target.

at night

his responsibility to

he saw the silhouettes of vehicles and that

talking at night. If there

Of course, and we have

is

would not be able to see
again, don't misinterpret

it

from the perspective of a

it. It

fair,

why
we are
is

in a house,
pilot.

you

But once

was a military target which had been used

to identify this target in order to
it

to be very

anybody sleeping somewhere

since the beginning of conflict over there

when

it is

the cues he sees are the ones which he needs to really

he was allowed to attack.

valid target

there

posts, military pieces in that area

continuously used. So for the pilot flying the attack,

But when he

we knew

target. Since late April

make

and we have

all

sources used

sure that this target was

still

a

was attacked." (Emphasis added).

The NATO position thus appears to be that it bombed a legitimate military target,
that it knew nothing of the presence of civilians and that none were observed immediately prior to the attack. Indeed,

NATO stated that they believed this area to

have been completely cleared of civilians. There

is

some information

indicating

camp
forces may

that displaced Kosovar civilians were forcibly concentrated within a military
in the village of Korisa as

human

shields

and that Yugoslav

military

thus be at least partially responsible for the deaths there.

89.

The

available information concerning this incident

is

tack occurred in the middle of the night at about 2330.

in conflict.

The

the attack was a legitimate military objective. According to
cable precautions were taken and

it
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was determined

The

at-

stated object of

NATO, all practi-

civilians

were not

Appendix A

present.

appears that a relatively large

It

number of civilians were

killed. It also

appears these civilians were either returning refugees or persons gathered as

human

shields by

FRY

authorities or both.

the credible information available

is

The committee

is

of the view that

not sufficient to tend to show that a crime

within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been committed by the aircrew or

by superiors in the
able to

it,

NATO chain of command. Based on the information avail-

the committee

is

of the opinion that

investigation concerning the

V
90.

The committee

bombing

OTP should not undertake

an

at Korisa.

Recommendations

has conducted

its

review relying essentially upon public

documents, including statements made by

NATO

and

NATO

countries at

and public documents produced by the FRY. It has tended
to assume that the NATO and NATO countries' press statements are generally reliable and that explanations have been honestly given. The committee
must note, however, that when the OTP requested NATO to answer specific
questions about specific incidents, the NATO reply was couched in general
terms and failed to address the specific incidents. The committee has not spoken to those involved in directing or carrying out the bombing campaign. The
committee has also assigned substantial weight to the factual assertions made
by Human Rights Watch as its investigators did spend a limited amount of
time on the ground in the FRY. Further, the committee has noted that Human Rights Watch found the two volume compilation of the FRY Ministry of
Foreign Affairs entitled NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia generally reliable and the
committee has tended to rely on the casualty figures for specific incidents in
this compilation. If one accepts the figures in this compilation of approximately 495 civilians killed and 820 civilians wounded in documented inpress conferences

stances, there

is

simply

no evidence of the necessary crime base

for charges of

genocide or crimes against humanity. Further, in the particular incidents re-

viewed by the committee with particular care (see paras.

and 48-76) the
justifying the com9,

committee has not assessed any particular incidents as
mencement of an investigation by the OTP. NATO has admitted that mistakes did occur during the

bombing campaign;

have occurred. Selection of certain objectives
gal debate.
is

errors of

for attack

judgment may

may be

On the basis of the information reviewed, however,

also

subject to

le-

the committee

of the opinion that neither an in-depth investigation related to the bombing

campaign
fied.

In

whole nor investigations related to specific incidents are justicases, either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are

as a

all
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unlikely to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate

charges against high level accused or against lower accused for particularly

heinous offences.

On the basis of information available, the committee recommends that no
investigation be commenced by the OTP in relation to the NATO bombing
91.

campaign or incidents occurring during the campaign.
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Judge James E. Baker is a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces. Immediately prior to his appointment to the bench in
2000, he served for three years as Special Assistant to the President and Legal

Adviser to the National Security Council (NSC), where he advised the President, the National Security Advisor

and the

NSC staff on United States and

international law involving national security, including the use of force, the

law of armed conflict, intelligence

human

activities, foreign assistance, terrorism,

and international law enforcement. His earlier
public service included service as the Deputy Legal Adviser to the National
Security Council, Counsel to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board and Intelligence Oversight Board, and as an Attorney Adviser in the
Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State. Judge Baker also served as
an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps.
Professor Michael Bothe is Professor of Public Law at the Johann
Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany. Professor Bothe has
arms control,

rights,

served as a Visiting Professor at the University of Montreal, the University of

and the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, and was a Visiting Scholar at the
University of Michigan. He is currently serving as Chairman of the Advisory
Commission on Humanitarian Law of the German Red Cross; on the Scientific Advisory Board, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law, Heidelberg, Germany; and as the President of the German
Society of International Law. He was a member of the German delegation to
the Diplomatic Conference on International Humanitarian Law (1974-77).
Florida,

Professor Bothe

is

the author and/or editor of numerous books and articles

on

international humanitarian law as well as international law questions relating

maintenance of international peace and security.
Professor Ove Bring is Professor of International Law

to the

at

Stockholm UniChairman of the

and at
He is
Swedish Branch of the International Law Association and has served

versity

cial

the Swedish National Defense College.

Legal Adviser at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

He

as

Spe-

participated in the

Contributors

Thomson/Blackwell humanitarian mission to the former Yugoslavia, reporting
to the Committee of Senior Officials of the Conference on Security and Coop-

(CSCE) (1992-1993). In 1994 he headed a Swedish human
rights mission to China and Tibet, reporting to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In February 1995 he was appointed Swedish Conciliator under
the European Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE,
now The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Professor Bring was on the Central Board of Directors for the Swedish Red Cross
from 1996 to 1999, and is currently a member of the Governing Council of the
San Remo Institute of International Humanitarian Law and a Swedish Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.
eration in Europe

.

Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, US Navy (Ret.), commanded
Fighter Squadron 41 and Carrier Air Wing 8, both embarked in USS NIMITZ

(CVN

68).

He

later

during Operations
rier

commanded

USS MIDWAY

Commander,

the assault ship

USS

GUAM

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM,
(CV

(LPH

9) and,

the aircraft car-

he became
Group 6 and Commander, USS America Battle Group.
combat deployments to Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, he de41). Following promotion to

flag rank,

Carrier

In addition to

ployed in support of United Nations operations in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia.
served with the

US Air Force;

the staff of Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet;

the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Staff (as J6)

;

and

as Director,

He

on

four occasions; with the Joint

Navy Space, Information Warfare, and Command

and Control (N6). Vice Admiral Cebrowski became the forty-seventh President of the Naval War College in July 1998. Following retirement, in November 2001 Vice Admiral Cebrowski was appointed as Director of the Office of

Force Transformation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Captain William H. Dalton, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), is currently assigned to the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, as Associate
Deputy General Counsel (Intelligence). From 1965 to 1995 he served as a
judge advocate in the United States Navy. His assignments included service

Naval Legal Service Office, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii;
the Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General (International Law) within the
Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Navy; the Staff
Judge Advocate, United States Pacific Command in Hawaii; and as the Inspector General, Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C. Captain
Dalton also served on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College as the first
Deputy Director, Oceans Law and Policy Department.
as the Executive Officer,

Professor

Yoram

of International

Law

Dinstein
at the

is

US

currently the Charles H. Stockton Professor

Naval

War
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College, an appointment he also
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filled

Humbolt Fellow at the Max
Comparative and International Law in Heidel-

from 1999-2000. Previously, he served

Planck Institute of Foreign,

Germany (2000-01) and

berg,

B

Professor of

Dean

Human

of International Law, Yanowicz

Rights, President (1991-98), Rector (1980-85),

Law (1978-80)

of the Faculty of

Dinstein started his career in
Israel in

as Professor

as a

Israel's

at

and

Tel Aviv University. Professor

Foreign Service and served as Consul of

New York and a member of Israel's Permanent Mission to the United

Nations (1966-70).

He

is

a

member

of the Institute of International

the Council of the International Institute of Humanitarian

He was among
duced the San

Law

in

Law and

San Remo.

the group of international lawyers and naval experts that pro-

Remo Manual on

Law

International

Conflicts at Sea. Formerly, he served as

Applicable to

Chairman of the

Armed

Israel national

branch of Amnesty International and was also a member of the Executive
Council of the American Society of International Law. Professor Dinstein

is

the editor of the Israel Yearbook of Human Rights and has written extensively

on

subjects relating to international law,

human

rights,

and the law of armed

conflict.

Professor Rudolf Dolzer
national
versity

Law at

on

a Professor

is

and the Director,

the University of Bonn, Germany.

a Fulbright Scholarship

He

Institute for Inter-

attended Gonzaga Uni-

and has been a Visiting Professor

Law School and

University of Michigan School of Law, Cornell

at the

the Massa-

chusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Dolzer has been a Research Fellow, Max-Planck-Institute of Comparative Public

From 1992

to

Law and

International Law.

1996 he served as Director General in the Office of the German

Federal Chancellor.

He

is

currently a

member

of the Directorate,

German

Society for Foreign Policy; the Advisory Board, Drager-Foundation, Liibeck;
the International Board, Instituto de Empresa, Madrid; the Board of Direc-

Development Law Institute, Rome; and the German Parliament's Commission of Enquiry on Globalization.
tors,

International

Colonel David E. Graham,
erational

Law Division within

partment of the
Operations,
ville,

Army and

US Army,

During

the Chief, International and

Op-

the Office of The Judge Advocate General, Dethe Director, Center for

The Judge Advocate

Virginia.

is

Law and

Military

General's School of the Army, Charlottes-

his career in the

US Army,

which began

in 1971,

Colo-

Graham's other assignments have included Chief, Strategic Planning,
Office of The Judge Advocate General; Staff Judge Advocate, United States
nel

Southern Command; Legal Advisor, Multinational Force and Observers:
Peacekeeping Force, Sinai; and Attorney-Advisor, International Law, Office
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of the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, United States

Army Europe and

Seventh Army.
Professor Leslie C.

Green

is

a former Charles H. Stockton Professor of In-

Law at the Naval War College (1996-98). After serving
Army during World War II, he held university appointments

ternational

in the

British

at the

University of London; University of Singapore; University of Alberta, where

he

is

University Professor Emeritus;

Kyung Hee University,

Seoul, Korea; Uni-

and University of Denver. Professor Green's many government appointments include Member and Legal Advisor to the Canadian
delegation to the Geneva Conference on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (1975-77) and special consultant to the Judge Advocate General, National Defence Headquarters. In the latter capacity, he wrote the Canadian
Manual on Armed Conflict Law. Professor Green is the author of numerous
books, including The Contemporary Law Of Armed Conflict, and over 320
papers and articles.
versity of Colorado;

Greenwood is Professor of International Law at the

Professor Christopher

London School of Economics and Political Science. He is a Barrister, practicing from Essex Court Chambers in London, and has represented the United
Kingdom before the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons and
Lockerbie cases, as well as appearing regularly in the English courts,

where

his

and the Guantanamo Bay detainees case. Professor Greenwood was formerly a Fellow and Lecturer at Magdalene College,
Cambridge, has been a Visiting Professor at the Universities of Marburg, West
Virginia, and Mississippi, and Director of Studies and Lecturer at the Academy of International Law in The Hague. He is a regular lecturer at military
colleges, has published a number of articles on international law, and is the
cases have included Pinochet

author of a forthcoming book,

The Modern Law

Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg
tional

Law at

is

of Armed Conflict.
Professor of Public Interna-

the University of Frankfurt-Oder and former Professor of Law at

the University of Augsburg, Germany.

He was

the Rapporteur of the Interna-

Law Association Committee on Maritime Neutrality and is currently
the Vice-President of the German Society of Military Law and the Law of
War. Professor Heintschel von Heinegg was among a group of international
lawyers and naval experts who produced the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea. He is a widely published autional

thor of articles and books

Ms. Judith A. Miller

on the law of the

is

sea

and naval warfare.

a partner at the Williams

& Connolly law firm in

Washington, D.C., advising on a wide range of business and governmental issues. She returned to the firm in January 2000, after serving as the General
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Department of Defense. As the General Counsel from 1994 to
1999, she was responsible for advising the Secretary and Deputy Secretary and
their senior leadership team on the host of legal and policy issues that came
before the Department of Defense, including international affairs and intelligence matters, and operations law. Ms. Miller is the Co-Chair of the Federal
Practice Task Force of the American Bar Association, and a member of the
Defense Science Board, the Standing Committee on Law and National Security, and the American Law Institute. She was appointed to the Civil Justice
Reform Act Advisory Group for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and its follow-on implementation committee, and is on the
Executive Committee of the American Society of International Law.
Counsel

for the

Lieutenant Colonel

Tony

E.

Montgomery,

US

Air Force,

is

the Deputy

United States Special Operations Command, MacDill
Air Force Base, Florida. During his career, which began in 1983, his assignments have included service as the Area Defense Counsel for Florennes Air
Staff Judge Advocate,

Base, Belgium; Chief of Military Justice at Hill Air Force Base, Utah; Staff

Judge Advocate for Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas; Chief, Operations
and International Law for Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley
Air Force Base, Virginia; and from 1998 to 2001, he served as the Deputy

Judge Advocate and Chief, Operations Law, for the United States European
Command. During the summer of 1996, Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery
served as the Staff Judge Advocate to the

Commander,

Joint

Task Force

Southwest Asia.
Professor John Norton

Moore

is

the Walter L.

Brown

Professor of Law at

the University of Virginia School of Law, and Director of the University's

Center

for

National Security

Law and

the Center for

Oceans Law

& Policy.

Moore chaired the American Bar Association's Standing Commiton Law and National Security for four terms and has been a member of the

Professor
tee

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)'s Historical Review Board from 1998
to the present.

He

is

the author or editor of 20 books and over 140 scholarly

two decades on the editorial board of the American
Journal of International Law. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Law Institute, and the American Society of International
Law. Professor Moore's public service includes two terms as the Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace, as the Counselor on International Law to the Department of State, as Ambassador and
Deputy Special Representative of the President to the Law of the Sea Conferarticles

and served

ence, and

for

Chairman of the National Security Council Interagency Task Force

on the Law of the Sea. He has served

as a
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Consultant to both the President's

Contributors

Intelligence

Oversight Board and the

Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency.

and Chair of International Law at
King's College of London University where he is also the Director of the Master of Arts Program on International Peace
Security. From 1992-94 he was
Visiting Centennial Professor of the London School of Economics and Political Science. He served as the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Estonia during
1991-92 and from 1988-92 Professor Mullerson was a Member of the United
Nations Human Rights Committee. He is a member of the Institut de Droit
International. Professor Mullerson is the author of six books on international
law and politics and more than 150 articles and reviews. His latest books are
Human Rights Diplomacy (1997) and Ordering Anarchy: International Law
Professor Rein Mullerson

is

Professor

&

in International Society (2000).

Professor John F.

Murphy

is

Professor of

Law

at Villanova University. In

addition to teaching, his career has included a year in India
tion Fellowship, private practice in

on

a

Ford Founda-

New York and Washington, D.C., and ser-

vice in the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs,

US Department of State. He was previously on
sity

the law faculty at the Univer-

of Kansas, and has been a visiting professor at Cornell University and

Georgetown University. From 1980-1981 he was the Charles H. Stockton
Professor of International Law at the US Naval War College. Professor
Murphy is the author or editor of several books and monographs, and is also
the author of numerous articles, comments, and reviews on international law
and relations. Professor Murphy has served as consultant to the US Departments of State and Justice, the ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security, and the United Nations Crime Bureau, and has testified
before Congress on several occasions. He is currently the American Bar Association's Alternate Observer at the US Mission to the United Nations.

Mr.
tired),

States

W. Hays
is

Parks, Colonel, United States Marine Corps Reserve (Re-

Special Assistant to

Army

for

Law

of

War

The Judge Advocate General

Matters.

He

of the United

has also occupied the Naval

War

Law and is Adjunct ProSchool of Law and American

College's Charles H. Stockton Chair of International
fessor at

both George Washington University

University School of Law.

A legal adviser for the

1986

air strike against terrorist-

had primary responsibility for the investigation of Iraqi war crimes during its 1990-1991 occupation of Kuwait. He
has served as a United States representative for law of war negotiations in
New York, Geneva, The Hague, and Vienna. A frequent lecturer on the law
of military operations at the National, Army, Air Force and Naval War
related targets in Libya, Mr. Parks also
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and other service schools such as the Navy
Fighter Weapons School ("Top Gun"), Mr. Parks is widely published in military and legal journals. In 2001 he became the fifth person in the history of the
United States Special Operations Command to receive that command's top
Colleges, the service staff colleges,

civilian award, the U.S. Special

Operations

Command

Outstanding Civilian

Service Medal.

Judge Fausto Pocar

is

currently serving as a Judge at the Appeals

Chamber

of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and

Rwanda (ICTR) He

on leave from the University of Milan where he is
Professor of International Law and where he also served as the Dean of the
Faculty of Political Sciences and as the Vice-President. Judge Pocar has been

for

.

is

constantly involved in United Nations activities. Elected in 1984 as a
of the

Human Rights Committee of the United Nations,

and 1992.

He

also

served several times as a

member

Chairman

in 1991

High Commissioner for
1995 and in Russia in 1996). He

conducted various missions

Human Rights (among others in Chechnya in

its

member

for the

of the Italian delegation to the General As-

New

York and to the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva.
Judge Pocar was also a member of the United Nations Committee on the
sembly in

peaceful uses of outer space. Judge Pocar taught at
ternational

Law and

participated, during the past

The Hague Academy of Intwenty years, in The Hague

Conference on Private International Law. Author of numerous
tions,

Judge Pocar

droit international

Professor

is

a

member

legal publica-

of various associations, such as the Institut de

and the International Law Association.

Adam

Roberts

is

the

Montague Burton

Professor of Interna-

Oxford University and a Fellow of Balliol College. He has
been a lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics
and Political Science and was the Alastair Buchan Reader in International
Relations and Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford from 1981-86. He has a
three-year Leverhulme Major research Fellowship for 2000-03. He is the autional Relations at

The Theory
Documents on the Law

thor of numerous articles and books including Nations in Arms:

and Practice of Territorial Defence and he co-edited
of War.

Rear Admiral Horace B. Robertson, Jr., JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), served
31 years on active duty with the US Navy, first as a general line officer (surface
warfare) and later as a law specialist and judge advocate. Included among his
assignments were tours as

Commanding

Officer of an amphibious landing

Counsel to the Secretary of the Navy, Special Counsel to the
Chief of Naval Operations, and Judge Advocate General of the Navy. Followship, Special

ing retirement, Rear Admiral Robertson was appointed Professor of
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Duke

University School of Law, where he assumed Emeritus status in 1990.

He is the editor of The Law of Naval Operations, volume 64 of the Naval War
College's International Law Studies (the "Blue Book") series. He was among a
group of academics and naval experts that worked together to produce the

San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at
Sea. During 1991-92, he served as the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the US Naval War College.
Professor Natalino Ronzitti
University,

Rome,

Italy.

He

is

Professor of International

Law

at the Luiss

has been a Visiting Scholar, Wolfson College,

Cambridge; a Fulbright Scholar and Scholar in residence, University of Virginia

School of Law, and twice been a

NATO Fellow.

Professor Ronzitti has

been a member of numerous Italian delegations at international conferences,
including the 1975 Session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflict; International Conference for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988); CSCE Meetings on
the Human Dimension: (Paris, 1989; Copenhagen, 1990; Moscow, 1991);
Legal Adviser to the Permanent Representative of Italy to the Conference of

Disarmament (Geneva), 1991-95; the XLVIIth Session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly; Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference (New York, 1995); and the Review
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